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Abstract 
 
Since the 1970s, modern biotechnology and its innovative products have been central to the 
development of what is considered to fall within the scope of patent eligible subject matter.  
In major patent systems, an interpretation of the definition of patentable invention has evolved to 
allow matter qualifying as patent eligible to include techno-scientific products and processes that 
could not have been envisaged when patent systems were first established. 
However, modern biotechnology and its bio-artifacts have proved challenging, as they have 
increasingly raised social opposition and ethical concerns from non-governmental organisations and 
civil society.  
Biotech patent claims on genetically modified organisms, DNA sequences and genes, isolated human 
biological materials and human embryonic stem cells have questioned more radically than other 
technological claims the meaning of nature and artifact, subject and object, discovery and invention. 
In the United States, Canada and under the European Patent Convention (EPC), several landmark 
biotech patent cases involving these kinds of inventions have settled the patent eligibility of these 
products. In these cases, judges, parties, patent officers and amici curiae have drawn on a rich 
repertoire of metaphors that, by defining the “nature” and ontology of the claimed invention, 
sustained or rejected the allocation of intellectual property rights over it. 
This thesis addresses whether and how metaphors and the analogies they entail have been resorted to 
in judicial decisions and the administrative discourse of patent offices (practices and guidelines) to 
expand and limit the scope of patentable subject matter. Moreover, the thesis is engaged in explaining 
the discrepancies that marked the development of what is a patentable invention in these three 
jurisdictions.  
The main hypothesis of the thesis is that the use of the metaphors of the machine, molecule and code 
has proved pivotal in expanding the scope and stabilizing the meaning of patent eligible matter.  
These metaphors have been endorsed in technoscientific domains of research and they could be 
deemed what Ruse has called “root metaphors”, metaphors that were pivotal in orienting the study of 
the phenomena of life. All these metaphors, as this work illustrates, imply an atomistic and 
reductionist view of the living organisms, which has largely sustained their patent eligibility. 
Drawing on the insights offered by cognitive linguistics, the thesis explains that, by prompting 
analogies, metaphors define the “is” and the “ought” of a concept. Their analysis, therefore, enables 
an account of how descriptive and normative issues have been entangled in sustaining and settling the 
meaning of molecular biotech products, so that the metaphorical definition of the nature of the 
invention conveyed or not its patent eligibility. 
The thesis argues and shows, furthermore, that the judicial and administrative narratives in which 
these metaphors have been employed have been likewise influential and backed particular 
sociotechnical imaginaries of life and nature, which have been pivotal in defining what is natural and 
artificial and in framing individual and collective identities in molecular terms. 
This work relies, in particular, on Science and Technology Studies’ framework centered on concept of 
co-production, namely the insight that the natural and social orders are produced together. According 
to this framework, the is and ought of the world are continuously established, through the 
authoritative discourses of science and law, which define what is a claimed invention within a 
technological field and how it should be governed. 
The co-productionist framework is fundamental to pinpoint and understand the relevant nexus that 
narrative analysis should address and explain in the thesis (which has been articulated by Calvert and 
Joly): the relationship between making knowledge – the creation of ontologies – and the production of 
intellectual property. 
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Introduction 
 
Biotechnology and its innovative products have been increasingly at the core of the 
development of the concept of “patent-eligible matter” over the last forty years,1 as genetic 
engineering technologies have developed. 
In the 1970s, the improvements in recombinant DNA technology made the commercial 
products and applications of biotechnology less speculative and resulted in a series of patent 
applications involving genetically modified microorganisms and organisms.  
Several national and regional patent systems (such as the one established by the European 
Patent Convention)
2
 of developed countries had, first, to tackle the patentability of genetically 
modified microorganisms and organisms and decide whether these kinds of products fulfilled 
the threshold of patent eligibility and qualify as “patentable inventions”.  
They had later, since the 1990s, to focus on the patent eligibility of DNA sequences and 
human and primate cell lines (such as stem cells lines) and determine whether particular 
patentability rules should be set out to draw the boundaries between the molecular body as a 
natural object and as an artificial patent eligible one.  
Furthermore, these systems had to address whether the scope of protection for gene 
sequences should be absolute
3
 or limited to the possible function and uses set out in the patent 
application.
4
 
The decisions of patent examiners, offices and judges on this matter have impinged on the 
definition and ontology of these products as possible objects of intellectual property. 
Although patent litigation focusing on patent eligibility may seem to involve just techno-legal 
                                                          
1
 See on the point, Dan L Burk, ‘Patents and Related Rights. A Global Kaleidoscope’ in Rochelle C Dreyfuss 
and Justine Pila (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press 2018) 461, 
470. 
2
 The European Patent Convention or Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 is an 
international patent treaty, which entered into force on 7 October 1977 and established a system for granting 
national patents in any number of the Contracting States. Justine Pila, The Subject Matter of Intellectual 
Property (Oxford University Press 2017) viii, 45. 
3
 Absolute protection on a product entails that “the patent on a new product applies without restriction, 
independent on how the product is used”. Franz-Josef Zimmer and Svenja Sethmann, ‘Act Implementing the 
Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions in Germany (BioPatG)’ (2005) 24(5) 
Biotechnology Law Report 561. 
4
 For example, the German implementation of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions with the BioPatG introduced in 3 December 2004 
by the Federal government limited the patent protection for human gene sequences to the specific function of the 
sequence or its application. ibid. 
However, as Pila illustrated, under Directive 98/44/EC (Recital 23 and Article 9) “isolated genes and other 
products ‘containing or consisting of genetic information’ are protected as purpose-limited products, namely 
products of (and intended for) used for a specific purpose only”. Pila (n 2) 107. 
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issues which are confined to intellectual property, it has proved to be far more challenging 
and has entailed broader public policy implications for biotechnology.  
IPRs over these kinds of inventions, in fact, have turned out to be controversial in different 
political and legal contexts, as many biotechnological patents have been questioned and 
challenged because of the ethical and social concerns related to their use and 
commercialization voiced by NGOs and civil society.
5
  
In 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States settled, first, the issues of the patentability of 
genetically modified microorganisms in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
6
 by claiming that the 
liveliness of a product was not relevant to determine its patent eligibility and concluding that 
“anything under the sun that is made by man” was patentable, provided it fulfilled the other 
patent requirements of novelty, usefulness and non-obviousness. 
As Bracha pointed out, in the United States new patent subject matter has not engendered 
“legal fragmentation”:7 Innovative products have been subsumed under the existing flexible 
statutory classes of patentable subject matter and, therefore, specific rules for particular 
industries have not been set out. 
The product of nature doctrine, which originated in the 19
th
 century, instantiates this approach, 
centered on the application of a general definition of “patentable subject matter” and possibly 
adjusts it. The doctrine excludes the patent eligibility of laws of nature, physical phenomena 
and abstract ideas, and constitutes the main form of adaptation of the general rule of 
“patentable invention”.8  
Just a few years later, the Canadian courts and the boards of the European Patent Office had 
to confront with the patent eligibility of GMOs. Their ruling and arguments on the 
patentability of GMOs partially differed from the U.S. view that “anything under the sun that 
is made by man” is inherently patentable.9  
                                                          
5
 For example, the birth of “Dolly” in 1996, the first mammal cloned by nuclear transfer, raised a large public 
debate about the morality of patenting clones in several countries, in the 1990s. In the United States, the 
Congress enacted the Human Cloning Prohibition Act, in 1998, which banned human-somatic-cell-nuclear 
transfer technology (H.R. 2235, 90
th
 Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (III. 1997)). 
6
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty  447 U.S. 303 (1980) 206 USPQ 193. 
7
 Oren Bracha, ‘The Emergence and Development of United States Intellectual Property Law’ in Rochelle C 
Dreyfuss and Justine Pila (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press 
2018) 235, 254. 
8
 ibid. See also Christopher Beauchamp, ‘Patenting Nature: A Problem of History’ (2013) 16(2) Stanford 
Technology Law Review 257. 
9
 On the concept of “inherent patentability” or “patent eligibility” see Justine Pila, ‘Patent Eligibility and Scope 
Revisited in Light of Schütz v. Werit, European Law, and Copyright Jurisprudence’ in Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss and Jane C Ginsburg (eds) Intellectual Property at the Edge: The Contested Contours of IP 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 382. 
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In 2002, more than 17 years after the patent application was filed, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in Commissioner of Patents v. President and Fellows of Harvard College,
10
 judged 
genetically modified higher life forms not patent eligible, even though genetically modified 
microorganisms had been held patentable in Canada since 1982.
11
  
The European Patent Office (EPO) granted in 1992, following a decision of the Technical 
Board of Appeal (case T19/90 Onco-mouse/HARVARD)
12
 a patent regarding the same kind 
of invention litigated in Canada, “transgenic non-human mammals” genetically modified to 
be cancer-prone, but had to face several patent oppositions from NGOs which led it to restrict 
the patent to mice.  
How could these differences of rulings and rationale in judicial decisions be adequately 
explained across the patent systems of these developed countries, which had worked towards 
the substantial harmonisation of the concept of patent eligibility and the requirements for 
invention?
13
  
How could these differences across jurisdictions be accounted for, in particular after the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) established a common definition of patentable subject 
matter
14
 and a standard for patent protection in the WTO’s countries?15  
Why did the major patent offices in the world still apply different standards of patentable 
subject matter regarding biotechnology and living matter?
16
 
How, furthermore, can this hiatus be accounted for in jurisdictions with similar patent 
statutory rules, such as the United States and Canada, in which the definition of patentable 
                                                          
10
Supreme Court of Canada, Commissioner of Patents v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 5 
December 2002, (2002) 4 R.C.S. 425. 
11
 Re Application of Abitibi CO, 62 C.P.R. (2d) 81 (1982). 
12
 Decision of Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.2 dated 3 October 1990, T19/90 Onco-mouse/HARVARD, (1990) 
12 OJ EPO 476. 
13
 The United States and Member Countries of the EPC and European Union highly promoted and supported the 
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See Duncan Matthews, 
Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPs Agreement (Routledge 2002) xii, 30-40. 
14
 Article 27, WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (opened for signature 
15 December 1993 and entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 299, available at 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf>. 
15
 See in particular, with reference to patents, Articles 27-34, WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, available at <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf>. 
On the efforts made by patent offices of developed countries, in the 1990s, to harmonise patent systems, see 
Patent Leaders Endorse Efforts to Harmonize Protection Systems No.7, (1999) 13 World Intellectual Property 
Report (BNA) 245. 
16
 Michael North, ‘The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter: Creating a Competitive Advantage for 
Foreign Multinational Companies’ (2000) 18 Boston University International Law Journal 111, 112. 
15 
 
invention is alike and includes the same classes of patentable subject matter, namely 
“machine, manufacture, composition of matter and process”?17 
Although in Europe the full operation of the Unified Patent Court
18
 might be able to narrow 
down these discrepancies in the future, it is questionable whether some fundamental 
differences in framing the scope of patent eligible matter could be eliminated, not least 
because of the uncertainties of its actual implementation.
19
 
Major differences in interpreting and applying the concept of patentable subject matter persist 
in developed countries and their stability cannot be fully explained by resorting to the 
distinctive national and regional provisions, which characterize specific patent systems, and 
the flexibilities allowed by the TRIPs Agreement for its implementation. 
Scholars have long been engaged in understanding why contemporary biotechnology and its 
inventions raised such controversies. Consequently, biotechnology has become the test-bed of 
the concept of patent eligibility in recent years.  
However, they have struggled to explain why biotechnological inventions prompted 
substantial discrepancies in the interpretation of what a patentable invention is across 
jurisdictions and also within the EPC patent system, which seemed to have settled the issues 
of their patent eligibility.  
It has been illustrated that the development of biotechnology industry has hinged on the 
favorable patent system framework offered in some countries, such as the United States,
20
 
whose case-law and guidelines of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
which addressed some of the legal issues concerning the patentability of biotech products,
21
 
backed its expansion since the 1980s.
22
 
Nevertheless, in the last few years the U.S. Supreme Court has partially reversed course and 
re-framed the interpretation of patentable subject matter as far patents on isolated human 
                                                          
17
 In the U.S., Title 35 U.S.C. § 101. In Canada, Section 2, Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4.  
In 1869, Canada enacted the first federal patent statute, which was aligned with the U.S. Patent Act. Daniel 
Gervais, ‘The Emergence and Development of Intellectual Property Law in Canada’ in Rochelle C Dreyfuss and 
Justine Pila (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press 2018) 265, 286. 
18
 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court [2013] OJ C 175/1 (“UPC Agreement”). 
19
 Several uncertainties regard the decision of the United Kingdom, in June 2016, to leave the European Union 
and how the UK will be able to ratify the UPC Agreement. Moreover, some uncertainties are related to the 
impact of the decisions of the CJEU on the UPC jurisprudence.  
20
 In the U.S., the USPTO and the courts have rarely addressed issues of morality and public policy. Jasemine 
Chambers, ‘Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the United States, Europe and Japan: How Much 
Patent Policy Is Public Policy?’ (2002) 34 George Washington International Law Review 223, 226. 
21
 The Utility Examination Guidelines set out the criteria of isolation and purification to back the patent 
eligibility of DNA sequences. Department of Commerce, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Utility 
Examination Guidelines, Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1092-1099. 
22
 Chambers (n 20) 224. 
16 
 
native DNA sequences
23
 and therapeutic methods
24
 are concerned, by holding that they fall 
within the exclusions of the product of nature doctrine. 
In order to tackle these differences part of the scholarship has focused on the debates on 
biotechnology and genetic engineering in different political contexts and their relationship 
with IPRs, focusing on the attitudes of the public towards this technology and its regulatory 
policies.
25
 
A substantial amount of scholarship has been devoted to internal IP debates about the 
function and evolution of “inherent patentability” across jurisdictions, in order to make a 
critical assessment of its development in specific areas of biotechnology (for example, 
genetic diagnostic methods) and has suggested more balanced approaches to sustain IPRs 
over biotech inventions without hindering innovation.
26
  
Another part of the legal literature has been committed to examining the moral problems 
related to patenting biotech inventions, in particular the ones involving human embryonic 
stem cells (hESCs).
27
 
The modern concept of invention was outlined in the 18
th
 century, “when lawyers and 
administrators began systematically to make the distinction between ideas and embodiments, 
or between the invention and the material artefact in which it was expressed”.28 It has been 
noted that the process of construction of the modern invention as an intangible abstract thing 
entailed jurisprudential and administrative decisions and technoscientific practices to back the 
separation of the abstract idea and knowledge from its embodiments and the de-
materialization of the material artifact.
29
 However, this process turned out to be complex and 
cumbersome, especially in particular areas of technological innovation,
30
 such as 
biotechnology. 
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The problems that patent systems of developed countries faced in this area are related to the 
fact that establishing this distinction has proved to be more difficult, as contemporary 
biotechnology and its bio-artifacts challenge deeply socially shared ontological and practical 
views about what is natural and artificial, moral and immoral. 
As far as patent law and biotechnology are concerned, the main issues regard setting the 
epistemic and ontological boundaries between discovery and invention, nature and technical 
artifact and providing a rationale for them. The definition of these boundaries has, 
nevertheless, beckoned substantial public attention in developed countries. 
Landmark biotech patent decisions of the courts and boards have brought about the 
development of patent eligible matter. Although they have been largely commented and 
analysed, with the exception of few scholars,
31
 the literature has totally overlooked the 
metaphorical dimension embedded in these judgements, centered on defining what the 
claimed invention was.  
In particular, it has disregarded to what extent, in handling the delicate problem of defining 
“the nature of the claimed invention”, judges and parties have drawn upon metaphors which 
backed or undermined the subsumption of products, such as GMOs, DNA sequences and 
human embryonic cell lines, under the statutory classes of patentable inventions. 
Moreover, the relevance of metaphors as means of legal interpretation and integration of the 
law has been completely neglected by the general theory of legal interpretation. Metaphors 
are not contemplated as a matter of legal inquiry, because it is assumed that they should not 
be resorted to in legal reasoning, which aims at providing certainty in defining statutory 
categories. 
This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature concerning the development of patentable 
subject matter prompted by new biotechnological innovative products, by fully examining 
whether and to what extent metaphors have been at the core of the development of patent 
eligibility in three jurisdictions of highly developed countries: the United States, Canada and 
the EPC system.   
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Although the thesis comments also the landmark Australian biotech patent case D’Arcy v 
Myriad Genetics, which involved the BRCA1 gene,
32
 Australia it is not one of the 
jurisdictions of comparison. The main purpose of its analysis is rather to show that the same 
metaphors and judicial arguments employed in the U.S., in the case concerning the same 
patent, have been largely embraced by the Australian courts, because of their rationale. 
The main research hypothesis of the thesis is that the use of metaphors in the legal-
jurisprudential discourse, because of the analogies that they entail, has substantially 
contributed to shape the scope of patentable subject matter, by eliciting a shifting in the 
meaning of the statutory classes of patentable subject matter and the definition of invention in 
the three jurisdictions subject to analysis.  
Moreover, the hypothesis deems the conceptual metaphors of the molecule, machine and code 
pivotal in framing and re-framing the scope of patent eligibility, by fostering particular views 
of the nature of claimed biotech inventions which sustained the allocation of IPRs over them. 
Scholars
33
 have explained that, in understanding and litigating inventions, the concept of the 
machine has proved pivotal in the U.S. and in Canada. This concept is embedded in the 
definition of patentable invention and has been at the core of what has been called 
“mechanical jurisprudence”.34 As Pottage and Sherman illustrated, in the 19th century the 
machine has been used by U.S. patent lawyers to draw rules for the very concept of invention 
and its material embodiment.
35
  
This kind of approach rested on the fact that patent litigation in the first part of the 19
th
 
century focused on mechanical devices, but has turned out to be far more influential, as the 
discourse of the mechanical jurisprudence used in infringement patent cases has been applied 
to GMOs and genetically modified microorganisms that are viewed and dealt with, judicially 
and administratively, as bio-artifacts like machines.     
Ruse has illustrated that some metaphors, which he called “root metaphors”, have largely 
oriented the scientific discourse throughout the centuries and proved to be more important 
and basic than others epistemically and heuristically.
36
 In Western Modern Age the metaphor 
of the machine turned out to be the main metaphorical device in order to understand and 
explain the functioning of organisms and, in particular human beings, society and the world.
37
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All these metaphors, but primarily the metaphor of the molecule, have been embraced in 
scientific domains of research and entail a molecular view of life, as they all convey an 
atomistic and reductionist description of what claimed inventions – such as GMOs, genes, 
cell lines – are (see, on this point, chapter two). 
Furthermore, the thesis is engaged in probing whether these metaphors and narratives about 
the patent eligibility of biotech products prompted different sociotechnical imaginaries of life 
and nature which marked the U.S., Canada and the EPC
38
 system.  
In all these systems, as it will be illustrated in the chapters of the thesis, the development of 
biotechnology has been fostered by narratives of social progress, industrial modernization 
and competitiveness. Institutional support to biotechnology has been deemed fundamental in 
order to produce socially valuable products, benefit society and promote desirable futures. 
However, in particular as far as IP over gene sequences is concerned, the metaphors and 
narratives in patent litigation have led to a public re-discussion of the contract between the 
inventor and society and the already settled sociotechnical imaginaries of life and nature 
constructed around biotechnology. 
The thesis will address the following research questions related to the hypothesis: 
1. How and to what extent has the use of metaphors and the narratives in which they are 
embedded impinged on settling and unsettling the scope of patentable subject matter? 
2. Which are the main recurring metaphors in the patent judicial discourse? 
3. How, and to what extent, have these metaphors been validated by the scientific 
expertise, jurisprudential arguments and the practices of patent offices? 
4. What were the effects and implications of drawing on metaphors in the legal 
discourse in defining the “nature of the biotechnological invention”? 
5.  Have the metaphors of molecule, code and machine, been endorsed in specific areas 
of research, such as molecular biology and genetics, which are linked to the 
development of biotechnology? If yes, how in these domains of research have they 
been validated?  
6. Are there other factors which, together with metaphors and narratives, proved to be 
pivotal in settling the patent eligibility of biotechnological inventions? 
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7. How have these narratives and counter-narratives impinged on the construction of 
collective and individual identities and backed a different interpretation of the social 
contract between the inventor and society? 
8. Did metaphors and narratives contribute to the creation of techno-imaginaries of what 
is life and nature in these three political and legal contexts?  
In order to address these questions, the thesis draws on narrative analysis, which offers a set 
of valuable methodological resources to examine whether and how the metaphors of 
molecule, machine and code have been resorted to in the scientific and jurisprudential 
discourse, in the administrative guidelines of patent offices and also in patent drawings (see, 
on this point, chapter three). 
The recourse to narrative analysis as an appropriate means of inquiry to deal with these 
specific research questions has several benefits. 
Narrative analysis is a qualitative methodology which focuses on meaning and discourse to 
understand how individuals, collectivities and institutions make sense of human experience. 
Narrative is any kind of “spoken or written presentation”, whose organizational scheme is 
expressed in a story form.
39
 It is a powerful practice of knowledge-making particularly when 
it is employed by institutions, since it supports and justifies their decision-making process 
and its outcome. 
It entails several analytical advantages in order to understand the technoscientific and social 
decisions which involved biotechnology and its innovative products, as it is contextual and 
textually accurate. Its practices, therefore, enable the researcher to pinpoint and characterize 
through a precise textual analysis how, in the face of technologies and products which 
challenge well-established understanding of nature such as genetic engineering, new 
emerging orders have been settled and justified. Moreover, they help the scholar notice how 
and where the shifting of meanings of terms has been brought about. 
A narrative-based methodology offers several benefits in terms of pursuing and achieving 
what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz referred to as “thick description”, 40  namely a 
description which explores how human behavior becomes meaningful by focusing on the 
context and does not take coherence as a major test of validity.
41
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As it provides a more inclusive kind of explanation which is oriented towards making-sense, 
not towards fact-making, it forces the researcher not to focus on the consistency of the 
jurisprudential holdings or administrative decisions as a major element to be explained. 
Conversely, it looks at how parties and judges constructed their story to endorse prescriptive 
conclusions. It, therefore, draws the attention of the scholar towards some unnoticed details in 
the plot and discourse of the narrative that have been crucial in justifying judicial and 
administrative patent decisions.  
A significant part of the legal literature has pointed out the narrative character of 
jurisprudential decisions and viewed case-law as “chain of novels”.42 This thesis draws on 
this insightful perspective in order to tackle the hypothesis and research questions, by 
focusing of three main aspects of the narrative methodology: the themes, structures and 
frames that narratives embed.  
In the thesis, narrative methodology will be used to examine and discuss landmark biotech 
patent decisions, patent offices’ practices and guidelines involving biotechnological products 
and also patent claims and drawings. The cornerstone of the inquiry will be understanding 
whether and how a metaphorical definition of the nature of the claimed invention, because of 
the analogies it entails, has contributed to stretch the concept of patent eligibility in these 
different patent systems. 
Although the work will take into account the technoscientific and legal practices of patent 
offices which favoured particular metaphors and narratives, the analysis will be mainly 
textual. The narrative method, in fact, requires a dimension of textuality, namely a text as a 
medium in which the narrative is fixed, in order to allow a comprehensive and detailed 
examination the kind of plot and discourse that characterize it.  
The thesis will employ a methodological narrative approach focused on “frames” which, 
however, does not neglect the relevance of thematic and structural modes of analysis that deal 
with the content of the story (what is told) and how it is told. Frames, as the sociologist 
Goffman, illustrated, are human means to organize meaning, involvement and action in 
specific contexts, as they offer an understanding of what is going on in a specific situation.
43
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In particular, part of the scholarship showed that frames have proved pivotal in order to 
devise national and regional public policies on biotechnology, which has been addressed as 
“product”, “process” or “programme” in different political contexts.44  
This work will address how the use of well-established frames have been drawn upon in 
patent litigation and backed a shifting the discourse of IPRs over biotechnological inventions 
accordingly. 
Furthermore, the thesis will apply the insights of metaphorical analysis provided by cognitive 
linguistics theory, according to which metaphors ought not to be viewed as rhetorical devices, 
but as concepts. This perspective, formulated by Lakoff and Johnson in 1980, argues that, 
since the nature of human conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical,
45
 metaphors are 
conceptual. It rejects the assumption that metaphors are a matter of language alone. 
Conversely, it has explained that they structure human perception and thought, orienting 
human action accordingly. 
This theory (Conceptual Metaphor Theory or CMT), which has become the dominant 
framework to study metaphors,
46
 has epistemically questioned the cornerstones of other 
theories about the nature of metaphors. In particular, it has overturned the traditional theory 
of metaphor as comparison, as well as some of the entailments of rhetorical tradition: for 
example, the distinction between dead metaphor and metaphor tout court, concept and 
metaphor.  
Its implications for the legal theory of interpretation are relevant, as it undermines the idea 
that there is a rigid distinction between literal and figurative language and metaphors are 
fundamentally rhetorical devices to argue persuasively in legal prosecution.  
Moreover, it highlights the intrinsically cognitive and practical dimensions linked to the use 
of metaphors, which are fundamental concepts to make sense and order of the world, in 
particular of what is novel, abstract and unknown. 
By providing linguistic evidence that the human conceptual system is inherently metaphorical, 
this theory offers a fresh perspective on how IP statutory classes are actually constructed and 
the definition of patent eligible invention has been brought about in patent case-law.  
This thesis, on this issue, points out that there is a gap in the theory of legal interpretation in 
addressing and explaining how metaphors as conceptual means are applied in the legal 
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discourse, as well as in the technoscientific one, and this work substantially contributes to 
offer some answers.  
The use of this perspective points out that making sense of new technologies and dealing with 
the issues of patent eligibility of their products is a more open ended cognitive and practical 
process, in which experts and professionals ordinarily apply metaphors that entail analogies 
which structure their understanding of the nature of the thing. 
In order to understand the development of patent eligible matter prompted by biotechnology, 
the contribution of this work is significant, as it points out that judges, patent examiners, 
scientific experts, parties are used to make sense and order of new technoscientific products 
in this way and that metaphors cannot be eliminated from the scientific and IP legal discourse. 
Conversely, they are an integral part of them, because the human conceptual system is 
fundamentally metaphorical.  
By applying this innovative perspective, this work aims to show that far from claiming the 
irrelevance of drawing on different conceptual metaphors, the theory of legal interpretation 
should question more consistently the work of defining statutory classes and concepts, 
especially in hybrid legal systems, such as the patent one, where technoscientific and legal 
expertise are entwined in defining the nature of the claimed invention.  
In the thesis, narrative methodology and metaphorical analysis will be applied consistently 
with  Science and Technology Studies’ (STS) perspective, which provides several theoretical 
insights on how the methodology should be drawn upon, what is the relevant nexus to be 
accounted for and the kind of explanation that should be sought. 
STS has been epistemically engaged, as a field, in explaining the social and contingent 
dimension of the production of knowledge. Moreover, it has provided a view of causation and 
explanation which rejects deterministic
47
 ways of addressing the relationship between 
systems of production of formal knowledge (i.e. technoscience) and of production of norms 
(i.e. law).  
The STS approach largely shares with narrative analysis the critique to the realist 
epistemology and a constructivist point of view, according to which making sense of the 
world is contingent and contextually related.
48
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It refrains from endorsing linear, mono-causal narratives of technoscientific and social 
progress. Conversely, it offers a more comprehensive and complex framework of explanation, 
as it hinges on the concept co-production, namely the insight that the natural and social order 
are produced together and that the is and ought, the descriptive and prescriptive dimension 
are tied inextricably.  
In this work, the concept of co-production establishes the scope of narrative and metaphorical 
analysis, as it points out that science, as much as law, is the place where influential narratives 
and metaphors have been nurtured. As a result, the validation of metaphors and narratives in 
the technoscientific discourse should be accounted for, together with their use in judicial 
decisions. 
It highlights that the practices and guidelines of patent offices should be taken into 
consideration in analysing the construction of what is patent eligible, in order to achieve a 
more accurate and complex explanation of the shifting of meaning that patentable subject 
matter underwent.  
Moreover, it highlights that also technoscientific practices and theories elaborated in the 
laboratory have been influential in framing the issues of the patent eligibility of biotech 
products (for example the practices of isolation and purification). 
Part of the STS literature has illustrated that, although the discussion on genomic property 
tends to focus on the decisions of the patent and trademark office and the courts as the sites of 
property production, the laboratory is equally fundamental as a site for the creation of 
scientific property.
49
 It pointed out that making knowledge and making property rights do not 
constitute two separate moves, temporally and institutionally.
50
 Conversely, the creation of 
patents is deeply embedded in the laboratory’s practices and routines.51 
The co-productionist framework, in addition, pinpoints what is the relevant nexus that 
narrative analysis and metaphorical analysis should address and account for: the relationship 
between making knowledge – the creation of ontologies – and the production of intellectual 
property.
52
 
The significance of this work rests in showing that metaphors and the analogies they entail 
about the nature of biotechnological inventions have been largely validated by the practices 
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and visions of molecular biology and genetics and they were crucial in re-framing the concept 
of patentable invention. Moreover, it lies in explaining how the laboratory and the courts are 
the expert sites which, by promoting a molecular and atomistic view of life, created a specific 
kind of semantics of appropriation centered on conceptual metaphors. 
Although other theoretical approaches could be resorted to in order to address the research 
hypothesis and its questions, Science and Technology Studies’ approach has been preferred, 
as it provides several insights in order achieve a more inclusive and complex account of 
technoscientific phenomena. 
STS has offered a more accurate epistemic perspective about how knowledge making is 
brought about. In particular, STS has substantiated the social character of technoscientific 
knowledge-making, by showing that technoscience, as much as law, involves a process of 
social construction.  
STS scholars, moreover, have extensively examined the process of establishing frames in the 
policymaking of new technologies and showed how frames lie at the interface of the 
descriptive and prescriptive dimensions. Moreover, they illustrated how political and 
scientific institutions enjoy a substantial power in terms of establishing enduring frames and 
creating master narratives to assess and govern new technologies, such as rDNA 
biotechnology. 
Jasanoff and Gottweis, for example, analysed how the frames of “product”, “process” and 
“programme” have been pivotal, in different national contexts, to set up diverging policies of 
biotechnology.
53
  
However, more significantly, STS literature pinpointed that the specific frames endorsed in 
different national political contexts of developed countries and the institutions of the 
European Union reflect specific national and regional modes of understanding and governing 
techno-scientific innovation in terms of what constitutes the public good. 
The thesis, furthermore, argues that these metaphors have oriented how life and nature is 
characterized in different political contexts, promoting different technoscientific and legal 
imaginaries, according to specific narratives concerning what is the role of IP in these 
political and legal contexts and biotechnological innovation in terms of fulfilling social 
desires and promoting the public good. 
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This work does not overlook the relevance of other factors, beyond metaphors themselves, in 
settling the meaning of what is patent eligible. Conversely, it highlights that several other 
elements came into play in framing the scope of patent eligible matter. 
Whereas in the U.S. and Canada the definition of patentable subject matter is centered on the 
formulation statutory classes, in the EPC system it hinges on whether the invention fulfills 
the technical threshold and falls within the patent exclusions and exceptions set out in 
Articles 52(2) and 53 EPC.  
In the United States, moreover, the so-called IP clause, Article I § 8, clause 8 of the 
Constitution, as chapter three shows, has proved fundamental in devising a narrative of 
progress which has supported a broad interpretation of patentable subject matter.  
In Europe, it has been the reference to the “technical” character of the invention, set out in 
Article 52(1) EPC 2000, which has largely shaped the concept of patent eligibility. As Huys, 
Van Overwalle and Matthijs pointed out, the implementing regulations of the EPC clarify that 
“the invention must have technical features (Rule 43(1)), be related to a technical field (Rule 
42(1)(a)) and concerned with a technical problem (Rule 42(1)(c))”.54 Although the technical 
element of the invention has been considered ambiguous, it operates as a demarcation 
concept between discovery and invention. 
In addition, the establishment of the legal criteria of isolation and purification in these three 
patent systems, as in particular chapter four and six illustrate, have proved to be pivotal in 
settling the patent eligibility of DNA sequences and human biological materials. Both the 
“technical” character of the invention under the EPC and these two criteria serve within 
patent systems demarcation purposes, which are epistemic and ontological. However, part of 
the literature has noted that isolation and purification fall short, nevertheless, in fulfilling the 
requirement of patent eligibility.
55
 
The thesis also considers the construction and use of legal doctrines as a crucial factor in 
settling the scope of patent eligibility: for example, chapter three illustrates how and why the 
doctrine of the product of nature has been recalled, in the U.S., in judicial decisions which 
clearly have expanded the scope of patentable invention.  
Furthermore, the judicial omission of doctrines should be also noticed and accounted for. 
Beauchamp has, for example, pointed out that in the main landmark biotech decisions on the 
patent eligibility of gene sequences, no reference has been made to the long-standing doctrine 
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of useful difference that for decades has been applied by U.S. courts to foster the patent 
eligibility of chemical products.
56
 
Also the legal theory of legal fictions, which are strictly linked to metaphors and analogies, 
offers an insightful approach to understand how analogical reasoning is brought about in the 
legal discourse, as section 1.5 explains. 
Moreover, Pottage and Sherman highlighted that taxonomic practices have been crucial in 
providing the rules which govern the patentability of biological inventions.
57
 This thesis, 
however, does not focus on these practices in the three patent systems of comparison, since 
their analysis would require an autonomous monographic work. 
In the thesis, chapter one explains the methodology focused on narrative analysis and frames 
and illustrates STS theoretical framework. In particular, it clarifies the explanatory relevance 
of the concept of co-production. It, then, expounds how the role of metaphor (and analogy) 
has been increasingly acknowledged in science and law, as well as the theoretical perspective 
of metaphor offered by cognitive linguistics. Finally, it clarifies how the concept of 
sociotechnical imaginaries will be used in order to address the comparison. 
Chapter two explores how the molecular view of life has become established and how the 
metaphors of molecule and code have proved to be epistemically pivotal in tackling the 
problems of molecular biology and genetics and oriented them as disciplines. It clarifies how 
biotechnology largely relied on the legacy of these disciplines, as well as on their metaphors, 
and presents the main narratives on its origin and evolution (which has also been employed in 
patent judicial discourse).  
Chapters three to six are devoted to the patent landmark judicial decisions which involve 
different areas of biotech inventions.  
Whereas chapter three focuses on the case law concerning the patent eligibility of genetically 
modified microorganisms and organisms in the three jurisdictions of comparison, chapter 
four deals with all the controversies arising from Myriad Genetics’ patents on isolated DNA 
sequences of the BRCA1 and 2 genes. Although chapter four analyses also the High Court of 
Australia decision on one of Myriad Genetics’ patent on the BRCA1 gene, Australian patent 
system is not part of the comparison. The reference and comment on this decision has been 
included to show how the same metaphors and arguments used in other jurisdictions, namely 
the U.S., has been largely resorted to as the rationale to decide on the same socially 
controversial patent claims. 
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Chapter five deals, mainly, with the construction of the patent eligibility of transgenic seeds 
and plants. It analyses the different metaphors and narratives which have sustained the 
definitions of their nature and other technical factors that, under the EPC, contributed to 
establish their patentability. 
Chapter six examines the issues related to the settlement of the legal and ontological status of 
human biological materials (HBMs) in U.S., Canada and Europe, and how it has impinged on 
the allocation of IPRs over them. It also engages in explaining why the question of the 
morality of patenting human embryonic stem cells has become the focus of the European 
debate, as far as HBMs are concerned. 
Finally, several conclusions are drawn on the co-production of the technoscientific and legal 
order that metaphors and narratives have entailed in terms of re-framing the scope of patent 
eligible matter in the three jurisdictions, which has been analysed. These conclusions point 
out how much opening the “black boxes” of metaphors and narratives used to sustain 
technoscientific, judicial and administrative definitions of the products of genetic engineering 
is crucial in order to construct, at present, a more reflexive debate on the problems raised by 
gene editing technologies and, in particular, CRISPR-cas9. 
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Chapter One 
Theoretical Framework and Methodological Approach 
 
1.1 S&TS Mode of Explanation 
S&TS’ theoretical approach differs from other modes of studying and explaining the 
relationship between society and “technoscience”, which is referred to by Latour and other 
S&TS scholars as the unitary dimension of making and applying science.
58
 The distinctive 
features of S&TS’ view and style of explanation are related to the concerns and focus of the 
field on the contextual and material dynamics of scientific and technological practices, which 
S&TS have shown are a “fertile ground for social, political and ethical analysis”,59 as well as 
being a workbench for legal inquiry. 
Science and Technology Studies’ multidisciplinary origins offer a vast set of methodological 
resources to address the issues of technological innovation as social process. Throughout the 
years of S&TS’ development, these resources underwent cross-fertilization and hybridization 
among the disciplines and provided the field with fresh tools to tackle the complex issues 
involved in knowledge making. Place, time, actors, materiality, practices and 
conceptualization, as well as the construction of individual and collective identities and 
institutional discourses, matter in S&TS analysis.
60
 
Science and Technology Studies’ framework enables it to gain a better understanding of the 
processes and practices through which science and law make sense and order of technological 
objects, such as biotechnological inventions, as it accounts for a non-deterministic 
explanation of choices which specific societies and institutions make about innovation, risks 
and allocation of rights. 
This chapter will, first, illustrate some of the main features of S&TS approach, which is 
considered a kind of “constructivism”, explaining the issues and implications related to this 
definition. 
The second part of the chapter will, then, examine the framework of “co-production”, as an 
analytical resource that challenges reductionist and deterministic explanatory accounts of the 
role and status of technoscience in society. 
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In the third part of this chapter, it will be explained how “narrative” analysis and, in particular, 
the concept of “frame”, as a qualitative methodological tool, has been applied by S&TS’ 
scholars to make sense of how, in complex settings, normative choices are made and justified. 
The final part of the chapter will be devoted to illustrating how a comparative overview of 
different legal and social contexts, where intellectual property rights on biotech inventions 
have been granted and litigated, can provide further insights in explaining why some choices 
gain stability or not. In particular, it will be explained how introducing and using the idea of 
“sociotechnical imaginaries” can fill a theoretical gap in order to account for choices made in 
specific national or regional contexts. 
 
1.1.1 S&TS’ Constructivism  
Science and Technology Studies’ theoretical approach is deemed “constructivist”. Under the 
term “constructivism” heterogeneous programs and theories in the social studies of science, 
philosophy and other disciplines, such as psychology, neurobiology, psychiatry and 
information science, have been subsumed.
61
 “Constructivism” has been referred to a 
particular epistemic point of view on the human relationship to the world and reality, 
according to which the world is not discovered, but is, at least to a certain extent, “made” by 
the people who probe and inhabit it.
62
 “Constructivism” challenges the fundamental 
assumption of realism that “there is a way that the world is, and is possible to discover and 
represent it”63 and, in particular, of scientific realism, according to which “entities, states and 
processes described by correct theories really do exist”.64  
As far as scientific realism is concerned, Hacking distinguishes two kinds of realism: realism 
about entities, which asserts that “a good many theoretical entities really do exist”65 and 
realism about theories, which claims that “scientific theories are either true or false 
independent of what we know”,66 as “science at least aims at the truth, and the truth is how 
the world is”.67 However, he notes68 that three elements can be identified in scientific realism, 
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as Newton-Smith pinpointed:
69
 1. An ontological element, according to which “scientific 
theories are either true or false, and that which a given theory is, is in virtue of how the world 
is”;70 2. A causal element, according to which “if a theory is true, the theoretical terms of the 
theory denote theoretical entities which are casually responsible for the observable 
phenomena”;71 3. An epistemological element, according to which “we can have warranted 
belief in theories or in entities (at least in principle)”.72 
The word “constructivism” conveys the metaphor of “construction” in its root, “construct”, 
and therefore the activity which is involved in knowledge-making. Theories and fields 
labeled as “constructivist” may endorse more or less radical versions of it. Scholars, however, 
disagree on what radical and moderate kinds of constructivism claim. Hess, for example, 
points out that “in its extreme version, constructivism amounts to more than an 
instrumentalist account of theories”.73 In particular, he refers to social idealism, “in which 
there is no material reality that constrains or structures sensory observations”74 and theory 
choice. He notices that an alternative version to radical constructivism consists in “the 
position that scientific theories are realistic maps or explanations of the real world and at the 
same time vehicles that encode culture-bound linguistic categories and cultural values and/or 
are shaped by social interests and other social variables”.75 
Glasersfeld, nevertheless, highlights that “radical constructivism in no way denies an external 
reality”.76 In his view, radical constructivism entails a modified concept of cognition and 
knowledge, which endorses Vico’s perspective that human knowledge is a human construct 
and rejects the claim that cognition is true if it reflects objective reality.
77
 Constructivism 
relies, therefore, on viable knowledge, which is knowledge that fits into the experiential 
world of the one who knows.
78
 Flick illustrated that the different kinds of constructivism 
share questioning “whether external reality is directly accessible – that is to say, independent 
of perceptions and concepts that we use and construct”.79 
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In S&TS the expression “social construction” became widely used in the 1970s and was 
introduced after the publication of “The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge” by the sociologists Berger and Luckmann, in 1966. In the essay, 
they argue that “reality is socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must 
analyse the process in which this occurs”. 80  As “all human ‘knowledge’ is developed, 
transmitted and maintained in social situations”, 81  they maintain that “the sociology of 
knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is done in such a way that a 
taken-for-granted ‘reality’ congeals for the man in the street”.82 It has been noted83 that, 
according to their theory, knowing social reality consists of “apprehending the objectivated 
social reality” 84  and “ongoingly producing this reality”. 85  Sismondo explained that the 
fundamental point that the two sociologists are making concerns the mataphysics of the social 
world: “To construct X we need only that: (a) knowledge of X encourages behaviors that 
reduce other people’s ability to act as though X does not exists; (b) there is reasonably 
common knowledge of X; and (c) there is transmission of knowledge of X”.86 
Berger and Luckmann recognized how much the legacy of the sociologist Alfred Schütz 
influenced their work.
87
 Schütz showed that the knowledge of the world, in common-sense 
and in scientific thinking, implies constructs: a set of abstractions, generalizations, 
formalizations and idealizations, which are specific to the level of thought organization.
88
 
Moreover, he clarified that there are no pure and simple facts, as such. Facts are selected 
“from a universal context of the activities of our mind”.89 Facts, therefore, are always already 
interpreted, from the outset. 
Although their work contributed to the widespread use of the expression “social construction” 
in S&TS, some scholars questioned the outcome of their theoretical efforts. Bruno Latour and 
Steve Wolgar in “Laboratory Life. The Construction of Scientific Facts”90 pointed out that 
“the tension between the existence of knowledge as pre-given and its creation by actors has 
long been a theme which has preoccupied philosophers (Bachelard, 1953) and sociologists of 
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knowledge”.91 They, however, concluded that, although some sociologists – and they refer to 
Berger and Luckmann – have attempted a synthesis of the two views, the results are 
“somewhat unsatisfactory”.92 Latour and Wolgar made clear that, despite these attempts, 
“facts refuse to become sociologized”.93 
It has been noted, however, that the objects that S&TS hold are “socially constructed” means 
that “they are real objects, though contingently real”.94 In comparison to other constructivist 
perspectives, S&TS have added a further dimension to the metaphor of “social 
construction”,95 considering and examining the processes in which it occurs. Moreover, by 
applying and extending the principle of explanatory symmetry, S&TS have offered a more 
reflexive and complex account of how objects gain social stability or fail to do so. 
In two decades, the metaphor of “social construction” has become ubiquitous in academic 
writings. The philosopher of science Hacking, who published, in 1999, a book in which he 
discussed the meaning and implications of the metaphor, counted more than twenty titles 
claiming that “things” are socially constructed. He judged the metaphor redundant and tired 
and stigmatized the arguments that are common to social constructivists, summing them up in 
the following way:  
“Social constructionists about x tend to hold that:  
(1) X have not have existed, or need not to be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is 
not determined by the nature of things, it is not inevitable. Very often they go further, 
and urge that: 
(2) X is quite bad as it is. 
(3)  We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically 
transformed”.96 
 Although the work of scholars labeled as “social constructivists” shows the contingent and 
not inevitable character of the nature of things and mostly consists in de-constructing well-
established narratives and discourses, it is actually this kind of theoretical effort that 
contributed to provide a more reflexive and non-reductionist explanatory outlook. 
It has been noted
97
  that the growing debate about the meaning and implications of 
constructivism is related to the different forms of relativism that constructivism could entail 
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and, in particular, epistemic relativism, that is the stance that knowledge is rooted in a 
particular time and culture.  
Some scholars suggest that there is no necessary connection between constructivism and 
relativism, however, constructivist perspectives imply to a certain extent a relativist account 
of the world, as they show the contingency of facts and things. This contingency is a problem 
which, however, turns out to be more difficult to be handled by non-relativistic scholars. The 
S&TS scholars Barnes and Bloor, debating in the 1980s on relativism, rationalism and the 
sociology of knowledge, pointed out that relativism is considered pernicious as a threat to 
rationality and scientific standards.
98
 However, they argued that they are more comfortable 
with relativism, since “there is more evidence to be cited for relativism than against it”.99 
According to them, more than representing “a threat to the scientific understanding of forms 
of knowledge, relativism is required by it”.100 
Nevertheless, some questions about the epistemic relativism, which is embedded in S&TS 
constructivist approach, could be raised especially in relationship to the engagement of the 
field in the politics of science. The concerns about “the uneasy fit between epistemological 
relativism and normative belief or action”101 have been addressed by Jasanoff, who argued 
that these issues depend on a misunderstanding of the implications of science and technology 
studies for social and political analysis. She noticed, by showing some concrete examples of 
the political use of S&TS’ work, that the field “provides a different and more comprehensive, 
accounting of order in society, by integrating a critical understanding of our systems of 
formal knowledge with an equally deep appreciation of the institutions, practices, cultural 
beliefs and material resources that sustain particular ways of knowing”.102 One of the modes 
in which S&TS could contribute to improving normative action is through its style of 
explanation, which, she points out, is “qualitative rather than quantitative, thickly descriptive 
rather than reductionist or model-dependent, deconstructive rather than paradigmatic, and 
self-consciously, often ironically, narrative”.103 This style largely endorses a specific view of 
causation and explanation, which will be further addressed in this thesis and accounts for the 
choice to apply S&TS’ theoretical approach. 
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1.2 The Co-Productionist Framework 
The term “co-production” has been introduced for the first time within S&TS by Latour in 
We Have Never Been Modern.
104
 In this work, Latour addressed the main problem S&TS 
scholars’ face in their analytical effort, namely to retie what he considers “the Gordian knot”: 
the dichotomy nature/culture, “the divide that separates exact knowledge and the exercise of 
power”105 which marks Western modernity.106 The Actor-Network Theory devised and relied 
on the notion of translation or network in order to compose this dichotomy,
107
 but the 
nature/culture separation is still a resilient analytical key that encumbers the social sciences 
and results in overshadowing alternative frames to explain the world. In his “final 
examinations”, Latour remarked:  
“Since the invention of longer networks and the increase in size of some collectives 
depends on the silence they maintain about quasi-objects, how can I promise to keep 
the changes of scale and give up the invisibility that allows them to spread? Worse 
still, how could I reject from the premoderns the lasting nondifferentiation of natures 
and societies, and reject from the moderns the absolute dichotomy between natures 
and societies? How can size, exploration, proliferation be maintained while the 
hybrids are made explicit? Yet this is precisely the amalgam I am looking for: to 
retain the production of nature and of society that allow changes in size through the 
creation of an external truth and subject of law, but without neglecting the co-
production of sciences and societies”.108 
Latour envisaged the concept of “co-production” as a theoretical tool which could foster the 
process of explanatory symmetrization of hybrid networks, such as modern biotechnologies 
and their products, avoiding the dualism of ascribing explanations to one or the other side of 
the divide. According to Latour, the social sciences are part of the problem, not of the 
solution,
109
 since the sociological categorizations and frameworks are not useful in examining 
the elaboration of technology.
110
 In his analysis, the theoretical problems related to the 
persistency of the nature/culture divide are linked to political philosophy, as he calls for the 
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need to rethink the essence of modernity in terms of a “Parliament of things”, where the 
natural, social and discursive dimensions of networks are recognized. 
The concept of “co-production” has been, however, the focus of S&TS research in several 
domains for decades, even before the term “co-production” has become widely used and 
established in the S&TS community. Since the 1990s, S&TS scholars referred to the process 
of producing natural and social order together as a theoretical perspective with promising 
explanatory power. Some of them, such as Taylor,
111
 preferred the term “co-construction”,112 
whereas most of the S&TS community endorsed the form “co-production”. 
In 2004, most of the work carried out in the field has been expounded in the volume “States 
of Knowledge. The Co-Production of Science and Social Order”, edited by Sheila Jasanoff, 
which collects a series of essays aiming at capturing how the idiom of co-production filled a 
theoretical gap in the vocabularies and analytical frames of the social sciences. “Co-
production” has been elaborated within S&TS research in order to provide more thorough 
and accurate accounts and interpretations of complex phenomena at the crossroads of science, 
technology, culture and power.
113
  
 “Co-production” is an interpretive framework based on the insight that “thinking of natural 
and social orders as being produced together”114 constitutes a theoretical resource that enables 
to address some of the limits that the social sciences have confronted with in explaining how 
the production of science and technology is intertwined with the legal and social normative 
dimensions. As Jasanoff illustrated, “co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the 
ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable 
from the ways in which we choose to live in it”.115 
Although the effort of creating and refining fundamental categories provided the social 
sciences with analytical explanatory tools, this heredity proved to be a bottleneck in 
explaining the interface between the social processes of making of knowledge and the 
production of norms. Constructs as “structure and agency”, “nature and culture”, “science 
and politics”,116 in the concrete analysis of complex phenomena tend to turn into irresoluble 
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dichotomies, which lack the explanatory power to make sense of sociotechnical formations. 
These divides favour explanations centered on the categorization of factors, subsumed under 
one or the other banner and classified either as “internal” or “external”, which do not 
accommodate untidy processes where practices, materiality, identities, institutions, narratives 
and norms are entangled.
117
  As S&TS, as a field, examines and questions the social 
production of knowledge and norms in its complexity, showing how it is socially 
embedded,
118
 it dismisses realistic accounts and a priori demarcations about the world. 
In the volume, Jasanoff engaged in explaining the meaning and relevance of co-production as 
a framework, pinpointing that it avoids any form of natural or social determinism: “science, 
in the co-productionist framework, is understood as neither a simple reflection of the truth 
about nature nor an epiphenomenon of social political interests”.119 Whereas technoscientific 
and social determinisms provide simplistic explanation of the nexus of knowledge and its 
products, materiality and normativity, claiming for the priority of one dimension in 
explaining complex phenomena, co-production shows the hidden links which tie together 
these dimensions, which are socially constructed, challenging the assumption of  privileged 
explanatory factors and discourses. The co-productionist framework fulfills, therefore, the 
epistemic need for explanatory symmetrization, which S&TS maintained and pursued. 
Jasanoff, the S&TS scholar who largely contributed to the definition of this framework, 
pointed out that the co-productionist literature addresses issues which are metaphysical and 
epistemological, namely “about the way the world is and how we find out about it”.120 She 
identified two co-productionist streams of analysis: the constitutive and the interactional. The 
former deals with “the ways in which stability is created and maintained, particularly for 
emergent phenomena, whether in a particular site where knowledge is made, such as research 
laboratory, hospital or legal proceeding, or around a novel technoscientific object, such as the 
human genome or a periodic table for chemicals”.121 This kind of analysis is focused on “how 
people perceive elements of nature and society, and how they go about relegating part of their 
experience and observation to a reality that is seen as immutable, set apart from politics and 
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culture”.122 Its concerns are more metaphysical, as it has to confront with questions related to 
the meaning of what is natural or social, human or non-human.
123
 
The latter is qualified as interactional, since it engages in examining “knowledge conflicts 
within worlds that have already been demarcated, for practical purposes, into the natural and 
the social”.124 As new phenomena challenge or destabilize human knowledge about “what 
counts as nature or science and what as society or culture”,125 it examines how people reshape 
these boundaries in these kinds of contingencies, in which different epistemologies contend. 
The interactional stream addresses, therefore, more epistemological issues. 
These two kinds of analysis are concerned with metaphysics and epistemology; however, the 
co-productionist perspective dismisses the kind of a priori demarcations
126
 that conventional 
studies in these fields endorse. Jasanoff points out that co-production undermines the 
distinction between metaphysics and epistemology, “showing how our knowledge of things 
as they are relates to earlier choices about how we wish to know things in the first place”.127 
The co-productionist framework, in her analysis, entails several theoretical benefits in term of 
description and explanation, normativity and prediction. Whereas the former two will be 
explained in this section, the latter will be illustrated in the next one. 
As far as description is concerned, co-production is grounded on contextualization. Co-
productionist accounts have gained “descriptive thickness”128 through the cross-fertilization 
of different disciplinary perspectives and methodologies, which provide a wide range of 
useful theoretical tools to analyze the context of the production of knowledge and norms. 
Moreover, these accounts are less centered on fact-making, which has been privileged by 
science studies, and more concerned with sense-making.
129
 This shift entails that society’s 
efforts to order experience have become part of S&TS scholars’ analytical work. 
With regard to explanation, co-production challenges linear and mono-causal narratives of 
technoscientific and social progress.
130
 In particular, the constant methodological attention to 
the concrete context in which phenomena take place reveals some unnoticed elements to the 
analyst, which make more complex the questions related to the “why” and expand the 
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questions connected to the “how”.131  The co-production frame could, therefore, improve 
significantly the scholar’s explanatory capacity to inquire human activity.  
In the next section, it will be explained how this interpretive framework also offers insights 
into the normative discourses of the law and judicial decisions. 
 
1.2.1 Science, Law and Policy: The Idiom of Co-Production 
Edge, tracing back the origins of S&TS, showed how its origins and growth as a field have 
been largely marked by a “democratic impulse”, which resulted in a demand for institutions 
to become more socially responsible in the terms of democratic accountability for their 
scientific policies and the democratization of science and technology.
132
 He suggested that 
the different strains of S&TS scholarship could contribute addressing the issues at the 
interface of the “is/ought” dimensions in the form of the question: “Given that critical STS 
scholarship paints a distinctive and fresh picture of science – a new ‘is’ – what are the policy 
implications (if any) – the new ‘ought’ that follow?”.133 
Edge pinpointed one of the main ambitions of S&TS’ scholarship, which the frame of co-
production concurs to fulfill. The theoretical relevance of “co-production” stands mainly at 
the interface of the “is/ought” dimensions of inquiry, since it is centered on considering the 
concomitant social processes of making sense of the world and making order of it. 
Science and the law are two of the most influential institutional places of collective 
knowledge-making and sense-making, as they are conferred social authority. When new 
phenomena are emerging, these are the institutions which are at the forefront of making sense 
and order of what is new. Both these institutions are called upon to establish facts, which 
underpin and legitimize normative decisions, such as the rules regarding regulatory science 
and jurisprudence holdings and arguments. 
It has been illustrated that the emergence of order is a significant moment, in which the 
processes of co-production become noticeable.
134
 When new phenomena are stabilized it is 
more difficult to understand how the natural and the social, as well as knowledge and power, 
affect each other.
135
 As Jasanoff remarked, relevant normative decisions are made at this 
stage: “in the resolution of conflicts; the classification of scientific and social objects; the 
standardization of technological practices; and the uptake of knowledge in different cultural 
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contexts”.136 Employing the co-productionist framework in examining the emergence of new 
sociotechnical formations, such as modern biotechnologies, enables one to gain access to how 
power is exercised through the concrete institutional practices of knowledge-making. In 
particular, how science, law and politics exercise a mutual elicitation in establishing a 
dominant frame about what a technology is, if it entails risks or not, what kind of assessment 
and management it should undergo, if any, whether it should be considered patent eligible or 
not. The choices related to these issues affect the normalization and naturalization of these 
phenomena. However, the co-productionist analysis draws the scholar’s attention to how 
knowledge and power are mutually constituted, how alternative viewpoints are eluded or 
marginalized and settlements gain stability or fail to do so within specific political, scientific, 
legal and cultural contexts.
137
 
In that respect, the co-productionist idiom provides an alternative framework in comparison 
to other well-established ways of examining the relationship between science, policy and law. 
These main frames have been pinpointed and confronted by Jasanoff in the third edition of 
the Handbook of Science and Technology Studies and are the following: the “law lag”, the 
“culture clash”, the crisis and the deference framework.138 
The “law lag” is a recurring narrative of the relationship between science and law, whose 
origins Jasanoff located in the work of the American sociologist Ogburn. Ogburn’s “law lag” 
narrative is embedded in his “cultural lag” theory, which he, first, articulated in a chapter 
entitled “The Hypothesis of Cultural Lag” published in 1922 and, then, illustrated in the 
monograph “Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature” in 1923.139 The 
term “cultural lag”, however, was first used by him, in 1914, as a professor of economics and 
sociology at Reed College
140
 in order to point out that the time factor in social causation was 
more important than the so called “disguise factor”, namely the latent factor, which was 
highly valued at the time in the economic interpretation of history. 
The “cultural lag” framework is grounded on the assumption that culturally related 
institutions,
 141
 such as science and law, advance at “unequal rates of change”142 and the lag 
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between them results in maladjustments: “A cultural lag occurs when one of the two parts of 
culture which are correlated changes before or in greater degree than the other part does, 
thereby causing less adjustment between the two parts that existed previously”.143 Although 
Ogburn acknowledged that maladjustments are difficult to be proved, since they involve 
subjective factors as value judgments which are not subject to measurement, he deemed most 
maladjustments demonstrable, regardless of the variation in value systems.  
The “cultural lag” theory consisted of the following steps: “(1) the identification of at least 
two variables; (2) the demonstration that these two variables were in adjustment; (3) the 
determination by dates that one variable has changed while the other has not changed or has 
changed in a greater degree than the other; and (4) that one variable has changed earlier or in 
a greater degree than the other, there is less satisfactory adjustment than existed before”.144  
In the examples and data
145
 that Ogburn provided, law was predominantly shown to be the 
dependent variable entailing the lag, which required adjustments.  
Ogburn did not strictly endorse economic determinism,
146
 however he maintained that “in our 
times in the Western world, technology and science are the great prime movers of social 
change”147 and, therefore, allocated to science and technology the lead of social change. 
Moreover, referring to the increasing number of patents, discoveries in applied science and 
inventions in modern times and to the related amount of lag to them, he incorporated an 
addendum to the theory:
148
 “lags accumulate because of the great rapidity and volume of 
technological change”.149 
The “law lag” narrative has proved to be a very popular means to deal with the relationship 
among science and technology, and society and has been recurrently used by legal scholars 
and judges to frame biotechnology and biotech inventions. However, it has been noted that 
this narrative is imbued with a deterministic view of science and technology as “the prime 
movers”150 of social change and entails normative implications: in order to eliminate the lag, 
the law should adjust and comply with the rapid pace of science and technology and “speed 
up” its legal processes. 
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The culture clash framework endorses the view that science and law are institutions which 
pursue different, opposing, goals and are marked by distinctive characteristics, which 
generate conflicts between them.
151
  This view has been mainly advanced
152
 by the American 
legal scholar Goldberg, who argued that science and scientists are engaged in promoting the 
progress of knowledge on the natural world, whereas law and legal scholars are conversely 
interested in the process of solving human disputes.
153
 Although he principally refers to these 
institutions in the United States, he considers their divergent characteristics more broadly as 
the defining features of their nature.
154
 Whereas science is deemed a self-governing republic 
of peers, whose cumulative enterprise
155
 aims at the progress of knowledge, resulting from 
the empirical testing of scientific hypothesis,
156
  law “stresses the process by which a decision 
is reached in an attempt to ensure that the decision will be, at the very least, something with 
which society can live”.157  
Goldberg considers the science-technology link indirect and uncertain,
158
 as he argues that “it 
is rare for a scientific discovery to immediately lead to a new device”.159 Many areas of 
scientific research do not lead to practical developments or payoffs and the relevant 
applications of a scientific theory are mostly far and not envisaged by scientists.
160
 
However, when scientific research results in commercially relevant products, it is under the 
intense scrutiny of regulatory agencies and Courts’ decisions. The regulatory agencies 
address very thoroughly the implications of commercializing new technologies, such as 
biotechnology. As a result, scientific applications suffer what he defines as “a regulatory gap”. 
The regulatory gap is a gap between research and application, which originates “from the fact 
that basic research receives unusually little public scrutiny while applications of that research 
receive an extraordinary dose of public involvement”.161 Although he acknowledges that new 
technologies can entail risks, Goldberg suggests speeding up the legal and political 
democratic process in order to promote the smooth commercialization of new technological 
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products. Scientists as counselors are charged with the task of creating one culture, in which 
progress and process are efficiently and successfully merged.
162
  
The crisis and the deference frames emerge, especially in the United States, from litigation 
involving scientific evidence and scientific expertise in trials.   
Jasanoff pointed out that the crisis narrative is more focused on the threat that science suffers 
because “junk science” and “crackpot scientists” are allowed in the courtroom than on the 
cost of litigation that this entails.
163
 She illustrated that this kind of genre encompasses 
several viewpoints. Whereas the positivist lawyer Peter Huber has a radical position and 
accused the traditional American adversary system to allow pseudoscientific expertise in 
trials, producing “scientific anarchy in court”,164 the former executive editor of the “New 
England Journal of Medicine” Marcia Angell expressed a more careful view of the 
relationship of science and law in trials in her analysis of the U.S. breast implant lawsuit.
165
 
Angel, according to Jasanoff, drew upon both the culture clash and crisis narrative and 
claimed that “the law’s adversarial zeal, coupled with high financial stakes, produced a 
settlement based on nonexistent evidence and the consequent withdrawal of a product that 
many women found beneficial or enabling.
166
 
The narrative of “deference” has been, conversely, advanced and claimed by the Courts in the 
U.S. and refers to the attitude of consideration towards science and scientists showed by 
judges. Jasanoff and Tallacchini illustrated that this narrative emerged in contests concerning 
the admissibility of scientific evidence and in the significant U.S. Supreme Court case 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and was centered on the metaphor of judges as 
“gatekeepers”, whose role is to guarantee that only the evidence that comply with the 
scientific standards of validity and reliability is admitted.
167
 
In comparison to these frameworks, the co-productionist framework shows that “the is” and 
“the ought” of human experience are entangled and, in knowledge societies, science, law and 
society make sense and order simultaneously. Furthermore, co-production draws the attention 
on how science and law contribute to maintain specific understandings about agency, human 
identity, the role of the market and the collective good. Courts’ decisions on biotechnological 
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inventions, in the U.S, Canada and Europe, illustrate this co-productionist interplay and this 
thesis aims at explaining it through narrative analysis. 
 
1.3 Narrative Analysis 
Narrative analysis is a qualitative approach that has gained momentum in research after the so 
called “narrative turn” in the human sciences in the 20th century, 168  which fostered a 
methodological shift towards textuality, meaning and discourse as means of understanding 
and explaining social life. 
The “narrative turn” has complex origins and is related to the emergence of different national 
traditions in several fields of research. The psychologist Polinghorne illustrated that Russian 
formalism, U.S. new criticism, French structuralism and German hermeneutics contributed to 
fostering the study of narrative and establishing its centrality in making sense of human 
experience.
169
 He, therefore, located the origins of narrative scholarship in the first half of the 
20
th
 century. Kristin Langellier has related the “narrative turn” to the critique of the realist 
epistemology and realism at large and to several movements in the 1960s: the critiques in 
social science of positivist modes of inquiry and their realist epistemology; the “memoir 
boom” in literature and popular culture; new emancipation movements concerned with 
identity; and a therapeutic culture examining and using personal life for therapies of various 
kinds.
170
 The “narrative turn” involved many disciplines, such as literary studies, history, 
anthropology and folklore, psychology and sociolinguistics, sociology and communication 
studies.
171
 However, narrative inquiry has been endorsed also in other fields as a theoretical 
approach, such as law and political sciences.
172
  
Narrative analysis deals with meaning and is engaged in explaining how and why events and 
action are embedded in narratives.
173
 The focus of its inquiry is, therefore, language. 
Although understanding the cultural contexts, practices, theories and movements which have 
been involved in devising this kind of qualitative inquiry is fundamental, this chapter will 
deal with addressing its theoretical relevance in qualitative research and S&TS’ co-
productionist framework. 
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In this part of the chapter, it will be illustrated what is narrative and why narrative analysis 
provides a useful set of methodologies in order to explain how, in different cultural contexts, 
biotechnology has been framed and biotech inventions have gained intellectual property 
protection or failed to obtain it. 
The analysis will be, then, focused on the meaning of “frame” as the core concept of one kind 
of narrative analysis and its theoretical relevance within Science and Technology Studies’ co-
productionist approach. 
 
1.3.1 What Is a “Narrative”?  
Most of the scholars committed to narrative analysis agree that defining “narrative” could be 
cumbersome for its polysemy and for the disputes surrounding its meaning. The sociologists 
Kohler Riessman and Quinney remarked that, as narrative inquiry is marked by realist, 
postmodern and constructionist diverging views and strands, a final and inclusive definition 
of “narrative” cannot be articulated.174 
As Polkinghorne illustrated, the word “narrative” can be used in a general way to refer to 
“any spoken or written presentation”,175 such as the answers to a questionnaire in the form of 
sentences or paragraphs. However, “narrative” is mostly referred to, in narrative analysis, as 
“the kind of organizational scheme expressed in a story form”.176 In this case, it can indicate 
the process of making a story, the cognitive scheme of the story or the result of the process.
177
 
“Narrative” is mostly considered a synonym of “story”, 178  which is a special mode of 
organizing human experience, linking action and events in a chronological way, in order to 
make sense of them. Griffin and May pointed out “that a narrative is an account of a non-
random sequence of events that conveys some kind of action and movement through time”.179 
Moreover, they explain that the sequence of events is made non-random by the articulation of 
a plot which provides “a logical and meaningful connection between events so that prior 
events seem inevitably to lead to later ones, providing a sense of causality”.180 The plot 
revolves around a particular point or meaning which the narrator wants to communicate to his 
audience. The plot of a narrative is considered “the organizing theme that identifies the 
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significance and the role of the individual events”,181 that “waives together a complex of 
events to make a single story”.182 
The cognitive psychologist Bruner showed that narrative is a mode of knowing and cognitive 
functioning which is complementary to the logic-scientific mode, follows its own criteria of 
well-formedness and verification and has its own operating principles.
183
 These two modes of 
knowing rely on different kinds of causality to connect events, as the logic-scientific or 
paradigmatic mode pursues universal truth, while the narrative mode searches for “particular 
connections between events”.184 Referring to Bruner’s work, Polkinghorne explained that the 
narrative mode provides a different kind of explanation in comparison to the logic-scientific 
mode. In the logic-mathematical reasoning “the power of explanation by laws comes from its 
capacity to abstract events from particular contexts and discover relationships that hold 
among all the instances belonging to a category, irrespective of the spatial and temporal 
context”.185 
Conversely, explanation by narrative is contextually related: 
“When a human event is said not to make sense, it is usually not because a person is 
unable to place it in the proper category. The difficulty stems, instead, from a person’s 
inability to integrate the event into a plot whereby it becomes understandable in the 
context of what happened (…). Thus, narratives exhibit an explanation instead of 
demonstrating it. 
In narrative organization, the symmetry between explanation and prediction, 
characteristic of logic-mathematical reasoning, is broken. Narrative explanation does 
not subsume events under laws. Instead, it explains by clarifying the significance of 
events that have occurred on the basis of the outcome that has followed. In this sense, 
narrative explanation is retroactive”.186 
Although narratives can concern individual personal stories, they are inevitably social, as 
they are the most common form of communication among people. It has been noted that 
narrative frameworks provide a fundamental resource to structure the events in order to make 
them more understandable to other people.
187
 Narrative frameworks “do not originate from 
the individual but are shared cultural tools that offer us a repertoire of possible stories and set 
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limits on what can be told”.188 However, nations, governments, institutions and groups also 
use frames to make narratives. These narratives build up and reinforce identities and also 
establish the horizon of possible human action. They tell “who collectivities and individuals 
are”,189 “where they come from”190 and settle roles and boundaries of action. Since narratives 
which are produced by groups who are vested of social authority gain stability easily, 
marginal groups have to elaborate counter narratives in order to challenge and oppose the 
dominant ones.
191
 
In S&TS, scholars have frequently drawn upon narrative analysis as a theoretical approach 
that offers insights to explain how individuals and collectivities make sense of their 
experience. Narrative analysis constitute a valuable means of inquiry, as narratives provide a 
contingent and much more inclusive kind of explanation, which accounts for how identities, 
action, reality are contextually construed.  
Moreover, narratives are at the forefront of emerging orders and new identities. When 
something new, for example a new technology and its related products such as modern 
biotechnology, destabilizes and challenges well-established ideas of nature, narrative frames 
are relied upon in order to make sense and order of it.  
Narratives are powerful practices of knowledge-making especially when they are deployed 
by institutions which are conferred authority. This can result in the normalization of the new 
technology or in the elaboration of a counter narrative. 
The French philosopher Lyotard portrayed the postmodern condition as marked by the 
decline of master narratives
192
 or metanarratives on progress and emancipation of mankind, 
that modernity
193
endorsed and relied upon in order to legitimize power in society. The fading 
of master narratives in his analysis entails that culture, in postmodernity, is a “patchwork of 
little narratives”,194 too fragmentary and discontinuous to allow a universal point of view. 
Notwithstanding this philosophical perspective on human postmodern condition and the 
breakdown of narratives, S&TS’ scholarship shows that master narratives, as much as 
narratives, are still lively and constitute influential rhetoric resources in order to legitimize 
power and action within society as far as science, technology and law are concerned. The 
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Report entitled “Taking the European Knowledge Society Seriously”195 by the Expert Group 
on Science and Governance to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate of the 
European Commission, mostly formed by S&TS scholars, illustrated that master narratives 
are institutionally and socially very influential for what they entail, as “They reflect 
prevailing institutional structures and reinforce collective aspirations. In worlds of policy 
practice, narratives (…) tacitly define the horizon of possible and acceptable action, project 
and impose classifications, distinguish issues from non-issues, and actors from non-
actors”.196 
In master narratives of policy, descriptive and prescriptive dimensions are deeply intertwined, 
so that the description of situations entails how they should be dealt with and regulated. It has 
been observed
197
 that dominant master narratives could be considered “performative”,198 as 
their issuing consists in the performing of an action: telling a narrative on something can 
make it so.  
Policy narratives on science and law are centered on frames which exhibit these normative 
and performative dimensions. In the next section, it will be explained what “frames” are, 
which is their relevance within narrative analysis and how they have been applied to 
biotechnology in order to sustain its normalization or to challenge it. 
 
 1.3.2 Frame Analysis 
The concept of “frame” in the social sciences has been explored by the influential Canadian-
born sociologist Goffman in his monograph entitled “Frame Analysis. An Essay on the 
Organization of Experience”,199  published in 1974. In his essay, Goffman addressed the 
organization and “structure of experience individuals have at any moment of their social 
lives”, 200  without aiming at proposing any theory on the organization and structure of 
society.
201
 The sociologist Bennett Berger, in the foreword to his essay, observed that 
Goffman’s “frame” concerns the “inevitably relational dimension of meaning”202 and “is only 
a particularly tangible metaphor for what other sociologists have tried to invoke by words like 
                                                          
195
 Ulrike Felt and Bryan Wynne, Taking the European Knowledge Society Seriously, 2007, Expert Group on 
Science and Governance to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, Directorate-General for Research, 
European Commission, available at <https://www.bmbf.de/pub/EuropeanKnowledge(6).pdf>  5. 
196
 ibid 73. 
197
 ibid 75. 
198
 John L Austin, How to Do Things with Words (1
st
 edn 1962, Oxford University Press 1976) vii, 4-24. 
199
 Goffman (n 43) viii. 
200
 ibid 13. 
201
 ibid. 
202
 Bennett M Berger, ‘Foreword’ in Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience (1
st
 edn 1974, Northeastern University Press, 1986) xi, xiii. 
49 
 
‘background’, ‘setting’, ‘context’, or a phrase like ‘in terms of’”.203 According to Berger, all 
these words “attempt to convey that what goes on in interaction is governed by usually 
unstated rules or principles more or less implicitly set by the character of some larger, though 
perhaps invisible, entity (for example, ‘the definition of the situation’) ‘within’ which the 
interaction occurs”.204  
Goffman undertook his study, showing that the analysis of social reality had been at the core 
of social psychology and sociology since the 19
th
 century. He commented on the American 
sociologist William Isaac Thomas’ dictum “If men define situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences”, 205  noting that, although “defining a situation as real certainly has 
consequences”,206 these may have a slight impact on the events. According to Goffman, “all 
the word is not a stage”207 and despite “presumably a definition of the situation is almost 
always to be found, those who are in the situation ordinarily do not create this definition”.208 
People try to assess accurately what the situation “ought to be for them”209 and, then, act in 
accordance with their assessment.  
Goffman drew upon Gregory Bateson’s work, in which the term “frame” was, firstly,210 
proposed. The anthropologist and psychologist Bateson, in “A Theory of Play and Fantasy” 
published in 1954,
211
 showed that any communication, verbal or nonverbal, implies sets of 
levels of abstraction, which are implicit. One set of abstract levels is called “metalinguistic” 
and encompasses “those explicit or implicit messages where the subject of discourse is the 
language”.212 The other set is called “metacommunicative” and regards messages where “the 
subject of discourse is the relationship between the speakers”.213 
The reference to metacommunicative set of abstractions proves to be fundamental in order to 
understand any message.
214
 These metacommunicative sets of signals concern “what is going 
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on” and were named by Bateson “frames”.215 Bateson reached this conclusion, by observing 
two monkeys playing at Fleishhacker zoo in San Francisco, in January 1952. The animals 
were “engaged in an interactive sequence of which the unit action or signals were similar to 
but not the same as those of combat”216 and “it was evident, even to the human observer, that 
the sequence as a whole was not combat, and evident to the human observer, that to the 
participant monkeys this was ‘not combat’. 217  Bateson, therefore, inferred that the 
phenomenon, play, “could only occur if the participant organisms were capable of some 
degree of metacommunication, i.e., of exchanging signals that would carry the message ‘This 
is play’”.218 Bateson meant the term “frame” as a psychological concept and used two kinds 
of analogies in order to discuss it: “the physical analogy of the picture frame and the more 
abstract, but still not psychological, analogy of the mathematical set”.219 However, he pointed 
out that the two analogies partially fall short in expressing the psychological dimension of the 
term, as one is too physical and concrete and the other is too abstract.
220
 
Likewise, Goffman dealt with the question that individuals confront with in any current 
situation, namely “What is it that’s going on here?” and tried to provide a framework that 
could offer an answer.
221
 His aim was to identify some of the basic frameworks of 
understanding, which individuals use to make sense of events, and their specific 
vulnerabilities.
222
 In addressing this issue, he explained that, since roles in activity are 
differentiated, the view that one individual has of “what is going on” differs from that of 
another person and different interests elicit different motivational relevancies. Moreover, the 
retrospective portrayal of the same event or situation may diverge widely among the 
individuals who were involved. 
In order to isolate these basic frameworks, Goffman focused his analysis on “strips”, namely 
“any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity, including here sequences of 
happenings, real or fictive, as seen from the perspective of those subjects involved in 
sustaining an interest in them”.223  
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Goffman referred to Bateson’s use of the term “frame”224 and provided a general definition of 
it in the context of “frame analysis”: 
“I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of 
organization which govern events–at least social ones–and our subjective involvement 
in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to 
identify. That is my definition of frame. My phrase “frame analysis” is a slogan to 
refer to the examination in these terms of the organization of experience”.225 
In his view, frames regard the organization of experience, “something that an individual actor 
can take into his mind”,226 and are not related to the organization of society. Frames organize 
meaning and involvement for individuals, as “during any spate of activity, participants will 
ordinarily not only obtain a sense of what is going on but will also (in some degree) become 
spontaneously engrossed, caught up, enthralled”. 227  Moreover, frames entail and involve 
expectations of a normative kind: 
“All frames involve expectations of a normative kind as to how deeply and fully the 
individual is to be carried into the activity organized by the frames. Of course frames 
differ quite widely in the involvement prescribed for participants sustaining them”.228 
He, therefore, did not make any claim, in his essay, on social organization and social 
structure. Conversely, he preferred to concentrate his attention on the principles by which 
experience is subjectively organized. He, firstly, identified and characterized “primary 
frameworks” as the “schemata of interpretation” that the individual recognizing a particular 
event tends to imply in his response.
229
 These frameworks are defined “primary”, since their 
application is considered by those who are applying them “as not depending on or harking 
back to some prior or ‘original’ interpretation”.230 A “primary framework”, therefore, “is seen 
as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that 
is meaningful”.231 These frameworks may differ in degree of organization, as some resemble 
“a system of entities, postulates and rules”232 and others are more akin to a perspective or an 
understanding. 
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He distinguished them in two classes of frameworks: natural and social.
233
 Whereas natural 
frameworks offer an understanding of pure physical events undirected and unguided, due 
from start to finish to “natural determinants”,234 social ones regard events and situations that 
involve “the will, aim, and controlling effort of intelligence, a live agency, the chief being the 
human being”.235 All types of frameworks provide a way of describing the event to which 
they are applied. Goffman is, in particular, interested in how primary frames are transformed 
and reworked through activity. Frameworks can be converted into keys or fabrications and 
designs. Whereas keys entail transformations in which all the participants to a certain activity 
are aware of what is occurring, namely that a reworking occurred, fabrications and designs 
are asymmetrical, as some of the participants are unaware that a transformation occurred. A 
key is “the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful, in terms of 
some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by 
the participants to be something quite else”.236  
In the essay, frames are deemed organizational premises sustained in the mind and 
corresponding “to the way in which an aspect of the activity is itself organized”.237 Goffman 
explained that “given their understanding of what it is that is going on, individuals fit their 
actions to this understanding and ordinarily find that the ongoing world supports this 
fitting”.238 
Goffman’s “frame analysis” has nurtured and inspired theoretically and methodologically 
several fields. In the human sciences, frame analysis and, particularly, the 
dramaturgical/performance analysis that Goffman devised and applied, has become a kind of 
narrative methodology. Kohler Riessman explained that the dialogic/performance analysis is 
a type of narrative methodology which, unlike thematic and structural approaches, deals with 
“how talk among speakers is interactively (dialogically) produced and performed as 
narrative”,239 focusing widely on contexts and, therefore, examining the setting, the impact of 
the investigator and the social circumstances which condition the production and 
interpretation of the narrative. Whereas thematic and structural approaches are concerned 
with the content of the story (what is told) and the narrative itself (the telling of the story), 
frame analysis is engaged in exploring the performative character of narratives. This kind of 
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analysis hinges on the awareness that “stories are social artifacts”,240 that are created and 
sustained in institutional, historical and discursive contexts. It addresses how a story is 
coproduced in a specific context. 
The family of methodologies named “narrative analysis” in the human sciences, however, 
encompasses a set of models and the articulation of formal practices in order to sustain it, 
namely interviewing, transcribing and analyzing transcripts of narrative to draw some 
conclusions. However, it has been noted that “prevailing concepts of verification and 
procedures for establishing validity (from the experimental model) rely on realist 
assumptions and consequently are largely irrelevant to narrative studies”.241 Consequently, 
any evaluation based on narrative analysis does not refer to verification criteria,
242
 since 
narratives are not mirrors of the world.
243
 Narratives and, in particular, frames are sense-
making tools that enable individuals and collectivities to deal with what they experience. 
Frame analysis, as a kind of narrative analysis, consists of a set of formalized models and 
practices linked to ethnographical and sociological studies. It has been embraced, however, in 
other fields of research, such as policy and communication studies, which have drawn on 
Goffman’s legacy in order to gain a better understanding of how institutions, individuals and 
groups make sense of their experience. 
Frame analysis has become a salient approach in order to understand the processes of 
policymaking and their implementation, as policy problems result from the construction made 
by different actors and how they are framed affects policy solutions and their rationale,
244
 as 
well as causality and responsibilities. In particular, collective action and social movement 
scholars
245
 have pinpointed how framing entails diagnostic and prognostic aims, as it defines 
problems and establishes responsibilities and set out solutions. Moreover, they pointed out 
that it is an interactive and contested process in which frame alignment, namely “the actions 
taken by those who produce and invoke frames in an attempt to connect these frames with the 
interests, values and beliefs of those they seek to mobilize”,246 and resonance, namely how 
groups and individuals respond, are intertwined.
247
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Furthermore, frames have also been significantly probed in order to explain global IP 
policymaking. The IP scholar Duncan Matthews, in particular, has illustrated how framing 
and re-framing IP issues in terms of right to health and access to medicines proved pivotal to 
pursue national patent policies and foster development for developing countries, before and 
after the entry into force of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (the TRIPs Agreement).
248
 He has explained that in Brazil, South Africa and 
India
249
 framing strategies set up by coalitions of NGOs have reshaped the debate on IPRs 
and led to re-framing also global IP policymaking.
250
 These coalitions of NGOs were able to 
‘frame’ and “re-frame” “intellectual property-related issues by using the emotive language of 
human rights to underpin substantive arguments”251 to undermine and hinder the dominant 
IPRs frames that powerful transnational firms and their governments were supporting.
252
 
The insights of this analytical perspective have been also applied to legal decisions. Frame 
analysis constitute a useful theoretical perspective in order to understand legal decisions, as 
frames provide a sense of continuity, by organizing facts in a selective way, according to an 
axial matter where will, agency and purpose of social actors are accommodated. Peter 
Manning and Keith Hawkins drew attention to the specific features of legal frames, observing 
that legal frames are oriented towards decision-making and highlighting their reflexivity, as 
“they both constitute ‘reality’ and they selectively identify the facts that sustain a social 
reality”.253 
Framing is at the core of judicial dynamics: lawyers select the matters of fact and law and the 
relevant precedents related to a case and this activity amounts to framing the case. Their 
framing undergoes negotiations with prosecutors and judges who, in turn, contribute to the 
framing process. Frames are ways of stabilizing meaning. However, stabilizing a frame 
largely depends on the power and authority of the actors and institutions which sustain it. In 
this respect, judges and courts, as powerful embodiments of legal authority, provide an 
official version of reality whose frames tend to prevail over other possible ones. 
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Although frames have been interpreted as “cognitive schemata”, Goffman pointed out that 
they are not a matter of the mind, but “correspond in some sense to the way in which an 
aspect of the activity itself is organized”.254 Therefore, he pinpointed that these organizational 
premises (frames) are “sustained both in the mind and in the activity”,255 since they are 
something cognition “sometimes arrives at, not something cognition creates or generates”.256 
Frame analysis, thus, should also take into consideration the particular kind of activity which 
maintains the frame. In the legal context the kind of activity supporting the frame is mostly 
formalized by a set of procedural rules which differs according to the judicial system and the 
kind of legal process. 
Whereas this section examined the significance and meaning of “frame analysis” as a 
narrative method in the human sciences, the next section will explain how, in Science and 
Technology Studies, this theoretical approach has been applied and developed. 
 
1.3.3 Frame Analysis in S&TS  
S&TS have extensively drawn upon the theoretical and methodological insights of Goffman’s 
frame analysis. Narrative analysis and, in particular, frame analysis have been privileged by 
several S&TS scholars, in order to pursue and provide what the anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz referred to as “thick description”,257 namely a description which explores how human 
behavior becomes meaningful by focusing on the context and does not take coherence as a 
major test of validity.
258
 
S&TS work showed that frames are at the interface of the is/ought dimension. Frames define 
“what is going on” and their definition entails a series of descriptive and normative 
expectations from participants, individuals and groups, which are involved in the frame. 
Power, agency, causality, risks and accountability are all dimensions embedded in frames, 
which S&TS scholars have been committed into examining as concerns policymaking and its 
implementation.  
S&TS scholars, moreover, have more specifically taken up Goffman’s awareness of the 
power which is embedded in framing as an activity and frames as a result, as well as of the 
asymmetries related to it. An established frame constitutes, in fact, an official version of 
“what is going on”. Dominant groups and institutions enjoy a consistent power to create 
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enduring frames, whereas for less powerful groups and individuals it is harder to challenge a 
frame and can require a significant amount of time and resources. 
As far as technoscientific phenomena are concerned, framing is a fundamental activity which 
is carried out by political institutions and agencies, which deal with regulatory science, in 
order to assess a new technology and its potential risks and, eventually govern them.  
With regard to the rise of commercial biotechnology, the political scholar Herbert Gottweis
259
 
illustrated how two alternative frames were considered in order to make sense of 
biotechnology and genetic engineering: the “process” frame and the “product” frame. 
Jasanoff,
 260
 furthermore, illustrated and explained the relevance of the “product”, “process” 
and “programme” frames  in defining specific policies of biotechnology in different countries: 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. Frames contribute to mark, as she 
pointed out, national specific modes of addressing what is new and can challenge well-
established views of what is natural, of identities and what represents the public good. 
 
1.3.4 Narrative (and Metaphors) and Law 
The significance of the narrative in the law has been increasingly acknowledged in the last 
thirty years, in particular in common law countries in which judicial precedent have been 
understood as providing successive narratives in terms of a chain.
261
 Court’s trials and 
decisions, largely hinge on competing narratives of the parties involved and of the judges as 
the legal scholar Anthony Amsterdam and the psychologist Jerome Bruner have illustrated in 
“Minding the Law: How Courts Rely on Storytelling, and How Their Stories Change the 
Ways We Understand the Law – and Ourselves”.262  
The number of allowed narratives, their mode and structure are dependent from the specific 
context, legal system, kind of jurisdiction and phase of trial involved. In some jurisdictional 
systems, judges can express their dissent through dissenting opinions, in others the judgement 
is devised as a univocal institutional answer to a legal controversy. 
                                                          
259
 Gottweis (n 44) vi. 
260
 Jasanoff (n 44) vi. 
261
 The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin referred to the judge as “a writer of chain novels". Dworkin (n 42) 28. 
See Jefferson White, ‘Analogical Reasoning’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and 
Legal Theory (Wiley-Blackwell 210), 571, 574. 
262
 Anthony G Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law: How Courts Rely on Storytelling, and How 
Their Stories Change the Ways We Understand the Law – and Ourselves (Harvard University Press 2000). 
57 
 
Academic programs and conferences on law and narrative have been flourishing in different 
countries and that the “narrative turn” has definitely marked legal studies 263  has been 
illustrated by Peter Brooks in “Narrative in and of the Law”.264 In the Unites States, it has 
been pointed out,
265
 it was the work by Robert Cover entitled ‘Nomos and Narrative’, 
published in 1983, and, then, “Violence and the Word”, which largely contributed to foster 
narrative studies centered on the law. However, Stern noted that the narrative approach has 
been restricted mostly to narrow areas of the law, such as “trial advocacy, ‘outsider’ 
jurisprudence, and occasionally topics such as search and seizure, and the ‘grand’ narratives 
of constitutional law”.266  
Lately, narrative analysis has also been drawn upon to examine intellectual property law of 
biotechnology
267
 and specific case law concerning the property over human biological 
materials. 
Narrative scholars, however, have overlooked the relationship between technoscientific and 
legal narratives in judicial decisions, which has been addressed by the S&TS scholar Sheila 
Jasanoff in “Science at the Bar”,268 in which she focused on how shifting of meanings are 
brought about and stabilized by the intertwining of different kinds of narratives. 
Greta Olson has explained that narrative can be employed “a form of rhetoric”, but also as 
grand récits, namely “larger narratives about what the law does”.269 
In narrative analysis what is narrated and how are referred to as “story” and “discourse”. 
Whereas the former “denotes what a jurist might call the facts of a case, or the known 
sequence of events”,270 the latter “describes the form that the narrative takes, including the 
perspective from which the story is told, from a position within or outside of the story world, 
and in a first- or third-person voice, and from a singular perspective or multiple ones”.271 
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Linda Berger has explained that narratives and metaphors are intertwined in legal settings 
because they “reassure us that things hang together, providing a sense of coherence to the 
patterns and paths we employ for perception and expression”.272 In particular, she pointed out 
their cognitive dimension from the point of view of legal rhetoric, which is focused on 
persuasion.
273
 
However, from an S&TS perspective, the analysis of the relationship between narrative and 
metaphors in specific legal contexts,
274
 such as judgements on biotech patent claims in 
particular jurisdictions, account for specific ways of “making sense and order” of new 
technoscientific products (and processes) and stabilizing their collective meaning by 
continuously drawing the line between nature and artifacts (as inventions), nature and culture. 
In that relationship, S&TS points to a mutual shifting of metaphors and narratives between 
technoscience and law which results in the settlement and unsettlement of meanings, which 
justifies and legitimises legal and policy choices. 
 
1.4 Metaphor (and Analogy) in Science and Law  
Metaphor is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “A figure of speech in which a name 
or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but 
analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable”.275 Its etymology comes from the ancient 
Greek μεταϕορά, formed by the prefix μετα- and ϕορά, which means carrying, bearing, “after 
μεταϕέρειν”276 which signifies to transfer.277 
Metaphor has been viewed, for most of the twentieth century, with mistrust and scepticism by 
legal and science scholars for methodological and epistemic reasons. Justice Cardozo, 
addressing the problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations in 1926, 
pointed out that it was “still enveloped in the mists of metaphors”278 and famously censured 
their use in the law: 
“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate 
thought, they end often as enslaving it. We say at times that the corporate entity will 
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be ignored when the parent corporation operates a business through a subsidiary 
which is characterized as an ‘alias’ or a ‘dummy’”.279 
This statement epitomizes how low the appraisal of metaphors in law has been by legal 
scholars, because of the misleading character which is coupled with it. However, at present, 
still many legal textbooks express distrust towards resorting to metaphors in the legal 
discourse.
280
 
Likewise, in science, drawing metaphors as useful theoretical tools has been disdained and 
largely disregarded, in the twentieth century. Only from the 1960’s the study of the use of 
metaphors in different scientific fields has gained momentum, from the hard sciences to 
biology. As both science and the law, because of the significant influences of neo-positivism 
and legal positivism, were  posited to have epistemic and methodological claims to certainty 
and truth, as far as “the is” and “the ought” of the world is concerned, the recourse to 
metaphors in these areas seemed, for decades, an admission of failure or betrayal of these 
aspirations. Moreover, civil law systems, like the French, German and Italian ones, are 
grounded on a specific idea of rationality linked to the enactment of codes as complete and 
coherent legal statute, under which any concrete legal case can be subsumed simply applying 
the canons of interpretation. Under this idea of rationality, the ambiguities of metaphorical 
polysemy are banned in the name of the certainty and clarity offered by the rules of the code. 
This partially accounts for the fact that legal scholars have long ignored its pervasiveness in 
legal narratives as a means of interpretation and integration and, in particular, more recently 
its use in the definition of legal concepts at the crossroads of science and technology. 
Metaphors have been studied from different perspectives since ancient times in several fields 
of knowledge, such as rhetoric, philosophy, literature,
281
 linguistics, psychology and science. 
These theories have a specific focus and offer different answers to the issues of its meaning 
(linguistics theories) and use (pragmatics theories). The bibliography on metaphor and its 
theory is, therefore, boundless. The so called “classic” theories account for the metaphor in 
terms of comparison, anomaly or interaction.
282
 However, a new generation of theories has 
arisen, which view metaphor as class-inclusion statement or as a conceptual means, rather a 
figure of thought than a figure of speech.
283
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Metaphor has, nevertheless, elicited considerable attention in the last decades. The relevant 
role of analogy and metaphor in science has been studied, since the 1960s, by the philosopher 
of science Mary Hesse,
284
 who showed the “all-pervasive character of metaphor in natural 
language”285 and that metaphors mediate a kind of social knowledge286 and challenged the 
deductive model of scientific explanation, arguing that it should be modified and integrated 
by a concept of theoretical explanation as a metaphorical re-description of the domain of the 
explanandum.
287
 Max Black,
288
 whose work on metaphor Hesse mostly referred to, in the 
same years, devised a new interaction theory of metaphor. Several scholars, later, further 
explored the pivotal role of metaphor in different scientific fields, such as biology, chemistry, 
and physics.
289
  Moreover, the publication of the two editions of “Metaphor and Thought”, 
edited by Andrew Ortony, in 1979
290
  and 1993,
291
 the first volume collecting 
interdisciplinary essays on metaphor by eminent scholars in several disciplines, was a 
seminal moment for the study of metaphor, as it brought together and linked the research in 
different fields and its contributions are still extensively referred to and discussed at 
present.
292
 This publication was followed by a third volume entitled “The Cambridge 
Handbook of Metaphor and Thought” which was edited by  the linguistic psychologist 
Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. and published in 2008, which aimed at providing further 
developments about contemporary research on metaphor, showing how it contributes to 
human cognition, communication and culture.
293
  
With reference to legal theory, the significance of metaphor has been addressed and 
illustrated, since the 1950s, by the logician and legal scholar Chaïm Perelman, who authored 
with the social sciences’ scholar Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca,  a pivotal work entitled “The New 
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Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation”. 294  Their work questioned the centrality of 
demonstration (which is meant as logical deduction)
295
 as means of proof and logical 
justification. In particular, they pointed out that, although demonstration is employed in 
scientific disciplines, it should not be regarded as the only means of practical rational 
justification. Conversely, they claimed and showed the value of argumentation in providing 
reasonable arguments for persuasion, which results from conveying effective arguments. In 
particular, Perelman, in his further work, showed that the law and its logic centered on 
argumentation shall be taken as a model of reasoning in other practical fields. 
Although their theory drew on a longstanding Western rhetorical tradition, which it is not 
specifically rested upon, in this thesis, their analysis of the relationship between metaphor 
and analogy
296
 might be insightful to understand how metaphors have been applied in 
defining and ruling biotech patentable subject matter. 
In their treatise, they refer to Aristotle’s definition of metaphor in Poetics as “the application 
of a word that belongs to another thing: either from genus to species, species to genus, 
species to species, or by analogy”.297 Under the definition of metaphor, Aristotle included 
figures of speech that scholars have later distinguished from it, namely metonymy and 
synecdoche, and devised a theory of metaphor as comparison. According to this view a 
metaphor is, as Searle explained, an ellipsis of a simile, in which “like” or “as” has been 
deleted.
298
 
Among the examples offered by Aristotle of metaphor, there is one in which, according to 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the analogical relationship is brought into focus, because it 
pinpoints how “a metaphorical expression can rise from an analogy”.299 
Aristotle, in fact, further clarified: “I call ‘by analogy’ cases were b is to a as d is to c: one 
will then speak of d instead of b, or b instead of d. Sometimes people add that to which the 
replaced term is related. I mean, e.g., the wine bowl is to Dionysus as the shield to Ares: so 
one will call the wine bowl ‘Dionysus’ shield’, and the shield ‘Ares’ wine bowl’. Or the old 
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age is to life as evening to day: so one will call evening ‘the day’s old age’, or like 
Empedocles, call old age ‘the evening of life’ or ‘life’s sunset’”.300 
In this last example, they commented that “the analogy ‘A is to B as C is to D’ yields the 
expression ‘C of B’ to designate A”.301 They, therefore, argued that a metaphor can be well-
described as “condensed analogy, resulting from the fusion of an element from the phoros 
with an element from the theme”.302 As a result of this fusion, the analogy is not conveyed as 
a suggestion, but as a datum.
303
 
As Perelman elucidated the formula of analogy is: “a/b as c/d” 304  and, in case of a 
mathematical proportion, is “a/b = c/d”.305 He addressed the relationship of metaphor and 
analogy also in other texts, explaining that analogy means “proportion” and it establishes a 
similarity of relationship, in which two heterogeneous domains are confronted in order to 
clarify or assess the first couple (called “theme”) in the light of the second couple (called 
“phoros”).306 
The concept of analogy expounded by Aristotle in Poetics must be distinguished from 
analogical reasoning, which he referred to in Prior Analytics as “example” (or proof by 
example),
307
 which has been deemed, since the Middle Ages, an autonomous form of 
reasoning, which proceeds from particular to particular.
308
 The development of legal analogy, 
which has been devised and elaborated in the legal sciences as a means of integration of the 
law, arose from Aristotle’s work on “example” as analogical reasoning. 
Legal analogy is a form of reasoning which aims at filling legal gaps, in Latin lacunae, which 
is allowed to be drawn upon by judges when a particular concrete case (species facti) cannot 
be solved by subsuming it under one or more legal provisions. The logical structure of 
analogical reasoning, as Bobbio illustrated, is the following: “S is similar to M; M is P: S is 
P”.309 This kind of analogical reasoning has been referred to an analogia legis, which is 
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distinguished from analogia iuris, namely a process of legal integration, not strictly 
analogical, in which a legal gap is solved by resorting to general legal principles.
310
 
Canale and Tuzet explained that the legal gap “is filled by arguing analogically from a source 
case to a target case”311 and the scheme of analogy is: 
“C1 falls under N1. 
C2 does not fall under any actual norm of the system (there is a gap in the law). 
There is relevant similarity between C1 and C2. 
C2 falls under N2 obtained by analogical reasoning (filling the gap)”.
312
 
In analogical reasoning, therefore, the regulation of the source case C1 is extended to the 
target case C2, by creating analogically a new norm N2 from N1.
313
 
As legal analogy is not a deductive argument, which is the logically valid form of inference, 
it does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion, even if its premises are true.
314
 The 
conclusions drawn from legal analogy are not causal or predictive, as White pointed out, but 
normative, as they regard the “correct legal outcome”.315 
Golding pinpointed that, as far as the use of metaphor is concerned, “the crucial question is 
whether the compared objects resemble (and differ from) one another in relevant respects, 
that is, respects that are relevant to possession of the inferred resemblance”.316 In particular, 
he highlighted that the assessment of the factors, such as “the number of respects in which the 
compared objects resemble one another (positive analogies) and the number of respects in 
which they differ (negative analogies)”317 is complex. In this assessment, the judge makes 
several relevant personal choices on the factors that should privileged over others and, 
therefore, exercise his discretion. However, a good analogical argument should be possibly 
based on relevant characteristics (albeit few) rather than many irrelevant ones.
318
 
Furthermore, it has been illustrated
319
 that stating that “A is similar to B”, which is at the core 
of analogical reasoning entails two problems. The first problem was explained by Goodman, 
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who pointed out that this statement is incomplete, in so far as “the properties to which the 
similarity claim refer” have been identified. Since A and B could be stated to be alike in 
numberless ways, restrictions on the relevant properties should be made, but any kind of 
restriction hangs on “an intrinsically relative judgment”.320 Moreover, White pinpointed that, 
before adjudication, “the similarities which bear upon various specific issues within a case 
must be collectively assessed in order for a determination of overall fit between precedent 
cases and the case at hand to be made”.321 
Several different theories have been developed in order to understand the analogical patterns 
of inference,
322
 in particular by Klug,
323
 Alexy,
324
 Brewer
325
 and Weinreb.
326
 
It should be noted that whereas, in civil law systems, judges rather refrain from 
acknowledging the need for analogical reasoning, because of the uncertainty and judicial 
discretion which have been coupled with it in the civil law cultural tradition; in common law 
countries, as the analysis of the case law regarding biotech patent claims also shows, justices 
refer to its use in a much more liberal way, as a practical resource to adjudicate in a new case. 
Weinreb remarked that, in the United States, “Not only do analogical arguments figure 
prominently in briefs and opinions, but they are also a standard feature, one might almost say 
a defining feature of legal education; the content of Socratic dialogue, on which law school 
classes are typically built in, is mostly an exercise in reasoning by analogy”.327 He referred, in 
particular, to the U.S. scientific tradition of studying that stemmed from the “case method of 
legal education”, 328  which was introduced, in 1870, at the Harvard Law School by 
Langdell.
329
 This method is posited to replicate what occurs in the process of adjudication, in 
which lawyers and judges relentlessly recur to analogical reasoning.
330
 
However, as this work will illustrate, in common law patent jurisdictions, such as U.S. and 
Canada, judges, lawyers and amici curiae make reference to analogies mostly not 
acknowledging the need to fill a legal gap and drawing on metaphors which convey 
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analogical features across cases. It has been noted that, when courts in the U.S. reason 
analogically, the principle that they elaborate “appears not to reach further than what is 
required by a comparison of the specific facts before the court with other facts, equally 
specific, for which the result is known”.331 Furthermore, only in a few cases the arguments of 
the courts provide the statement of a general rule.
332
 Nevertheless, the use of precedent is 
focused on the use of the relevant rule which grounds the decision, which constitutes the 
precedent
333
 and how to differentiate
334
 the ratio decidendi from obiter dictum.
335
 
Several differences emerge across particular national jurisdictions, such as the United States 
and Canada, as far as what judges recognize as the appropriate limits of their role in recurring 
to legal analogy. 
Nevertheless, as this work will show, when the reference to an analogy is made in patent case 
law is general, not strictly linked to formal analogical reasoning. However, in several cases 
metaphors are drawn upon in order to create analogies. 
The perspective that will be applied to analyse the metaphors used in legal discourse, in order 
to establish the patentability of biotech products, is centered on “conceptual metaphor” and 
was developed by the cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in the seminal 
monograph “Metaphors We Live By”,336 firstly published in 1980, in which they argued that 
metaphor should be interpreted as “metaphorical concept”. 
Cognitive linguistics defines metaphor as understanding and experiencing
337
 one conceptual 
domain (the target domain) in terms of another conceptual domain
338
 (the source domain), 
namely “CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (A) is CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN (B)”.339 The source 
domain (B) is, as Kövecses illustrated, “the conceptual domain from which we draw 
metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain”,340 whereas the target 
domain is the conceptual domain which is understood by resorting to the source domain (A).  
Understanding one domain (a) in terms of another (B) means that “there is a set of systematic 
correspondences between the source and the target in the sense that conceptual elements of B 
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correspond to conceptual elements of A”,341 which are named “mappings”. The use of a 
metaphor, therefore, implies a set of systematic correspondences between the two domains. 
Conceptual metaphor is related to metaphorical linguistic expressions, which are “words or 
other linguistic expressions that come from the terminology of the more concrete conceptual 
domain (i.e. domain B)”,342 since the latter contribute to settle and reinforce the former. 
Nevertheless, conceptual metaphors are differentiated from linguistic metaphors or 
metaphorically linguistic expressions. Linguistic metaphors have been defined as “the 
linguistic realizations or manifestations of underlying conceptual metaphors”.343 
As metaphorical linguistic expressions in language are systematically linked to metaphorical 
concepts, their study proves to be fundamental in order to understand metaphorical concepts 
and how they make sense and order human activity.
344
  
Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor is based on the view that “metaphor is pervasive in 
everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action”345 and that the nature of the 
conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical.  Metaphorical concepts structure human 
perceptions (what and how humans perceive), relationships (how humans relate to things, 
animals and other people) and actions (what humans do). Furthermore, they point out that 
they are not just a matter of words, figures of speech and rhetorical means, but regard 
ordinary language and structure both thought and action.
346
 
According to cognitive linguistics, metaphor is characterized by sistematicity, which allows 
understanding a concept in terms of another, but hides some aspects of it: understanding one 
aspect of a concept in terms of another entails that some aspects of it are highlighted, but 
others, inconsistent with the metaphor, are hidden.
347
 Embracing a metaphor implies, 
therefore, the dismissal of some aspects of experience which are inconsistent with it. 
Furthermore, Cognitive linguists highlight that metaphors are “built into the conceptual 
systems”348 of the cultures and are context-dependent.349 
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This theory shows that metaphor is pervasive in ordinary life,
350
 that the conceptual system is 
“fundamentally metaphorical in nature”351  and metaphors orient perceptions, thought and 
actions.
352
  
The theoretical view of cognitive linguistics has been favoured and endorsed, in this work, 
for its explanatory power in comparison to other theories of metaphors, as it fills a gap in 
addressing how metaphors are pervasive in everyday life, scientific disciplines and the law. 
Moreover, as the thesis will show, metaphors in different scientific and legal contexts are still 
enduring, even though their contingent role seems to be accomplished. Without positing that 
human conceptual systems is metaphorical it would be difficult to understand why metaphors 
are so enduring and why patent law in defining the model of patentability refers to them 
constantly, even though they are considered outdated and unsuitable to define a new 
technology and its products. 
Kövecses illustrated that metaphors are classified according to the degree of “conventionality” 
that they entail, namely how deeply they are well established and well entrenched “in 
everyday use by ordinary people for everyday purpose”. 353  Moreover, they have been 
distinguished according to their function. Whereas structural metaphors “enable speakers to 
understand target A by means of the structure of source B”,354 the cognitive function of 
ontological metaphors is to provide “an ontological status to general categories of abstract 
target concepts”. 355  Orientational metaphors, moreover, provide “basic human spatial 
orientation, such as up-down, center-periphery, etc.”.356 
In this work, it will be argued that the seminal metaphors used in the legal discourse 
concerning the patent eligibility biotech claims are structural and ontological. Lakoff and 
Johnson explained that ontological metaphors have different purposes, such as referring, 
quantifying, identifying aspects and causes, setting goals and motivating action. They also 
provide metaphorical models for what something is. They instantiate their statement referring 
to the metaphor “THE MIND IS A MACHINE”. The use of this metaphor allows specifying 
certain kinds of objects, by highlighting specific features of them. In this case, they remark, 
the metaphor offers a “conception of the mind as having an on-off state, a level of efficiency, 
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a productive capacity, an internal mechanism, a source of energy, and an operating 
condition”.357 
By drawing on the conceptual theory developed by Lakoff and Johnson, it will be explained 
in the following chapters that some metaphors, such as “machine”, “molecule” and “code”, 
were pivotal in order to decide whether new biotechnological products and processes fell 
within the legal concepts of “patentable subject matter” and “invention”. 
It will be shown that, even though these metaphors have been referred to by judges, parties 
and amici curiae as concepts which provide a description of claimed inventions, their origins 
and use is metaphorical and to a large extent they have been constructed and endorsed in 
molecular biology and genetics, but they have become so entrenched in the way in which 
professionals (patent lawyers and attorneys, patent examiners and judges) and common 
people think and act about these objects. 
The legal use of metaphors and the analogies they imply has been overlooked in specific 
areas of the law. However, more recently, scholars have addressed how narrative and 
metaphor are intertwined in the law.
358
 As far as patent law is concerned, only a few scholars 
have illustrated the metaphorical and analogical dimension which marks the definition of 
patent eligible invention in biotechnology. Graham Dutfield,
359
 a scholar in the global 
governance of IP, and the S&TS scholar Mariachiara Tallacchini
360
  have devoted part of 
their work to open up the arguments carried out by judges in patent decisions and pinpointed 
how metaphors are at the core of construction of meanings and the settled “nature” of 
patentable objects. 
This work aims at filling partially this gap, by addressing a large area of the biotech IP case 
law and focusing on landmark judicial patent decisions in different systems which involved 
the definition of what is patent eligible. The aim of this analysis is to account for the shifting 
of meanings between science, law and society in defining legal concepts. The focus of the 
research will be, therefore, the concepts of “patentable subject matter” and “invention”, as the 
threshold and core of the definition of what is patentable. The requirements of patentability 
will sometimes be referred to, when claimants and judges have raised issues of their 
fulfillment in these cases, which shaped the boundaries of patent eligibility. 
 
1.5 Legal Fictions, Metaphors and Analogies 
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Legal Fictions, metaphors and analogies have been at the forefront of the development and 
evolution of legal concepts, statutory classes and doctrinal categories for centuries. Their 
salience lies in being creative means of interpretation and integration of the law, which have 
been applied to address statutory gaps and scientific uncertainties emerging in litigation.
361
 
Their theory offers significant insights in understanding how the scope of patent eligible 
invention has been constantly re-framed. In particular, their analysis shows the cognitive, 
practical and creative work which is involved in the evolution of law. 
Legal fictions, which characterised Roman law and had also a relevant role in the common 
law tradition,
362
 have elicited new theoretical interest in the 20
th
 century after the publication 
of Hans Vaihinger’s philosophical work on fiction “The Philosophy of ‘As-If’. A System of 
the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind” in 1922. 363  Following its 
publication, great theorists of law, such as Hans Kelsen and Lon Fuller, devoted considerable 
attention to legal fictions and their prominence in the development of the law, as regards its 
theory and concepts. 
Fictions perform numerous functions in legal systems, from solving problems of proof to 
mitigating the harshness of rules, but they are primary means to enable legal change,
364
 as 
much as analogies and metaphors. 
However, scholars have disagreed on what a legal fiction is and whether it pertains to the 
practice of the law or just its theory. In fact, the scholarship devoted to legal fictions made a 
significant distinction between fictions of theory and fictions of practice, claiming that 
fictions of practice were not authentic fictions.
365
 
Legal fiction has been authoritatively defined by Fuller as “either (1) statement propounded 
with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as 
having utility”.366  
This definition narrows down the scope of what could be deemed a fiction to situations in 
which legal scholars and practitioners draw on a statement and are aware that it is false. 
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However, they do acknowledge its utility in terms of solving a legal issue, often arising from 
a statutory gap. 
According to the theory of fiction articulated by Vaihinger, a fiction is characterised by the 
following elements: 1. a contradiction with reality or self-contradiction; 2. it must be 
provisional; 3. there must be awareness of its fictitious character; 4. it must be deemed an 
expedient.
367
 
Kelsen, coherently with his general theory of law, endorsed an even narrower concept of 
legal fiction, which rejected the idea that fictions applied in the practice of the law were true 
fictions, arguing that legal fictions were only related to the theory of law.
368
 
Under this restricted definition of legal fictions, in most jurisprudential cases in which the 
judge has to deal with a gap in the law, it would be hard to ascertain the existence of all these 
elements in the solution endorsed by the judge. 
In the classic theory of fiction established by these theorists, the idea of fiction implies a 
realist epistemology, namely that there is a correspondence between language and the 
external world,
369
 which supports the first and third elements of fiction formulated by 
Vaihinger.  
The most recent development of the theory of fiction, conversely, has been predominantly 
marked by the endorsement of constructivist perspectives
370
 and a more open definition of 
fiction,
371
 which relates it to metaphor and analogy. 
The distinction between fictions and metaphors is complex and difficult to outline. It largely 
depends on the kind of theory that the scholar endorses.  
The work of the Danish legal realist Alf Ross on the types of legal fictions has addressed this 
distinction.
372
 Fiction and metaphor are, according to him, both techniques of analogical 
extension of legal rules, by asserting an equivalence or identity.
373
 
However, as a specific kind of legal fabrication, legal fictions are “posed proposition, which 
hazard a premise only to secure a particular doctrinal result”.374 
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Stern has illustrated that, in his perspective, “legal fictions lack the generative potential of 
metaphors, because fictions depend on a truncated causal chain that exclude any consequence 
other than the doctrinal consequence the fiction was created to license, whereas metaphors 
spur on the imagination to make further connections”.375  
Moreover, fictions differ from legal doctrines because they are not affirmed: although their 
proposition consists apparently in an affirmative statement, their status is still hypothetical 
and does not allow drawing the broader consequences that a doctrine entails.
376
 
The thesis embraces the distinction between legal fiction and metaphor set out by Ross, 
which highlights the further “generative potential” that metaphors involve in comparison with 
fictions.  
It acknowledges, moreover, that legal fictions can be structured on metaphors, as part of the 
literature has illustrated, but several legal fictions “do not  take the form of a metaphors” 
when no identity between terms is asserted.
377
 
Furthermore, the thesis deems legal fictions significant in the evolution of the patentability of 
inventions, in particular as far as the development of the statutory requirements of novelty 
and originality/inventive step are concerned. 
It argues and engages in showing, however, that conceptual metaphors (and the analogies that 
they entail), rather than fictions, played a more relevant role in settling the boundaries of 
patent eligible matter. This emerges clearly from the judicial narratives, which will be 
analysed in the thesis, in which metaphors are embedded.  
In these narratives the courts, parties and amici curiae, far from acknowledging a statutory 
gap concerning the definition of patentable invention, affirm a conceptual metaphor as the 
very technoscientific and legal definition of the nature of the claimed invention.  
Furthermore, as the following chapters will highlight, in their narratives the use of machine, 
molecule and code has open up a potential of practical consequences, which are not limited to 
one doctrinal consequence. 
As Stern has illustrated, linguists have pointed out that metaphors are deemed “more 
productive than similes, because the former are less confined to a particular ground of 
similarity”.378  
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According to cognitive linguists, metaphors entail a more creative dynamic, because the 
identity that they establish involves sistematicity: namely the use of a metaphor prompts 
understanding a concept in terms of another and hides some aspects of it.
379
 However, the 
grounds of similarity that the use of a metaphor involves and raises are manifold and 
culturally related. 
Metaphors, as section 1.4 has illustrated, foster and establish analogies between different 
domains. This characteristic of the metaphor has been pointed out by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, who clarified that “a metaphorical expression can rise from an analogy”,380 
because “the analogy ‘A is to B as C is to D’ yields the expression ‘C of B’ to designate 
A”.381  As a result, they argued that a metaphor can be defined as “condensed analogy, 
resulting from the fusion of an element from the phoros (the first couple) with an element 
from the theme (the second couple)”.382 The fusion entails that the analogy is not conveyed as 
a suggestion, but as a datum.
383
 
Max Black,
384
 who formulated the interaction theory of metaphor, as Hesse illustrated, has 
explained how the use of metaphors leads to “brings together the ‘associated commonplaces’ 
of the primary system in which the metaphor is used and the secondary system in which the 
word is literal”. In his classic example, he clarified that: “When we say ‘main is wolf’, we are 
bringing wolf-like characteristics to bear upon our understanding of ‘man’ in such a way as to 
modify, emphasize and suppress certain of our previous held commonplaces about man. The 
metaphor is a filter through which we view the primary system. The effect of meaning, 
however, is a symmetrical interaction, because not only the connotations and hence the 
meaning of ‘man’ shifted, but also the connotations of ‘wolf’. Wolves become more human 
after the metaphor is used: ‘bestial’ for instance becomes a term of abuse for beasts as well as 
men. Since meanings are thus affected, there can be no explicit translation or paraphrase of 
a metaphor without cognitive loss”. 385 
The thesis will address these kind of analogies established though metaphors, not what are 
technically defined as legal analogies (analogia legis and iuris), which are means of 
integration of the law illustrated in section 1.4.  
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Cognitive science scholars have noted that analogy, in a general sense” is “the ability to think 
about relational patterns” and crucial for human cognition.386 It involves picking out patterns 
and identifying “recurrences of these patterns despite variation in the elements that compose 
them, to form concepts that abstract and reify these patterns, and to express these concepts in 
a language”.387 Analogy, therefore, is the ability to identify the sameness in the relations 
across domains. 
This literature have pointed out that the fundamental processes of analogy characterize also 
metaphor.
388
 In particular, scholars refer to the processes of structural alignment
389
 (namely 
“an explicit set of correspondences between the representational elements of the two 
situations”),390 inference projection,391 progressive abstraction and re-representation which 
play a pivotal role in processing metaphors.
392
 Metaphors, in this respect, have been 
considered similar to analogies, but their structure is more variable.
393
  
Moreover, whereas analogies are deemed to be drawn upon more in “explanatory-predictive 
contexts”, metaphors are also applied in “expressive-affective contexts”.394 
The thesis will show that the metaphors used in the IP judicial discourse are kinds of 
analogical legal and technoscientific “fabrications” that do not involve the recognition of the 
existence of a statutory gap. They constitute a common system of reasoning in the process of 
adjudication, which allows extending or limiting the application of a rule and legal category. 
It should however be noted that, in civil law systems, judges tend to refrain from 
acknowledging the need for analogical reasoning, because of the uncertainty and judicial 
discretion which have been coupled with it in the civil law cultural tradition. 
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Conversely, in common law countries, as the analysis of the case law regarding biotech 
patent claims also shows, justices refer to the use in a much more liberal and open way, as a 
practical resource to adjudicate in a new case. 
Weinreb observed that in the United States, “Not only do analogical arguments figure 
prominently in briefs and opinions, but they are also a standard feature, one might almost say 
a defining feature of legal education; the content of Socratic dialogue, on which law school 
classes are typically built in, is mostly an exercise in reasoning by analogy”.395 
In particular, this work argues that the analogies conveyed by conceptual metaphors used in 
the judicial discourse passed mostly unnoticed, because of their validation from 
technoscience and their conventionality in the patent discourse. 
This partially explains why the metaphorical dimensions of these judgements have been 
mostly overlooked by the IP legal literature
396
 and this work aims at filling this gap. 
 
1.6 A Matter of Imaginaries: Epistemology and Topography of Comparison 
The aim of this thesis is to draw a comparison of the sociotechnical imaginaries of nature and 
life which biotechnology and the intellectual property over biotech inventions maintained and 
conveyed in different Western nation-states, namely the United States and Canada, and  
Europe (EPC member states). The main question that will be addressed is whether and how, 
in different sociopolitical contexts, distinct ways of imagining what biotechnology is and 
entails in terms of public good shaped different legal and policy responses. The suggested 
hypothesis is that, notwithstanding the globalization of intellectual property law and the 
increasing convergence in defining patentable subject matter and the requirements of 
patentability, the institutional and social modes of tackling biotechnology were contextual 
and partially diverged. 
In this section, the reasons for the comparison, its boundaries and epistemic premises will be 
illustrated, as well as how the conceptual tool of “sociotechnical imaginaries” fills a gap in 
accounting for why biotechnology underwent such different reactions. 
The theoretical relevance of comparison of political and legal systems in understanding how 
different societies, groups and individuals make sense and order of complex technoscientific 
phenomena should not be overlooked. In some areas of the law, such as intellectual property 
and more specifically patent law, the increasing convergence of the criteria for patentability 
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across states due to international treaties, has boosted accounts where differences across the 
countries are side lined in favor of more globalized views about how rules are implemented 
and enforced. Although some judicial cases, which will be analysed in the thesis, show that 
the interpretation and implementation of the patentability criteria are far from uniformly and 
univocally established, too often these differences are explained in terms lack of rationality, 
coherence and/or scientific knowledge exhibited by judges, citizens and parties involved in 
patent decisions. However, a more attentive and extensive comparison, where differences are 
not sidelined and dismissed, would contribute to gain a better understanding of how the 
boundaries of what is natural and artificial, patentable or not are drawn and re-drawn in 
specific sociopolitical contexts. 
This thesis will draw upon the methodological and epistemic questions and problems that 
comparative legal theory has, partially, envisaged and refined. Its purpose, however, is not 
providing a comparative legal study, due to the epistemological and methodological lines that 
most comparative legal scholars endorse, which largely contrast with the S&TS co-
productionist and narrative-based framework of this work. Comparative legal studies rely on 
a long and well-established tradition which dates back to the 19
th
 century
397
 and distinctive 
ways of addressing the basic questions of comparison: Why compare? What to compare? 
How to compare? 
Although the present epistemic underpinnings of comparative legal research are more 
diversified than in the past,
398
 it still largely relies on the concept of validation of the research 
assertions
399
 or Popperian corroboration and non-falsification which does not fit with the 
post-Kuhnian constructivist epistemology that several streams of S&TS sustained and 
nurtured since the 1960s, as it has been explained in the appendix. 
Although, at present, the comparative legal scholar Pierre Legrand points out that “law is a 
social phenomenon”, 400  at least because it operates within society, and therefore the 
comparatist should rely on the insights offered by other fields, such as anthropology, 
linguistics and cognitive psychology,
401
 most scholars still confine the boundaries of the field 
to the study of rules, judicial cases, legal concepts and institutes within definite legal 
traditions and cultures.  
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Comparatists admit the need for an interdisciplinary approach,
402
 however they do not 
question the concept of interdisciplinarity and how the boundaries among disciplines are 
drawn and the power that disciplinary discourse involve.  
Furthermore, although comparative theory has been elaborating and focusing on alternative 
methodologies,
403
 the functional method
404
 is dominant. The functional method focuses on 
the facts behind the law and is marked by a praesumptio similitudinis.
405
 It is mostly applied 
to judicial decisions, comparing the responses offered by different legal systems to the same 
situation.
406
 As Michaels noted, it considers its objects in a functional relation to society and 
the function is intended as a tertium comparationis, namely institutions are comparable only 
if they fulfill a similar function in the various legal systems examined.
407
 Moreover, in some 
forms of functionalism, functionality becomes a criterion of evaluation in order to establish 
the best law: the law that fulfills best its function in comparison to the others.
408
 
The functional methodology underwent criticism by comparative law scholars and other legal 
fields, such as Critical Legal Studies (CLS).
409
 Frankenberg criticized comparative legal 
scholars for their “faith in objectivity” 410  and for their mode of comparison marked by 
cognitive control, namely “the formalist ordering and labeling and the ethnocentric 
interpretation of information, often randomly gleened from limited data”.411 
S&TS epistemic perspective shows that these comparative methodological stances can be 
censured on the ground that facts, scientific and legal, result from a construction and that 
every distinction between legal and extralegal phenomena is the outcome of what the 
sociologists call “boundary work”, namely the discursive attribution of selective qualities, in 
this case, to legal scholars, their method and their claims for the purpose of drawing a 
rhetorical boundary between the law and some less relevant phenomena.
412
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Alternative methods could be applied in comparative legal analysis. The hermeneutical 
method, which focuses on the “cultural mentalité” or cultural structure that legal rules signify, 
and therefore on the historical, social, economic, political, cultural and psychological context 
which has shaped the rule
413
  is characterized more by “an acknowledgement of 
‘difference’”414 than similarity. 
Notwithstanding the differences across all these methodologies, comparative law theory is 
marked and endorses, more or less implicitly, a realist cognitive perspective which contrasts 
with S&TS constructivist view of knowledge. The acceptance of the realist view of 
knowledge shines through the choice of language.  
Moreover, comparative legal studies neglect the relevance of materiality and technoscientific 
practices in shaping legal concepts. For example, although Legrand pinpoints the relevance 
of the cultural structure which is expressed by legal rules in order to make a comparison, he 
does not consider both these elements as part of the comparative analysis. However, as far as 
intellectual property on genomic inventions is concerned, the S&TS scholar Stephen 
Hilgartner showed that, although the discussion on genomic property tends to focus on the 
Patent and Trademark Office and Courts’ decisions as the sites of property production, the 
laboratory is equally fundamental as a site for the creation of scientific property. He pointed 
out that making knowledge and making property rights do not constitute two separate moves, 
temporally and institutionally. Conversely, the creation of patents is deeply embedded in 
laboratory’s practices and routines.415 
Finally, most comparative legal scholars argue for a praesumptio similitudinis that should 
inspire comparative work, but social studies of science and technology have proved that the 
judgments of similarity and difference are contingent.
416
  
Comparative law studies are largely informed by the idea of comparing in order to find a 
better solution which could be exported or in order to harmonize. Comparative law analysis 
was devised as legal knowledge with practical purposes.  
Conversely, S&TS view is not strictly prescriptive in its aims and is more focused on gaining 
a contextual view of how people make sense and order of what is new and maybe socially 
disruptive. In particular, the S&TS’ comparative approach hinges on the concept of civic 
epistemologies, which has been elaborated by Jasanoff. Civic epistemology has been defined 
as “the institutionalized practices by which members of a given society test and deploy 
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knowledge claims used as a basis for making collective choices”. 417  This theoretical 
comparative tool is crucial to understand why technoscientific societies make diverging 
choices about how to frame new technologies.
418
 This concept draws upon the insight that 
“modern technoscientific cultures have developed tacit knowledge-ways through which they 
assess the rationality and robustness of claims that seek to order their lives”. 419  Civic 
epistemology is a useful comparative tool in addressing how publics challenge patent policies 
and decisions in different jurisdictions, as chapter three to six will show. 
The reasons for focusing this work on the comparison of different political systems rely on its 
main research assumption, namely that different sociotechnical imaginaries shaped the way in 
which biotechnology has been addressed in different political contexts, at the nation-state 
level and the regional and international ones. Only a comparison would allow understanding 
whether these differences emerged and account for distinctive policy and legal responses or 
not. Comparison, moreover, entails the constant questioning of legal categories, institutes and 
cultures, as well as the “point of view” of the scholar, which is far from being a “view from 
nowhere”.  
In order to assure the consistency of the comparison, this work will take into consideration 
two nation-states, the United States and Canada, which are industrially and technologically 
advanced and with high interests in the development of biotechnology, since the 1970s, and 
Europe, namely the Member Countries of the EPC that are mostly members of the European 
Union, which in the same years envisaged biotechnology as a promising field to be sustained 
and fostered, but is regional political entity whose member states equally possess 
technoscientific and industrial resources. Biotechnology, as it will be shown in the thesis, has 
been an important benchmark on which the European identity was tested.  
The comparison draws on the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries in order to address why, 
even though the definition of patent eligible matter was alike in different jurisdictions, it has 
evolved dissimilarly.      
Political science scholars and theorists have devoted, since the 1980s, a considerable amount 
of their work to the concept of “imaginary” in order to explain several collective phenomena, 
in broader or smaller scales. The political scientist Benedict Anderson illustrated how the 
nation should be explained as “an imagined political community” and that the national 
imaginary accounts for how heterogeneous individuals, inhabiting a different place and time, 
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make sense of their identity and experience as “common”. 420  The political philosopher 
Charles Taylor, in Modern Social Imaginaries,
421
 examined how forms of social imaginaries 
have marked and supported the settlement of Western modernity and its new moral order. 
The political theorist Yaron Ezrahi, in Imagined Democracies,
422
 explored why and how 
democracies rely on performative imaginaries in order to legitimise their power and agency 
before citizens.  
In Science and Technology Studies, the concept of “sociotechnical imaginaries” has been 
devised, in the last decade, as an analytical tool in order to address “the sources of the long-
lasting cross-national variations in S&T policy”423 and a theoretical gap in explaining “the 
relationship of science and technology to political institutions”.424 This work relies on it in 
addressing how different modes of envisioning life and nature arose from the construction of 
IP over biotech inventions in different “Western nation-states”. 
Sociotechnical imaginaries have been defined as “collectively imagined forms of social life 
and social order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or 
technological projects”.425 Their relevance as cultural resource lies in their descriptive and, at 
once, prescriptive dimension, in their conveying a specific description of an attainable future 
and prescribing that it ought to be pursued and achieved: 
“They project visions of what is good, desirable, and worth attaining for a political 
community; they articulate feasible futures. Conversely, imaginaries also warn against 
risks or hazards that may accompany innovation if it is pushed too hard or too fast. In 
activating collective consciousness, imaginaries help create the political will or public 
resolve to attain them”.426 
They provide a cultural resource to understand how policies of innovation are promoted and 
justified in terms of “what constitutes public good”427 by political institutions, but also by 
administrative and judicial ones. In fact, through their practices and decisions, national patent 
offices, the European Patent Office (EPO), as well as judges deciding on patent cases, 
endorse and foster sociotechnical imaginaries of innovation, progress and public good, as 
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much as political institutions. In this work, the concept of “sociotechnical imaginary” will be 
resorted and applied to as a pivotal analytical key to account for the specificities and 
continuities in the judicial and administrative decisions regarding the patentability of biotech 
inventions.  
As the S&TS scholar David Winickoff argued, technological imaginaries are part of “the 
interpretative framework of judging”428 and they condition and orient the doctrinal choices 
and legal reasoning.
429
 This thesis will, further, point out that these imaginaries are built up 
and oriented by the endorsement of specific metaphors, which were sustained in 
technoscientific contexts and shaped judicial arguments and decisions on the patent eligibility 
of biotech inventions. 
The next chapter will, therefore, engage in explaining how the metaphors of molecule, code 
and machine have been crucial in shaping the theoretical framework (and imaginary) of 
particular fields of research and what are the views of life and nature that they entail. The 
chapter, moreover, will clarify how the molecular imaginary of life that these disciplines 
fostered has sustained biotechnological claims over the definition of the “nature” of its 
products and processes and backed their legal status as patentable subject matter. The 
following chapters will, then, examine how these metaphors have been employed in judicial 
arguments and impinged on the adjudications issued in several areas of biotech innovation 
and also shaped particular sociotechnical imaginaries of life. 
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Chapter Two 
Molecular Imaginaries of Life 
 
2.1 Molecular Imaginaries of Life 
This chapter will illustrate how a “molecular” mode of studying and investigating life was 
devised, since the 1930s, in the United States and then took hold. The establishment of a 
scientific field of research named “molecular biology”, its theoretical premises, focus, 
practices and methodologies affected the development of biotechnology and the molecular 
imaginaries which inform it. The process of “molecularization of life”, namely the 
“formulation of particular strategic approaches in biology and medicine centred on 
molecules”,430 in the 20th century, has proved pivotal in order to sustain and promote the 
patentability of biotech products since the 1980s, in the United States, Canada and Europe. 
As historians of science de Chardarevian and Kamminga have pointed out, the expressions 
“molecularization”, “molecular vision”, “molecular revolution” and “molecular politics” are 
associated with molecular biology and its successfulness in addressing the structure and 
function of proteins and nucleic acids since the 1950s and 1960s, “the development of 
recombinant DNA technologies in the 1970s,
431
 and the making of the Human Genome 
Project with its promise of genetically based molecular medicine”.432 
Tracing back the origins and development of molecular biology, recombinant DNA 
technology and the Human Genome Project enables to explain some of the basic features of 
the scientific and legal narratives regarding biotechnology, namely descriptive atomism, 
reductionism and determinism, which will be later analysed in the chapter. These features 
mark the imaginaries of life which are endorsed or challenged in different social, legal and 
policy contexts and also affect, as it will be shown in the thesis, the patentability of biotech 
products and processes. 
The first part of the chapter will illustrate how molecular biology arose and became 
established as an independent research field and offer an outlook of its epistemic premises 
and aims.  
The second part of the chapter will, then, address how molecular biology shifted from the 
notion of the gene as a material physicochemical molecule to a carrier of sequence of 
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information
433
 and how its research program implied and endorsed descriptive atomism and, 
at least to a certain extent, reductionism and determinism as its main features. 
The last part of the chapter will, finally, examine how the program of molecular biology 
conflated, in the 1970s, into biotechnology. Moreover, it will consider the different kinds of 
narratives on biotechnology and how they impinge on the definition of biotech products and 
processes and the risks and benefits they might entail. 
 
2.2 The Origins of Molecular Biology 
The origins of molecular biology are complex and controversial. The expression “molecular 
biology” has been, firstly, devised and used, in 1938, by Warren Weaver,434 at the time 
director of the natural science division at the Rockefeller Foundation, to name a field and its 
related research program aimed at studying biological entities in their minimal and essential 
dimensions, namely the molecular level and processes which occur at the submicroscopic 
region.
435
 
The historian of science Lily Kay illustrated that “molecular biology” was born as a scientific 
program, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation from the 1930s to the 1950s, involving 
several academic institutions in the United States, such as the California Institute of 
Technology (Caltech), which became in a few years one of the major research and training 
center in the field.
436
 Its meaning and impact in the history of biological sciences, however, 
should not be confined and circumscribed to what an ordinary long-term research project 
entails. It was a vision of biology far more ambitious in its premises and objectives, since it 
became, as Kay’s pointed out, the indispensable “Occam’s razor”437 in order to define what 
life is. 
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Although molecular biology is compared to molecular genetics of DNA, it is entrenched in an 
original and coherent framework to study phenomena related to “life”, which emerged before 
the description of DNA’s double helix, in 1953.438 
The historian of science Rheinberger defined molecular biology as a “hybrid science”439 
which combines “experimental systems from biophysics, biochemistry, and genetics, and it 
uses widely different model organisms in its search for the biological function at the 
molecular level”.440 Molecular biology is, furthermore, a research program marked by its 
radical novelty because of its structural premises, which distance it from the background of 
previous biological research, and its “physicochemical approach”.441  
It was defined, since its inception, as a “new biology”, as it addressed the unity of life 
phenomena, namely phenomena which regard all the organisms.
442
 In its theoretical effort, 
this new biology privileged, as models of research, the simplest biological systems, such as 
bacteria or viruses, on the assumption that organisms marked by different levels of 
complexity can be compared. 
As the philosopher of science Evelyn Fox Keller noticed, molecular biology took 
“epistemological and technological benefits of reductio ad simplicitatum”,443 which is the 
premise of whichever kind of control: its power laid “in identifying the simplest unit of 
analysis, on the construction of E[scherichia] coli and bacteriophage as a model organisms 
for the study of genetics and development […]. E. coli is small, simple, and, above all, 
culturally homogeneous (by which I mean that all cells in a bacterial culture are identical). It 
is by its very nature insulated from the heterogeneity that is so central to the organization of 
higher organisms – the problem of differentiation and development”.444 
In order to understand the physical and chemical laws, which govern life phenomena, 
molecular biologists, however, drew their attention mainly to protein molecules, deeming that 
an improved knowledge of proteins’ structure and functions would have inevitably led to the 
explanation of the basic vital functions, such as reproduction and growth.
445
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Several scholars in history and philosophy of biology showed that new links between the 
laboratory, the clinic and industry had to be created in order to support the study, production, 
use and circulation of molecules.
446
 
Multiple opposing views about what is life and what are biological entities confront. The first 
question on the origins of molecular biology regards its foundational hypothesis: that life is 
molecular. Conversely, this molecular view can be considered one of the possible scientific 
visions of life, which has been privileged in the course of history. However, “the molecular 
vision of life” gained consensus. Its success did not rely, exclusively, on its explanatory 
power, but depended on the cognitive and social aims that molecular biology promoted since 
its origins. The molecular vision of life, therefore, became established, but bore a heavy 
legacy: a heritage of scientific evidences and metaphors intertwined with a mixture of 
expressed or implicit interests and intents. This way of thinking of life has become very 
influential, as it has shaped individual and social visions about what life is, as well as political 
and legal understanding of what could be the uses of molecular entities in the life sciences.  
 
2.2.1 Descriptive Atomism and Genetic Control      
This section and the next two will explain how molecular biology, in comparison to classical 
genetics, devised firstly the gene as a physicochemical unit and, then, as carrier of 
information. Moreover, they will show how some of the main features of the “molecular 
vision of life”, such as descriptive atomism, reductionism and determinism, are linked to the 
construction of the meaning of the gene. 
The word “gene” was coined in 1909 by the Danish botanist Wilhelm Johannsen and has 
become one of the most significant terms in the glossary of molecular biology.
447
 Fox Keller 
has illustrated that, by its use, Johannsen wished to free his research from any previous 
biological hypothesis and, in particular, from any association with preformationist theories.
448
 
“Gene” was a new term to denote the fundamental unit of the biologic specificity of 
organisms, “the evident fact that, in any case, many characteristics of the organism are 
specified in the gametes by means of special conditions, foundations, and determiners which 
are present in unique, separate, and thereby independent ways”.449 
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The geneticists were, originally, aware of the ambiguous and fictitious character of these 
entities. The “gene”, therefore, amounted only to a concept of the first Mendelian research, 
which could not refer to any material entity and on which there was no undisputed 
agreement.
450
 However, in the 1930s, molecular biologists had already endowed the genes 
with material and real status: genes, as Fox Keller observed, were described as biological unit 
analogous to physical atoms and molecules, provided with a set of properties, which would 
supply an explanation of life phenomena.
451
 
This analogy often recurred in the arguments of the first molecular biologists and some 
physicists, who deemed that, even though with reserves, biological phenomena could be 
understood and explained by conventional concepts of physics.
452
 This convergence fitted 
with a common approach to investigate and describe physical and biological entities, which 
were broken up in their elementary units – atoms, molecules, cells, genes – in order to 
understand their functioning. As the genetist Lewontin noticed, this descriptive modality, 
defined “atomism”, is an integral part of modern science and “makes the atom or  individual 
the causal source of all the properties of larger collections”453 and prescribes a particular way 
of studying the world, breaking it up in its individual causative fragments, in order to analyse, 
then, its properties.
454
 The use of this analogy pinpoints that molecular biologists endorsed a 
particular descriptive model of biological organisms and signals the peculiarities of a research 
program, in which the fundamental structural unity represents also the explanatory and 
functional unit and in which the knowledge of the structure entails understanding the function.  
The gene, in that respect, constitutes a unifying concept for molecular biology: structural and 
functional unit, to which was conferred, since the 1920s, causal action, notwithstanding the 
absence of any knowledge about how it could act.
455
 It is apparently odd that a set of 
properties related to structure, function and causal action were fully ascribed to the same 
object: the gene. The concept of the gene, as the historian of science Rheinberger noted, has 
never been “unified and generalized”456 by molecular biologists. Conversely, there was “no 
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singular, unique, and rigidly determined usage of the term”457 in the relevant literature and 
the concept is, therefore, context dependent.
458
 
Since its introduction, however, the idea that these properties were localized into the gene had 
been linked to the confidence in its material reality. This assumption can partially be 
explained through the analogy with the atom. The explicative power of these entities, atoms 
and genes – interpreted, firstly, as hypothetical and, then, as real – originate from the 
mechanistic metaphor in which are embedded.  
Modern science and biology have accommodated the Newtonian and Cartesian metaphor of 
the world and organism as a clock/machine made out of gearwheels, whose knowledge 
entails the comprehension of the functioning of the whole clock/machine. Atoms, genes and 
molecules have been at the core of research programs, since they were considered 
fundamental units and, therefore, by definition, explanatory within the mechanistic metaphor. 
To these units were conferred, moreover, the property of stability. Their nature of “prime 
elements” validated the hypothesis of their stability. Although scientific research has showed 
that atoms undergo spontaneous transmutations and genes individual mutations, their 
structure has been always considered essentially stable. Genes have been related to the 
concept of immutability, since they secure hereditary continuity and have been studied 
mainly as causes of hereditary constancy.  
The publication, in 1944, of the conferences entitled “What is life?”459 held by quantum 
physicists Erwin Schrödinger had relevant role in fostering the incipient molecular biology 
program and encouraging a whole generation of physicists to reshape their view of biology. 
Explaining life meant, for Schrödinger, defining genetic structure. In “What is life?” he 
expounded one of the most influential genetic macromolecular models, in the 1940s: the so 
called Delbrück model.
460
  
Beyond these theoretical premises, molecular biology and genetics embraced and endorsed a 
specific conception of causality, which later became the core of its central dogma, formulated 
by Francis Crick in 1958:
461
 unidirectional causality, which implied “the rejection of any 
possible substantial influence over the genes from the intracellular and intercellular 
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environments”.462 Rather that thinking that between genes and environment could exist a 
feedback, namely a process of circular back-action, biologists deemed that the causal 
influence was linear: from DNA the information was transmitted to proteins and it could not 
overflow from these.
463
 Descriptive atomism calls for and prescribes a specific way to study 
the world, breaking it up in isolated fragments, but divides it into two separate autonomous 
and independent domains: the interior and the exterior.
464
  
The molecular view has, thus, maintained an interpretation of biological activities in which 
living organisms are determined by significant internal factors: the genes. This perspective 
implicitly excludes the theoretical relevance of a series of causal factors, which are positioned 
outside the space and time frames of gene action. As Fox Keller pointed out, this exclusion 
characterized the first phase of molecular biology, which was marked by the development of 
a framework focused on the discourse of “gene action”, which the geneticists referred to 
between the mid1920s and the 1960s as “the causal processes that connect the gene and the 
characters”.465 It has been observed that “for many years geneticists had little reason to refer 
to eggs and their cytoplasmatic structure and even less reason to talk about events before 
fertilization. The discourse of gene action has established a spatial map that lent to the 
cytoplasm scientific invisibility (…). and a temporal map that defined the moment of 
fertilization as origin with no meaningful time before fertilization. This schema offered 
neither time nor place in which to conceive of the egg’s cytoplasm as exerting its effects”.466 
The molecular physic-chemical approach ignored, as Kay clarified, the historical 
explanations of life processes, which are at the core of evolutionary and developmental 
biology. It, therefore, neglected the mechanisms of downward causation – implicitly 
overlooking their explanatory relevance – in order to focus on upward causation.467 
The avoidance, from the early molecular biology, of the historical accounts typical of the 
evolutionary approach championed a static and deterministic view of living organisms, seen 
“essentially” as the product of their genes. Lewontin observed that this perspective confers to 
genes and their action a metaphysical or almost metaphysical value.
468
 
Furthermore, the atomistic description of the biological processes can surreptitiously involve 
even a more questionable “corollary”: as genes determine individuals and individuals 
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compose society, genes determine society.
469
 Although genes can be considered as not strictly 
deterministic factors, the fact that molecular biology deemed the gene as the basic, if not 
exclusive, causal unit of hereditary characters has conferred the genes an extraordinary power 
of control over single organisms. Notwithstanding this power has been lessened and reduced 
by further genetic research, the dogmatic force of the discourse of “gene action” is still 
present and rhetorically effective. 
However, new data and information showed that genetic stability results from a dynamic 
process, but also the genetic function itself must be seen dynamically.  
Yet, the idea that the gene has a nearly absolute power to establish the biological identity of 
the individual is resilient and fundamental piece in scientific popularization narratives. The 
gene is, therefore, at the core of a paradox: although the scientific community does not see it 
as the structural, functional and causal unit, as in the past, however it still retains rhetorical 
power in numerous contexts, such as the ones linked to support new research programs or the 
patentability of new biotechnological products. 
Its rhetorical power is largely based on the idea of control and is connected to the original 
project of molecular biology, in which the possibilities of control provided by the field were 
functional to social control. Kay pointed out that the birth of molecular biology involved the 
promotion of a certain kind of science, whose form and content fitted perfectly with the 
dominative models inspired to the binomial “to know and make”,470 even though possible 
practical applications could not be fully envisaged at the time. The discovery, in the 1970s, of 
rDNA techniques, made the promises of genetic engineering concrete, but roused questions 
about the impact of molecular biology on society. 
 
2.2.2 Molecular Biology and the Information Paradigm: Metaphors and Analogies of 
Genetic Heredity 
Molecular biology has been a prolific field of analogies and metaphors on cells, molecules, 
genes and DNA. The physicist Erwin Schrödinger, illustrating the structure of the cell, 
introduced the analogy between chromosomes and code-script, which gained consensus 
during the process of gradual establishing of molecular biology as a research field: 
“In calling the structure of the chromosome fibres a code-script we mean that the all-
penetrating mind, once conceived by Laplace, to which every causal connection lay 
immediately open, could tell from their structure whether the egg would develop, 
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under suitable conditions, into a black cock or into a speckled hen, into a fly or a 
maze plant, a rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a woman. […]. But the term code-
script is, of course, too narrow. The chromosome structures are at the same time 
instrumental in bringing about the development they foreshadow. They are law-code 
and executive power – or, to use another simile, they are architect’s plan and builder’s 
craft – in one”.471 
The metaphoric of the “legibility” of the hereditary factors began to be affirmed through 
these brief considerations, full of implications, made by Schrödinger. Schrödinger was not 
the first physicist to draw upon the metaphor of the “text”. However, Schrödinger applied the 
metaphor of the code to a different object, to organic phenomena, and meant to explore the 
issue of the stability of genetic inheritance in relation to the action of the environment. In his 
discourse, the metaphor fulfills more an illustrative significance, but it achieved such a 
theoretical salience that, also at present, it seems to be unavoidable, even though its 
inadequacies have been remarked. 
The use of the metaphor of the code was marked by its novelty. This figure of speech, even 
though was already embedded in the metaphorical tradition of Galileo’s “book of nature”, 
embeds elements of originality. Longo observed that Schrödinger’s code-script is more 
similar to a “program”, in the sense of the computing sciences and, in particular of universal 
Turing machine, which was “at once program, compiler and operating system”.472 This idea 
still informs contemporary informatics, namely the idea of the program which is codified and 
transformed into data.
473
  
On the use of this metaphor, it has been observed that “by transferring the linguistic-symbolic 
nature of the notion of discrete code over a natural system, one obtains a structure of 
determination of Laplacian type”. 474  Laplace claimed that determination entails 
predictability.
475
 This view applied to hereditary factors, according to Blumenberg, implies 
that at the Laplacian conditions, “the whole genetic potential”476 is “like a state completely 
determined by a physical system, starting from which”477 the Laplacian demon can “predict 
by differential equations every other state of the system, equally in the past or in the future at 
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a given moment”.478 The demon would be able, as regards the chromosomes, to ascertain if 
“the egg will develop, at the right conditions, in a black cock or in a speckled hen”.479 The 
association of the term “code” to the chromosomes and the “Laplacian reader” suggests, thus, 
that the possible fulfillment of the de-codification of the information that they enclose would 
allow the biologist to gain a complete capability to predict the organism’s development. 
The Laplacian demon, as Blumenberg illustrated, can exert his omniscience, however, only 
on close systems. The “gene code”, nevertheless, is not a close system and cannot be 
connected to a set of causal factors inferable by the demon, as a text, as such, does not 
produce the state which describes or prescribes.
480
  
The analogy between the genetic heredity and the code introduced, therefore, in the discourse 
of molecular biology, a fundamental property of the code: the fact that programs, the kinds of 
data in computer systems are given in an exact and precise way and that this determination 
implies predictability.
481
 Longo remarked that the model of Laplacian intelligibility, with its 
pseudo-implications, gained consensus in biology.
482
 In the 1960s, the French biologists 
Francois Jacob and Jacques Monod still contrasted determination and causality and, thus, 
suggested again for the DNA the concept of program and the concept of determination as 
predictability.
483
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, this metaphor enlarged its repertoire of variations 
through the semantic hybridization of molecular biology with other fields. As Kay has 
explained “information, messages, texts, codes, cybernetic systems, programs, instructions, 
alphabets, words”484 are only some of the terms that recurred in the language of molecular 
biologists and altered the way in which biological phenomena were described in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The rhetoric power exercised by these metaphors can be understood analyzing the 
shift of meaning that the concept of chemical and biological specificity underwent.
485
 As Kay 
noted, at the beginning of the 20th century, the life sciences focused on the concept of 
specificity, which was considered within the discourse on the organization of the organisms 
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and microorganisms; however, some decades later, the word “information” seemed to have 
forced out any other rival reference in defining specificity.
486
 
Kay illustrated accurately how much the cybernetics promoted by Norbert Wiener and, 
particularly, the theory of communication developed by Robert Shannon influenced the 
metaphorics of molecular biology after Second World War.
487
 The new metaphors of the 
“legibility” are connected to the development of these areas of research and have been 
applied to genes, DNA (then to RNA) and the genome. 
“The genetic code”, as an autonomous object of investigation, is the result of a construction 
largely supported by the theory of information. Before molecular biology underwent, since 
1953 (the year of the publication of the article on the molecular structure of nucleic acids by 
Watson and Crick),
488
 the shift of its theoretical-explanatory axis of genetic heredity from 
proteins to DNA, it had already faced a process of re-orientation due to the sciences of 
communication, according to Kay.
489
 
The experience of the Second World War, in the United States, represented a watershed for 
scientific research, since in its aftermath and under the auspices of the Bush Report a new 
way of devising, funding and organizing scientific research was established, as well as links 
among industry, military power an academic world. The origins of the so-called “discourse of 
information”, which affected molecular biology in the second half of the 20th century, as Kay 
illustrated, is part of this complex weave of relations sustained by military research on 
machines and living organisms, which created the links among the theory of communication, 
artificial intelligence, cybernetics, control systems, genetics and theory of automata.
490
 From 
the intersection of these fields a new view of information emerged: information became seen 
and understood as a mere physical parameter, in which the distinctions between animate and 
inanimate worlds were undermined.
491
 Wiener’s work on cybernetics contributed to foster 
this perspective, as he argued that living organisms and human beings had to be understood in 
terms of information, but he made clear that the semantic aspects of communication were 
irrelevant.
492
 
The impact of Wiener’s cybernetics was relevant as it led to the redefinition of terms such as 
message, information, feedback and control, according to a new space of representation at the 
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intersection of physics, biology and the social sciences.
493
 However, it was only after 
Shannon elaborated his theory of communication, that information was intended as a physical 
quantity measured in bit (binary digit).
494
 
In the 1950s, molecular biology shifted its focus from proteins to DNA. As a result, the 
metaphor of “legibility” changed its object, according to the discourse of information. 
Information has been more and more linked to DNA and nucleic acids, conferring it a 
“privileged status” among organic molecules. This status was recognized in the “central 
dogma” of molecular biology formulated by Francis Crick in 1958: 
“This states that once ‘information’ has passed into protein it cannot get out again. In 
more detail, the transfer of information from nucleic acid to nucleic acid, or from 
nucleic acid to protein may be possible, but transfer from protein to protein, or from 
protein to nucleic acid is impossible. Information means here the precise 
determination of sequence, either of bases in the nucleic acid or of amino acid 
residues in the protein”.495 
Crick expressed and articulated the problem of protein synthesis as a flux of information and 
localized biological specificity in the sequence of nucleic acids pairs.
496
 All those that for a 
long time have been considered indisputable dogmas, in molecular biology, have been 
supported by the metaphor of the flux of information, whose implications have been wide and 
pervasive.    
 
2.2.3 From Genetics to Genomics: Molecular Biology after the Human Genome Project 
The metaphoric of information has contributed to back and stabilize models of biological 
specificity, which became well-established. The authority, gained by them, is proved by the 
dissemination and popularity of some locutions, which are, at present, part of everyday 
language. The expression “genetic code” recurs so often that can be considered a catachresis, 
namely a silent metaphor of which nobody is any more aware, when people are talking about 
genes, DNA and, in general, nucleic acids. 
Metaphors, which are largely endorsed, contribute to the construction of the social imaginary, 
so that questions about their introduction result vacuous or redundant, in comparison with 
their persuasive power. It has been observed that “what did the genes do before transferring 
                                                          
493
 ibid 78-91. 
494
 ibid 91-102. 
495
 Crick (n 461) 153. 
496
 Kay (n 484) 174-175. 
93 
 
information?” is a superfluous question, at present, when the conflation of the genome with 
information has been achieved.
497
 
Kay noted that the code “is, by definition, a relation, or a set of rules of transformation from 
plaintext to cryptogram”,498 but “neither a language nor a ‘thing’”.499 Yet, the connection 
between this word and the genes has contributed to sustain the “genetic code” as an object of 
theoretical study. The use of this metaphor contributed to confer reality to a theoretical entity: 
the genetic code. 
Although some scholars deem that the metaphors of information and, in particular “the code” 
have exhausted their heuristic function and, maybe, are just a scaffolding currently in 
dismantlement, as now it has been understood how the genome produce identical proteins, 
they still keep their rhetoric vitality. 
Other scholars
500
 remarked how many contemporary biologists still apply the metaphor of the 
code and program devised by Schrödinger, in order to illustrate the DNA, even though the 
Laplacian predictability which is linked to them, is rather doubtful. It has been noted that this 
use is even more unsuitable following the “de-codification” of the DNA of some animals. 
After all these attempts, it is still not possible to know how to connect the so called “wild 
DNA” with the normal phenotype. Moreover, the kind of circular feedback of the code, in 
physics, does not seem like the circularity of vital phenomena in biology. Longo pinpointed 
these kinds of problems, starting from the kind of circularity which is far more complex in 
the organisms, owing to the different levels of organization which are involved.
501
 
This complexity makes the relation between DNA and the development of the organism 
difficult to understand and, therefore, and undermines predictive chances at the molecular 
level.
502
 
The fulfillment of the Human Genome Project (HGP) offers some hints in order to account 
for the reasons why the metaphoric of information is so resilient, notwithstanding its manifest 
inconsistencies. The achievement of its main purpose, in 2000, namely the sequencing of the 
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human genome,
503
 arose some questions about the promises of its supporters and the concrete 
results that will actually follow. 
The Human Genome Project was defined as an international research project “whose goal 
was the complete mapping and understanding of all genes of human beings”.504 This simple 
definition, on the web site of the Program, already encompasses several metaphors, such as 
“de-ciphering” and “program”. 
This project arose in the mid-1980s, due to the initiative of American molecular biologist 
Robert Sinsheimer and the physicist Charles Di Lisi, who was at the time the Director of the 
Office of Health Environment at the United States Department of Energy (DOE).
505
 De Lisi 
and the Senator Pete Dominici drew the project to the political attention since 1987, in order 
also to re-launch the activity of some U.S. national laboratories, such as Los Alamos, 
Livermore and Lawrence Berkeley.
506
 Although the National Institutes of Health is the main 
federal agency devoted to research in the life sciences, the project was actively encouraged 
by the Department of Energy.
507
  
Following the political action undertook by Dominici, who in 1987 submitted a bill with the 
aim to revitalise research in national laboratories, through genomic research, the U.S. 
Congress decided to fund further research on the human genome at the NIH and DOE.
508
 
However, only after the publication of a favorable report by the National Research Council, 
in 1988, the project became more definite in its goals, phases and areas of competence. In the 
report, it was suggested to fund the project for a long-term, 15 years, with a sum amounting 
to $200 million and that the sum should be used in order to complete the mapping of human 
genome, as well as to develop technologies that could make the sequencing faster and less 
expensive.
509
 
In the meantime, in Europe, similar projects of research on the human genome had started. 
These projects had, then, been coordinated with the United States’ one through the Human 
Genome Organisation (HUGO), composed by scientists from all over the world.
510
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In 2000, the Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, together with the private company 
Celera Genomics presided by Craig Venter, announced that they completed the first 
assemblage of the sequence of DNA of the human genome.
511
 What was with emphasis 
called “the vision of the Grail”512 did not seem so far and, thus, justified the enormous 
amount of money spent for the project. However, Lewontin noted that these kinds of 
programs “are administrative and financial organisms, rather than research projects”.513 They 
require an amount of financial resources in order to sustain the vast network of research 
centers, as well as a considerable public consent. 
The metaphors of information have contributed to raise social support to back the project, in 
terms of public interest. If the DNA is described as the carrier of information, which is read 
by the cellular mechanism in the production process, like the code that must be de-cyphered 
in order to disclose its information, the inevitable prescriptive consequence is that this effort 
should be pursued without any postponement. The metaphor of the code embeds an implicit 
call for the reading, as far as scientists and society are concerned. 
The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment significantly concluded its report on mapping the 
human genome holding that “one of the strongest arguments for supporting human genome 
projects is that they will provide knowledge about the determinants of the human 
condition”514 and that scientists have backed it as they “will provide one of the most powerful 
tools humankind has ever had for deciphering the mysteries of its own existence”.515 
Similar points of view had been expressed, during the initial phase of the project, by the 
director of Science, Koshland, who drew openly the prescriptive consequence: denying or 
withdrawing support to this project, even though it was highly engaging, amounted to incur in 
the “immorality of  omission”, as it could have helped the poor and the infirm.516 One of the 
most eloquent examples of this combination of ill-concealed determinism, linked to an 
undisputed predictive potential, related to the de-codification of the human genome, was 
expressed by the well-known biochemist Walter Gilbert (one of the founders of Myriad 
Genetics, in 1991), when he illustrated the theoretical relevance of the project: 
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“What does that mean for biology? For example, if we were given a sequence data 
base of the human genome today, could we understand anything from it? The answer, 
I think, is yes; we could understand a tremendous amount. Today we learn a great deal 
about the functioning of genes by looking at the sequence of proteins they produce. 
For example there is a set of about a hundred thousand genes called oncogenes: each 
one identified as a DNA fragment, isolated from a tumor line or a tumor cell that will 
endow a normal cell with the ability to grow indefinitely”.517 
The grounds for the assumed predictability, that the knowledge of DNA should provide, rely 
on the construction of DNA as a “master molecule”, consistently promoted by the metaphors 
of information. Lewontin has insightfully observed that the most accurate description of 
DNA sees in the DNA the carrier of the information, which is read by the cell mechanism in 
the production process. However, the DNA has been immediately transformed in “blueprint”, 
“plan”, “master plan”, “master molecule”.518  
The ideological implications of this way of defining DNA are that the information, namely 
the relevant information, conflates with genome’s DNA and that its knowledge becomes 
knowledge of the specificity of organisms and their functioning. The scientists involved in 
the Human Genome Projected voiced their critique towards determinism. However, their 
utterances proliferate with references, which are implicitly deterministic.  
As Fox Keller remarked, if the technological progress made possible the HGP, “it was the 
concept of genetic disease that created the climate in which such a project could appear both 
reasonable and desirable”.519 The conversion of knowledge on the genome into therapeutic 
power turned out to be far more strenuous that its supporters envisaged. The HGP fostered 
the emergence of “genetic predictive medicine”, which allows quantifying the probability of 
getting a disease, but does not provide, in most cases, therapeutic solutions.  
The metaphoric of legibility, therefore, far from representing a theoretical scaffolding in 
dismantling, is recurrently invoked in order to socially justify research projects. The HGP 
represents one of the most exemplary cases of a certain use of the rhetoric of information. 
The wide appeal of the “book of life”, by now identified with DNA and the genome, has 
proved pivotal in the construction of a special imaginary of life, with the aim to promote 
public consensus towards the project. 
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2.3 The Origins of Biotechnology: Narratives of Continuity and Novelty  
The history of biotechnology has been at the core of alternative and contrasting kinds of 
narratives: narratives of continuity and narratives of novelty, which are relevant in order to 
support and maintain particular frames about what is biotechnology and its social 
implications. 
The origins of biotechnology, according to the former kind of narratives, are remote. Record 
of biotechnology can be traced back to primordial human civilization, when agriculture and 
livestock began to be developed.
520
 The chronicles embedded in biotechnology textbooks 
illustrate that in Mesopotamia, already in 6000 B.C., beer was produced by processes of 
fermentation, which entailed the use of microorganisms and in Egypt rising bread was 
prepared since 4000 B.C.
521
 The history of biotechnology, therefore, is studded with a series 
of practices in which it is possible to see a nexus of diachronic continuity: from fermentation 
linked to food production to the utilization of agricultural surplus in order to produce biomass 
and to intensive agriculture and breeding.
522
 These techniques are encompassed in the 
concept of “traditional biotechnology”, which differs from innovative biotechnology for its 
empirical character and a less scientific and technological dimension. 
“Innovative biotechnology” is, conversely, marked by a “solid scientific and cognitive 
foundation, which draws upon several scientific disciplines”523  coupled with “a likewise 
strong practical and planning activity”.524 Although innovative biotechnology is characterized 
by these elements of novelty, it still keeps a bond with its traditional version. Both of them 
have been engaged in research on microorganisms. 
This kind of description has been influential. It recurs in biotechnological course books,
525
 
historical monographs and patent biotech textbooks. It involves a prescriptive corollary: as 
biotechnological practices are not radically new and do not constitute a departure from 
technics already used, they should not entail substantially different risks for human beings, 
animals and the environment. They do not need, therefore, a special regulation. Although the 
existence of a “frontier” zone, in biotechnology, which arise ethical problems, as well as 
issues concerning communication with the public, is recognized, it is pointed out that the vast 
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majority of bio-processes and bio-pharmaceuticals of the present biotechnology industry has 
not roused objections nor fostered social alarm.
526
 
A series of alternative narratives recount a different history of biotechnology, centered on its 
irreducible novelty in the scenario of scientific research and industrial production. 
According to the latter, the development, in the 1970s, of recombinant DNA techniques and 
the need recognized by the scientific community to control the risks arising from the latest 
application of molecular biology have been fundamental in constructing a social image of 
contemporary biotechnology as a “technology of the future”. The use of this image, largely 
employed also in the political and institutional context, entails the open recognition of the 
“innovative nature” of a whole field of research: “technologies of the future” are only those 
with a high growth potential and which are envisaged with an effective power to transform 
society. 
As proof of the character historically “revolutionary” of biotechnology has been advanced a 
series of events culminated in the international Asilomar Conference on recombinant DNA, 
held in 1975, and, afterwards, in the approval, on 23 June 1976, of the first Recombinant 
DNA Research Guidelines by the U.S. National Institutes of Health
527
 (the regulatory model 
which inspired also regulation in the European states).
528
 
Although some scientists, already in the 1960s, expressed concerns about the developments 
of molecular biology, the risks related to genetic engineering emerged as major focus of 
scientific debate afterwards. In the early 1970s, a group of researchers leaded by Paul Berg 
was able to create a DNA hybrid molecule, by using DNA from the bacterial virus lambda 
and the Simian Virus 40 (SV40), which triggers tumours in rodents.
529
 The aim of the 
experiment was to introduce new genes into mammalian cells by utilizing SV40, in order to 
understand how foreign DNA was expressed in them.
530
 After this first attempt, Berg and his 
colleagues decided to postpone the final phase of the experiment, as its effects could not be 
predictable and controllable. 
It has been illustrated that the first doubts on the safety of research on rDNA had been voiced 
only at the Gordon Conference on the nucleic acids, in 1973,
531
 which resulted in the 
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publication of the “Berg Letter”, which recommended postponing type II and III experiments 
until a better assessment of risks could be made.
532
 The “Berg Letter”, therefore, proposed a 
voluntary moratorium for these kinds of experiments in order to develop adequate 
precautionary measures and asked the National Institutes of health to draft guidelines for 
people working with potentially harmful rDNA molecules.
533
 
During the second Asilomar Conference on recombinant DNA technology, held on 24-27 
February 1975, had been agreed the principles of the first regulatory phase: rDNA research 
should be classified according to levels of risk (fundamentally four levels, from P1 to P4), to 
which corresponded different levels of physical and biological containment.
534
 This 
Conference, which was attended mostly by invited scientists together with a restricted group 
of legal scholars and journalists, has marked the history of biotechnology.  
It has been noted that “the risks that preoccupied scientists at Asilomar were biological, 
conceived in terms of possible harm to human health and the environment through the 
unchecked spread of undesired genes. Participating scientists worried about the introduction 
of dangerous traits, for antibiotics resistance or toxin formation, for instance, into molecules 
that might prove unexpectedly hard to contain within the lab or within the altered 
organism”.535 Moral and social issues fell outside from their concerns, even though some 
scientist and activists deemed they should be dealt with.
536
 Research on rDNA, which later 
became the scientific and technological platform for producing and commercializing 
biotechnological products, according to Asilomar’s scientists, was more marked by the 
novelty of its risks than by ethical and political questions that it could pose to society. 
 
2.3.1 Narratives of Continuity: From Zymotechnology to Biotechnology  
The historian of science Robert Bud, in his monograph The Uses of Life. A History of 
Biotechnology, provides an accurate example of a narrative of continuity, whose effect is the 
normalization of biotech revolutionary potential, by bringing it back to ancient fermentation 
processes and linking the development of “zymothechnology”, in the 20th century, to these 
remote methods.
537
 A brief account of his narrative is examined in this section, in order to 
show that narratives of continuity entail the normalization of the technology they refer to and 
the institutional places where this research is made. 
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Bud illustrated that the word “zimotechnology”, which embeds the Greek root “zyme”, 
namely leaven, refers to any kind of industrial fermentation, such as the production of beer 
and citric acid and leather tanning.
538
 A pre-existing term “zymotecnia”539 was coined in the 
17th century by Prussian physician Georg Ernst Stahl, in order to name the study of practical 
fermentation.
540
 Zymotecnia might become, according to Stahl, the fundamental science that 
could promote the growth of one of the most important German industries: the production of 
beer.
541
 Stahl wished that the scientific knowledge of fermentation processes could be used 
for industrial and commercial purposes and endorsed a specific concept of chemistry, which 
entailed a bond between scientific and empirical analysis with practical application.
542
 
Bud explains that the meaning of zymotechnology would merge into biotechnology.
543
 He 
pinpoints that between 1917 and 1919 the term “biotechnology”544 was, firstly, coined and 
used by Karl Ereky, a Hungarian agrarian engineer, who became Food Minister during the 
counter-revolutionary Horthy government.
545
 “Biotechnology” referred to a modernization 
project of agriculture and pork breeding in Hungary. Ereky aimed to organize a capitalistic 
agricultural industry on scientific basis and his biotechnological scientific approach consisted 
of the series of processes through which raw materials could be biologically improved.
546
 The 
word “biotechnology”, therefore, was related to the qualitative transformation and the 
increase of raw materials on industrial scale. Within some years, the term became established, 
even though the word “biotechnics” was preferred by some scholars.547 
The science, that Stahl deemed could have great practical possibilities, was according to Bud 
the joining link between traditional biotechnology and contemporary one. In order to 
understand this transition, it is useful to note that the term “biotechnology” appeared, when 
zymotechnology turned from agrarian technology to scientific application, namely when it 
began to incorporate several biological perspectives.
548
 Biotechnology, as a field, drew upon 
the legacy of zymotechnology. Both disciplines fostered the intertwining of different 
biological sciences, such as bacteriology, microbiology and, in 1950s, molecular biology. 
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Moreover, elements of continuity can be traced back at the institutional level. In some 
European countries the institutes established in order to study fermentation processes had 
been involved also in modern biotechnological research. For example, the German Institut für 
Gärungsgewerbe had a pivotal role in promoting biotechnology in Germany, in the 1960s. 
However, also the Institut Pasteur, in Paris, played a salient part in sustaining 
biotechnological research on recombinant DNA.
549
 
In his account, therefore, biotechnology is viewed in terms of continuity. Although the 
methods and processes applied could differ, substantially he does not envisage them as 
eliciting a solution of continuity within biotechnology, even though he acknowledges that it 
underwent significant changes.
550
 
 
2.3.2 Narratives of Novelty: Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering  
The analysis of the meaning of biotechnology and its political, social and cultural 
implications has to take into account its definitions and how they have been constructed. Its 
definitions, in fact, show the kind of narrative about biotechnology: “technology of the past” 
or “technology of the future”, field of research or industrial activity, normal or innovative 
intervention, risky processes or controllable ones. The descriptive elements are embedded in 
a narrative frame, with prescriptive implications for institutions and society. The law is one of 
the fields more affected by the construction of these frames. These frames are significant, as 
they suggest whether a technology entails risks or not, if regulating it is suitable or not, if its 
products fall within the definition of patent eligible matter and what kind of policy should be 
devised and implemented. However, the narratives paths are not so linear, as this section will 
show. 
Several are the definitions of biotechnology proposed by international and national 
institutions. “Biotechnology”, according to the OECD, is “the application of scientific and 
engineering principles to the processing of materials by biological agents to provide goods 
and services”.551 This definition, which dates back to 1982, was based on the one offered by 
the Biosociety Group of the FAST (Forecasting and Assessment in Science and Technology) 
unit, which was established by the European Commission in 1979, that pointed out the 
promising technologies and sectors involved: 
                                                          
549
 ibid 21. 
550
 ibid 189-218. 
551
 OECD, Biotechnology – International Trends and Perspectives, 1982, 
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/biotech/2097562.pdf>,1, 18-19. 
102 
 
“The meaning that is most widely accepted is that it is the industrial processing of 
materials by microorganisms and other biological agents to provide desirable products 
and services. It incorporates fermentation and enzyme technology, water and waste 
treatment, and some aspects of food technology”.552 
The central theme which brings together the two descriptions is the concept of 
“transformation” of raw materials at the industrial level, namely the economic dimension of 
this activity devoted to the production of goods and services. In addition to it, is made a 
reference to the material means of transformation – microorganisms and other biological 
agents – and to the techniques of genetic engineering as a resource for expanding 
biotechnological production. 
Several features, which were in Ereky’s definition of the 1910s, 553  are embedded in it: 
notably the scientific-technological dimension of biotechnology. These definitions, however, 
are the milestones of a path undertook in the 1970s and, then, pursued in the 1980s, which led 
to the extension and improvement of biotechnologies and the fulfillment of most of their 
industrial and commercial promises. They convey, therefore, the institutional 
acknowledgement that biotechnology had a high economic potential for industry. 
Beyond this narrative, however, other ways of interpreting the meaning and implications of 
biotechnology had been formulated, centered on the innovative character of genetic 
engineering. In 1984, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment published a Report entitled 
“Commercial Biotechnology: An International Analysis”. The Report distinguishes “the old 
biotechnology” from “the new biotechnology”, explaining that the discovery and application 
of rDNA techniques and cell fusion accounted for it.
554
 
The expression “new industrial revolution” largely used in the 1970s, when biotechnology 
became one of the major areas of policy interest, at the European Community and state levels, 
well expresses the promises which it in an industrial modernization perspective. The 
discourse of “modernization” has been very influential in promoting biotechnology as a 
“technology of the future”, together with information technologies. 
Gottweis
555
 and Wright
556
 illustrated how the institutional debate on biotechnology has been 
inscribed in Europe, at the national and Community level, in the perspective of international 
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competitiveness and modernization, as far as declining scientific research and industrial 
sectors were concerned. The European policies on genetic engineering in the aftermath of the 
Second World War had been marked, notably in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, 
by the awareness of the backwardness of European scientific research in molecular biology 
and of the United States’ worldwide superiority in the field.557 
The prospect of modernization contributed to back the narrative of the innovative character of 
biotechnology. Nevertheless, this narrative also relied on the new representation that rDNA 
techniques involved.  
The innovative potential of a technology can be “normalized” by bringing it back in the circle 
of previous technologies whose risks have been already assessed and regulated. As a result, 
the technology does not require any special regulation. However, if the revolutionary feature 
of the technology is recognized, as well as some new potential risks, it will follow the need to 
deal with and manage these risks. The policy of biotechnology was affected by these issues. 
One of the main divergences regarded the “process approach” or the “product” approach, 
which was at the core of the contrast between EEC (at present European Union) and the 
United States. Under the former approach, biotechnology is understood as a technological 
process, which solicits a special political and legal attention owing to its new inner 
characteristics; under the latter, conversely, it is considered as “an innocuous means to obtain 
products, which can be assessed pursuing to already existing regulatory principles”. 558 
Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms represents 
an eloquent example of the “process approach”, as the control to which it refers to regards all 
genetically modified organisms, not single products. This kind of choice is also important as 
far as the legislative EU competence is concerned, namely the drafting of regulatory bills. 
Genetically modified organisms fall within a unique horizontal legislative mandate of the DG 
XI, whose General Council, which deals with the environment, drafted the two most 
important directives on biotechnology (even though in collaboration and competition with the 
DG XII, whose focus is research). 
The alternative between “process approach” and “product approach”, which are two different 
ways of framing, implies as well a selection between horizontal or vertical legislation. A staff 
member of the Green Party in the European Parliament, in a briefing cited by Gottweis, 
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pointed out that these were crucial choices in the biotechnological debate:
559
 “Should the 
products of the new biotechnology be regulated on the basis of the process by which they 
were manufactured, requiring a new set of laws covering all GMOs, no matter of their 
function (horizontal legislation)? Or is it the process by which something is manufactured 
irrelevant as far as the legislation is concerned? According to this view, regulation should 
only be concerned with the end product (vertical legislation) and for that, the existing laws 
need only be slightly adapted to cover GMOs”.560 
Fundamental regulatory choices can change in time. As it has been illustrated,
561
 Directive 
2001/18/CE, which superseded Directive 90/220/CEE on the deliberate release of GMOs, 
introduced a new regulatory regime, in which single products derived from GMOs are 
regulated by vertical or sectorial provisions, which regard the n categories of products. 
These basic choices seem apparently technical, but involve an axiological dimension, as in 
situations of scientific uncertainty they can strike a different balance among biotechnological 
production, citizens’ and animal health and environment protection. 
What has been called “the micropolitics of meaning” 562  emerges through the complex 
systems of representation that derive from different sectors, such as technoscience, medicine, 
economics, law, which shape the semantics of a field. Biotechnology has been at the core of 
this kind of micropolitics.  
It is worth noting that, at present, to the term “biotechnology” is preferred the more 
reassuring expression “life sciences”. After the 1990s, when some political choices about 
biotechnology were challenged at the European level, as well as in some states, the word 
“biotechnology” seems compromised. In the reconstruction of twenty-five years of debate on 
biotechnology in Europe, a group of sociologists remarked that, paradoxically, exactly when 
the commercial advent of biotechnology has become inescapable, the companies working in 
the sector has begun to abandon its use, owing to a negative sense which is associated to it.
563
 
The preference for the new locution “life sciences”, in order to designate the whole 
productive field, in fact evokes calmer, less conflicting sceneries of medical applications. 
This preference has also marked the language of legal monographs concerning the intellectual 
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property on biotech inventions, where “life sciences” has substituted, in the title and in the 
text, the compromised word “biotechnology”.564 
Gottweis noticed that the history of biotechnology highlights a specific mode of representing 
the past by the dominant biotechnology narratives: in an ahistorical way or in monologically 
historical one. Ahistorical narratives present biotechnology as a “technology of the future”, 
whose potential will be fulfilled in a distant unspecified time, whereas the monological 
narratives represent it as “stemming from a long tradition, with beer and cheese production as 
‘forerunners’ of genetic engineering”.565 In these kinds of narratives there are significant 
omissions, which will be accounted for in the next chapters. 
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Chapter Three 
Imaginaries of Intellectual Property: Patenting Microorganisms and Organisms 
 
3.1 A Matter of Metaphors, a Matter of Narratives 
As set out in the Introduction, the main research hypothesis of this thesis is that the use of 
metaphors in patent case law, because of the analogies that they entail, proved pivotal in 
defining the nature of biotech patent claims and settling the boundaries of what is natural and 
artificial in the United States, Canada and under the EPC.  
This chapter will show that the recourse to the metaphors of the machine and molecule 
entailed, as chapter two has illustrated (section 2.2.1), an atomistic and reductionist view of 
life which allowed qualifying new rDNA biotechnological products as patent eligible in the 
U.S. and Canada.  Their use, together with other relevant factors that will be explained, has 
substantially contributed to enlarging the scope of patent eligible matter in both countries.  
Although in these two countries the statutory definition of patentable subject matter is alike, 
patent examiners and courts drew its scope in different ways and according to distinct 
narratives. 
It will be shown that, in Europe, the EPO’s Boards did not resort to metaphors in order to 
define transgenic animals, but relied on a molecular view of life that did back the patent 
eligibility of cells isolated and/purified. 
The analysis carried out in this chapter, in addition, will illustrate that the recourse to 
particular narratives have contributed to support and champion these metaphors in specific 
national contexts and settle a particular view about the nature and ontology of biotech 
products. 
This chapter and the following ones will, therefore, address the main research hypothesis of 
the thesis, namely whether the scope of the definition of “patentable subject matter” and 
“invention” have been analogically expanded, by drawing on metaphors in judicial patent 
decisions.  
The analogical interpretation of the definitions provided by national, regional and 
international patent law entail several legal problems, which involve the general theory of the 
law and the criteria of legal interpretation in different legal systems and, as far as patent 
decisions are concerned, the descriptive and prescriptive dimensions of technoscientific and 
legal definitions, which are embedded in statutory and case law.  
In order to account for whether and how analogical reasoning through metaphors extended 
the meaning of patent eligible matter and shaped the boundaries of what is “natural” and 
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“artificial”, these chapters will examine the main landmark cases which marked the way in 
which these categories and concepts have been understood and devised since the 1970s. 
Despite these cases having been widely commented on and analysed by legal scholars for 
their relevance as case law, their analogical and metaphorical dimensions have never been 
examined in their assumptions and implications for the general theory of legal interpretation. 
A thorough and contextual examination of these cases questions the meaning and role of 
analogy and metaphor in different legal systems, such as common law and civil law ones, as a 
means of integration and interpretation of the law. 
These landmark patent decisions and the arguments that they set out will be considered and 
studied according to the narrative framework illustrated in chapter one, as “narratives” 
providing and fostering descriptive/prescriptive frames about biotechnology and its products, 
which must be viewed within the context of national, regional and international wider 
narratives about its risks and benefits.  
The cases that will be examined in this chapter and in the following ones concern GM 
microorganisms and organisms, as well as chimeric cells, GM seeds and plants, human 
biological materials and genes, as isolated elements of the body. They are all focused on the 
definition of “patentable subject matter" and “invention” and marked the ways in which 
collectivities imagine what life and nature are, what is attainable through biotechnology and 
how individuals and groups understand their own identity.  
The narrative analysis of these cases will substantiate the main hypothesis of the thesis, 
namely that the arguments affirmed in these decisions drew on a large repertoire of 
metaphors and analogies, which by defining the nature of the claimed invention shaped the 
scope of patentable subject matter. Most of the metaphorical expressions employed in these 
landmark decisions suggest and argue that patent claimed living microorganisms and 
organisms should be considered in their molecular/atomistic dimension, not as forms of life. 
Some of the metaphors and analogies used in judicial arguments are well-established in 
scientific fields and their laboratory practices, such as molecular biology and genetics, as 
illustrated in chapter two. These metaphors reframed the meaning and scope of patent eligible 
matter, but also oriented sociotechnical imaginaries of life, because they have promoted in 
these patent systems a social perspective of life, linked to the development of biotechnology, 
which is inherently molecular and reductionist. 
Genetically modified microorganisms, GMOs, DNA sequences, genes and embryonic stem 
cells have been at the core of a process of molecularization of life, namely a mode of defining, 
regarding and handling life in molecular terms, which was maintained by metaphors and 
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analogies embedded in the arguments that judges developed in their decisions on patents. 
These decisions defined the legal status of claimed inventions and also impinged on the 
definition of the “nature” and ontology of the kinds of products and methods involved. In 
deciding whether these kinds of biotechnological products might fall within the definition of 
“patent subject matter” or “invention”, patent examiners and judges largely drew upon a 
repertoire of metaphors which are embedded in the patent system as general statutory classes, 
have been supported as appropriate definitions of the “nature” of the invention by the 
scientific community and are socially shared and endorsed. However, the definition of these 
inventions, which resulted from the co-production between technoscience and law in patent 
litigation, has influenced how collectivities and individuals think of life (in molecular and 
atomistic terms) and their view about what is natural and artificial. 
Opening up the metaphorical and analogical dimensions of the arguments articulated by 
judges allows understanding of what extent descriptive and normative issues are entangled in 
sustaining and stabilizing the meaning of molecular biotech products as “patent eligible 
matter” and how it affected and devised contemporary sociotechnical imaginaries of life. 
The perspective that will be applied in order to analyse the metaphors used in legal discourse, 
in order to establish the patentability of biotech products, is centered on “conceptual 
metaphor” and was developed by the cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in 
the seminal monograph “Metaphors We Live By”,566  in which they argued that metaphor 
should be interpreted as “metaphorical concept”. This theory of metaphor and its entailments 
have been illustrated in chapter one.  
In scrutinizing the meaning and use of the metaphors applied in the case law concerning 
patent eligible matter, particular attention will be devoted to the underlying analogy that they 
convey. In this effort, the analysis of the narratives in which metaphors are embedded proves 
to be crucial, as they elaborate the metaphor and clarify its use. Moreover, the plot and 
discourse of judicial and technoscientific narratives serves to support and justify metaphors 
and, therefore, its study accounts for their settlement in patent legal discourse. 
 
3.2 Narrating Origins in the United States of America: Diamond v. Chakrabarty  
As Jasanoff pointed out, science and the law are at the forefront of making sense and order of 
emerging technologies.
567
 When several recombinant DNA (“rDNA”) biotechnological 
experiments were conducted in the 1970s, science (and the scientific community) and the law 
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(the legislators, judges and administrative agencies), had to define what this technology was, 
the kind of regulatory framework that should be devised for it, whether it ought to be 
centered on “process”, “product” or “programme”,568 whether it entailed risks and if the 
products and processes involving rDNA fell within the definition of “patentable subject 
matter” or “invention” and, therefore, could be patented.569 Although these issues may seem 
mostly descriptive, since they offer possible answers to “what a technology is”, they all 
embed a prescriptive dimension: defining what a new technology “is” involves a series of 
decisions about the “ought”. These two dimensions are intertwined and the definition, 
framing, assessment and management of the technology and its risks is a complex process of 
co-production between science and the law, in which  intellectual property plays a 
fundamental role, and hinges on the political and regulatory culture.
570
 
In this regard, Jasanoff noted that that “science and the law wield enormous power in 
society” 571  as they are the “prime custodians of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ of human 
experience”, 572  since they play a part “in deciding how things are in the world, both 
cognitively and materially”.573 
Patent law and examiners, as well as judicial courts, have been involved early in the process 
of defining, as far as intellectual property’s categories were concerned, whether the inventive 
products and processes of the “new biotechnology”, which was applying genetic engineering, 
could fit into the existing concepts of statutory patent eligible matter or patentable invention. 
At the time, however, specific statutory rules regarding the patentability of biotechnological 
inventions or guidelines in order to assess them did not exist, in the nation-states where the 
first patent applications were filed. Patent examiners and judges, therefore, had to face some 
of these issues and decide about the legal status of these products and processes. Their 
decisions and practices have shaped the boundaries of “patent eligible matter” and the scope 
of patent protection.  Most of these decisions rest on metaphors, which supported and 
validated analogies between inorganic and organic matter, between microorganisms and 
organisms, between genes and molecules or genes and information. Metaphors proved to be 
fundamental in fostering the patent eligibility of genetically modified microorganisms and 
GMOs and also challenging it.  
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In the United States, the patent case which shaped future decisions on the patent eligibility of 
the products of “genetic engineering” has been the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
(“Chakrabarty”),574 decided on 16 June 1980 by the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
case concerned the patentability of bacteria of the genus Pseudomonas, modified by applying 
molecular techniques (not rDNA technology), having multiple compatible energy-generating 
plasmids containing degradative pathways for different components of hydrocarbons.
575
 The 
patent application (Application serial No. 260,563) was filed on 7 June 1972 and entitled 
“Microorganisms Having Multiple, Compatible Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids 
and Preparation thereof” by Dr Ananda Chakrabarty, a scientist working for General Electric 
at the time. Although the patent examiner admitted the patentability of some of the claims, he 
denied a patent on the microorganisms, rejecting claims 7-9, 13, 15, 17, 21, and 22-26, on 
two grounds: that they were living things and products of nature, therefore they did not fall 
within the definition of patentable subject matter pursuant to Title 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
Title 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title”. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) reversed the decision 
twice and, finally, a 5 to 4 majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the CCPA’s decision, 
holding that “A live, human-made micro-organism, is patentable subject matter under § 101” 
and that Chakrabarty’s micro-organism was a ‘ manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ 
within that statute.
576
 
The opinion of the majority, delivered by Justice Burger, conveys a narrative of the origins 
of the U.S. patent system and the United States as a nation centered on progress, which 
justified a broad interpretation of the definition of “patentable subject matter” under Title 35 
U.S.C. § 101. It is a narrative centered on a rendition of the beginnings, which is linked to a 
contemporary development of them and carries legal descriptive/prescriptive conclusions, 
which are consistent with the view of progress purported by the majority. 
Justice Burger, first, recalled Art. 1 § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution of the United States as 
the foundation of U.S. patent system, pointing out that it granted Congress “broad power” to 
legislate to “promote the Progress of Science and of the useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
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Discoveries”.577 The interpretation of this clause has been crucial, in the decision, to devise a 
narrative of collective progress centered on expanding the scope of patentable subject matter, 
in order to promote research and social access to the innovative products of genetic 
engineering. 
The promotion of the progress of science by granting to inventors intellectual property rights, 
under article 1 § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, entailed for the majority “a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the 
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our 
citizens”.578 
Justice Burger, then, set the boundaries of the case, by limiting it to the statutory 
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and clarifying that the words would “be interpreted as 
taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning”.579 In constructing its meaning the 
majority relied on the dictionary’s definition of “manufacture” and “composition of matter”, 
deemed consistent with their common usage.  
Justice Burger explained that the term “manufacture” means “the production of articles for 
use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, 
properties or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery”, 580  whereas 
“composition of matter” denotes “all compositions of two or more substances and (…) all 
composite articles, whether they be the result of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or 
whether they be gases, fluids, powder or solids”.581 Moreover, he pointed out that these 
“expansive” terms were modified by the comprehensive “any” and they should, therefore, be 
given wide scope. 
The statutory interpretation of section 101, however, hinged on the narrative of the origins, 
whose preamble of the beginnings was further unfolded by the majority. 
Justice Burger, after providing a literal construction of the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
combined it with a reconstruction of the legislative history, namely the intention of the 
legislator. By highlighting the similarity of the definition of patentable subject matter in the 
Patent Act of 1793 with § 101, he argued that section 101 ought to be interpreted broadly. In 
order to support this conclusion, he invoked the authority of Thomas Jefferson, one of the 
founding fathers of U.S. democracy, Secretary of State and member of the first Patent Board 
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under Act of 10 April 1790 and considered, as such, the first administrator of the patent 
system and the first patent examiner.
582
  
In particular, the Patent Act of 1793, which was authored by him, was deemed to be inspired 
by his philosophy, according to which “ingenuity should receive liberal encouragement”.583 
The same language and philosophy were, then, tied to all the following patent statutes 
enacted in 1836, 1870 and 1874.
584
 It should be noted that in the Jeffersonian mythology,
585
 
which has been illustrated by Waltersheid and was largely recalled by the majority, Jefferson 
was also credited to have incorporated the locution “composition of matter” in the 1793 
Act.
586
 
The narrative reaches its narrative climax, when the majority held that “the Committee 
Reports accompanying the 1952 act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter 
to include ‘anything under the sun that is made by man’”.587 This phrase, which at present 
epitomizes the United States’ view of what is patent eligible, was referred to Congress’ 
intention. It was, rather, used during the hearings by Pasquale Federico, at the time the 
examiner in chief of the USPTO. During the hearings before subcommittee No. 3 of the 
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives on the bill H.R.3760 to revise and 
codify the laws related to patents and the patent office, P. J. Federico, who was one of main 
promoters of the codification and the Examiner in Chief, was asked to give an explanation of 
the background of the bill and any information related to the patent laws. In addressing the 
content of § 101, Federico commented: “Now under section 101 a person may have invented 
a machine or manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man, 
but it may not necessarily be patentable unless the conditions are fulfilled”.588 
Federico’s remark expressed possibility and contingency, however, the abridged phrase 
referred to by the Court is more inclusive and solemn. The phrase is imbued with biblical 
solemnity, as it is the reversal of a verse in the biblical book Qohelet or Ecclesiastes 1:9, 
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according to which “What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; 
there is nothing new under the sun”.589 This phrase has become a kind of adage in the English 
language. It is listed among the proverbs in the Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs.
590
 
However, whereas in Qohelet the term “under the sun” is linked 8 times to the verb of labour 
(“amal”) and 9 times to the verb “make”591 in order to point out the uselessness of human 
efforts and troubles, in Justice Burger’s opinion, anything under the sun that is made by man, 
conversely, affirms and stands for the endless human creative technoscientific potential and 
its usefulness, which deserves to be rewarded with a patent. 
The majority did not acknowledge therefore that, with this broad interpretation of §101, it 
was reshaping the boundaries of patentable subject matter. Nevertheless, since its re-
definition seemed limitless, the majority made clear that section 101 still retained some limits: 
the laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas ought not to be held patentable. 
Justice Burger reaffirmed the so called “product of nature” doctrine,592 under which these 
three kinds are considered discoveries and, as such, “manifestations of nature, free to all men 
and reserved exclusively to none”.593 
Eisenberg pointed out that the doctrine retained considerable vitality before the Supreme 
Court in the 1970s,
594
 but Chakrabarty awaked its potential, since afterwards it has become 
one of the main grounds to establish the boundaries of what is natural and artificial within the 
patent system in the United States. 
Under Title 35 U.S.C. § 101, however, discoveries are not legally and epistemically 
distinguished from inventions, as far as their patent eligibility is concerned. It was, rather, the 
majority’s opinion in Chakrabarty that set forth these boundaries, by holding that: 
“This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable. […] Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in 
the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his 
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celebrated law that E=mc
2
: nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such 
discoveries are ‘manifestations of nature free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none’”.595 
Justice Brenner, finally, relied on the mechanistic metaphor which is embedded in section 
101, namely that the microorganism was a bio-artefact,
596
 alike to a machine or a 
manufacture, to sustain its patentability, as it was “a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature”.597  
Section 101 U.S.C., as far as products are concerned, is informed to a mechanistic model of 
invention, which entails two features: the invention must be to a certain degree “man-made” 
and consist of parts. These features are related to the meaning of the three general concepts of 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter set out in §101. The term “machine” is 
defined in the Oxford Dictionary as “an apparatus using mechanical power and having 
several parts, each with a definite function, and together performing a particular task”.598 
 “Machine, manufacture and composition of matter” are categories that, in modern patent law, 
largely reflect the kinds of inventions that the patent system was envisaged to offer 
intellectual property protection: mainly mechanical artefacts. This kind of protection has been 
extended, later, to chemical inventions and finally to microorganisms and higher life forms, 
as well as genes.  However, this process of extension of IP protection, by subsuming new 
kinds of inventions under these general concepts, occurred under the aegis of the mechanistic 
model of invention which is embedded in the definition of “patentable subject matter” or 
“invention” in several countries, such as the U.S. and Canada. This model implicitly requires 
the atomization and molecularization of inventions, in order to make them patentable. 
The narrative unfolded by the majority shows that the court made sense and order of this 
biotech invention reshaping the boundaries of the natural and artificial by drawing on the 
mechanistic metaphor, a move which allowed it to elude all the issues about the liveliness of 
the claimed invention. 
Justice Burger, moreover, dismissed as irrelevant the concerns on the potential risks related to 
genetic research products and the particular responsibility of the judges in deciding on this 
case in the name of scientific determinism, which conflates with economic determinism. He 
argued that: “The grant or denial of patents on microorganisms is not likely to put an end to 
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genetic research or its attendant risks. The large amount of research that has already occurred 
when no researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests 
that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from 
probing into the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides”.599  
The reference to the famous story about the Medieval Danish king Cnut the Great, is 
insightful about the approach of the majority, which disclaimed the responsibility and power 
of the court in deciding on the matter of the case.  
According to the legend, King Cnut or Canute “sat enthroned on a beach and commanded the 
waves to go back, thus receiving wet feet for his trouble”.600 This story was, first, narrated in 
the second quarter of the twelfth century in the Historia Anglorum by Henry of 
Huntingdon
601
 and, as the historian Timothy Bolton explained, must be examined in the 
context of the tales of Anglo-Saxon saints who could control nature. Although the story has 
been truncated in most modern retellings and interpreted throughout the centuries in different 
ways, either as a prideful
602
 or foolish act or as an act of humility,
603
 it is focused on 
reminding a ruler that “his power is nothing before God and the Church”.604 
By recalling this story in relationship with the grant or denial of patents on microorganisms, 
the majority displayed humbleness in settling a significant dispute as to the future 
patentability of biotech products, but eluded the responsibility and power related to any 
“legislative or judicial fiat” on the matter. By enshrining a deterministic view of scientific 
progress, the judges of the majority disguised and concealed the power and authority of any 
legal and judicial choice on the matter and, in particular, the ones carried out in their own 
decision. They, therefore, rather acted as the gatekeepers of the technoscientific progress 
envisaged in the United States’ patent system.  
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As Jasanoff noticed, the majority dodged in particular the main meta-question regarding the 
character of invention, whether it had changed radically because of molecular biology, as to 
make Jefferson’s view of IP outdated.605 
This deterministic view of the relationship amidst science, law and society must be 
considered, however, within the preamble of the narrative of the origins centered on the idea 
of progress, according to which biotech research would be beneficial to American society, as 
it would lead to “the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the 
economy”.606  
Koselleck and Meier pointed out that the modern concept of progress emerged in the last 
quarter of the 18th century and arose from the incorporation of an ideal of perfection into 
time as a growth projected in an open future.
607
 The opinion of the majority shows, in this 
respect, how much U.S. legal discourse is product-centered in the way of imagining social 
progress. 
The introduction of the clause in article 1 has been largely interpreted as connected to the 
commercial clause in the same article. According to Commissioner of patents Lawrance 
Kingsland, the framers of the U.S. Constitution “viewed the grant of limited monopolies to 
inventors primarily as a means of promoting the industrial development of the new republic 
and emphasized this primary objective by the phraseology of the constitutional provision”.608 
The narrative of the court eluded therefore the main issue raised by Chakrabarty’s claims to 
the bacteria, namely whether allowing the patentability of living things constituted a 
departure from well-established practices of the USPTO and a constant interpretation of 
patentable subject matter in the United States. Yet, the decision stretched out the scope of the 
definition of patentable subject matter and made clear to the biotech industry that its products 
could be patented, provided they fulfilled the requirements of patentability. 
Furthermore this narrative, as this chapter and the following ones will explain, proved far 
more influential in the development of the patent eligibility of biotech products. It would be 
constantly drawn upon and reiterated by the USPTO, in several guidelines involving biotech 
products, and the U.S. courts in the landmark decisions which have extended the boundaries 
of patentable subject matter in different areas of biotech innovation in order to justify their 
choices. 
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Although the narrative has provided the influential plot and discourse to sustain the holding, 
the analysis in this section has showed that it was the recourse to the mechanistic metaphor of 
the microorganism as a bio-artefact that has brought about the enlargement of the scope of 
§101. By assimilating the claimed invention to artefacts already covered by patent protection, 
new subject matter has been included as patentable in the U.S. patent system. 
  
3.2.1 Micro-Organisms as “Chemical Molecules”: In re Bergy, Coats and Malik; In re 
Chakrabarty 
Whereas the definitional approach of the majority of the Supreme Court focused on the 
metaphor of micro-organisms as bio-artefacts, the one endorsed by the CCPA centered on the 
metaphorical concept of “chemical molecule”. This approach was supported, in particular, by 
Justice Rich, who was one of the judges who largely influenced CCPA’s approach of limiting 
patent exclusions and fostering patent protection for all fields of invention
609
 and was one of 
the promoters and drafters of the codified Patent Act in 1952.
610
 
As Helen Longino pointed out, “reductionism is both a methodological practice and a 
metaphysical view. Methodologically, reductionism is the practice of characterizing a system 
or process in terms of its smallest functional units. Metaphysical or ontological reductionism 
argues that those smallest functional units are what is real and that all causal processes can 
ultimately be understood as a function of interactions among these least bits”. 611  Since 
methodological reductionism – she notices – has proved to be useful in guiding the work of 
researchers in addressing “the mechanisms or material constituents of a process”, 612  its 
pragmatic success has been conflated by metaphysical reductionism “with both a guarantor of 
truth and the promise of universal reducibility”.613 
As chapter two has pointed out (section 2.2.3), molecular biology and genetics have 
methodologically embraced reductionism as a practice in order to study organisms and life. 
However, their scientific discourse, which has focused on the smallest functional biological 
units, has shifted towards deeming these units as the very definition of the organisms object 
of study. Since these technoscientific domains have been successful in providing an 
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understanding of life phenomena since the 1950s, their view has become dominant in 
defining organisms and their identity in reductionist terms. This kind of ontological 
reductionism, as this section will explain, has proved fundamental in arguing for the patent 
eligibility of GM microorganisms. 
This need for molecularization and reduction emerged in the first patent cases focused on the 
patent eligibility of GM microorganisms and organisms, but must be examined within the 
U.S. narrative of the origins focused on progress.  
Patent examiners and judges were aware, at the time, that their decisions could affect the 
commercial opportunities of newly established biotech companies and the use of genetic 
engineering in order to bring new products to the market. They had to decide whether Title 
35 U.S.C. § 101 ought to be interpreted strictly and literally or extensively, in an evolutionary 
way.  
As Eisenberg noticed, before the first wave of patent applications on these advances in 
biotechnology, “living organisms had generally been assumed to fall outside the range of 
patent-eligible subject matter under a time-honored exclusion for ‘products of nature’”.614  
The molecular dimension of microbial life validated the analogy between chemical molecules 
and microorganisms in the United States. This emerges clearly from the CCPA’s second 
judgment, which decided In re Chakrabarty together with In re Bergy, Coats and Malik.
615
 
Judge Rich, delivering the opinion of majority of the Court, argued: 
“The nature and commercial uses of biologically pure cultures of microorganisms like 
the one defined in Bergy’s claim 5 and the modified microorganisms claimed by 
Chakrabarty are analogous in practical use to inanimate chemical compositions such 
as reactants, reagents, and catalysts used in chemical industry. (…) we see no reason 
to deprive it or its creator or owner of the protection and advantages of the patent 
system by arbitrary excluding it at the outset from the § 101 categories of patentable 
invention on the sole ground that it is alive. It is because it is alive that it is useful. (…) 
We see no sound reason to refuse patent protection to the microorganisms themselves, 
or to pure microorganism cultures, – the tools used by chemical manufacturers in the 
same way as they use chemical elements, compounds, and compositions – when they 
are new and unobvious. In fact, we see no legally significant difference between active 
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chemicals which are classified as ‘dead’ and organisms used for chemical reactions 
which take place because they are ‘alive’”.616  
The argument employs several metaphorical expressions related to the metaphor of 
“molecule”, in order to link microorganisms to chemical molecules and maintain that they 
are inanimate chemical molecules. The metaphor was supported by the expertise of Upjohn’s 
molecular biologists and questions, as Calvert and Joly have pointed out, the nature of the 
relationship between knowledge, ontologies and the production of intellectual property.
617
 
Cognitive linguistics defines metaphor as “understanding one conceptual domain” (the target 
domain) “in terms of another conceptual domain”618 (the source domain), such as “conceptual 
domain (A) is conceptual domain (B)”.619 This is what is defined as conceptual metaphor.  
In Justice Rich’s main argument, microorganisms (the target domain) are devised in terms of 
chemical compounds (the source domain). The use of this metaphor entail that a set of 
properties of the source domain are attributed to the target domain. 
In order to point out the focus of the metaphor within the discourse carried out by Judge Rich, 
it is useful to refer to Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s reflection on the metaphor as a 
condensed analogy explained in chapter one, namely a “condensed analogy, resulting from 
the fusion of an element from the phoros with an element from the theme”.620  
In this case, an example of analogical metaphorical fusion can be recognized in the argument: 
modified and pure cultures of microorganisms (A) are the chemical molecules (C) of the 
biotechnological industry (B). The analogy from which it is drawn upon is the following: 
modified and pure cultures of microorganisms (A) are to the biotechnological industry (B) as 
inanimate chemical molecules (C) are to chemical industry (D). 
The main effect of this fusion is that it rules out, as ontologically and legally irrelevant, one 
fundamental difference between microorganisms and inanimate chemical molecules: their 
being alive. The significance and relationship between these cultures of microorganisms and 
biotechnological industry is stated in the premise to the argument: “American industry is on 
the threshold of a new advance in microorganism technology in which man is exploring more 
intensely and learning to better convert to his use the micro-world of living cells, the field of 
molecular biology, a new branch of a useful art which has existed for many years”.621 
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The Supreme Court’ decision, likewise, dismissed the significance of the living thing 
distinction, opting for a broad construction of  §101 statutory provision and pointing out that 
the terms “manufacture” and “composition of matter” ought to be interpreted expansively. 
Since these terms are modified by the comprehensive “any”, the majority pinpointed that 
Congress “plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope”.622 However, 
the majority did not reject the relevance of the “alive” distinction on the basis of the 
molecular analogy, but on the grounds of the mechanistic metaphor of life. According to the 
mechanistic metaphor, modified micro-organisms are bio-artefacts,
623
 if they have markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature. They are, thus, patentable.  
As the Court deemed that Chakrabarty had produced “a new bacterium with markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant 
utility”,624 it concluded that it was patentable. Justice Burger, delivering the opinion of the 
Court, maintained that the enactment of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which afforded patent 
protection to certain asexually reproduced plants, and of Plant Variety Protection Act, in 
1970, which offered protection for certain sexually reproduced plants, were not related to the 
fact that § 101 did not include living things. 
Conversely, Justice Brennan, who delivered the dissenting opinion, focused his reasoning on 
the lex specialis argument, namely that lex specialis derogat legi generali (“special law 
makes an exception to general law”), which is a criterion of general legal theory of 
interpretation. It is one of the criteria applied to solve legal antinomies. However, Justice 
Brennan referred to it for what it implies: had the lawmaker wanted living organisms, such as 
plants, covered by the Patent Act, he would have not enacted two special laws in order to 
offer them IP protection. Furthermore the legislator would not have introduced particular 
provisions to accord patent protection to the developers of asexually reproduced plants, in 
1930 with the Plant Protection Act, or of certain new plant varieties obtained through sexual 
reproduction, with the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970, had he thought that living things 
fell within the general utility patent protection. The enactment of these two acts offered, 
therefore, evidence of congressional limitation, which excluded bacteria from patentability.
625
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Furthermore, he argued that although Congress considered bacteria in the legislative debate 
on the PVPA, it nevertheless did not include them in the scope of patent protection.
626
 Since 
in the legislative history there was no reference to the exclusion of microorganisms, the Court 
should not take “license to invent reasons” 627  and, instead, drew the conclusion that 
“Congress, assuming that animate objects as to which it had not specifically legislated could 
not be patented, excluded bacteria from the set of patentable organisms”.628 
The minority opinion is marked, hence, by the evident concern not to dodge the boundaries of 
judicial power in interpreting the scope of patentable subject matter, by expanding it in an 
area which entailed public concern, in the absence of a clear intention in the statutes.
629
 
In contrast with the majority, he undermined their narrative of progress and economic 
determinism positing a different meaning of Article 1, § 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 
according to which patent laws had to reconcile the U.S. Nation “deep seated antipathy to 
monopolies with the need to encourage progress”.630 Consequently, he contended that, in the 
absence of legislative direction, Congress should decide whether and to what extent expand 
the patent privilege into areas where the common understanding was that patents were not 
available.
631
 
However, as the next sections will point out, the mechanistic metaphor of the bio-artefact, 
together with the molecule, would prove the dominant means of legally defining biotech GM 
living products under patent law. 
 
3.2.2 From Microorganisms to Organisms: Patenting Animals in the Aftermath of the 
Chakrabarty Case 
In the United States, SCOTUS’ decision on Chakrabarty paved the way to the patentability 
of GM organisms and other biotechnological products, as its narrative of progress and 
metaphor of living things as bio-artefacts enabled the accomodation an endless range of 
organic matter where there was a human intervention and it fulfilled the patent requirements. 
In 1987, Donald J Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 
of the USPTO, issued a brief guideline on “Animals-Patentability”, in which he explained 
that, following a decision by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in Ex parte Allen 
that held that claimed polyploid oysters are nonnaturally occurring manufactures or 
                                                          
626
 ibid 202. 
627
 ibid. 
628
 ibid. 
629
 ibid 201-202. 
630
 ibid 201. 
631
 ibid 202. 
122 
 
compositions of matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, “the Patent and Trademark 
Office is now examining claims directed to multicellular living organisms, including 
animals”.632  
Ex parte Allen
633
 was decided in 1987 by the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
(“BPAI”) and concerned four product-by-process claims directed polyploid Pacific oysters 
produced by a method of inducing polyploidy in oysters by using a hydrostatic process. The 
claims were rejected by the patent examiner on grounds of obviousness in light of the prior 
art under 35 USC § 103 and as “living entities” not falling within statutory subject matter 
under 35 USC § 101,
634
 since the animal obtained was “controlled by laws of nature and not a 
manufacture by man that is patentable”.635 
Although the BPAI rejected the claims on grounds of obviousness, it affirmed the patent 
eligibility of living organisms. It drew upon the narrative developed in Chakrabarty, 
according to which Congress intended “patent laws would be given wide scope”,636 so that 
statutory subject matter was to “include anything under the sun that is made by man”.637 
Accordingly, the only relevant point the BPAI had to address was whether the claimed 
invention was made by man and concluded that claimed polyploid oysters were non-naturally 
occurring manufactures or compositions of matter.
638
 In Ex parte Allen, therefore, the BPAI 
endorsed the mechanistic metaphor set out in Chakrabarty and contributed to its extension 
from microorganisms to organisms in the U.S. 
The USPTO’s notice rested, moreover, on the BPAI’s administrative decision in Ex parte 
Hibberd (which will be examined in chapter five),
639
 which held that plants were patentable 
subject matter “under general utility patent provisions”, 640  and SCOTUS’s judgement in 
Chakrabarty. 
Quigg clarified, however, that “a claim directed to or including within its scope a human 
being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter”, as the grant of a limited but 
exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution”.641  
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The Notice was published when several patent applications on transgenic animals or 
organisms were pending.
642
 Philip Leder and Timothy Stewart filed on 22 June 1984 a patent 
on transgenic non-human mammals, the so called Harvard mouse, which would be granted in 
1988
643
 and raised Congressional debate in the United States, but triggered long patent 
litigation in Canada and Europe, as this chapter will show. 
However, USPTO’s commitment to fully embrace Chakrabarty’s narrative, by issuing this 
guideline on the patentability of animals, was not shared by animal protection associations 
and several farmers groups, as well as members of Congress. 
Animal Legal Defense Fund and other animal-rights organizations, together with individual 
farmers and groups of animal husbanders, challenged the rule embedded in the USPTO’s 
notice before the District Court, N.D. California, alleging that the rule was promulgated in 
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC 500 et seq., as the USPTO’s 
Commissioner and the Secretary of Commerce failed to provide for a period of public notice 
and comment under 5 USC 551 et seq. Moreover, they claimed that the rule was issued in 
excess of statutory authority.
644
  
Both the District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which decided 
in 1991, rejected the claims also for lack of standing, but the Court of Appeals significantly 
embraced and endorsed the narrative of economic determinism set forth by the majority in 
Chakrabarty. The Court, in fact, stated: “However, were we to enjoin issuance for patents for 
non-naturally occurring animals, the requested relief would not prevent the development of 
such animals. It should hardly need saying that the issuance of a patent gives no right to make, 
use or sell a patented invention, or that the absence of a patent creates no legal prohibition 
against continued research and development”. 645  It, then, cited the same full argument 
endorsed in Chakrabarty.
646
 
The Notice, nevertheless, was at the core of Congressional debate, in 1987, when the U.S. 
Senate adopted a moratorium on animal patents which was part of a supplemental bill, even 
though the moratorium was dropped.
647
 In 1987 and, then, 1988, House Resolution 3119 and 
Senate Bill 2111 directed to amend Title 35 of the United States Code in order to prohibit the 
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patenting of genetically modified animals.
648
 Whereas the former would have imposed a two-
year moratorium on animal patents, the latter would have entailed a ban on animal patents. 
However, both bills died when the 100
th
 Congress adjourned.
649
 
Moreover, in 1989, Robert Kastenmeier a Wisconsin Democrat member of the House of 
Representatives backed the Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act (HR4970).
650
 The Act 
passed the House of Representatives, but was not debated at the Senate before the end of the 
Congress and since Kastenmeier lost his seat in 1990, the bill was never reintroduced. The 
Act would have introduced for GM animals a form of IP protection closer to Plant Breeders’ 
Rights and included a farmers’ exemption from royalty payments.651 
Nevertheless, after the USPTO granted a patent on the so-called Harvard mouse in 1988, for 
some years a voluntary moratorium on animal patents was established, which ended in 
1993.
652
 At the time 180 patent applications on GM animals were pending before the 
USPTO.
653
 
As this section has pointed out, the initiatives aiming at challenging the patent eligibility of 
GM organisms failed to undermine the definition of patent eligible matter according to 
mechanistic and molecular metaphors, which will turn out to be also the focus of the judicial 
re-definition of the concept of “invention” in Canada. 
 
3.3 Thresholds of Artificiality in Canada: Re Application of Abitibi CO 
This section and the next two will show that, in Canada, the metaphor of the chemical 
metaphor has been largely resorted to in order to settle the patent eligibility of GM 
microorganisms and organisms. 
In 1982, the Patent Appeal Board and Commissioner of Patents, deciding in Re Application of 
Abitibi CO
654
 (“Abitibi”), a case concerning the patentability of a mixed microbial culture, 
considered and endorsed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty and ruled 
likewise, but limited the scope of the judgment to all microorganisms and excluded higher 
                                                          
648
 ibid 30; William Lesser, ‘Animal Patents in the USA: Are the Concerns Justified?’ in William H Lesser (ed) 
Animal Patents: The Legal, Economic and Social Issues (Stockton Press 1989) 353. 
649
 U.S. OTA (n 640) 30; Lesser (n 648) 353. 
650
 100th Congress 2d Session, House of Representatives, Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act, Report 
together with additional views to accompany H.R. 4970, 100-888,  available in William H Lesser (ed) Animal 
Patents: The Legal, Economic and Social Issues (Stockton Press 1989) 185. 
651
 Lesser (n 648) 353. 
652
 Edmund L Andrews, ‘U.S. Resumes Granting Patents on Genetically Altered Animals’ (3 February 1993) 
The New York Times A1, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/03/business/us-resumes-granting-
patents-on-genetically-altered-animals.html >. 
653
  ibid. 
654
 Patent Appeal Board and Commissioner of Patents, Re Application of Abitibi CO, 62 C.P.R. (2d) 81 (1982). 
125 
 
life organisms. The definition of “invention”, according to section 2 of the Canadian Patent 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, includes “any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter” and is similar to the definition of “patentable subject matter” set out 
in Title 35 U.S.C. § 101, in the U.S. 
The Patent Appeal Board and the Commissioner of Patents rested their decision on the 
metaphor of the molecule. Microorganisms were defined as chemical compounds, since they 
can be produced en masse and possess uniform properties:  
“Certainly this decision will extend to all micro-organisms, yeasts, moulds, fungi, 
bacteria, actinomycetes, unicellular algae, cell lines, viruses or protozoa; in fact to all 
new life forms which are produced en masse as chemical compounds are prepared, 
and are formed in such large numbers that any measurable quantity will possess 
uniform properties and characteristics”.655 
In Abitibi, however, micro-organisms were considered like chemical compounds because of 
their process of production, which is en masse and allows them to retain uniform 
characteristics/properties. The metaphor and analogies on which this decision is grounded 
pinpoint the relevance of reproducibility in order to deem genetically modified 
microorganisms patentable. 
In this case, modified and pure cultures of microorganisms (target domain) are defined as the 
chemical molecules (source domain) of the biotechnological industry. However, the 
argumentation hinges on this analogical feature: their reproducibility en masse like chemical 
compounds. Therefore, although the metaphor of the chemical molecule is identical to what 
has been applied by Justice Rich in In re Bergy, the analogy that it conveys differs, as the 
judicial narratives point out. 
The Canadian Patent Appeal Board, yet, recognized and stated clearly in the editorial note, 
that the judgment was significant, as it entailed a change in the Canadian Intellectual Property 
Office (“CIPO”) practice and laid down criteria for the patentability of living matter. 
Moreover, it pointed out that it had implications for subject matter as genetic-engineering and 
plant patents.
656
  
The Board endorsed a different approach from the USPTO and U.S. courts. It compared the 
policy answers in the U.S., Australia, Germany, Japan and the UK as to the patent eligibility 
of microorganisms and the sufficiency of the deposit of the microorganism in a culture 
collection to fulfil the description requirement for the invention, in order to justify Canadian 
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patent policy choices. The Board acknowledged the relevance of the decision for the biotech 
industry. It sets out, however, a threshold of artificiality only for microorganisms, leaving the 
decision about higher life forms to the Parliament. 
Chakrabarty and Re Application of Abitibi CO removed some legal uncertainties about the 
patentability of genetically modified microorganisms in the United States and Canada. 
Whereas, in the United States, in the aftermath of Chakrabarty, the USPTO clarified, in 
1987,
657
 that patent claims on “multicellular living organisms, including animals” could be 
examined, the CIPO considered genetically modified higher life forms excluded from 
patentability under Abitibi. In that respect, CIPO’s more cautious approach differed from 
USPTO’s one, which further backed the passage from the patent eligibility of GM 
microorganisms to organisms.  
The CIPO, following the approach of other patent systems, endorsed a molecular view of GM 
microorganisms, which affirmed their artificiality and patent eligibility. However, it refrained 
from backing its extension to complex organisms because of its possible implications for 
human beings. 
 
3.3.1 Patenting “Higher Life Forms” in Canada: The “Oncomouse case” 
Whereas the USPTO, in the aftermath of Chakrabarty, displayed a full commitment to 
embrace its holding and narrative, by considering patent applications on GM animals, CIPO 
seemed more reluctant to deem that Abitibi had paved the way to the patentability of complex 
life forms. Its more careful approach emerged when CIPO had to examine the patent 
application concerning “transgenic non-human mammals” genetically modified in order to 
develop cancer.
658
 Although the patent on this invention was granted in the U.S. in 1988, in 
Canada patent examiners and judges considered the issue of patenting life deserving more 
careful consideration. 
Whilst patent application ’723 was lodged in 1985, claims1-12 were rejected as directed to 
non-statutory subject matter by the Commissioner of Patents on 4 August 1995. President and 
Fellows of Harvard College (“Harvard”), the assignee, appealed against the rejection and the 
case triggered one of the longest and most debated patent controversies in Canadian history. 
The claims all concerned a “transgenic mammal, who is a mammal containing a gene that has 
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been artificially introduced into the chromosomes of the mammal or its ancestor at the 
embryonic stage”.659 
The rationale for the dismissal was that the claimed invention did not fall within the words 
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” under s. 2 of the Patent Act,660 which set forth the 
definition if invention, as the inventor did not have full control over the characteristics of the 
mammal. 
Judge Nadon of the Federal Court, Trial Division, articulated the main questions posited by 
the case as follows: 1. “Is it appropriate to examine the degree of the inventor’s control over 
the creation of the claimed invention?”;661 2. “Is it appropriate to distinguish between human 
intervention and the laws of nature?”; 662  3. “What is the relevance of the test of 
reproducibility in the present instance?”; 663  4. “Is it appropriate in determining whether 
something is patentable subject matter to make distinctions between higher and lower life 
forms?”.664 
He, first, remarked that processes entailing the use of microorganisms were patentable in 
Canada since 1965, when American Cyanamid Co. v. Charles E. Frost & Co.
665
 was decided 
by the Exchequer Court, and microorganisms were held patentable in Abitibi.
666
 Abitibi, 
however, established a threshold test of reproducibility focused on uniform reproducibility of 
the claimed life form, namely that “any measurable quantity would possess uniform 
properties”.667 In Abitibi, the Patent Appeal Board clarified that, insofar as microorganisms 
could be produced en masse, they were to be deemed like chemical compounds and, therefore 
patentable. The patentability of microorganisms resulted from drawing on the metaphor of 
the chemical molecule, which entailed a similarity, the reproducibility en masse. 
He, then, recalled Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. V. Canada (Commissioner of Patents),
668
 a case 
concerning the patentability of a soybean variety obtained by cross-breading, in which the 
Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) showed awareness of how much judges largely relied on 
metaphors in order to define biotech products and address their patentability. The FCA 
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referred to the use of the terms “manufacture” and “composition of matter” applied in 
Chakrabarty by SCOTUS and commented: 
“I have not been convinced. Even if those definitions were held to be applicable to a 
micro-organism obtained as a result of a laboratory process, I am unable to go further 
and accept that they can also adapt to a plant variety produced by cross-breeding. 
Such a plant cannot really be said, other than on the most metaphorical level, to have 
been produced from raw materials or to be a combination of two or more substances 
united by chemical or mechanical means. It seems to me that the common ordinary 
meaning of the words ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter’ would be distorted if 
a unique but simple variety of soybean were to be included within their scope”.669 
Judge Nadon, therefore, pointed out that “raw material”670 and “combination of substances 
united by chemical or mechanical means”671 were considered to be applied “for ordinarily 
understood industrial tools”,672 not for plants. 
Discussing the definitions of “manufacture” and “composition of matter” offered by the 
appellants, he remarked that: 
“On even the broadest interpretation I cannot find that a mouse is a ‘raw material’ 
which was given new qualities from the inventor. Certainly the presence of the myc 
gene is new, but the mouse is not new nor is it a ‘raw material’ in the ordinary sense 
of the phrase. 
A mammal is a very complex form of life and therefore it is more difficult to make 
analogies to chemical reactions as was done in Abitibi”.673  
He, therefore, rejected the chemical metaphor
674
 endorsed in Abitibi, as far as higher life 
forms were concerned, concluding that: 
“I agree with the appellant’s argument with respect to chemical processes. In a 
chemical process A + B = C is always true. However, in the creation of mammals A + 
B = C, D, E, F, … N. The chemical reaction and its products are known (once 
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discovered) and constant, whereas the parameters of the resulting mammal are largely 
unknown and change every time. Thus, what is involved here, i.e. the insertion of the 
myc gene and the subsequent breeding, cross-breeding and back-breeding is more 
analogous to the process involved in the Hi-Bred case than it is to the process seen in 
Abitibi”.675 
He examined the following definitions of these locutions submitted by the appellant:
676
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He, finally, focused on the questions raised by the case and contended that the degree of 
control of the claimed inventor over the GM organisms was not very high as “the ultimate 
product which will result from the process is completely unknown and unknowable”.677 He 
highlighted that all the cited definitions implied an element of control and, since the 
Oncomouse was a complex form of life, applying the analogy with the chemical compounds, 
employed in Abitibi, was arduous.
678
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“Manufacture” 
 
1. “An article made by hand; a person’s 
handiwork … an article or material produced by 
physical labour or machinery, now spec. one 
produced on a large scale” (The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary on Historical 
Principles (Clarendon 1993) at 1691). 
2. “… something made by the hands of man” 
(Hornblower v. Boulton (1799), 8 T.R. 95, Dav. 
Pat. Cas. 221, 101 E.R. 1285 at p. 1288 per Lord 
Kenyon C.J.). 
3. “Something of a corporeal or substantial nature, 
something that can be made by man from the 
matters subjected to his art and skill … is 
requisite to satisfy this word” (R. v. Wheeler 
(1812), 2 B. & Ald. 345, 106 E.R. 392 at P. 395 
per Abbott C.J.). 
4. “… the production of articles for use from raw 
materials prepared by giving to these materials 
new forms, qualities, properties or combinations 
whether by hand labor or by machinery” 
(Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks v. Chakrabarty, 206 U.S.P.Q. 193 
(1980) at 196-197). 
“Composition of Matter” 
 
1. “a ‘composition of matter’ may be taken 
broadly to mean chemical compounds, 
compositions and substances. In Electric 
Fireproofing Co. of Canada v. Electric 
Fireproofing Co. Archibald J. defined the term 
‘composition of matter’ as including all 
composite matter whether it was the result of 
chemical reaction or of mechanical mixture” 
(H.G. Fox, The Canadian Law and Practice 
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, 4
th
 ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1969, at 18). 
2. “… all compositions of two or more substances 
and all composite articles, whether they be the 
results of chemical union, or of mechanical 
mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, 
powders or solids” (Diamond, Commissioner of 
Patents and Trademarks v. Chakrabarty, 206 
U.S.P.Q. 193 (1980) at 197).  
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Moreover, he pinpointed that the claimed invention failed the test of reproducibility, which 
was set out in paragraph 27(3)(b) of the Patent Act. As the claims regarded all the mammals, 
too much was left to luck and chance: “The location and even the presence and quality of the 
gene are totally uncontrollable. Thus, although the gene will be present in some mice, at some 
place, with some characteristics, the precise mouse, the precise location and the precise 
quality of the gene are irreproducible”.679 
Although Judge Nadon disputed the adequacy of the metaphor of the chemical molecule to 
address the patent eligibility of GM organisms, the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal of 
Canada disagreed with his opinion and holding. 
Justice Rothstein, who delivered the opinion of the majority, fully embraced the narrative of 
progress posited by SCOTUS in Chakrabarty.  
He, first, pointed out that the purpose of the Patent Act “is to provide an incentive for the 
creation of processes or products which are new, useful and unobvious”.680 
Justice Rothstein, dismissed the policy questions concerning the animal sufferance, human 
health and environment as to be addressed by Parliament, but adduced the need for 
harmonization to draw prescriptive policy conclusions: “The evidence is that the oncomouse 
has been patented in the United States and Europe. It is arguable on policy grounds that there 
is merit to uniformity and that Canada should follow suit”.681 He, therefore, resorted to the 
law lag argument. However, in this case the lag did not concern the relationship between 
science and the law, but the one between different patent systems and their case law. 
He, then, drew on Justice Burger’s arguments in Chakrabarty, purporting that the definition 
of invention should be given wide scope, as inventions are “necessarily unanticipated and 
unforeseeable”.682 The inevitable conclusion was that the Oncomouse was a “composition of 
matter”: 
“The process here involves injecting a plasmid containing the oncogene into a 
fertilized mouse egg. The oncogene is comprised of DNA. Kreuzer and Massey define 
DNA as: ‘the chemical molecule that is the basic genetic material found in all cells 
(…) DNA belongs to a class of biological molecules called nucleic acids’.  
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DNA is a physical substance and is therefore matter. The fertilized mouse egg is a 
form of biological matter. The combination of these two forms of matter by the 
process described in the specifications is thus a ‘composition of matter’”.683  
After defining the Oncomouse as a “composition of matter”, he pinpointed that this locution 
did not imply the exclusion of living organisms.
684
 Nevertheless, the subsumption of a living 
organism under the concept of “composition of matter” rested on endorsing a reductionist 
scientific view of what a biological organism is, namely chemical molecules. In that respect, 
the definition of biotech patent eligible matter resulted from a process of co-production 
between science and law, in which the conflation of methodological and ontological scientific 
reductionism was implicitly incorporated in the patent legal discourse and supported a re-
definition and re-framing of the scope of “composition of matter”. 
However, the majority recalled that, like in Chakrabarty, this conclusion did not entail that 
there were no limits to patentability. Natural phenomena, scientific principles and abstract 
theorems were excluded from the scope of invention, as in Canada subsection 27(8) of the 
Patent Act
685
 formally ruled out scientific principles and abstract theorems from 
patentability.
686
 
Judge Rothstein argued that, although the laws of nature were involved in the gestation 
process, the insertion of the oncogene into the mammal substantially marked the resulting 
transgenic mammals as a product of inventive ingenuity.
687
  
Inasmuch the majority consistently relied on the majority’s judgement in Chakrabarty, it 
needed to justify the peculiar reliance on a piece of case law of another jurisdiction, even 
though influential in the U.S. for its impact on the patentability of biotech products. The 
majority acknowledged that the origins of Canadian patent law rested in the common law of 
England and the royal prerogative of granting monopolies. Therefore, the law of the U.K. was 
referred to as authoritative in interpreting Canadian patent law.
688
  
Nonetheless, it justified the reliance on the high similarity of the definition of invention in the 
two jurisdictions: as the first Canadian Patent Act, enacted in 1869, was shaped according to 
U.S. patent statutes of 1836, the likeness of provisions legitimized the similarity in their 
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interpretation by courts in different jurisdictions.
689
 The majority noted that, although U.S 
decisions do not operate as stare decisis or constitute an estoppel in Canada, Fox pointed out 
that they ought to be considered with respect.
690
 
Since the U.S. opinion was persuasive, Justice Rothstein believed its rationale ought to be 
employed in defining the boundaries of the scope of invention in Canada. In explaining why 
he preferred the majority’s opinion in Chakrabarty rather than the minority’s arguments, he 
pointed out that he could not share that there was a “common understanding” that the patent 
legislation did not cover living organisms.
691
 Consequently, he relied on Justice Burger’s 
interpretation of what was common understanding in the U.S. and considered it applicable in 
Canada, notwithstanding a constant opposite patent examination practice. However, the 
majority championed an approach that will be embraced by courts in several jurisdictions 
deciding on biotech patent cases, namely to use the arguments’ rationale of landmark patent 
adjudications in other jurisdictions, even though they could not be considered as precedents. 
The majority, finally, addressed the issues of control over the claimed invention and its 
degree of reproducibility. It noted that a reference to a control test was made in the CIPO’s 
Manual of  Patent Office Practice, which set forth that: “In assessing whether subject matter 
falls within the meaning of the definition of patentable subject matter under Section 2 of the 
Patent Act, the prerequisites established by Canadian jurisprudence and legislation that must 
be satisfied are inter alia: (b) whether the subject matter is operable, controllable and 
reproducible by the means described by the inventor so that the desired result inevitably 
follows whenever it is worked”.692 
Justice Rothstein clarified that the wording of this guideline was modelled on the Patent 
Appeal Board’s decision in Organon, in which the Board deemed the test implicit in the 
requirement of usefulness.
693
 As the claimed invention has been judged useful, it was deemed 
to pass the control test.
694
  
Moreover, as he pinpointed that the invention was sufficiently disclosed by the applicant, 
reproducibility did not constitute a major problem affecting the patentability of the 
challenged claims.
695
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Judge Isaac, who dissented, mainly based his opinion on the reasonableness of the 
Commissioner’s conclusion and the deference that courts ought to pay to the technical 
expertise of patent examiners in assessing and deciding on the patentability of inventions. He 
cited salient case law pinpointing that examiners “are persons with technical expertise” and 
concluded that the Commissioner was “an expert tribunal”.696 
Examining the second question, the Judge noted that the complexity of life forms made the 
distinction between the laws of nature and human intervention difficult to draw.  
He addressed a basic problem in applying the chemical metaphor and the analogies it implies 
to complex life forms. His argument was centered on the complexity of organic processes, 
which could hardly be curtailed under the aegis of forms of reductionism. 
He, consequently, concluded that the issues of the patentability of “higher life forms” should 
be addressed by the legislature, since the Oncomouse did not meet the standard of 
reproducibility en masse established in Abitibi. 
As this section has illustrated, the majority of the FCA has endorsed the metaphor of the 
chemical molecule to define both the oncogene, as DNA sequences, and the transgenic 
mammal and subsumed them under the locution “composition of matter”, concluding they 
were patentable. Moreover, it relied on the narrative of progress set out in Chakrabarty in 
order to justify a broad interpretation of the concept of “invention” in Canada. 
 
3.3.2 Setting Boundaries on Life: the Supreme Court of Canada’s Judgement  
The metaphor of the chemical molecule was, afterwards, rejected by Supreme Court of 
Canada (“SCC”) as adequate to characterize transgenic organisms. 
In December 2002, the SCC finally judged in Commissioner of Patents v. President and 
Fellows of Harvard College and, in a 5 to 4 decision, held that “a higher life form is not 
patentable because it is not a ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ within the meaning of 
‘invention’ in s 2 of the Patent Act”.697 
Whereas the majority rejected the recourse to the metaphor of the chemical molecule to 
characterize a living organism, the minority conversely maintained it as the appropriate way 
to qualify both microorganisms and organisms. 
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In order to sustain a broad interpretation of patent eligible matter, the dissenting opinion, 
delivered by Justice Binnie, recounted a narrative focused on Canadian public interest in 
biotechnology.  
The minority, first, pointed out that the discovery of the structure of DNA in the 1950s 
fostered the biotech revolution, which attracted large private investments. These investments 
boosted innovation in the field.
698
  
It, then, highlighted that issuing patents “reflects the public interest in promoting the 
disclosure of advancement in learning by rewarding human ingenuity”699 and expressed awe 
towards “the extraordinary scientific achievement of altering every single cell in the body of 
an animal which does not in this altered form exist in nature”.700 
Justice Binnie unfolded the narrative of the law lag, illustrated previously. According to it, 
Canadian patent case law could not stand behind the new technoscientific inventions, in the 
context of the global governance of intellectual property.
701
 The law lag that he envisaged did 
not affect only the relations between patent law and technoscience, but also involved 
Canadian patent case law in respect to other jurisdictions. 
He pointed out that, in many of states, the Oncomouse
702
 or similar transgenic mice
703
 were 
already held patentable and questioned why Canada had to stand apart from other patent 
jurisdictions. Since its statutory definition of invention was not unique, but like the U.S. one, 
he suggested that this gap should not exist. 
He acknowledged that, in 1869, when the post-Confederation Patent Act was enacted, 
Parliament did not consider GM “higher life forms” patentable. 704  He pointed out, 
nevertheless, that other technological products which were not envisaged at the time, such as 
genetically modified micro-organisms, became patentable later.
705
 
Although he allowed that legal interpretation consists in “reading the words ‘in their entire 
context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, 
the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament’”.706 In contrast with the majority, he 
nevertheless deemed that the context and scheme of the Act supported an expansive 
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interpretation of “composition of matter” and the intent of Parliament highlighted the public 
interest to foster new and useful inventions.
707
 
The minority fully expanded the law lag argument by illustrating the global dimension of IP, 
the present and past efforts of its harmonization and the relevance of the biotech sector for the 
Canadian economy.
708
 
Moreover, it illustrated that “even university research” had to be paid for, as the case at issue 
prompted, and IPRs largely contributed to cover its cost.
709
 
The opinion, subsequently, addressed the patenting of life forms in Canada and other 
jurisdictions. 
It noted that microorganisms had been held patentable, in Canada, already in the 1940s and 
were, further, settled as patent eligible in Abitibi.
710
 Furthermore, it highlighted that the case 
at issue regarded GM organisms, not plants and seeds resulting from hybridization and cross 
selection like in Pioneer Hi-Bred.
711
 
Then, it relied on Justice Burger’s narrative in Chakrabarty, as a proper way of filling the law 
lag gap that was likely to increase, judging otherwise.
712
 He clarified that “composition of 
matter” was an “open-ended expression” 713  embedded in the Patent Act in order to 
contemplate the unforeseeable and the Oncomouse fell within its definition. Any other 
questions, the minority argued, did not regard the law, but “murine metaphysics”714 and, 
therefore, did not have to be addressed by the court. 
It is worth considering that Judge Binnie’s opinion handled the lack of regulatory framework 
provided by the Patent Act reaffirming the law lag argument. He maintained that “regulation 
necessary follows, rather than precedes, the invention” 715  and “there are many areas of 
potential regulation as there are areas of invention”,716  concluding that “these regulatory 
regimes cannot and should not be put under the inadequate umbrella of the Patent Act”.717 
In addressing whether the claimed invention consisted in applying laws of nature to obtain a 
GM organism whose control was not principally under the inventor, he drew on the narrative 
of continuity of biotechnology illustrated in chapter two (section 2.3.1). According to it, the 
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laws of nature have always been involved in biotechnology, from the fermentation processes 
to pharmaceutical drugs, such as AZT, and its patented inventions.
718
 He, therefore, did not 
deem that a solution of continuity had occurred between modern biotechnology, which was 
drawing on genetic engineering, and previous biotechnology. In his argument, GMOs were 
normalized as a kind of biotech product not very different from others, which had already 
been held patent eligible.  
Since this narrative supported a broad interpretation of invention, all the ethical issues 
regarding animal sufferance, environmental risks, and policy concerns about patenting higher 
life forms were dismissed by drawing on an accurate boundary work, in which they were 
construed as completely outside the jurisdiction of the Courts. Justice Binnie pinpointed that 
if the commodification of animals and life, as well as the protection of the environment, were 
major concerns against the  patentability of higher life forms, “the genie was already out of 
the bottle”,719 patents or no patents, thus he dodged the responsibility of the court in terms of 
closing or leaving it open. 
The opinion of the majority, delivered by Justice Bastarache, pinpointed that the sole 
question before the court was “whether the words ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’, 
within the context of the Patent Act”,720 were “sufficiently broad to include higher life forms 
such as ‘inventions’”.721 By analyzing the meaning of the terms of the Act, he rejected Judge 
Rothstein’s interpretation grounded on the majority’s opinion in Chakrabarty. He drew on 
the following definitions of the relevant terms:
722
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“Manufacture” 
 
1. “[T]he action or process of making by hand … 
The action or process of making articles or 
material (in modern use, on large scale) by the 
application of physical labour or mechanical 
power (Oxford English Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed. 1989, 
vol. IX, 341)”. 
2. “Fabrication”: “[TRANSLATION] Act or action 
of manufacturing … The manufacture of 
technical object (by someone). Manufacturing by 
artisans, by hand, by machine, industrially, by 
mass production … (Le Grand Robert de la 
langue française, 2
nd
 ed, 2001, vol.3, 517)”. 
3.  “The production of articles for use from raw or 
prepared materials by giving to these materials 
new forms, qualities., properties, or 
combinations, whether by hand labor or by 
machinery (Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 16 June 
1980, 447 U.S. 303, 308)”. 
 
“Composition of Matter” 
 
1.1 “Composition”:  “[a] substance or preparation 
formed by combination or mixture of various 
ingredients (Oxford English Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed. 
1989, vol. III, 625)”. 
1.2 “Composition”: “[TRANSLATION] action or 
manner of forming a whole, a set by assembling 
several parts, several elements (Le Grand Robert de 
la langue française, 2
nd
 ed, 2001, vol.2, 367)”. 
2.1 “Matter”: “[p]hysical or corporeal substance in 
general ...  contradistinguished from immaterial or 
incorporeal substance (spirit, soul, mind), and from 
qualities, actions, or conditions (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed. 1989, vol. IX, 480)”. 
2.2 “Matière”: “[TRANSLATION] corporeal substance 
‘that is perceptible in space and has mechanical 
mass (Le Grand Robert de la langue française, 2
nd
 
ed, 2001, vol. 4, 1260)”. 
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In contrast with the minority, he argued in favour of a narrow, grammatical interpretation of 
the terms, since the definitions of the relevant categories of patentable inventions fell short in 
being applied to “higher life organisms”, which were “generally regarded as possessing 
qualities and characteristics that transcend the particular genetic material of which they are 
composed”.723 
Although the majority acknowledged that the definition of invention in s 2 was broad enough 
to encompass unforeseen and unanticipated technologies, it deemed that the definition was 
not unlimited, such as "to include anything under the sun that is made by man”, as in the U.S. 
As to the word “manufacture”, they relied on the Oxford English Dictionary definition. They 
disagreed on the fact that a mouse could be deemed like a man-made “article”, “material” and 
“object technique” and pinpointed that the word would be commonly understood to denote a 
non-living mechanistic product or process.  
The majority, therefore, censured the scientific reductionism that the minority, drawing on 
Chakrabarty’s arguments, embraced, which allowed the subsumption of complex life forms 
under the locution “composition of matter”. 
Since Parliament did not include in the definition of invention categories that could be 
applied to life forms, the majority inferred that these kinds of products was intended not to be 
covered by patent law. Judging otherwise would have entailed “a radical departure from a 
traditional patent regime”.724  
The majority clarified that it was easier to conceptualize and analogize a microorganism to a 
chemical compound or another inanimate object rather than do it with a plant or an animal.
725
 
The justices recalled the definition of composition of matter of the Oxford English Dictionary 
and Le Grand Robert de la langue française. They would consider the fertilized egg, in 
which the oncogene was injected, as a composition, but they would not admit the Oncomouse 
to be understood in such terms. They, in particular, remarked that the meaning of “matter” 
expressed one aspect of life forms, as “matter is a physical or corporeal substance in general 
(…), contradistinguished from immaterial or incorporeal substance (spirit, soul, mind), and 
from qualities, actions, or conditions”726 or “corporeal substance ‘that is perceptible in space 
and has mechanical mass’”.727 They argued that these definitions do not fit well with the 
common understandings of human and animal life, which are regarded as having qualities 
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and characteristics that transcend the particular genetic material of which they are 
composed.
728
 In particular, they observed that reproduction is one of the specific features 
which mark living organisms.
729
 
Moreover, the problem of tracing the boundaries between higher and lower life forms was 
deemed fundamental: “there is no defensible basis within the definition of invention itself to 
conclude that a chimpanzee is a composition of matter while a human being is not”.730 Such a 
relevant issue was considered a matter to be addressed by Parliament, not by the courts. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, therefore, drew a line between GM microorganisms, which 
were judged patent eligible, and transgenic organisms, which were deemed to fall outside the 
definition of “invention”.  
In this respect, it should be noted that the definition of “patentable invention” in the U.S. and 
Canada embeds a mechanistic model of invention,
731
 which has marked the way in which the 
concept of patentable subject matter has been developed. 
Tallacchini illustrated accurately how this model impinged on deciding on the patentability of 
transgenic organisms. She commented the following illustration
732
 included in the U.S. Office 
of Technology Assessment’s Report entitled “New Development in Biotechnology: Patenting 
Life”:  
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The OTA pulled together the two patent figures of the mousetrap (on the left side), which 
was patented in 1900 in the U.S., and the eight ones that were part of the Oncomouse patent 
(on the right side). She pointed out that this illustration offers several insights about how the 
discourse of patent eligibility relied on metaphors and their rhetorical-persuasive power: both 
sets of drawings show the deterministic features of mechanical products and suggest that the 
140 
 
“nature” of the two inventions is the same.733 Nevertheless, she pinpointed, “the insertion of 
genetic material is not brought about in such a precise way that the illustrations suggest”734 
and “its effects are not limited to one genomic sequence, but potentially impinge on the 
whole phenotype”.735 
The OTA’s Report used this illustration to address the sui generis administrative issues 
related to biotech inventions, whose literal description proved to be inadequate to enable a 
person skilled in the art to reproduce them.
736
 
This juxtaposition, however, clarifies how the homologation between non-living and living 
matter has occurred in the United States, namely by fully applying the mechanistic model of 
life embedded in the definition of patentable invention to microorganisms and organisms. 
Also in Canada the model embedded in the definition of invention impinged on 
accommodating microorganisms within the scope of it. However, the assimilation of 
organisms failed, because the majority of the Supreme Court’s decision hinged on the 
relevant differences that made transgenic mammals not like a machine or a chemical 
compound. Therefore, although the statutory definition of patentable subject matter in these 
two countries is alike, the case law shows that the courts embraced partially different 
epistemic legal models of complex living organisms.
737
 
 
3.4 Patenting Micro-Organisms before the EPO 
Whereas in the U.S. the patentability of micro-organisms has been questioned before 
SCOTUS in Chakrabarty, the European Patent Office (“EPO”) had not faced major 
challenges related to this issue, in the same years. Whilst in the U.S. the Chakrabarty 
judgment attracted public attention, in 1976 the British Patent Office had already granted the 
corresponding British patent, but the fact went unnoticed.
738
 This shows, however, how much 
the patentability of microorganisms, as such, was not a controversial matter for legal scholars, 
NGOs and citizens at the time. 
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The European Patent Convention (“EPC”), which is a multinational treaty in operation since 
1978,
739
 lacks any explicit rule allowing the patentability of microorganisms as such, as Art. 
53(b) and Rule 31 EPC do not refer to microorganisms as such.
740
 Rule 26(3) EPC defines 
“biological material” as “any material containing genetic information and capable of 
reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological system”. Microorganisms are 
encompassed in the definition. 
The term "microorganism", according to EPO Guidelines, G-II, 5.5.1,  “includes bacteria and 
other generally unicellular organisms with dimensions beneath the limits of vision which can 
be propagated and manipulated in a laboratory, including plasmids and viruses and 
unicellular fungi (including yeasts), algae, protozoa and, moreover, human, animal and plant 
cells.
741
 
Article 53(b) EPC sets out the patentability exception of plants or animal varieties or 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals, but it clarifies that the 
provision “shall not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof”. Therefore, if 
a product resulting from a microbiological process other than a plant or animal variety is a 
microorganism, it may be patentable.
742
 
Moreover, Art. 52(2) EPC sets out subject matter and activities which shall not be regarded 
as inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1, and includes “(a) discoveries, scientific 
theories and mathematical methods”. 
However, the patentability of micro-organisms as discoveries has never been at the core of a 
major judicial challenge and European social debate, in 1970s and 1980s.  
At present, Section G-II, 3.1 of the Guidelines, specifies the threshold of patentability for 
micro-organisms, which is characterized as the “production of a technical effect”.743 
Although the EPC does not provide a definition of what “invention” is, the standard 
established in Section G-II, 3.1 of the Guidelines is consistent with the technical nature of the 
invention. As Huys, Van Overwalle and Matthijs pointed out the implementing regulations 
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clarify that “the invention must have technical features (Rule 43(1)), which is related to a 
technical field (Rule 42(1)(a)) and concerned with a technical problem (Rule 42(1)(c))”.744 
Under the EPC system, the “technical” character of the invention and the “production of a 
technical effect” as a threshold of patent eligibility have proved to be central for the 
settlement of the patent eligibility of genetically modified microorganisms and organisms. 
Issues regarding the patent eligibility of microorganisms have been raised, in the 1990s, when 
the NGO Greenpeace opposed European Patent No. 0 242 235, granted to Plant Genetic 
Systems on 10 October 1990, entitled “plant cells resistant to glutamine synthetase inhibitors, 
made by genetic engineering” (which made them resistant to herbicides inhibiting glutamine 
synthetase).  
The patent, according to the specification, regarded a process “for producing plants and 
reproduction material of said plants including a heterologous material stably integrated 
therein”,745 but also “plant cells, reproduction material, particularly seeds, as well as plants 
containing a foreign or heterologous DNA fragment stably integrated in their respective 
genomic DNAs, said fragments being transferred throughout generations of such plant cells, 
reproduction material, seeds and plants”.746 
Greenpeace opposed the patent on several grounds and argued that the claims concerned non 
patentable subject matter under Art.53(a) and (b). In particular, Greenpeace maintained that 
the grant of a patent for plant life forms and its exploitation was contrary to morality and 
ordre public; that the claims related to plants and the processes for their production were not 
patentable under Art. 53(b) EPC and plant products from any generation beyond the first one 
did not constitute an invention under Art. 52 EPC. 
The Technical Board of Appeal (“TBA”) of the EPO decided, finally, on the case, T 356/93 
Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, on 21 February 1995. 
The TBA drew on a technical approach to the kind of claims involved, refraining from 
engaging in any discussion of the nature and risks of genetically engineered microorganisms 
and organisms. The Board relied on the narrative of naturalization and normalization of 
contemporary biotechnology which has been illustrated in chapter two: rDNA biotechnology 
should not be considered differently from the previous biotechnology, as it only entails a 
better control over the patented products. 
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As far as claim 14 was concerned, which regarded plant cells (which fall within the definition 
of microorganisms), Greenpeace argued that the grant of a patent on plant cells contravened 
Article 53(a) and (b). 
The Board pointed out that “plant cells were considered to be microbiological products under 
the current practice of the EPO”747 and addressed whether any of the claimed subject matter 
constituted an exception to patentability under Art. 53(a) and (b). Art. 53(a) EPC 1973 
excluded from patentability “inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be 
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be 
so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the 
Contracting States”.  
The Board clarified that there was no European definition of morality and ordre public and 
that the meaning of these concepts “must be defined by way of interpretation”.748  
Ordre public was considered to cover the protection of public security and the physical 
integrity of individuals as part of society, which also encompasses the environment. 
Therefore, the inventions whose exploitation is likely to breach public peace, social order, or 
seriously prejudice the environment can be considered contrary to ordre public. The TBA 
construed “morality” as “related to the belief that some behavior is right and acceptable, 
whereas other behavior is wrong”749 on the basis of the “totality of accepted norms which are 
deeply rooted in a particular culture”.750 
It, then, affirmed that, according to the historical documentation relating to the EPC the 
concept of patentability must be as wide as possible, pinpointing that the exceptions to 
patentability should be narrowly construed.
751
  
The Board maintained the opposed patent claims, as it deemed that no challenged claim 
included subject-matter contrary to the clause,
 752
 as Greenpeace failed to prove a sufficiently 
substantiated threat to the environment linked to the invention and its contrariety to morality, 
as no misuse or destructive use of the invention could be devised “in light of the 
conventionally accepted standards of conduct of European culture”.753 Moreover, the Board 
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affirmed that the processes involved were not essentially biological, but technical, and 
microbiological and, thus, did not fall within the patent exceptions set out in Art. 53(b).
754
 
The case was finally remitted to the Opposition Division, which maintained it in an amended 
form in 1996.
755
 However, the claims to transgenic seeds and plants had already been deleted, 
following the decision of the Opposition Division in 1993 and the TBA affirmed its decision. 
It has been illustrated that patents became “socially sensitive” institutions in Europe in the 
1990s, when growing awareness of NGOs and groups about the social impact and effects of 
IPRs emerged and, in the process of political integration towards the future European Union, 
ethics was increasingly considered and devised as a relevant means to build the European 
identity.
756
 
As Tallacchini explained, the institutionalization of ethics in the European Community began 
when “the European Commission decided to incorporate ethics into the decision-making 
process for Community research and technological development policies by setting up the 
Group of Advisers on Ethical Implications of Biotechnology (GAEIB)”, 757  in November 
1991. This incorporation concerned, first, biotechnology and, then, from 1997, when the 
GAEIB was replaced by the European Group on Ethics on Science and New Technologies 
(EGE), all the areas of science and technology, as the Group’s mandate was extended to 
cover all areas of application of science and technology.
758
 This integration, Tallacchini 
noticed, was deemed as a fundamental political factor in the transition from Rome Treaties to 
the Unique Market, up until the Maastricht Treaty.
759
 However, this process of integration 
turned to be particularly difficult and the efforts of constructing a European ethical shared 
view went amiss also within the EPC system as no settled vision emerged from patent case 
law, as chapter six will show. 
 
3.5. Patenting GM Organisms in Europe: The Onco-mouse Case I and II 
This section will illustrate that, in Europe, the Boards did not draw on metaphorical 
expressions in order to decide on the patent eligibility of “transgenic non-human mammals” 
in the so-called “Onco-mouse” case, but had for the first time to engage in addressing 
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thoroughly the meaning of the term “animal variety” under Article 53(b) EPC. However, as 
this section and the next will point out, the Boards resorted to analogies between 
microorganisms and organisms in order to assess the sufficiency of disclosure of the claimed 
invention. 
Moreover, this case proved to be the test bench of the morality clause embedded in Article 
53(a) EPC. As several IP scholars pointed out,
760
 for more than a decade, after the entering 
into force of the EPC, Article 53 EPC had not been drawn upon in order to oppose biotech 
patent claims and challenge biotechnological products and processes. Nevertheless, the EPO 
had for the first time to face the moral dimension of IPRs by examining the patent eligibility 
of a biotech transgenic organism. 
On 24 June 1985 President and Fellows of Harvard College filed European Patent application 
No. 85 304 490.7 and the EPO Examining division raised two objections to the application: 1. 
That the patent claimed animals per se, which had to be considered not patentable as covered 
by the exceptions to patentability under Article 53(b) EPC; that the application was 
objectionable under Article 83 EPC, as it unduly extrapolated “to ‘transgenic non-human 
eukaryotic animals’ from what has actually been carried out, namely transgenic mice”.761 The 
application was rejected, because of the issues related to claims 1, 17 and 18.
762
 
The applicant, President and Fellows of Harvard College, argued that the claims were not 
directed to an animal variety and the claimed process was not essentially biological. 
Consequently, claims 17 and 18 had to be deemed patent eligible. 
Article 53(b) EPC sets forth a specific exception to patentability, which concerns “plant or 
animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals”,763 
even though the provision is not to be applied to microbiological processes or the products 
thereof. 
The Examining Division’s decision relied on an historical narrative, which focused on the 
interpretation of the purpose of the provision. It argued that the wording of the article was 
taken unchanged from Article 2(b) of the Strasbourg Patent Convention devised in 1962, 
when the issue of patenting transgenic animals was “scarcely conceivable”,764 and deemed 
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that the purpose of the exclusion of animal varieties from the scope of patentable inventions 
was that they were not “an appropriate subject-matter for patent protection”.765 
Furthermore, it pointed out that whilst in the provision, with regard to plants, the legislator 
used identical designations in all the three official languages, with respect to animals different 
taxonomic terms had been employed: the German version “Tierarten” diverged from the 
English one, “animal varieties”, as well as the French one, “races animales”.766 According to 
the Division, these differences suggested that the intention of the legislator was not to 
exclude some specific groups of animals, but animals in general from patentability.
767
 
Accordingly, it contended that the purpose of the provision implied that the EPO should 
reject claims directed not only to a specific variety, but to animals.
768
 
The examiners dismissed the ethical issues under Article 53(a), pointing out that patent law 
was not “the right legislative tool for regulating”769 these kinds of problems, especially as the 
invention might have beneficial effects for mankind. The Examining Division recalled that 
the Guidelines for Examination, in C-IV, 3.1, assisted in deciding on cases involving morality 
by clarifying that the purpose of Article 53(a) EPC was to exclude from patent protection 
inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to lead to criminal or other generally 
offensive behaviour and referred to a letter-bomb as the typical example falling under the 
provision.
770
 
The Examining Division, moreover, raised the question of reproducibility of the claimed 
invention. As far as sufficiency of disclosure under Article 83 EPC was concerned, it 
pinpointed that the claims regarded non-human mammalian animals and were not limited to 
mice or rodents. However, the specification did not offer any instruction on how to 
successfully obtain other transgenic non-human mammals. The examiners referred to one of 
the inventors’ declaration (Philip Leder’s statement) before the USPTO in order to support 
the non-obviousness of his invention, in which he professed how surprised he was to achieve 
positive results on mice, even though he was aware of several factors that could have made 
his efforts fail.
771
 Relying on his statement, the Division deemed that the subject matter was 
not sufficiently disclosed. 
                                                          
765
 ibid. 
766
 ibid 455. 
767
 ibid. 
768
 ibid. 
769
 ibid 459. 
770
 ibid. 
771
 ibid 460. 
147 
 
On appeal against this decision, the TBA, in its decision T19/90 dated 3 October 1990,
772
 
overturned the arguments of the Examining Division. 
The TBA argued that, although the claimed invention was broad, as it concerned “all non-
human mammalian animals”, it was sufficiently disclosed under Article 83 EPC. It 
acknowledged that non-human mammals other than mice have different immune systems and 
numbers of genes, but it did find that the claimed invention could be carried out also on these 
organisms by a person skilled in the art.
773
 The TBA, furthermore, disagreed that the claims 
should be limited to rodents, instead of mammals, because grounded on the assumption that 
rodents are alike mice for the purpose of the invention.
774
 
The TBA did not resort to metaphors in order to define the “nature” of the patent claims and 
the boundaries of patent eligible inventions, but it drew on the analogy between different 
kinds of organisms and microorganisms to assess the sufficient disclosure of the patent 
claims. The Board endorsed the appellant’s reference 775  to case T292/85 Polypeptide 
expression/GENENTECH I, which involved a recombinant plasmid and bacterium and its 
polypeptide expression.
776
 A patent on the claimed invention was, firstly, rejected by the 
Examining Division as not sufficiently disclosed. The claim over bacteria was deemed so 
broad that could encompass unsuitable species or variants, but the TBA considered the 
“unsuitability of unspecified variants of a functionally defined component feature of the 
invention”777 as immaterial to sufficiency, “as long as there are suitable variants known to the 
skilled person through the disclosure or common general knowledge which provides the same 
effect for the invention”.778 It ruled, therefore, that a biological invention was sufficiently 
disclosed if “it clearly indicated at least one way in which the skilled person could carry it 
out”.779 
The TBA agreed on the relevance of T292/85 to determine the sufficiency of disclosure on 
the Onco-mouse case and pointed out that: “the invention clearly indicates now the skilled 
person can achieve chromosomal incorporation of an activated oncogene sequence into the 
genome of a non-human mammal disclosing as it does an activated mouse myc gene 
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introduced into a suitable plasmid and then micro-injected into mouse eggs at a given stage of 
cellular development”. 780  According to the TBA this ensured that the invention was 
reproducible in mice and, therefore, it might be posited that the invention could likewise be 
performed in suitable mammals. By drawing this conclusion, the TBA has implicitly 
established that the claimed invention fulfilled an adequate standard of reproducibility, but, as 
the Courts’ decisions on the Oncomouse case in Canada showed, the reproducibility turned 
out to be one of the main issues raised against its patent eligibility. 
This decision points out that the sufficiency of disclosure sets out a standard of reproducibility, 
which is largely based on assumptions of control, precision and efficiency about the kind of 
technology related to the claimed invention. In this case, as the claimed “transgenic non-
human mammals” resulted from recombinant DNA technology, metaphorically named 
“genetic engineering”, and this kind of technology was assumed to guarantee precision in 
their reproducibility, the claimed invention was considered sufficiently disclosed. 
The TBA reversed also the Division’s interpretation of the terms embedded in Article 53(b) 
EPC as excluding the patentability of animals as such. It admitted that the meaning of the 
German term “Tierarten” was broader than the English and French locutions, however, it 
observed that patent exceptions should be narrowly construed and found that the Examining 
Division broad construction was not sufficiently supported.
781
 
The Board offered, therefore, a historical counter-narrative of the origins of Article 53(b), 
excluding, first, that the reference to specific categories of animals resulted from a mistake in 
drafting the exception.
782
 Accordingly, the TBA regarded the language of the article as not 
covering animals as such, pointing to the preparatory documents were completely silent on 
the purpose of this patent exclusion and, hence, ruling out the centrality of the historical 
interpretation.
783
 
It, then, backed an evolutionary interpretation of its meaning focused on the presumed 
intention “in the light of the changes in circumstances which have taken place since”784 when 
the law was adopted. In construing thus the ratio legis, the Board was aware of acting as a 
gatekeeper in making a balance involving the role of the patent system on the face of the 
interests of inventors and society: “It is now the task of the European Patent Office to find a 
solution to the problem of the interpretation of Article 53(b) EPC with regard to the concept 
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of ‘animal varieties’, providing a proper balance between the interest of inventors in this field 
in obtaining reasonable protection for their efforts and society’s interest in excluding certain 
categories of animals from patent protection.
785
 
The TBA significantly devised a particular approach to address whether a claimed invention 
fell within the moral exception to patentability set forth in Article 53(a). In contrast with the 
Examining Division, which dismissed the moral questions as part of examining process of the 
claimed invention, the TBA took on the responsibility of the EPO and the Boards in dealing 
with ethical problems arising from patent claims. It pointed out that the genetic modification 
of animals was problematic, since the insertion of activated oncogenes made the animal prone 
to develop tumors and created a suffering animal model for research.
786
 In addition, it 
involved environmental issues:  there was a danger that the animal released by mistake in the 
environment could cause “irreversible adverse effects”. 787  It, therefore, set out a moral 
utilitarian approach
788
 to these issues based on weighing the risks and benefits involved: “The 
decision as to whether or not Article 53(a) EPC is a bar to patenting the present invention 
would seem to depend mainly on a careful weighing up of the suffering of animals and 
possible risks to the environment on the one hand, and the invention’s usefulness to mankind 
on the other”.789 The TBA, therefore, deemed that the usefulness of the transgenic animals as 
models for cancer research outweighed the animal sufferance and the potential risks to the 
environment.
790
 This weighing up approach, which is consequentialist, as it considers the 
risks and benefits that can follow from granting IPRs on an invention, would become in the 
following years the dominant way to handle and solve the Gordian knot of patent exclusions 
on morality grounds embedded in the EPC. 
The case was finally remitted to the Examining Division for further prosecution. The patent 
was, then, granted on 15 May 1992,
791
 but between 18 December 1992 and 13 February 1993 
seventeen oppositions were lodged against the patent
792
 and opened up a wider European 
debate over the patentability of animals.  
In 1990, the decision of the TBA in the Onco-mouse case widened the scope of patent 
eligibility, under the EPC, to accommodate transgenic animals, as it narrowed the patent 
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exception under article 53(b) EPC. Moreover, it devised the morality test to be applied when 
a claimed invention might fall within the patent exceptions of Article 53 EPC. Still, this 
settlement proved to be uncertain, as NGOs and civil society have grown aware of the 
political and ethical relevance of IPRs on biotech inventions and become more willing to 
oppose patents. 
After the grant of the patent in 1992, 17 oppositions were filed against it. The opponents 
included several NGOs which requested the revocation of the patent on several grounds, but 
mainly under Articles 53(a) and 53(b) EPC.
793
 
On 7 November 2001, the Opposition Division decided on the case
794
 and focused most of its 
analysis on whether the invention fell within the exceptions to patentability under Article 
53(a) and (b) EPC. 
The Division judged Rules 23(b) to 23(e) EPC applicable and addressed whether animals 
should be considered patentable under Article 53(b) EPC. It relied on Rule 23(c)(b) EPC, 
which referred to the same issue, and applied it as “a supplementary means of 
interpretation”.795 
It agreed with the TBA that exceptions to patentability should be construed narrowly and that 
the use of both terms “animals” and “animal varieties” in the same half-sentence of Article 
53(b) EPC unequivocally suggested that the locution “animal varieties” was not drafted in 
order to cover animals.
796
 However, the Division deemed that case G 1/98 Transgenic 
plant/Novartis II case (that will be analysed in chapter five), which concerned the patent 
eligibility of transgenic plants and seeds under Article 53(b) EPC, could be applied to animal 
varieties.
797
  
The Examining Division’s arguments rested on an analogy between the conclusions drawn in 
that case and the Onco-mouse case, as the first patent case concerning the patentability of 
animals. The Division admitted that T 356/93 drew different conclusions on the patentability 
of plant varieties, but it did not offer any reasons for the preference accorded to G 1/98, 
whose holding was applied to handle the exclusion of animal varieties.
798
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In G 1/98, the EBA argued that the purpose of the exclusion of plant varieties was to avoid a 
dual protection for plant varieties, according to the ban set forth in the UPOV Convention
799
 
and endorsed “the higher taxonomic level approach”800 for transgenic plants that supported 
their patent eligibility.
801
 
However, the Division had to fill up the gap concerning the rationale for animal exclusion, 
positing that in the absence of any form of IP protection for animal varieties, at the time, as 
products of animal breeding, the “most obvious reason for this must have been the intention 
or at least the keeping open of the possibility to create such a law for the protection of animal 
varieties later on”.802 
It, therefore, concluded that Article 53(b) did not establish any bar to the patentability of the 
subject-matter claimed in the patent. 
As to the exclusion under Article 53(a) EPC, the Opposition Division observed that Rule 
23(d)(d) dealt precisely with this invention, since it clarified that “(d) processes for modifying 
the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any 
substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes” 
shall not be patented. 
It maintained its intention not to endorse extreme positions in examining the meaning of 
Article 53(a) EPC. It, then, re-framed the balancing test set forth in T19/90, by substantiating 
the evidence of the European moral order.  
It stated the test was superseded by the similar approach contained in Rule 23(d)(d).
803
 
According to the Opposition Division morality should be assessed primarily by considering 
the laws and regulations which are common to most of the European countries. As these 
provisions do exist, they rejected other kind of evidence as means of assessment, such as 
public opinion polls, which were adduced by the opponents. 
804
 
It, then, pinpointed that the relevant regulation on use of such animals for testing, namely 
Directive 86/609/EEC (no longer in force), the Council Directive of 24 November 1986 on 
the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
regarding the protection of animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes, 
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implied that the exploitation of the invention was allowable in Europe and, therefore, not 
immoral.
805
 
The two relevant criteria to be balanced were the suffering of the animal and the substantial 
medical benefit to man and animal.
806
 However, the Division foresaw a problem that the TBA 
did not deal with, namely at which date the assessment must be made, since this approach is 
consequentialist. 
According to the Division the assessment ought to be made at the effective date and it was 
linked to the probability element stated in Rule 23(d)(d), otherwise the element of probability 
would have been superfluous.
807
 Suffering, the Division acknowledged, existed irrespectively 
of the date assessment, as the animals were prone to develop tumours. 
Nevertheless, the substantial medical effect had to be assessed at the effective date of the 
patent and was centred on “whether at the effective date the inventor had bona fide reasons to 
believe that his invention would have a substantial medical benefit”.808 Since this was judged 
undisputed, there was no bar to the patentability of the animals. 
 Consequently, the Division allowed auxiliary request 4, directed to rodents, which included 
“representative animal species useful for allowable animal testing”,809 but rejected the main 
request directed to non-human mammalian animals, as only testing animals were considered 
to pass the morality test.
810
 
On the 16 January 2003 the Opposition Division decided to maintain the patent in this 
amended form. However, the boundaries of the patent scope that were re-drawn by the 
Division did not satisfy the opponents, who argued against the patent eligibility of animal 
varieties and requested the patent be fully revoked.  
The TBA had, therefore, to examine again the issues related to the patent eligibility of the 
invention and decided, finally, on 6 July 2004.
811
  
The Onco-mouse case has proved to be the first European patent case in which the moral 
dimension of IPRs emerged as a pivotal issue for civil society, even though the opponents 
were not completely successful. In its aftermath, “the moral respectability”812 of IPRs, as 
Drahos and Braithwaite called it, has been increasingly questioned and challenged by a 
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higher level of transnational activism,
813
 which was a clear signal that intellectual property 
was becoming a legal area constantly under the scrutiny of NGOs, political groups and 
citizens, notwithstanding its highly technical character. 
The TBA addressed the relationship between Article 53(a) and Rule 23(d)(d), making clear 
that the rule set out a non-exhaustive list of biotech inventions excluded from patentability.
814
 
Whereas Rule 23(d)(d) established a balancing test for assessing  the patentability of 
processes for genetically modifying animals or animals produced by such processes, Article 
53(a) involved a different kind of test. The first balancing test entailed weighing the suffering 
of animals against the medical benefit to animals and humans and was focused on the 
likelihood of the suffering, which triggered the application of the rule.
815
  
Furthermore, it pinpointed that, although T19/90 set forth a balancing test very similar (as 
adapted to the one embedded in Rule 23(d)(d)), it differed for its reference to the “usefulness 
to mankind” and “possible risks to the environment”.816 In particular, it acknowledged that 
the locution “usefulness to mankind” could encompass a wider range of beneficial factors 
than the “substantial medical benefit”. In order to apply the test under Rule 23(d)(d) the 
relevant point of time was deemed the effective date, namely the filing date or priority date of 
the patent or patent application which was challenged.
817
 Moreover, it limited the evidence to 
the relevant matters: the likelihood of suffering, the likelihood of substantial medical benefit 
and the necessary correspondence between the two.
818
 
As to the exclusions under Article 53(b) EPC, the TBA addressed fully the inconsistencies of 
languages in defining “animal varieties” and admitted that “a definition by reference to a 
taxonomical rank would be both consistent with the position in relation to plant varieties and 
in the interests of legal certainty”.819 
Nevertheless, it agreed that, notwithstanding these inconsistencies of the wording in the three 
languages, the same principle, upheld by the EBA in G1/98 Novartis II case concerning 
transgenic plants should be applied to cases involving animals, namely that in the absence of 
the identification of a specific plant variety in a product claim, the subject-matter of the 
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claimed invention should not be considered as directed to a plant variety or variety within the 
meaning of Article 53(b) EPC.
820
 
The TBA rejected, then, the respondent’s main request, pertaining to “a transgenic rodent” 
and a method to produce it, since it deemed that there was no likelihood of substantial 
medical benefit to be derived from applying the claimed process to all rodents apart from 
mice and allowed, accordingly, the first auxiliary request, which was limited to mice.
821
 All 
the other moral issues raised by the appellants were dismissed for lack of conclusive evidence: 
environmental risks, viable non-animal alternatives, degree of animal suffering, threat to 
evolution, increased use of transgenic mice.
822
 
As Bently and Sherman pointed out, the Onco-mouse case highlighted that “while in many 
other situations patent law has been able to accommodate alien concepts within its own logic 
and procedures, in its encounter with the ethical, patent law is now confronted with a set of 
problems for which it manifestly lacks not only an appropriate conceptual, procedural, or 
institutional framework, but also a suitable language to deal with ethical questions”.823 
They refer to the difficulties that the Opposition Division and, later, the Boards encountered, 
because they could not “quantify the objections raised against the patent that the [morality] 
test required”,824 as they were “abstract in nature, based on a priori principles, and not readily 
reducible to a quantifiable form”.825 In this respect, they illustrated that patent law underwent 
a process of closure and objectification that has led to “marginalizing non-legal concerns”.826 
In particular, they explained that the invention was devised and handled as a “closed, secure 
and fixed entity” 827  and patent law was meant and applied positing that qualitative 
judgements on the invention could be averted.
828
 This also accounts why patent law has been 
deemed by the EPO and IP professionals as a neutral, technical system, isolated from ethical 
and political issues.
829
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The troubles of opening up patent law to ethical concerns lie therefore, partially, in their 
potential destabilizing effects, as they have been viewed as undermining “those practices 
which depend upon the invention as a closed and stable entity”.830 
 
3.6 Not So Artless Metaphors: Conclusions 
In the United States and Canada, judges, patent examiners and scientific experts largely relied 
on the conceptual metaphors of the machine and chemical molecule in order to decide 
whether GM microorganisms and organisms ought to be accommodated within the scope of 
“patentable subject matter” or “invention”. As this chapter has explained, these metaphors 
were crucial to affirm the patent eligibility of these biotech products, as they entail 
reductionist analogies about the ontology and nature, which allowed patent examiners and 
judges to subsume microorganisms and organisms under the already settled categories of 
patentable inventions. 
As chapter two (sections 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) has highlighted, these metaphors have been 
epistemically and heuristically influential in orienting how organisms have been studied in 
Western philosophical and technoscientific tradition and could be considered the “root 
metaphors”831 which, together with the genetic code, have offered a definition of life and 
human identity at the atomistic level. This chapter has explained how these metaphors have 
been relevant in the development of the scope of patent eligible matter offering a definition of 
the biotech nature of the invention which largely supported its expansion.  
In all the three political contexts, molecular biology, genetics and biotechnology have been 
institutionally fostered and flourished. As anthropologists pointed out,
832
 these fileds of 
research have influenced how individuals and collectivity interpret their identities: atoms, 
molecules and DNA sequences are considered the relevant units that determine what/who 
organisms are and their actual and possible future pathologies. 
However, the analysis of case-law in these jurisdictions shows that these metaphors, together 
with other factors, have largely contributed to settle the meaning of patentable subject matter. 
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The recourse to these metaphors sustained, therefore, in both jurisdictions a semantic of 
appropriation, which has marked the development of patent eligible matter in these countries. 
Whereas in the United States Chakrabarty re-shaped the boundaries of patent eligibility by 
describing micro-organisms as bio-artefacts, not different from the kinds of products set out 
in Title 35 U.S.C. § 101, in Canada the Patent Appeal Board, in Re Abitibi, took the decision 
of re-framing the scope of “invention” in s 2 relying on the metaphor of the chemical 
molecule. However, it limited the enlargement of its scope to microorganisms.  
Subsequently, in the Oncomouse case, both the Trial Division of the Federal Court and, later, 
the SCC, pointed out that the metaphor of the “chemical molecule” fell short in describing a 
transgenic mammal and, hence, the claimed invention could not be subsumed under the 
definition of invention in s 2. The SCC, moreover, highlighted the political nature of the 
decision on the patent eligibility of higher life forms, which accordingly ought to be 
discussed by Parliament and should not be left to administrative practices or judicial fiat. 
The narrative of progress set out in Chakrabarty, however, proved to be influential also 
outside the boundaries of the U.S., as the Canadian FCA largely drew on it to back the patent 
eligibility of transgenic organisms. As Graham Dutfield illustrated, although “both the Unites 
States and Canada require physical inventions to be machine, manufactures or composition of 
matters, and yet both have accepted that life forms are patentable”,833 this have been brought 
about in different ways. 
The sociotechnical imaginary of what was collectively desirable related to the development 
of biotechnology differed in these nations. 
In the United States, the narrative of progress linked to the Constitutional IP clause sustained 
a sociotechnical imaginary in which the patent eligibility of genetically modified products 
was crucial in fostering the needs and wealth of American society.  
In Canada, even though the public policy favoured biotech products and their patentability, 
the SCC showed a cautious approach in granting IPRs over higher organisms when 
fundamental rights could be involved.
834
  
Although in both countries biotechnology has been framed in terms of products, a different 
sociotechnical imaginary emerged in Canada which questioned the support to biotechnology 
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tout court in the face of the constitutional rights just set out in a state still largely in the 
making. 
Under the EPC patent system, the patent eligibility of microorganisms was not widely 
disputed. The Board of Appeals did not resort to metaphors in order to address the problems 
related to the possible patent exclusion of genetically engineered plant cells, under the ordre 
public and morality clause embedded in Art 53(a) EPC, but relied on a narrative of continuity 
and boundary work in order to decouple biotechnology from its applications, which were 
distinguished as good and bad, and then building a moral analogy between traditional 
selective breeding and plant biotechnology based on genetic engineering, which was set out 
in T 356/93 Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems: “Indeed, in the Board’s judgement, plant 
biotechnology per se cannot be regarded as being more contrary to morality than traditional 
selective breeding because both traditional breeders and molecular biologists are guided by 
the same motivation, namely to change the property of a plant by introducing novel genetic 
material into it in order to obtain a new and, possibly, improved plant. However, compared 
with traditional breeding techniques, genetic engineering techniques applied to plants allow a 
more powerful and accurate control of genetic modifications”.835 
However, in the 1990s, when ethics was emerging as a central epistemic element in the 
construction of the identity of the European Community, significant concerns about the 
patent eligibility of GM organisms were raised by NGOs, political parties and civil society in 
the Onco-mouse case.  
Their opposition forced the EPO’s Opposition Division and Boards to address the meaning of 
the patent exception set out in Article 53(b) on “animal varieties” and the morality clause in 
Article 53(a). The Division and Boards did not rely on a metaphorical definition of transgenic 
organisms, but endorsed the “higher rank approach” set out in the Novartis II case, without 
fully engaging in explaining the preference for this approach in comparison to T 356/93 Plant 
cells/Plant Genetic Systems and filling a gap in the historical narrative of the origins of the 
provision (Article 53(b)) in favour of the patent eligibility of animals. 
They, however, drew on analogies to assess the sufficiency of disclosure of the claimed 
invention, by assimilating the threshold of sufficient disclosure for transgenic organisms to 
the one settled for microorganisms and positing that “genetic engineering” entailed a high 
degree of control and reproducibility over the claimed invention. 
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The Boards, as it will emerge in several cases concerning other areas biotech innovation, 
relied on historical narratives tracing back the meaning of the terms of the EPC, however 
sometimes in an ambiguous way, by filling the gap when a clear intention, in the travaux 
préparatoires, could not be construed. 
Under the EPC system, a clear support to the expansion of patent eligible matter emerged and 
a molecular view of life and nature characterized technoscientific practices and the social 
imaginary: biotechnology and its GM products, as chapter two has illustrated (section 2.3.2), 
were linked to creating a brighter future in terms of the protection of the environment, 
promoting medical research and industrial modernization.  
However, as the long opposition to the “Onco-mouse” patent shows, a particular perspective 
of what was desirable and attainable through the allocation of IPRs on GMOs was emerging 
and this view challenged their morality and fulfillment of collective needs. 
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Chapter Four 
Intellectual Property on Gene Sequences 
 
4.1 Information, IP and Gene Sequences 
Whereas the previous chapter illustrated how the use of metaphors on biotech micro-
organisms and organisms has shaped the boundaries of what is natural and artificial, as far as 
the interpretation of patent eligible matter is concerned, this chapter will address how these 
boundaries have been further expanded by patent offices’ practices and guidelines in order to 
accommodate other biotechnological products, such as isolated and purified DNA sequences.  
Although resorting to metaphors proved to be a significant move to expand analogically the 
scope of “patentable subject matter” or “invention”, likewise the judicial and institutional 
narratives in which metaphors were embedded turned out to be fundamental in order to 
sustain their use and implementation in particular national and supranational contexts. These 
narratives concern the construction of the definition of the threshold of artificiality, which is 
statutory required to deem a product or process patentable. Yet, alongside this, they set out 
the aims of intellectual property in specific national settings, champion views about the 
boundaries between patent jurisdiction, policy-making and patent offices’ administrative 
authority, which can result in the normalization or not of technoscientific products and 
processes within patent systems. 
Furthermore, this chapter will show that alternative metaphors (mainly the metaphor of the 
genetic code) and counter-narratives have been used in the systems of comparison to reframe 
sociotechnical imaginaries of life, as far as IP over DNA sequences and genes is concerned. 
The metaphor of the genetic code conveys an atomistic and reductionist view of life, as much 
as the metaphors of the machine and molecule. However, it has been supported by scientific 
researchers, associations of clinicians and cancer patient advocacy groups to argue for the 
patent ineligibility of DNA sequences as products of nature. 
The chapter will focus, in particular, on how the established boundaries of what is “patentable 
subject matter” have been unsettled, when the validity of  patent claims on the BRCA1 and 2 
genes have been, successfully, challenged in the United States, Europe and Australia, in the 
last decade. 
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Several IP scholars
836
 engaged in analysing the role that information is playing in 
contemporary societies, in the global economy and the entitlement issues that it elicits. They 
showed that information and its commodification is problematic in terms of market efficiency, 
liberal political theory and allocation of property rights.
837
 Information carries the features of 
“public goods”, as it has high social value, it is expensive to produce and acquire, even 
though its results are cheap to copy.
838
 Economic theorists argue that, in order to produce this 
kind of good which, otherwise, would be under produced, intellectual property rights are 
fundamental to providing incentives for its creation. Nevertheless, it has been noticed,
839
 that 
social access to information is pivotal to keep the market efficient, foster scientific research, 
promote creativity and benefit the public. North American and most European contemporary 
democracies, in addition, are largely grounded in liberal political theory, which devises the 
public sphere and its liveliness as depending upon the free access to information and its 
communication,
840
 as freedom of speech is the cornerstone of constitutionally recognized 
human rights. At present, IP systems are facing some of the tensions engendered by the 
policy of information, which is ultimately deemed and handled as a form of wealth. 
James Boyle pinpointed
841
 that the “information society” or the “information age” is marked 
by the “universalizing logic of the information relation”, namely “the tendency is toward the 
economic and conceptual separation of the information message from the medium – cells, 
diskettes, telephone directories or whatever – and the progressive devaluation (literally the 
diminishing marginal cost) of the medium as compared to the message”.842 As a consequence, 
he notices, “as the information content is decontextualized, the location or form of the 
information comes to seem increasingly – as irrelevant as the color of two books would be to 
a comparison of their arguments”.843 
He refers to the Human Genome Project (“HGP”) and the relevance of information 
technology and, in particular, bioinformatics in devising the project and, then, mapping and 
sequencing the genome, which entailed the use of special computer software in order to 
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collect, organize and analyse large amounts of data to identify introns and exons,
844
 which are 
stored on disk. 
The analysis of the patent decisions on the BRCA1 and 2 genes case illustrates the kind of 
issues that the logic of the information relation engenders in terms of access, distribution, 
control and allocation of rights and how it actually operates, as it has shaped for decades 
patent offices’ practices and guidelines, judicial approaches and patentability criteria, such as 
isolation and purification. 
 
4.2 DNA’s Threshold of Artificiality: USPTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines and the 
Narrative of the Origins  
The legal status of the human genome has been uncertain and ambiguous during and after the 
completion of the HGP.  
On 26 June 2000, in the joint press conference
845
 issued by U.S.A. President Bill Clinton and 
U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair that announced the successful conclusion of the mapping of 
the human genome, they both expressed the excitement for the historic breakthrough, which 
would “revolutionize the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of most, if not all, human 
diseases”.846 However, they both acknowledged that this achievement was only a starting 
point for further public and private scientific research, which is required to address the legal, 
social and ethical implications of the project concerning responsibility on the uses of this kind 
of information.  
Prime Minister Blair, in particular, pointed out: “We, all of us, share a duty to ensure that the 
common property of the human genome is used freely for the common good of the whole 
human race; to ensure that the powerful information now at our disposal is used to transform 
medicine, not abused, to make man his own creator or invade individual privacy”.847  
Blair’s speech conveys a specific understanding and qualification of the human genome, 
coherent with the common guiding principles that all the participants to the HGP were asked 
to comply with, since the beginning of the undertaking: “Article 1. The human genome 
underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the 
recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense it is the heritage of 
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mankind”;848 “Article 4. The human genome in its natural state shall not give rise to financial 
gains”.849 
According to these principles, set out by the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 11 November 1997, 
the participants to the HGP seemed to endorse the qualification of the human genome as a 
part of a “common heritage of mankind”,850 which “in its natural state shall not give rise to 
financial gains”.851 Although the interpretation of this legal qualification in international law 
and its implications are debated,
852
 the announcement took place after years in which the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health and Craig Venter’s group and his newly founded company, 
Celera Genomics, had already patented a substantial amount of DNA sequences before the 
USPTO.
853
 
In 1990, the legal scholar Eisenberg had already examined the trend of patenting DNA 
sequences and pinpointed some of the doctrinal problems regarding their assessment, as far as 
the threshold of patentable subject matter and the requirements of novelty and non-
obviousness are concerned.
854
 Moreover, she discussed the policy considerations of patenting 
human DNA sequences in the aftermath of the 1980 Patent & Trademark Act 
Amendments,
855
 also known as Bayh-Dole Act, whose aim was “to use the patent system to 
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development”,856 by allowing nonprofit research institutions and small businesses to retain 
title to inventions and grant exclusive licenses for specific uses of the inventions to large 
businesses.
857
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Since the 1980s,
858
 the USPTO had granted many patents on genes and DNA sequences, 
whose commercial uses for the production of therapeutic proteins or diagnostic tests for 
genetic diseases were rather predictable and clear.
859
  
As Calvert and Joly pointed out,
860
 the reduction of genes and DNA sequences to chemical 
molecules is linked to the development of molecular biology, which shifted the representation 
of the gene from “Mendelian” to “molecular”,861 namely from genes as “hypothetical factors 
which are responsible for phenotypic differences between organisms”862 to stretches of DNA 
which code for particular polypeptides. They remarked that the earliest patents involving 
genes were granted by the USPTO on Mendelian genes, which were not considered as 
chemical compounds. As an example, they refer to US patent No. 3,710,511, which was 
granted in 1973, on “Procedures for use of genic male sterility in production of commercial 
hybrid maize”.863 Although the patent is on a method to produce hybrid maize, it centrally 
involves a Mendelian gene, as it describes a gene for a particular trait.
864
 
Some years later, in 1998, Rebecca Eisenberg and Michael Heller published in Science a 
well-known article, entitled “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research”,865 in which they expressed some concerns that the practice of granting patents on 
basic tools of research could stir anticommons effects in certain areas of innovation, such as 
biomedical science. They drew on the metaphor used by the ecologist Garrett Hardin, “the 
tragedy of the commons”, in an article published as well in Science thirty years before,866 in 
which he questioned the negative effects of the regime of the commons, as to the preservation 
and protection of the environment. Heller and Eisenberg, overturned his metaphor and 
questioned whether and how an anticommons regime, marked by the proliferation of IPRs 
granted to much upstream, could have a negative impact on scientific research. 
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One of the main examples provided by them regarded the proliferation of U.S. patents on 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs),
867
 namely cDNA
868
 fragments (usually 200-500 nucleotides 
long) which result from “copying one or both ends of an mRNA which are often used in 
place of a full length cDNA”. 869  These DNA sequences have been named “expressed 
sequence tags” because, as the molecular biology scholar Tropp explained, “they (1) 
represent a snapshot of the genes that are expressed in specific tissues, specific 
developmental stages, or both; and (2) can be used as hybridization probes to tag 
complementary chromosomal DNA sequences”.870 
What, in particular Heller and Eisenberg pinpointed was that the function of ESTs sequences 
was largely unknown.
871
 
On 5 January 2001 the USPTO published the revised Utility Examination Guidelines
872
 
which established “the policies and procedures to be followed by Office personnel in the 
evaluation of any patent application for compliance with the utility requirements of 35 U.S.C. 
101 and 112”.873 The Guidelines describe the procedures to be followed by patent examiners 
and make clear that they shall assess whether the claims involve a specific, credible and 
substantial utility or not.
874
 
The revised Utility Examination Guidelines have been issued in order to address the 
problems related to patent claims on DNA sequences, namely the risk of granting patents 
whose scope is too broad, if no specific, credible and substantial utility is requested and 
provided.  
The USPTO had to reply to several public comments on the Revised Interim Utility 
Examination Guidelines, which pointed out that: 1. “a gene is not a new composition of 
matter because it exists in nature”; 2. an inventor who isolates a gene does not actually invent 
or discover a patentable composition because the gene exists in nature”; 3. “naturally 
occurring DNAs are part of our heritage” and hence not inventions;  4. the fact that a person 
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whose body includes a patented gene could be found guilty of patent infringement.
875
 Several 
comments urged the USPTO not to issue patents for genes on the grounds that they are 
products of nature and these kinds of patents can hinder and delay medical research.
876
  
In response, the USPTO rejected the comments and affirmed isolation and purification as the 
two guiding criteria in order to assess the patent eligibility of DNA sequences: 
“A patent claim directed to an isolated and purified DNA molecule could cover, e.g. a 
gene excised from a natural chromosome or a synthesized molecule. An isolated and 
purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is 
eligible for a patent because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a patent as a 
composition of matter or as an article of manufacture because the DNA molecule does 
not occur in that isolated form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are 
eligible for patents because their purified state is different from the naturally 
occurring compound”.877 
The USPTO’s responses to specific comments and, notably, to the substantial ones resorted 
to the same narrative of the origins that the majority of SCOTUS set out in Chakrabarty, 
scattered its main narrative units. This narrative sustains the de-naturalization of isolated and 
purified DNA sequences/molecules and, hence, their normalization as patentable subject 
matter in the U.S. patent system, under the aegis of the analogy with the chemical compounds. 
The first comment noticed that, while inventions are patentable, discoveries are not, pointing 
out that since genes are discoveries rather than inventions, patents on genes should not be 
issued.
878
 Rejecting the comment, the USPTO recalled Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution which does use the term “discoveries” instead of inventions and linked it to 
Title 35 U.S.C. § 101, which does not discriminate between inventions or discoveries as 
patentable subject matter, in order to conclude that discoveries are also patentable.
879
 
The third set of comments pointed out that “the USPTO should seek guidance from Congress 
as to whether naturally occurring genetic sequences are patentable subject matter”.880 The 
USPTO replied that legislative history shows that Congress intended “anything under the sun 
that is made by man” to be patent eligible, under Chakrabarty.881 
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Rebutting the fourth set of comments, which argued that patents should not be issued on 
genes “because the sequence of the human genome is at the core of what it means to be 
human and no person should be able to own/control something so basic”,882 the USPTO 
reaffirmed that the patent system promotes progress through the kind of exchange embedded 
in the Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the US Constitution.
883
 
Most of the answers rejected the adoption of the comments by drawing on the analogy 
between chemical molecules and DNA sequences.
884
 
Several comments stated that DNA should be freely available for research and patents on 
ESTs could inhibit biomedical research. In response, the USPTO pointed out that the office 
“must administer the laws as Congress has enacted them and as the Federal Courts have 
interpreted them”.885  
USPTO acted mainly as a policy-maker. The Utility Examination Guidelines were issued by 
the USPTO in order to set out the threshold for the patentability of genes. Their adoption and 
implementation proved pivotal in strengthening the patentability of DNA sequences, reducing 
the risks for patent holders to incur in the objections of the “product of nature” doctrine. 
Before the approval of the new Utility Guidelines, the USPTO had granted a large number of 
patents on DNA sequences. The formal introduction of the criteria of isolation and 
purification has, however, established the rationale to legally demarcate naturally occurring 
DNA sequences from “artificial” isolated/purified ones. 
 
4.2.1 Genes as Information: Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. United States 
Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al.
886
 
In the United States, the patent eligibility of biotech genetically engineered living products 
seemed to be settled for decades, in the aftermath of Chakrabarty, by drawing on the 
conceptual metaphor of the machine, namely microorganisms and organisms defined as bio-
artifacts. 
As far as patent applications on DNA sequences are concerned, the USPTO relied on the 
conceptual metaphor of the chemical molecule, in order to uphold their patent eligibility 
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status, and on the criteria of isolation and purification to establish a threshold of artificiality, 
which would exclude the application of the product of nature doctrine. 
This outline of the boundaries of what is natural and artificial was due, however, to be 
challenged. 
In 2006, Tania Simoncelli who was a science advisor at the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) between 2003-2010,
887
 together with Chris Hansen, a senior ACLU attorney, started 
to examine the possibility of undertaking a judicial case to challenge Myriad’s patents888 on 
the BRCA1 and 2 genes. They were joined, afterwards, by Sandra Park, an attorney in 
ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project. 
Simoncelli’s work, at the time, “involved identifying emerging and important issues in 
science and technology that had implications for civil liberties”889 and the patenting of human 
genes was pinpointed by her as an area of concern, which deserved to be probed.
890
 
Their endeavor aimed, first, at speaking to pathologists, medical geneticists and counselors, 
activists and researchers to understand whether to challenge gene patents or not and what 
kind of goals should be pursued. The foundation of the case required some years of work, in 
which they benefited from the support of scientific experts and professionals, health and 
patients organizations, which proved to be pivotal to undermine USPTO’s long-standing 
policy and practice of granting patents on naturally occurring isolated DNA sequences,
891
 as 
affecting the public interest. Their aim was to challenge radically the patent eligibility of 
DNA sequences and genes. 
They, subsequently, filed a case against Myriad Genetics and the USPTO contesting the 
validity of its product and method patent claims involving the BRCA1 and 2 genes. Their 
lawsuit hinged on undermining the narrative of progress maintained by the majority of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Chakrabarty, by backing a counter-narrative which proposed a 
different interpretation of the relationship between 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Article I, Section 8 
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution in the light of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution. In particular, the plaintiffs pinpointed the tensions between 
Article I, Section 8 Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, which supports and justifies 
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patent law and IPRs, and the First Amendment which protects freedom of speech and 
thought.
892
 
This counter-narrative, together with the metaphor of the genetic code, have been employed 
to re-frame the sociotechnical imaginary of biotechnology in the United States, by showing 
that the patent eligibility of these genomic products was not desirable for researchers and 
would not benefit cancer patients and American society at large. 
The claims have been challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. According to plaintiffs, 
they fell within the judicial patentability exclusion established in Chakrabarty on the laws of 
nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas. Furthermore, they infringed the First 
Amendment,
 
which deals with liberty of expression and association, and Article I, section 8, 
Clause 8, U.S. Constitution, the Constitutional IP clause.  
Myriad was accused of having pursued, since the 1990s, a commercial strategy aimed at 
gaining the monopoly on the testing of BRCA1 and 2 mutations: Myriad patented several 
mutated and wild-type BRCA1 and 2 sequences, as well as the methods in order to analyze 
and compare them and, then, enforced its patents and exclusive licenses against other 
researchers and laboratories offering similar services, by sending “cease and desist letters” 
and sometimes proposing collaboration licenses.
893
 This monopolistic strategy was 
considered to have hindered clinical research on cancer, limited the performance of 
alternative/complementary diagnostic tests, having considerably raised health insurance 
expenses related to BRCA1 and 2 mutations testing and restrained access to health care for 
patients. 
The BRCA1 gene was discovered in 1990 by a group led by Mary-Claire King at the 
University of California, Berkeley,
894
 and is a tumor-suppressor gene located on chromosome 
17, whose mutations have been linked to genetic breast cancer. In 1991, scientists found that 
its mutations were connected with genetic ovarian cancer too and, in September 1994, a 
group of Myriad Genetics’ scientists, together with researchers from the National Institute for 
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Environmental Health Sciences (which is a subdivision of the NIH), completed the mapping 
and sequencing of the gene.
895
 
In 1991 the BRCA2 gene was discovered, which is a tumor-suppressor gene located on 
chromosome 13, whose mutations entail an increased risk to develop breast cancer and 
ovarian cancer and can affect both women and men. In 1995, a group of investigators led by 
Michael Stratton at UK Institute for Cancer Research announced the mapping and sequencing 
of the BRCA2 gene.
896
 The mapping and sequencing of these genes attracted considerable 
media coverage and attention for its scientific and social significance. 
ACLU was able to involve PubPat, several medical organizations and potential and actual 
cancer patients and on 12 May 2009 they sued Myriad Genetics Inc., the directors of the 
University of Utah Research Foundation, and USPTO. The plaintiffs challenged fifteen 
claims of seven patents, owned or exclusively licensed to Myriad Genetics, a molecular 
diagnostic company based in Salt Lake City (Utah, US), and asked for a summary judgment 
on their invalidity. 
The claims-in-suit belonged to two different kinds of claims: composition or product ones 
and method or process ones. 
The product claims covered the isolated BRCA1 gene: claim 1 and 2 of the ’282 patent, 
claims 5 and 6 of the ’282 patent were directed to fragments as short as 15 nucleotides long 
of the DNA molecules in claims 1 and 2 of the ’282 patent, claim 7 of the ’282 patent and 
claim 1 of the ’473 patent were directed to “isolated DNA possessing one of the specified 
mutant BRCA1 gene sequences. 
Moreover, they covered the BRCA2 gene: claims 1, 6, and 7 of the ’492 patent. 
The method claims were directed to compare and analyse mutated BRCA1 and 2 and “genes 
sequences with the normal ones or “wild-type” ones in order to identify the presence of 
cancer-predisposing mutations: claim 1 of the ’999 and ’001 patents, claim 1 of the ’441 
patent, claim 1 of the ’857 patent, claim 2 of the ’857. Claim 20 of the ’282 patent concerned 
a “method for screening potential cancer therapeutics” which comprised growing cells 
carrying a mutated BRCA1 gene causing cancer  in the presence of the therapeutic, 
comparing the growth rates of the cells and determining whether the therapeutic has slowed 
the growth rate or not. 
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Significantly, the claims-in-suit covered also “wild-type” DNA sequences, which refer to the 
“normal” non-mutated human gene sequence, “i.e. the sequence of a gene without any 
variations, against which individuals’ gene sequences are compared”.897 Gaining IPRs over 
these isolated sequences, together with the mutated ones, is strategically relevant for 
companies selling genetic predisposition and diagnostic tests, as it allows them to prevent 
other companies and research groups to develop and market alternative and complementary 
tests because, even if they identify and isolate mutations of the same gene, they cannot 
compare them with patented wild-type DNA sequences owned by a competitor. 
This litigation has reshaped the scope of patentable subject matter in the United States and 
changed the long-standing practice of the USPTO to grant patents on isolated DNA 
sequences.  
The litigation focused on whether the claims fell within the scope of “patentable subject 
matter” under Title 35 U.S.C. § 101 or not and on the definition of DNA sequences, either as 
chemical molecules or information, as far as product claims were concerned. 
The Plaintiffs devoted a considerable amount of resources and expertise to de-construct and 
overturn the influential narrative of the origins and progress set out by the majority of the 
Supreme Court in Chakrabarty, endorsed by the USPTO in the Utility Examination 
Guidelines and relied on by Myriad Genetics in order to rebut the challenges against the 
validity of its patents.  
They argued that these patents hindered the work of clinical researchers, the improvement of 
genetic diagnostic tests, scientific progress and did not benefit society, as Myriad’s diagnostic 
tests were too costly and not accessible to every possible patient. 
ACLU et al. and Myriad offered two different views about what genes and DNA sequences 
are, which are centered on conceptual metaphors and the case was focused on their 
description in order to decide on their patentability. 
The Plaintiffs, relying on the scientific expertise of biologists, argued that genes are 
information, which is naturally occurring in the body and their isolation from it does not 
make them patentable subject matter under Title 35 U.S.C. § 101. They drew on the metaphor 
of the genetic code as the book of nature, which as such does not belong exclusively to 
anybody: 
“Genes are not like carburetors. The function of a gene is to convey information to the 
body. […] A genetic sequence is biological information itself. A gene is represented 
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by a series of letters. Like strings of alphabetic text, the genetic sequences are the 
same regardless of whether the data reside in the DNA of an organism, a computer, or 
as letters on a printed page. The physical form in which they occur is unimportant; 
what matters is the informational content. The information in a gene sequenced in a 
lab is identical in function to that in the body. 
The sole reason for sequencing a gene is to uncover that information. In that respect, 
sequencing can be compared to using a microscope to read small letters. Alterations 
or mutations are recognized exactly as typographical errors are recognized, by a letter 
being seen as out of place. The comparisons between two genes are done by 
comparing the letters, exactly like proof-reading a book. Because of the informational 
aspect of genes, it is inaccurate to treat genes as if they were carburetors or chemicals. 
Thus, the patent claims in this case directly limit information in a manner far different 
from patents on true inventions, such as carburetors. They limit pure information”.898 
By referring to carburetors or chemicals, the plaintiffs pinpointed the metaphors which have 
guided contemporary IP imaginary of biotech products, according to which GMMs, GMOs, 
DNA sequences are either artefacts, like machines, or chemical molecules and therefore, as 
such, falling within the statutory definition of patentable subjected matter developed by the 
U.S. case law. The main argument maintained by the plaintiffs was directed to undermine the 
description of DNA sequences and genes as chemical molecules and affirm their 
characterization as information. 
This metaphor has been endorsed by Justice Sweet of the U.S. District Court Southern 
District of New York, who declared invalid all Myriad’s claims on the DNAs’ sequences and 
on the method claims.  
Judge Sweet, drawing upon some cases
899
 concerning patentable subject matter and, in 
particular, Chakrabarty, addressed whether the composition and method claims were directed 
to products “markedly different” from products of nature or not.   
As far as the product claims were concerned, he pointed out that, although Myriad claimed 
that purification of “naturally occurring” compounds does not exist in nature, “purification of 
a product of nature, without more, cannot transform it into patentable subject matter”.900 He 
remarked that the central premise of Myriad’s argument that the claimed DNA is “markedly 
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different” from DNA found in nature is that “isolated DNA molecules should be treated no 
differently than other chemical compounds for patent eligibility”.901 
This definition was overturned by the Judge, who highlighted the unique characteristics 
which differentiate DNA from chemical compounds, namely its unique informational quality, 
that makes the analogy unsuitable: 
“Myriad’s argument that all chemical compounds, such as the adrenaline at issue in 
Parke-Davis, necessarily convey some information ignores the biological realities of 
DNA in comparison to other chemical compounds in the body. The information 
encoded in DNA is not information about its own molecular structure incidental to its 
biological function, as it is the case with adrenaline or other chemicals found in the 
body. Rather, the information encoded by DNA reflects its primary biological function: 
directing the synthesis of other molecules in the body – namely, proteins, ‘biological 
molecules of enormous importance’ which ‘catalyze biochemical reactions’ and 
constitute the ‘major structural materials of the animal body’”.902 
The conclusion that follows from this definition, which Judge Sweet supported, is that genes 
are “products of nature”. 
Myriad, conversely, maintained the chemical nature of DNA (as tangible chemical 
molecule), alleging the structural and functional different properties of isolated DNA. In 
particular, it significantly drew on the holding of Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.
903
 
to argue that “isolated DNA should be treated no differently than other chemical compounds 
for patent eligibility”.904 Parke-Davis was a landmark case, decided by Justice Hand, which 
involved the validity of two patents
905
 for a glandular extractive product covering purified 
forms of adrenaline and the compound in a solution with salt and a preservative. The holding 
of this case backed the patent eligibility of purified chemical compounds and, as Myriad’s 
defense pointed out, settled that the purification of a natural product makes it patentable.
906
 
As Graham Dutfield has illustrated, this case concerning a purified hormone has paved the 
way to the patent eligibility of “other chemicals found in living things as long as they were 
purified or at least isolated in a way that made them available to the public for the first 
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time”. 907  It, therefore, backed the metaphorical and analogical assimilation of 
microorganisms and genes to chemical molecules.
908
 
The District Court dismissed the relevance of the case as it focused on novelty (under 35 
U.S.C. § 102, in modern days), not on patentable subject matter (35 U.S.C. § 101), which was 
the question before the Court. Justice Hand, in fact, clarified that the validity of the claims 
was challenged mainly because they were “anticipated in the art” and, then, on several other 
“technical grounds”. His conclusion, the District Court observed, was focused on the fact that 
“the patented purified extract was not in fact different from the prior art ‘only for a degree of 
purity’, but rather was a different chemical substance from that found in the prior art”,909 
because it was not anticipated.
910
 
Although Justice Sweet conceded that in that judgment it was stated “But, even it were 
merely an extracted product without change, there is no rule that such products are not 
patentable”,911 he noted that this statement was a dicta that lacks accuracy in light of more 
recent decisions and especially Chakrabarty, which has established that a claimed invention 
must have “markedly different characteristics” over the products of nature.912 
Moreover, as far as method claims were concerned, he rejected the precedents adduced by 
Myriad and pointed out they consisted simply in comparing and analyzing and did not pass 
the “machine or transformation test” set out in Bilski, whose nature is mechanistic. Under the 
“machine or transformation test”, a claimed process is patent eligible if it fulfills one of these 
two conditions: “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a 
particular article into a different thing”. Judge Sweet highlighted that transformation should 
be a pivotal element of the claimed process.
913
 
In particular, he pointed out how the claims under dispute did not embed any element of 
transformation, since they did not refer to any particular method of analysis or comparison 
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and were directed to the abstract mental processes of comparing and analyzing gene 
sequences.
914
 
In contrast with the Prometheus decision of the Federal Circuit, which was recalled by 
Myriad, he pinpointed that the claims-in-suit did not involve the transformative steps of 
extracting and measuring in order to determine metabolite levels, which involved high 
pressure liquid chromatography.
915
 
Consequently, Justice Sweet held the challenged patent claims invalid, but his main argument 
regarding the nature of DNA sequences was centered on the endorsement of the metaphor of 
the code. 
 
4.2.2 Genes as Chemical Molecules: The AMP Case before the Court of Appeals 
In contrast with the District Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
supported the chemical molecule as the most appropriate definition of isolated genes and 
DNAs sequences. The Court of Appeals affirmed and reversed in part the District Court’s 
decision and each member of the panel wrote a separate opinion. All the judges of the panel 
deemed that Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. provided the legal framework in order to assess the 
patent eligibility of the product claims. As far as the product claims were concerned, the 
majority of the Court judged the isolated DNA sequences and cDNA sequences patentable, 
but disagreed on the rationale. 
Justice Alan Laurie, who has a background in chemistry,
916
 pointed out the chemical nature 
of DNA sequences and the chemical structural differences between native DNA, which is in 
the human body, and isolated DNA. According to him, the cleavage of the covalent bonds of 
DNA’s backbone was sufficient to change structurally the nature of the sequences. He argued 
that:  
“Isolated DNA, in contrast [with native DNA], is a free-standing portion of a native 
DNA molecule, frequently a single gene. Isolated DNA has been cleaved (i.e. had 
covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed) or synthesized to consist of just a 
fraction of naturally occurring DNA molecule. […] Accordingly, BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 in their isolated state are not the same molecules as DNA as it exists in the 
body; human intervention in cleaving or synthesizing a portion of a native 
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chromosomal DNA imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical identity from 
that possessed by native DNA”.917 
However, he clarified that the claims-in-suit on isolated DNA sequences had not been 
purified by being isolated. He, therefore, dismissed the significance of the case law regarding 
purified chemical compounds adduced by Myriad and, in particular, Parke-Davis & Co. v. 
H.K. Mulford Co and In re Marden. Purification, he noted, “makes pure what was the same 
material, but was previously impure”. 918  Conversely, he pinpointed that isolated DNA 
sequences, once the cleavage occurs, are chemically manipulated and result in molecules that 
are “markedly different from that which exists in the body”.919 
He acknowledged that isolated DNA sequences have similar informational properties to 
native DNA sequences, but he deemed their informational content irrelevant in terms of 
determining their patent eligibility, since he endorsed a structural rather than functional view 
of the gene: “We recognize that biologists may think of molecules in terms of their uses, but 
in genes are in fact materials having a chemical nature and, as such, are best described in 
patents by their structures rather than their functions”.920 
He considered, therefore, the chemical alteration dispositive for the isolated DNA sequences. 
However, he judged the method claims directed to compare and analyse the DNA sequences 
falling outside the scope of § 101 as claiming “only abstract mental processes” 921  and, 
therefore, failing to pass the “machine or transformation test” as re-framed in the Prometheus 
judgement. Claim 20 of the 282 patent, which concerned a method for screening potential 
cancer therapeutics, was held involving transformative steps and, thus, patent eligible. 
Justice Kimberly Ann Moore, who has a background in electrical engineering,
922
 disagreed 
with the majority that the different chemical structure made isolated DNA markedly different 
from a product of nature.
923
 
In her opinion, she dwelled on the deference that should be accorded to USPTO’s 
longstanding and consistent practice (and policy) of granting patents on isolated DNA 
sequences and the need to preserve “the settled expectations of the biotechnology 
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industry”.924 In particular, she illustrated the research investments of time and money made 
by the U.S. industry in this sector, as well as its success, for example in the case of the 
isolated DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin.
925
 She, therefore, claimed that the 
unsettlement of these expectations would hinder the “progress of science and the useful 
arts”.926 She brought her argument further by inferring an implicit approval of the USPTO’s 
policy because no moratorium on gene patents was passed and prohibited patents on human 
beings, but did not intervene on isolated DNA sequences. 
Justice William Bryson, in contrast, found the claims on genes and gene fragments not patent 
eligible. He allowed that Myriad put efforts and resources in locating and identifying the 
BRCA1 and 2 gene sequences, but he pinpointed that “the only material change made to 
those genes from their natural state is the change that is necessarily incidental to the 
extraction of the genes from the environment in which they are found in nature”.927 He found 
the characterization of the isolated DNA sequences of the majority unconvincing, arguing 
that: “Yet there is no magic to a chemical bond that requires us to recognize a new product 
when a chemical bond is created or broken, but not when other atomic or molecular forces 
are altered. A chemical bond is merely a force between two atoms or groups of atoms strong 
enough ‘to make it convenient for the chemist to consider [the aggregate] as an independent 
molecular species’”.928 
He pointed out that the case law involving the purification of natural substances clarified that 
a substance is patentable only if purification results in a change of functionality, a new thing 
therapeutically and commercially. 
He, furthermore, suggested that the most appropriate language to understand the claims 
directed to DNA sequences was genetics, not chemistry
929
 and embraced a functional view of 
DNA sequences. The judge, then, explained that the test set out in Chakrabarty involved 
addressing two issues: “(1) the similarity in structure between what is claimed and what is 
found in nature and (2) the similarity in utility between what is claimed and what is found in 
nature”.930 Since the claimed isolated DNA sequences are the same as the native ones, both 
structurally and functionally, he concluded that they fell within the product of nature 
exclusions and were not patent eligible. He concurred with the majority that cDNA 
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sequences, as they were created in the laboratory and not simply isolated from nature, were 
patent eligible. He, nevertheless, judged two claims too broad and deemed them invalid. 
In contrast with Justice Moore, he endorsed a different narrative of progress, which 
considered patents on gene sequences as preempting future research, hindering the 
development of future diagnostic genetic tests and possibly creating in a near future patent 
thickets which could be hardly be solved and affects “the next generation of innovation in 
genetic medicine”.931 
The Court of Appeals decided twice on the case and used, as far as the composition claims 
directed to isolated DNA sequences were concerned, the same kind of argument centered on 
the chemical molecule. The majority of the Court concluded that the challenged claims to 
isolated DNAs, whether limited to cDNAs or not, were directed to patent-eligible subject 
matter under § 101, as they covered “molecules that are markedly different-have a distinct 
chemical identity and nature from molecules that exist in nature”.932  
On remand of the U.S. Supreme Court in light of Mayo
933
 the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit dismissed the significance of the case in order to address the patent eligibility 
of DNA sequences and affirmed its previous holding. 
Moreover, the majority argued that the structural definition of DNA sequences, focused on 
chemical molecule, was a better description than the one based on function: “We recognize 
that biologists may think of molecules in terms of their uses, but genes are in fact materials 
having a chemical nature and, as such, are best described in patents by their structures rather 
than their functions”.934  
The majority did not explain the grounds on which this preference should be given. It referred 
to the fact that “many different materials may have the same function (e.g., aspirin, 
ibuprofen, and naxopren)”,935 but overlooked that DNA sequences have different functions 
(largely unknown) and that the USPTO, in 2001,  enacted new Utility Guidelines to address 
the problems related to the description of DNA claims and requested the claims to pass the 
specific, substantial and credible utility test, according to which the inventor must not 
indicate a speculative use of the invention, in order to have granted a patent.  
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4.2.3 A New Settlement: AMP before the U.S. Supreme Court 
The U.S. Supreme Court, finally, took on the task of settling whether isolated native DNA 
sequences should be deemed patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
The Court did not align with any of the views expressed by the District Court’s and Federal 
Court’s judges, which focused on devising DNA sequences as “chemical molecules” or 
“information”. It rather focused on the delicate balance that patent protection strikes.  
Justice Thomas, who delivered the opinion of the court, first clarified that Myriad “did not 
create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and 2 genes”,936 but it 
contributed to locating the genes and identifying the sequences. 
He, then recalled Chakrabarty, but it highlighted that the Myriad’s patent claims directed to 
isolated DNA sequences “fell squarely within the law of nature” exceptions.937  
Justice Thomas did not dwell on the “nature” of genes and DNA sequences, but on the form 
of the claims. In particular, he pinpointed that they were not “expressed in terms of chemical 
composition”938 and did not “rely in any way on the chemical changes that result from the 
isolation of a particular section of DNA”.939 Conversely, the claims were focused on “the 
genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and 2 genes”.940  
However, as cDNA sequences differed from natural DNA ones, since the intron regions had 
been removed, they were found patent eligible as synthetic products created in laboratories.  
The Court, therefore, concluded that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of 
nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated”.941 Nevertheless, the Court 
deemed cDNA patent eligible, as it results in an exons-only molecule that is not naturally 
occurring. 
The judges did not linger over the nature of genes and DNA sequences, but looked at 
Myriad’s claims, concluding that they were not expressed in terms of chemical composition 
nor do they rely on chemical changes that result from the isolation of a specific section of 
DNA. Conversely, they were focused on genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes. As Parthasarathy illustrated, the Supreme Court did not tackle policy and 
“distributional concerns” related to gene patents.942 The Court, rather, embraced a technical 
approach and claimed to apply the product of nature doctrine, as set forth in Chakrabarty. Its 
                                                          
936
 ibid. 
937
 ibid 2117. 
938
 ibid 2118. 
939
 ibid. 
940
 ibid. 
941
 ibid 2109. 
942
 Parthasarathy (n 888) 170-171. 
179 
 
decision, however, substantially reshaped the boundaries of the natural, which have been 
stabilized for decades by the practices of the USPTO and courts decisions following 
Chakrabarty. 
On March 4, 2014 the USPTO issued a new guidance memorandum
943
 titled “Guidance For 
Determining Subject Matter Eligibility Of Claims Reciting Or Involving Laws Of Nature, 
Natural Phenomena & Natural Products”,944 superseding the June 13, 2013, memorandum 
and implementing a new procedure “to address changes in the law relating to subject matter 
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in view of recent court decisions”.945  
In the guidance, the overall process to assess subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
is set out and the examiners should consider whether a patent claim is “significantly different” 
from a judicial exception, such as a natural product or phenomenon, or not. Some factors 
weigh for and against patent eligibility. As far as nucleic acids are concerned, the 
memorandum clarifies that their patent eligibility assessment would be based only on whether 
“a product claim reciting something that initially appears to be a natural product” is markedly 
different in structure from naturally occurring products or not.
946
 As AMP suggests, this 
evaluation relies considerably on how the structure of nucleic acids, such as DNA, is 
interpreted and defined: whether they are considered chemical molecules or carriers of 
information. 
The influential historian of the life sciences
947
 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, together with other 
biologists,
948
 noticed that “the spectacular rise of molecular biology has come about without a 
comprehensive, exact, and rigid definition of what a gene is”.949 In particular, Rheinberger 
illustrated that: 
“This claim can be substantiated for both aspects distinguishing the gene concept of 
molecular biology from that of classical genetics: the aspect of representing a material 
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entity, and that of being a carrier of information.
950
 The meaning of both these notions 
has remained fuzzy and tied to the experimental spaces that the new biology was 
going to explore, from the identification of DNA as the hereditary material in bacteria 
in 1944 to the genome sequencing projects of the late 1980s”.951 
He pointed out that the gene is a “boundary object”,952 namely “an analytic concept of those 
scientific objects which both inhabit several intersecting social worlds (…) and satisfy the 
informational requirements of each of them”. 953  Boundary objects, such as the atom in 
physics and the molecule in chemistry, he observed, are provided with “organizing power” in 
research fields and “are embedded in experimental operations”.954 Within molecular biology 
the “gene” underwent several shifts of meaning:  
“At the beginning, molecular genetics, with its set of biochemical practices and 
genetic manipulations, was characterized by switching from higher plants and animals 
to bacteria and phages as model organisms. First, it transformed its boundary object, 
the gene, into a material physicochemical entity. Second, it has made a unit endowed 
with informational qualities from the object. The first transformation provided a 
solution to the problem that classical genetics had with the stability of its units. The 
answer was: Genes consist of metastable macromolecules of such as nucleic acids. 
The second transformation provided a solution to the problem that classical genetics 
had with its units’ mode of reproduction, and the connection between genotype and 
phenotype. The answer was: Nucleotide sequences and DNA in particular, can be 
replicated specifically and faithfully by virtue of the stereochemical properties of their 
building blocks”.955 
Understanding the gene as a “boundary object” accounts for the different views of the gene 
which molecular genetics endorsed and has become legally pivotal in order to argue about the 
very nature of DNA sequences and their patent eligibility in isolated/purified form.  
However, the analysis of AMP further shows that the “genetic code” and “chemical 
molecule” have been used as conceptual ontological metaphors in the judicial discourse to 
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support and foster a particular definition and view of the gene and its patent eligibility. These 
two conceptual metaphors have also largely shaped and oriented the work of molecular 
biologists and geneticists throughout decades and are still influential in their fields, as chapter 
two has illustrated. The legal discourse has relied on these very influential scientific 
metaphors on the genome and DNA sequences to validate a view and a definition of the gene 
in order to solve the issues related to its patent eligibility in the U.S. patent law. The counter-
narrative maintained by the plaintiffs, based on the metaphor of the genetic code, undermined 
the well-established view of the genes as chemical molecules embraced by the USPTO in the 
Utility Examination Guidelines. 
Furthermore, it questioned the well-established sociotechnical imaginary life and nature 
linked to biotechnology. It pointed out in particular that, if the promotion of biotechnology in 
terms of products available to the public hinged on their patent eligibility, IPRs over DNA 
sequences did not contribute to fulfill the needs of patients and  bring about a suitable future 
environment for American scientific research. 
 
4.3 Canada and the Patents on the BRCA1 and 2 Genes 
The STS scholar Parthasarathy showed that genetic medicine has developed in different ways 
in the last part of the twentieth century and that the divide largely hinges on “different health-
care systems and approaches to commercialization in biomedical research and 
technology”.956 She focused her analysis on genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer, 
comparing how the architecture of genetic testing
957
 was built and devised in two national 
contexts, the United States and United Kingdom, which are dissimilar as to the provision of 
health care and the approach to university-industry relationships. In particular, she pointed 
out that, in the United States, genetic medicine grew in the context of a private health care 
system, in which the government was attempting, but not succeeding, to provide universal 
coverage through Medicare and Medicaid programs, aiming at offering health insurance to 
the poor and elderly. However, approximately 40 million people, at the time still, had 
inadequate or no insurance at all.
958
 
The same kind of matters should be taken into account in order to explain how Myriad 
Genetics’ patents have been challenged in Canada, but not before a patent court. 
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In Canada, Myriad was granted four patents related to the BRCA1 and 2 genes and their 
testing by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office. On 10 October 2000, CIPO granted 
patents No. 2,196,797 and 2,196,790, which covered the BRCA1 gene and its mutations, and, 
on 3 April 2001, patent No. 2,196,795 on the diagnostic test.
959
 Moreover, on 3 April 2001, 
the company was granted patent No. 2,239,733 on the BRCA2 gene sequences.
960
 
Although the Oncomouse
 
judgment by the Supreme Court of Canada, in 2002, clarified that 
higher life forms fell outside the definition of patentable invention, when the CIPO granted 
these patents to Myriad, it simply complied with a long-standing practice of granting patents 
on DNA sequences, which had never been questioned. CIPO issued quite broad patents to the 
company, but did not expect that they would spark social, institutional and political turmoil 
across the country in the next decade. 
Myriad Genetics (Myriad) designed a strategic business model centred on gaining IPRs on 
the BRCA1 and 2 gene sequences (wild-type and mutated sequences) and the diagnostic 
methods to compare across several jurisdictions.
961
  
In Canada, MDS Laboratories, a private Canadian-based diagnostic testing laboratory, was 
exclusively licensed as the sole provider of single mutation testing on 9 March 2000 and in 
the same year it began, together with Myriad, to offer its genetic testing services to provincial 
government officials who managed diagnostic centres.
962
 At the time, however, genetic tests 
for BRCA1 and 2 genetic mutations were already offered, on a research basis, by several 
Canadian provinces to residents with a family history of multiple breast and ovarian cancer 
cases.
963
 
As Gold and Carbone pointed out, these provincial government officials and the federal 
ministers of health, who are in charge of allocating the provincial budget on health care 
services, “soon realized that Myriad’s commercialization model – of requiring patent samples 
to be collected, sent outside the country, and analysed using a methodology determined by 
Myriad and not health care authorities – not only represented a higher cost (three times the 
cost of the test already in use in Ontario) but also more importantly, a challenge to the way 
the province provided services”.964 Moreover, they were aware that any kind of settlement 
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that they would agree upon with Myriad would establish the framework for future genetic 
services offered by provinces.
965
  
The issue of accessibility of genetic tests, together with the sustainability of the new genetic 
medicine for the Canadian health care system, has been at the forefront of the national 
narrative over Myriad’s IPRs over the BRCA1 and 2 genes and their related diagnostic 
products. 
Canada, since the 1980s,
966
 has set up a policy of biotechnology in order to foster one of the 
major industries in the country and the patent eligibility of DNA sequences have never been 
questioned by CIPO. However, these patents related to diagnostic genetic tests have 
prompted a political counter-narrative, according to which they would hinder the national 
health care system and affect the right to health of Canadian citizens. 
The policy debate over Myriad’s genetic tests took place, from the early to mid-1990s, in 
which provincial governments and, in particular Ontario and Saskatchewan, curbed health 
care expenditures and closed several hospitals.
967
 These controversial choices evoked 
criticism from citizens, who called for major financial support to health care system. As a 
result, several commissions and advisory committees were established to set out 
recommendations on how to devise the future of Medicare in Canada.
968
 
Gold and Carbone illustrated that, in 2000, MDS Laboratories and Myriad approached 
Ontario province’s government officials (Ontario has the largest health care budget in Canada) 
and, by the end of the year, Ontario’s Health Ministry’s policy unit began a consultation with 
scientists and laboratory directors in order to address the concerns regarding their diagnostic 
services.
969
 Since MDS and Myriad did not obtain any reply from the laboratory branches of 
Ontario’s Ministry of Health after several months, in spring 2001 Myriad started to send 
cease-and-desist letters to Alberta, Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia, four provinces 
which were offering and carrying out BRCA1 and 2 gene testing, asking to comply with its 
IPRs by 18 June 2001.
970
 
Ontario’s Health Minister, Tony Clement, significantly, pinpointed that “predictive breast 
and ovarian cancer tests should be available to women who require them” and that neither the 
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payments to hospitals for providing these services nor the services offered by the hospitals 
themselves constituted infringements of Myriad’s patent claims.971 
It has been noticed that in his firm rejection of Myriad’s claims, Ontario’s Health Minister 
“was opening up the question of the validity of Myriad’s Canadian patents”.972 Furthermore, 
Ontario’s government officials were shifting the debate over genetic testing from the 
provincial level to the federal one, as Industry Canada deals with biotechnology policy and is 
in charge of the Patent Act.
973
  
The debate triggered by Myriad’s claims and business model was framed in terms of access 
to genetic mutation tests for patients and sustainability
974
 of genetic medicine for the 
Canadian health care system. As Bryn William-Jones observed, the Canadian health care 
system, in the 1990s, was falling short in providing “comprehensive and timely genetic 
testing and counselling for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer” and Ontario was one of the 
provinces which were attempting to expand the number of laboratories providing this kind of 
testing.
975
 
Moreover, the standard of care, as far as genetic testing was concerned, was notably below 
the United States’ one, since Canadian hospitals were able to offer testing for only 120 
genetic diseases, while in U.S. more than 600 tests were available.
976
 
Facing a strong reaction from Myriad and the threat of trade sanctions from the U.S. 
Ambassador to Canada, Clement took the position that the federal government should 
consider revising the Patent Act with regard to the patentability of genes.
977
 
He organised, in December 2001, a wide roundtable in Toronto to debate genetic testing and, 
in January 2002, the Ministry of Health and Long-Term care published a report entitled 
Genetic Testing and Gene Patenting: Charting New Territories in Health Care,
978
 in which 
they called for the assessment of new health technologies and suggested that the government 
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had to limit the negative impact of gene patents over the health care system.
979
 The Report 
was backed by all Canadian provincial leaders.  
In the meanwhile, Industry Canada’s Patent Policy Directorate did not consider any of the 
concerns over gene patents and did not put forward any clear proposal to solve the 
controversy.
980
 
After 7 years, Myriad, finally, renounced to enforce its IPRs in Canada against provinces and 
the federal government and decided to invest more in the U.S. as a more profitable market.
981
 
Also the CIPO did not contemplate issuing new guidelines for the examination of patent 
claims covering DNA sequences. At present, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office’s 
practice manual, at ch 17.02.04 clarifies that “biomolecules are chemical compounds, and 
claims to nucleic acids, polypeptides, proteins and peptides are therefore directed to statutory 
matter”.982 It is still, therefore, embracing an understanding and definition of genes and DNA 
sequences as chemical compounds and, as such, patentable inventions, even though this view 
has been challenged in later patent cases.
983
  
However, this patent case that was never debated before a court has produced a shift in the 
way of imagining the benefits of IPRs over biotech products for Canadian society, making 
clear that they could also hinder the protection of the right to health. 
 
4.4 Patenting Genes in Europe 
Isolation and purification are technoscientific laboratory practices which have acquired legal 
relevance in patent systems in order to demarcate, as far as some biotech products are 
concerned, patent eligible matter from non-patent eligible ones. In the European Community, 
they were set out in the European Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (“Biotech 
Directive”).  
Article 5.1 of the Directive establishes limits to the patentability of the human body and gene 
sequences, as it provides: “The human body, at the various stages of its formation and 
development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or 
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partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable invention”.984 Article 5.2, however, 
limits the boundaries of these exclusions, by establishing the criteria of isolation and 
purification (also referred to in Recitals 20 and 21): “An element isolated from the human 
body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the sequence or 
partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that 
element is identical to that of a natural element”.985 
Although the European Community (at present European Union) and EPOrg are formally 
independent supranational institutions, on 16 June 1999, by a resolution of the EPOrg’s 
Administrative Council, the articles of the Biotech Directive became effective as Rules 23(b)-
(e) of the EPC Implementation Regulation, on 1 September 1999. The implementation of 
Directive has been justified in terms of a uniform, harmonized European approach to biotech 
patenting.
986
 However, its implementation has raised criticism as it should have entailed a 
Diplomatic Conference.
987
 As a result, isolation and purification were set out in Rule 23(e)(2) 
EPC, at present Rule 29(2), which provided that “elements isolated from the human body or 
otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial 
sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that 
element is identical to that of the natural element”. 
These criteria operate within the EPC system as “criteria of legal and ontological surgery”,988 
as they demarcate what is patent eligible from what is not and they determine also the legal 
and ontological status of things.  The formal introduction of the criteria has established the 
rationale to legally demarcate naturally occurring DNA sequences from “artificial” 
isolated/purified ones. 
The Boards of Appeal have settled patent cases regarding DNA sequences by affirming and 
applying adamantly these criteria and rejecting any opposition under Article 52(2)(a) EPC, 
which sets out that discoveries shall not be regarded as inventions. 
Although EPO’s Boards of Appeal decisions are marked by the use of technical language, the 
metaphor of the code and chemical molecule were drawn upon in order to argue against and 
for the patent eligibility of genes and DNA sequences.  
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In T 0272/95, Relaxin/Howard Florey Institute case, which concerned the opposition to 
patent EP 0112149 entitled “Molecular cloning and characterization of a further gene 
sequence coding for human relaxin”, on 23 October 2002 the TBA dismissed the appeal 
against the Decision of the Opposition Division and confirmed the validity of the challenged 
claims. Two oppositions against this patent were filed in 1992 by a group of 26 individuals 
representing the Green group of the European Parliament and their president
989
 on the 
following grounds: 1. lack of novelty under Article 54 EPC; 2. lack of inventive step under 
Article 56 EPC; 3. contrariety to ordre public and morality under Article 53(a) EPC; 4. the 
claims should not be regarded as inventions, but discoveries under Article 52(2)(a) EPC.
990
 
In this case, the opponents contended that the claimed invention amounted to a discovery by 
applying the metaphor of the code, pointing out that: “The essence of the invention was the 
elucidation of the genetic sequence of the H2-relaxin gene. In simple terms, the proprietor has 
obtained a code book from the donors (the genetic material) and ‘cracked the code’ 
(discovered the number and sequence of human relaxin genes”.991 
The Opposition Division held that the invention was not an exception to patentability, as it 
would not be universally considered as outrageous, arguing that “DNA is not life, but a 
chemical substance which carries genetic information and can be used as an intermediate in 
the production of proteins which may be medically useful”.992  
The TBA implicitly endorsed this view applying the criterion of isolation in order to define 
the nature of the invention. The TBA maintained that the challenged claims concerned either 
“biological material originating from the human body” 993  which was isolated or DNAs 
encoding the human protein prorelaxin or the protein per se which resulted from technical 
processes
994
 and, therefore, concluded that they fell within Rule 23(e)(2).
995
 Consequently, 
they could not be qualified as “discoveries”.996 Moreover, by drawing on the criterion of 
isolation and the technical nature of the invention,
997
 the TBA also quickly dismissed any 
objection in terms of contrariety to ordre public or morality.
998
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As Bently and Sherman noticed, the Relaxin case shows the reluctance of the EPO’s 
Opposition Division (and TBA) to tackle ethical issues: they both favoured the “scientific 
understanding of DNA as chemicals”999 and rejected their characterization as information and 
“life”, which would have requested a more burdensome analysis of the ethical objections. 
The same kind of approach has been resorted to in the cases arising from the opposition to 
Myriad’s European patents on the BRCA1 and 2 genes. 
The history of Myriad’s patents on BRCA1 and 2,1000 granted by the European Patent Office, 
and how they were challenged is complex.  One of the patents, EP 0705902, regarded “17q-
Linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility gene” and had the same content of the 
abstract of EP 0699754 on “Method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast and ovarian 
cancer” (granted on 10 January 2001).1001  
Moreover, on 8 January 2003, Myriad was granted EP 0785216 on “Chromosome 13-linked 
breast cancer susceptibility gene BRCA2”, which was opposed by several groups and, in 
2005, amended and limited in a highly questionable way to diagnosis of “predisposition to 
breast cancer in Askenazi-Jewish women”.1002 
The patent, which referred to the mutations in the BRCA1 sequence, was granted on 28 
November 2001, but was opposed by many organisations and individuals: Switzerland’s 
Social Democratic Party, Greenpeace Germany, the French Institut Curie, Assistance 
Publique Hôpitaux de Paris, Institut Gustave Roussy, the Belgian Society of Human Genetics, 
and the Netherlands (represented by the Minister of Health), and others. 
These organizations opposed both patents (EP 0705902 and EP 0699754) on the grounds that 
the claimed inventions lacked novelty, inventive step and industrial application. Moreover, 
they pointed out that the inventions were not disclosed sufficiently for a person skilled in the 
art. Along with more technical arguments challenging the validity of the patent, other ethical 
and policy issues were raised about the equity of patentability of gene sequences.
1003
 In 
particular, some opponents claimed that these patents impaired national public health care 
systems in Europe.
1004
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Patent EP0705902 was amended in January 2005 as a result of the decisions in opposition 
proceedings of the Opposition Division
1005
  and the Boards of Appeal
1006
 (T-1213/05 Breast 
and ovarian cancer/University of Utah).  
It has been illustrated that at the oral hearings in January 2005 Greenpeace and Dr Wilhelms 
argued that genes were not patentable discoveries and that the claimed invention consisted in 
the discovery of a link between a gene and a disease.
1007
 The opponents, moreover, relied on 
the definition of DNA sequences, such as probes, as information and, hence, argued that they 
were not patent eligible as discoveries. 
However, the Opposition Division dismissed the definition of the claimed subject matter, 
namely probes, as information,
1008
 Conversely it pointed out that “The claimed probes cannot 
be reduced to a presentation of information”1009  and “The facts that a link between the 
claimed probes, BRCA1 and breast cancer exists does not preclude the claimed probes to be 
patentable”.1010 The Division, therefore, ruled out that the sequence could be assimilated to a 
discovery of what could be found in nature. Moreover, it reaffirmed the technical nature of 
the invention, by upholding the criterion of isolation set out in Rule 23(e)(2) EPC.
1011
 
Likewise, the TBA maintained and supported the criterion of isolation against any claim that 
the subject matter was not patentable under Article 52(2)(a) EPC, as the sequences of the 
probes occurred in nature and were, therefore, discoveries.
1012
 
The Opposition division and the TBA endorsed a technical approach to the kinds of 
inventions that were challenged and avoided engaging in a thorough discussion on their 
nature. They mostly refrained from drawing on metaphorical expressions in addressing the 
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patent eligibility of DNA sequences, a discursive approach which marks the EPO’s narrative 
in comparison to U.S. and Canadian courts’ ones.  
However, in the BRCA1 and 2 cases, their narrative discourse aimed at technically upholding 
the settled criteria of patent eligibility and patentability. 
Sigrid Sterckx and Julian Cockbain pointed out that in all the major cases
1013
 regading the 
patent granted to University of Utah (Myriad) on the BRCA1 and 2 genes the Boards’ 
decisions were based on reaffriming the criteria of isolation and purification and the technical 
character of the claimed invention
1014
 and mostly maintained the patents in an amended form. 
In this respect, they followed the approach devised in the Relaxin case. 
However, the way in which the strong opposition to these patents has been handled by the 
EPO Boards conveyed the idea that the EPO system, as a whole, was sound and embedded 
the procedural and judicial resources, under Article 100 EPC, to revoke patent claims that did 
not fulfill the patent requirements. The discourse unfolded in these decisions conveyed the 
implicit assertion of the adequacy of the EPC system to address any kind of problem arising 
from questionable patented inventions and resulted in the overall legitimization of the Boards’ 
technocratic work of re-assessment. 
 
4.5 Patenting Genes in Australia: D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc.1015 
Likewise in Australia, patenting genes and DNA sequences has been at the forefront of public 
debate since Yvonne D’Arcy (“D’Arcy”), a former breast cancer patient, and a cancer 
patients’ advocacy group named Cancer Voices Australia started revocation proceedings 
before the Federal Court of Australia.
1016
 They questioned the validity of claims 1, 2 and 3 of 
Australian Patent No 686004, granted to Myriad Genetics in 1990 and regarding “in vivo 
mutations and polymorphisms in the 17q-linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility 
gene”, as the invention should not be considered patentable under s 138 of the Patents Act. 
The patent eligibility of isolated genes and DNA sequences has been settled in 1995 with the 
decision on Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of Washington.
1017
 Following 
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it, the Australian Patent Office granted a number of patents on isolated DNA sequences and 
this practice was well-established when Ms D’Arcy challenged one of Myriad’s patents. 
Whereas Justice Nicholas of the Federal Court of Australia and, then, Full Court of the 
Federal Court of Australia deemed that isolated nucleic acids constituted “an artificial state of 
affairs” and were, therefore, patentable subject matter, the High Court disagreed. 
The Full Court of the Federal Court upheld Justice Nicholas’ judgement and largely relied its 
opinion on the tenet of the U.S. Courts of Appeals’ for the Federal Circuit decision in AMP, 
fully embracing the metaphor of the chemical molecule. In particular, the Full Court 
contended that isolation entailed chemical, structural and functional changes in naturally 
occurring polynucleotides, which were removed from the cell
1018
 and concluded in favor of 
the validity of the patent.
1019
 
In contrast with the Full Court’s adjudication, the justices of the High Court endorsed the 
view that genes are information, hence the metaphor of the code. Although they shared the 
same perspective on the nature of the genes, their opinions focused on different legal and 
policy issues. 
Under Section s 18(1)(a) of the Australian Patents Act 1990 an invention, in order to be 
patentable, shall be “an invention that, so far as claimed in any claim: Is a manner of 
manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies”. 1020  The 
Dictionary in Sched 1 to the Patents Act 1990 provides the definition of “invention”, which is 
“any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of privilege within 
section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and includes an alleged invention”.1021 However, the 
implementation of the 17
th
 century Statute of Monopolies has proved more complex in the 
last century for patent courts, as patents were applied and granted on new technological 
products and methods, which question the meaning and scope of “manner of manufacture” 
under it. 
In the development of Australian patent law, National Research Development Corporation v 
Commissioner of Patents (“NRDC”) has been the landmark case which fostered the 
accommodation of new products and processes within the locution “a manner of manufacture” 
set out in section 6 of the old Statute of Monopolies. In NRDC, which was adjudicated in 
1959 and concerned a method involving the use of two known chemical compounds for new 
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herbicidal purposes,
1022
 the High Court set out the rationale to assess whether a claimed 
invention is a “manner of manufacture”. According to the Court, two elements were relevant 
in finally considering the patent valid, as regarding a product, namely because it consisted in 
an artificially created state of affairs and its significance was economic.
 1023
 
Following this decision, the expression “artificially created state of affairs of economic 
significance” has been largely deemed to provide the definition of “a manner of manufacture”, 
in Australian case law. 
The majority pointed out that the primary judge and the Full Court characterized very 
narrowly the effect of NRDC and that determining what is “a manner of manufacture” 
mandated a case-by-case analysis.
1024
  
Moreover, they argued that part of IP scholarship and jurisprudence highlighted that there 
was no consensus on continuing to expand the scope of patent eligible matter “into all fields 
of endeavour so as to remove all the remaining fetters on patentable subject matter”.1025   
The majority illustrated that other factors might be relevant in addressing whether the 
invention was a manner of manufacture
1026
 and policy considerations could play a part in 
it.
1027
  
The majority, significantly, rejected the narrative carried out in Chakrabarty, according to 
which “anything under the sun that is made by man” is patentable. Conversely, it showed 
awareness of the responsibility involved in the court’s task of developing a broad statutory 
concept,
1028
 which required a more careful consideration of any enlargement that could have 
a significant impact on the Australian patent system. 
It questioned Myriad’s main argument, centered on the characterization of the claims as 
directed to a class of chemical compounds
1029
 and argued that the invention referred to a 
sequence of nucleotides that, “in a cellular environment, can ultimately be translated into the 
BRCA1 polypeptide”.1030 Furthermore, the majority noted that this isolated information was 
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the same embodied information “contained in the DNA of the person from which the nucleic 
acid was isolated”,1031 namely the essential and valuable element of the invention.  
It observed, in addition, that Myriad did not express the claims in terms of chemical 
composition and, therefore, concluded that its definition of the claims elevated “form over 
substance to the detriment of the developmental function entrusted to the Court as explained 
in NRDC and reflected in the continuing use of the ‘manner of manufacture’ formula in s 
18(1)(a) of the Act”.1032  
The majority, consequently, held that the subject matter of the claims, as genetic information, 
lied “at the boundaries of the concept of ‘manner of manufacture’”.1033 In the opinion, the 
majority focused, in particular, on the risk of a chilling effect on innovative activity of 
legitimate improvers and inventors due to the patenting of a large amount of nucleic acids, 
embedding information.
1034
 
The IP scholar Brad Sherman
1035
 remarked that “the process of determining whether subject 
matter is patent-eligible is essentially an exercise of labeling, classifying, and 
categorizing”.1036 D’Arcy, as much as the U.S. and EPO cases regarding Myriad’s patents 
show that this effort has been carried out by the courts, scientific experts, patent lawyers and 
offices by drawing on conceptual metaphors which oriented how the scope of patentable 
subject matter has been envisaged and designed. The courts’ endorsement of the genetic code 
rather than the chemical molecule as an alternative metaphor to define genes and DNA 
sequences has sustained the re-framing of patent eligible matter in the U.S. and Australia 
where the strategy of the plaintiffs aimed at narrowing down the constant expansion of patent 
protection to any kind of valuable information. 
Moreover, even though in Australia NRDC has expanded the scope of “manner of new 
manufacture” and encouraged the development of new technological products, the narrative 
of the High Court and the metaphor of the genetic code undermined the master narrative 
according to which patents on DNA sequences could promote scientific research and benefit 
society. 
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4.6 Conclusions: Imagining Property, Imagining Nature and Life 
Several scholars have been engaged in probing how the gene became a chemical molecule or 
information.
1037
 The analysis of the patent cases regarding the BRCA1 and 2 genes, carried 
out in this chapter, has shown how the boundaries of the natural and artificial have been 
shaped and reshaped by resorting to different, alternative, definitions of what genes and DNA 
sequences are, centered on conceptual metaphors, which were devised within molecular 
biology and genetics and became legal and social means to make sense and order of new 
technoscientific products, such as isolated genes. 
Narratives and counter-narratives, however, have proved likewise crucial in order to sustain 
judicial decisions and arguments, scientists’ and patent examiners’ practices, activists’ and 
patients’ legal action, as they make a particular definition credible and acceptable within a 
national context and patent system.
1038
  
Stephen Hilgartner, in examining how genome research has been creating new forms of 
property and simultaneously large quantities of data in the public domain, has showed that 
making knowledge and making intellectual property are not two separate moves, 
institutionally and temporally.
1039
 He argued, conversely, that, in order to understand the 
creation of intellectual property, the laboratory, as much as the law, is a site in which 
appropriation mechanisms are institutionalized in specific research contexts.
1040
 
This chapter explained how the laboratory and the law are expert sites which created a 
specific kind of semantics of appropriation, centered on conceptual metaphors, which backed 
the patent eligibility of biotech products in different national contexts, as well as 
technoscientific imaginaries of life and nature. This semantics results from the co-production 
of technoscientific and legal language which, by sustaining the patent eligibility of DNA 
sequences, also fosters a specific mode of repreesenting, defining and using life and nature. 
Metaphors oriented patent examiners’ and judges’ decisions regarding the patentability of 
several kinds of biotech products, in different legal contexts, as far as their description as 
“patentable subject matter” or “invention” is concerned.  Metaphors such as “molecule” and 
“genetic code” have been collectively endorsed and became part of a sociotechnical 
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imaginaries of life, which shaped the way in which molecular biologists and geneticists 
oriented methodologically and epistemically their research, how patent systems and their 
actors accommodated several biotech products as patent eligible and how individuals and 
collectivities redefined their identities.  
Sociotechnical imaginaries are “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order 
reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological 
projects”. 1041  Their relevance as cultural resource lies in their descriptive and, at once, 
prescriptive dimension, in their conveying a specific description of an attainable future and 
prescribing that it ought to be pursued and achieved: “They project visions of what is good, 
desirable, and worth attaining for a political community; they articulate feasible futures. 
Conversely, imaginaries also warn against risks or hazards that may accompany innovation if 
it is pushed too hard or too fast. In activating collective consciousness, imaginaries help 
create the political will or public resolve to attain them”.1042 
They can provide, therefore, an analytical resource to understand how policies of innovation 
are promoted and justified in terms of “what constitutes public good” 1043  by political, 
administrative and judicial institutions, but also by citizens, scientific communities, experts, 
NGOs.  
Through their practices and decisions, patent offices, as well as judges, endorse and foster 
sociotechnical imaginaries of innovation, progress and public good, as much as political 
institutions. A closer examination of the metaphors, which were introduced and used in these 
landmark patent cases in order to affirm or challenge the patent eligibility of some products 
concerning life, suggests that they have fostered a molecular and atomistic view of life, which 
results from the co-production of science, law and society. This vision has informed and 
shaped the definition of “patentable subject matter” and “invention” in the last decades and 
has impinged on the definition of individual and collective identities. Patents on products in 
the field of biotechnology and molecular diagnostics, such as isolated DNA sequences, 
embed a molecular description of life which support and purport bodies and identities ought 
to be understood in molecular terms.  Human beings have become aware that they can carry 
mutations of the BRCA1 and 2 genes and are, therefore, “molecular patients” who should 
undergo diagnostic tests and make fundamental decisions about their health and lives. Groups 
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gained awareness of being at risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer in the future and of 
the need to have access to adequate and affordable molecular diagnostic tests. 
The patent cases regarding the BRCA1 and 2 genes pinpoint that, although the process of 
molecularisation has already affected identities and oriented collective sociotechnical 
imaginaries of life, it can be also challenged if it fails in projecting a collective vision of 
“what is good, desirable, and worth attaining for a political community”.1044 
The molecular sociotechnical imaginary has consistently oriented the legal reasoning of 
judges and their doctrinal choices, as well as the practices of patent examiners, in defining 
and deciding patent eligibility. Nevertheless, this imaginary has been questioned and 
undermined in the cases regarding the BRCA1 and 2 genes by several communities of 
clinicians, geneticists and patients under the aegis of the metaphor of the code: genes encode 
information. This metaphor has been, partially, endorsed by judges and will re-orient the 
future sociotechnical imaginary of intellectual property. 
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Chapter Five 
Intellectual Property Rights on Biotech Plants and Seeds 
 
5.1 Kinds of Artificiality: Plant Breeding’s Narratives and Intellectual Property 
Plant breeding has been the focus of the narratives on biotechnology in order to sustain and 
prove its seamless development throughout the centuries or its rift with the advent of rDNA 
technologies and genetic engineering. As it has been illustrated in  chapter two, biotech 
narratives of continuity firmly hinge on crop improvement as a biotech multimillennial 
human activity as old as agriculture,
1045
 whereas narratives of novelty rest upon the 
development of rDNA techniques for industrial purposes as a qualitative break within 
biotechnological conventional methods of genetic manipulation, such as selection and 
crossing. 
The U.S. OTA, in the report entitled “Commercial Biotechnology: An International Analysis” 
offers an expansive definition of biotechnology as “any technique that uses living organisms 
(or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve plants or animals, or to 
develop microorganisms for specific uses”. 1046  This definition encompasses any kind of 
human technique of production and/or alteration of living organisms for practical purposes. 
As far as plant breeding is concerned, its techniques entail making natural history and 
evolution, at least to a certain extent. However, as the report points out, several novel 
technologies, such as rDNA and cell fusion, improved in the 1970s and early 1980s, allowed 
more control over biological systems and overcoming several natural barriers, namely 
interspecific and sexual reproduction barriers. Both recombinant DNA transfer and cell 
fusion enable, in fact, “direct manipulation of the genetic material of individual cells”.1047 
These technologies involve a higher degree of specificity in the modification of living 
organisms in comparison to other conventional techniques.
1048
 They have been deemed, 
therefore, to open up a new, more rapid and extensive way to “outdo evolution”, as the 
molecular biologist David Baltimore declared. 
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In this chapter, it will be examined how these contrasting narratives, along with frames and 
metaphors, have been employed in several landmark patent cases in order to support specific 
definitions of the kind of artificiality which marks patent eligible inventions and their scope. 
Moreover, this chapter will illustrate that the co-production of the technoscientific and legal 
metaphorical discourse has validated a semantics of artificiality regarding the definition of 
patented GM seeds and plants has promoted sociotechnical imaginaries of life as an artificial 
chattel. 
 
5.2 Seeds as “Reproductive Technologies”: the “Bowman Case” in the United States 
Seeds are peculiar objects of intellectual property, since they are together products and means 
of production, as they can reproduce. According to the Oxford Dictionary, the seed is “the 
typically small roundish structure by which certain higher plants reproduce and disperse 
themselves, which develops from a fertilized ovule and consists of an embryo plant and 
(often) nutritive endosperm enclosed in a protective coat”.1049 
As Kloppenburg Jr. illustrated, although seeds are biologically “unstable as a commodity-
form” 1050  because of their biological specificity, they have been turned stable by 
technological and legal means. He refers to the process of commodification of the seed which 
started, in the U.S., with the funding of the agricultural sciences and led to the production of 
hybrid seeds. This process has allowed the separation of the product from the means of 
production: as “the progeny of hybrid seed cannot economically be saved and replanted, it 
has use-value and exchange-value only as grain, not as seed”.1051 Farmers planting hybrid 
seeds cannot reproduce them and, consequently, need to buy seeds each year. The reason why 
a farmer cannot save seeds from the previous hybrid seeds crop and plant them the following 
year, as Janis, Jervis and Peet explained, is that “the seed produced by a hybrid plant does not 
exhibit the same degree of phenotypic uniformity as the F1 parents”.
1052
 In order to plant 
seeds which have the same “consistent performance” 1053  of F1 hybrids, farmers must, 
therefore, buy seeds again from hybrid seeds suppliers, who try to keep the inbred parental 
lines (which breed true and can be easily propagated)
1054
 under trade secret
1055
 to prevent 
competitors from obtaining easily hybrid seeds. 
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This process of commodification has been expanded and further accomplished with the 
production of transgenic seeds and plants. rDNA technology, together with protoplast fusion 
and cloning, has improved and increased the possibilities of genetic modification of seeds and 
plants. It has been pointed out that these technologies are advantageous in comparison to 
conventional breeding: whereas conventional breeding hinges on whole organisms, these 
technologies intervene at the molecular level;
1056
 moreover, while the former rely on sexual 
means in order to achieve a genetic alteration, the latter allow bypassing sexual reproduction 
and breaching the “walls of speciation” 1057  by transferring genes across unrelated 
organisms.
1058
 
This biological “double nature” of the seeds has been at the heart of several patent 
infringement cases concerning transgenic seeds, in which the courts’ decisions implicitly 
downplayed its significance and, conversely, pinpointed the artificial nature of seeds by 
referring to them metaphorically as “reproductive technologies”. 
In this section, it will be argued that the process of commodification of seeds, which has been 
legally endorsed by these judicial decisions, has drawn on metaphors which largely affirmed 
the artificial nature of seeds and plants, condidering them analogous to chemical compounds 
or machines. In this respect, the process of their commodification coincides with the process 
of their de-naturalization
1059
 through a constant definition of plants and seeds resorting to 
metaphors of artificiality. 
Vernon Hugh Bowman v. Monsanto Company et al. (“Bowman”),1060 which was decided by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, on the 13 May 2013, constitutes one case which shows how 
intellectual property contributed to re-shape and re-define the “nature” of the seed, by 
fostering it as a product, a “reproductive technology”, whose intellectual property and control 
is totally vested on the patentee.  
The Bowman case concerns a lawsuit for patent infringement brought by Monsanto Company 
against Vernon Hugh Bowman, a farmer in Knox County, Indiana. Monsanto alleged that he 
infringed two of Monsanto’s patents on Roundup Ready® transgenic soybeans: claims 1,2,4 
and 5 of U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (“’605 Patent”)1061 and seventeen claims of Patent No. 
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RE39,247E (“’247E Patent”).1062 Both patents regarded the development of Roundup Ready® 
transgenic soybeans, which are marked by resistance to N-phosphonomethylglycine, which is 
commonly named as “glyphosate”. 
The first patent was granted to Monsanto by the USPTO in 1994 and concerned “chimeric 
genes for transforming plant cells using viral promoters”. Monsanto’s invention consisted in 
employing viral nucleic acids from the cauliflower mosaic virus (CaMV) as a vector to alter 
genetically plant cells by inserting a chimeric gene. The second patent was reissued by the 
USPTO, on 22 August 2006, and involved glyphosate-tolerant 5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-
phosphatesynthases (EPSPS). 
Bowman purchased from Pioneer Hi-Bred, one of Monsanto’s licensed seed producers, 
Roundup Ready
®
 transgenic soybeans from 1999 to 2007 and planted them as first-crop 
seeds.
1063
 When he purchased the seeds, Bowman signed a Monsanto Technology Agreement, 
according to which he agreed not to save seeds from the crop.
1064
 Although he complied with 
this clause of the agreement, Bowman bought commodity seeds from Huey Soil Service, a 
local grain elevator, in order to plant them as second-crop.
1065
 In 1999 he sprayed glyphosate-
based herbicides in the fields to ascertain whether the plants resulting from the commodity 
soybeans were glyphosate resistant.
1066
 Since most of the resulting plants exhibited 
glyphosate resistance, he decided to purchase these seeds in the following years for his 
second crops and then apply to them the glyphosate herbicide.
1067
 
Between 2006 and 2007, Monsanto began to investigate eight of Bowman’s fields and 
ascertained that his second-crop soybean seeds embedded the patented Roundup Ready
®
 
technology. Consequently, on 12 October 2007, Monsanto sued Bowman before the Southern 
District Court of Indiana. 
Bowman raised, as a defense before the District Court, the doctrine of patent exhaustion, 
claiming that “when the soybeans from a licensed Roundup Ready crop are harvested and 
sold to a grain elevator or dealer, they are sold without restriction, mixed with all other 
soybean crops and, therefore, when purchased and used by farmers to plant as seed 
(commodity soybeans) for another crop, they are not protected by patent”.1068   
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He disputed the constitutionality of allowing Monsanto to threaten patent infringement 
against anyone planting Roundup Ready
®
 transgenic soybeans, irrespective of the way in 
which seeds came into his possession.   
Moreover, he questioned how Monsanto’s claims to patent protection over Roundup Ready® 
seeds were undermining the possibility to buy and plant cheaper commodity soybeans for 
farmers. 
Conversely, Monsanto claimed that they invested a large amount of money and research 
efforts in developing an effective technology to grow soybeans glyphosate-resistant and, 
although the resulting beans belonged to the farmer, the technology embedded in the progeny 
belonged to Monsanto and should not be duplicated without its authorization.
1069
 
Justice Young allowed that “the monopolizing effect of the introduction of patented genetic 
modifications to seed producing plants on an entire crop species” was a compelling policy 
argument, however, he deemed that the doctrine of patent exhaustion could not be applied as 
a defense in the case. He recalled that patent exhaustion was drawn upon in several patent 
infringement cases concerning Roundup Ready
® 
seeds, namely Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs and 
Monsanto v. McFarling. In Scruggs, the farmer, as much as Bowman, relied on Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., to support the patent exhaustion defense. Nevertheless, 
resorting to Scruggs and McFarling, he pointed out that “No unconditional sale of the 
Roundup Ready
®
 trait occurred because the farmers could not convey to the grain dealers 
what they did not possess themselves”,1070 namely the right to plant the seeds. He, therefore, 
affirmed the patent infringement and granted compensatory damages to Monsanto amounting 
to $30,873.80. 
On appeal, Bowman argued that the sales of the second-generation seeds to grain elevators 
and from these to farmers were authorized by Monsanto under the Technology Transfer 
Agreement and covered by the doctrine of patent exhaustion. Furthermore, he pinpointed that, 
since the seed is “a substantial embodiment of all later generations” 1071  the doctrine of 
exhaustion if it is interpreted in a “robust” way should cover the progeny of the seeds and 
other self-replicating technologies. 
Monsanto contested this highlighting the conditional nature of the first sale to farmers, 
according to which should never be sold for planting.
1072
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The Court of Appeals disagreed that the only “reasonable and intended use for seeds” is to be 
planted and endorsed the argument in Scruggs that “The fact that a patented technology can 
replicate itself does not give the purchaser the rights to use replicated copies of the 
technology” and that “applying the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations of self-
replicating technology would eviscerate the rights of the patent holder”. 1073It, therefore, 
upheld the decision, which was finally affirmed by the SCOTUS. 
Whereas in other infringement cases involving patented Roundup Ready
®
 transgenic seeds, 
the U.S. Supreme Court did not take on the issue of deciding upon the exhaustion of IPRs, in 
Bowman the Court showed its willingness to clarify that patent exhaustion could not be raised 
as a defense for using/making patented seeds.  
Before SCOTUS Bowman claimed again the doctrine of patent exhaustion as main defense, 
arguing that “Monsanto could not control his use of the soybeans because they were the 
subject of a prior authorized sale (from local farmers to the grain elevator)”.1074  
Nard illustrated that according to the doctrine of patent exhaustion (also referred to as “first-
sale doctrine”) “the patentee is stripped of his rights in the product that embodies the claimed 
invention once he (or his licensee acting within the scope of his license) sells the product”.1075 
Its acknowledged rationale consists in restricting the control of the patent holder over a 
patented product or process, after an authorized sale has occurred, because the patentee has 
“presumably received consideration, which includes remuneration for the use and resale of 
the product”.1076 
In the Bowman case, as much as in other patent infringement cases involving Monsanto’s  
Roundup Ready
®
 patented seeds, the judges characterized the case as involving a 
“reproductive technology”. Although this locution is largely employed within IP and the 
scientific community dealing with biotechnology as a kind of technology, is metaphorical. A 
technology is according to the Oxford English Dictionary: “a. The branch of knowledge 
dealing with mechanical arts and applied sciences; (…) b. The application of such knowledge 
for practical purposes, esp. in industry, manufacturing, etc.; the sphere of activity concerned 
with this; the mechanical arts and applied sciences collectively. (…) c. The product of such 
application; technological knowledge or know-how; a technological process, method or 
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technique. Also: machinery, equipment, etc., developed from the practical application of 
scientific and technical knowledge”.1077 
The definition focuses on the knowledge or result of mechanical or applied sciences, which 
can hardly be semantically connected to a reproducible biological “roundish structure by 
which certain higher plants reproduce and disperse themselves”. 1078  Conversely, this 
definition should be regarded as a metaphorical oxymoron, since it pulls together opposite 
concepts, as the word “reproductive” refers to “of or relating to biological reproduction; 
bringing about reproduction in animals or plants. Also in an extended use”.1079 
Justice Kagan, who delivered the opinion of the court, first clarified the meaning and the 
rationale of the doctrine. She, then, pointed out that Bowman did not challenge the principle 
that “the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product”.1080 She, 
therefore, argued that this endorsement decided the case against him, as he could have used 
or resold the patented soybeans which he bought from the grain elevator without infringing 
the patents, but since he planted them and made “additional patented soybeans without 
Monsanto permission (either expressed or implied)”,1081 he clearly infringed. 
In defining “make” as “cause to exist, occur or appear, or more specifically plant and raise a 
crop”,1082 the court concluded that Bowman’s activities amounted to making a new product. 
She, therefore, rejected Bowman’s claim that “seeds are meant to be planted”1083 and that 
“allowing Monsanto to interfere with that use would create an impermissible exception to the 
exhaustion doctrine for patented seeds and other replication technologies”.1084 
Justice Kagan’s narrative followed consistently from J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, Inc. (“J.E.M.”), which upheld Chakrabarty’s narrative of progress. She pointed 
out that the holding of the court stemmed from this decision, in which SCOTUS addressed 
whether inventors could be entitled to patents on seeds and plants or only certificates under 
the PVPA and considered the two legal form of protection not conflicting, but different, 
endorsing the patentability of transgenic plants and seeds.
1085
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In that respect, the Bowman decision offered the seed industry the certainty of the 
effectiveness of the IP protection over seeds and plants, whose utility patent eligibility was 
settled judicially by the J.E.M. Ag Supply’s holding, as explained later in the chapter. 
In assessing the use of the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the court did not regard significant 
the differences between biological products, like seeds, and other patentable products.  
This approach proved to be coherent with the definition of seeds as “reproductive 
technologies”, as referred to by the Supreme Court and is part of the ordinary way of defining 
transgenic seeds and plants in patent infringement cases. This definition has been largely 
endorsed and promoted also by the scientific community involved in biotechnology. 
Commenting this decision, William Simons in Nature Biotechnology referred to seeds as 
“replicative biologic technologies”.1086 The adjectives “replicative” and “biologic” have been 
applied as labels to mark this kind of technology from others which are not. He pinpointed 
that the final decision of the Supreme Court relied on Quanta Computer, Inc V. LG 
Electronics a case of patent infringement concerning licensed microprocessors and chipsets, 
which upheld the first sale doctrine.
1087
   
Resorting to the term “replicative” in comparison to “reproductive” weakens the differences 
between mechanistic and chemical inventions and biologic ones, but does not eclipse the 
fundamental difference among these kinds, namely that a seed can potentially reproduce 
itself, with and without human intervention. 
Although this issue was not considered crucial by the U.S. Supreme Court, it will be raised in 
another patent infringement case, Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., in Canada. 
Moreover, the Court dismissed as captious the argument raised by Bowman under the banner 
that “seeds are special”,1088 namely “that soybeans naturally self-replicate or sprout unless 
stored in a controlled manner”,1089 drawing the consequence that “it was the soybean, not 
Bowman himself that made replicas of Monsanto’s patented invention”.1090 Justice Kagan, by 
contrast, pinpointed that “it was Bowman, not the soybean who controlled the reproduction 
(unto the eight generation) of Monsanto’s patented invention”.1091 
The Supreme Court’s decision, hence, handled the case as regarding a “reproductive 
technology”, the same definition used by the courts in Scruggs and McFarling and referred to 
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by biotechnologists, which implies that transgenic seeds and plants do not significantly differ 
from other kinds of technologies, but for replication. 
This definition assimilated biological entities to mechanical products and chemical 
compounds. This assimilation meant that the court did not have to engage with the distinctive 
feature of the seed, namely the fact that it is a product and means of production and can 
reproduce. Although seeds can be used as feed for animal or human consumption, their 
characteristic use entails a conflation of using and making and, therefore, entails a short 
circuit within the doctrine of patent exhaustion. 
The judgment, however, is consistent with the watershed that was brought about, in the U.S. 
system of protection of plants and seeds, by Ex Parte Hibberd and, then, J.E.M. and will be 
explained in the next section. 
As it has been observed,
1092
 the decision in Bowman has been significant beyond the IP 
interests of the agribusiness market, since a contrary decision of the Supreme Court would 
have impaired the patent protection over molecular biologic inventions. 
 
5.2.1 A Matter of Narratives
1093
 
The significance of judicial narratives does not lie only in supporting adjudication in 
particular cases, but in sustaining enduring technoscientific imaginaries of life and nature. 
Chakrabarty has offered a stable narrative of the origins and progress centered on continuity 
which has impinged on defining the nature of plants and seeds and their patent eligibility in 
the U.S. 
In the absence of specific rules providing that GM microorganisms, animals and plants were 
patentable under the U.S. Patent Act, the Courts, that must solve patent controversies, have 
taken up the task of deciding what is the nature of these things and whether they can fit the 
definition of patentable subject matter, according to Title 35 § 101 U.S.C. In that respect, the 
U.S. Courts have played a pivotal role in the policymaking of biotechnology since 
Chakrabarty, where the majority of the Supreme Court held that “anything under the sun that 
is made by man” is patentable. 
Bowman confirms how thoroughly the Courts have shaped the ground for biotechnology 
agribusiness, stretching the borders of the definition of patentable inventions to encompass 
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products that were never envisaged in the Patent Act, while pleading deference to the 
statutes.
1094
 
Ex Parte Hibberd and J.E.M. represent the two decisive judicial steps towards the complete 
de-naturalization and commodification of seeds and plants in the U.S. intellectual property 
system. 
In the U.S., the IP protection of plants and seeds proved difficult, since the 19th century, for 
several reasons.  
The definition of patentable subject matter dates back to the 1793 Patent Act, which included 
“any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or 
useful improvement thereof”.1095 Although in 1952 – when the Patent Act was codified – the 
word “art” was replaced by the word “process”, the wording remained unchanged.1096 The 
definition does not explicitly refer to life forms. In the 19th century, plants were considered 
to be patent ineligible under the Patent Act, but the rationale has been debated. Several 
scholars
1097
 point out that they were considered to fall outside the scope of patentable subject 
matter, because of the “products of nature” patent exclusion settled, in 1889, in Ex parte 
Latimer.
1098
 
In 1889 deciding on Ex parte Latimer,
1099
 the U.S. Commissioner of Patents rejected a patent 
application claiming a fiber “consisting of the cellular tissues of Pinus australis”.1100 The 
Commissioner argued that the “the mere ascertaining of the character or the quality of trees 
that grow in the forest and the construction of the woody fiber and tissue of which they are 
composed is not a patentable invention, recognized by the statute, any more than to find a 
new gem or jewel in the earth would entitle the discoverer to patent all gems which should be 
subsequently found”.1101  The Commissioner’s ruling has set out the “product of nature” 
doctrine, according to which products of nature, such as natural phenomena and laws, as well 
as abstract ideas, are not patent eligible, since their discovery does not entail any decisive 
human inventive act. 
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However, in establishing IP protection on plants, other hurdles proved to be more 
cumbersome than the conviction that plant varieties were products of nature. As the U.S. 
OTA illustrated in New Developments in Biotechnology: Patenting Life, “the view that a new 
plant variety could not be adequately described to comply with the description requirements 
of the general patent statutes”1102 weighed against patenting plants and plant varieties. In 
addition, the legislature considered plant breeding “not sufficiently reproducible to allow for 
stable, uniform, and true-to-type material suitable for patent protection”.1103 
During the Great Depression, in 1930, Congress enacted the Plant Patent Act (PPA), which 
allows intellectual property protection for new and distinct asexually reproducing plant 
varieties.
1104
 The PPA was the result of the promotional work carried out by the lobbying 
group of nurserymen. As the work of the breeder was thought to be a considerable aid to 
nature, Congressmen concluded it deserved to be ruled as a patentable invention. This was 
the first legal act establishing that plants and plant varieties could be considered “artificial” 
enough to deserve the IP protection accorded to inventions. 
The PPA, nevertheless, did not imply a right to exclude others from propagating the patented 
plant variety by seeds and provided a more relaxed written description requirement, “by 
permitting it to be in accordance with traditional botanic descriptions”.1105 As plant asexual 
reproduction consists of cuttings, grafting and budding, but does not involve seeds’ use,1106 
the PPA did not impact upon the traditional plant breeders’ rights and the possibility for 
farmers to re-plant seeds. The PPA partially answered the needs of the proponents, who 
pleaded that establishing a plant patent system would foster private investments in developing 
superior plant varieties, and fulfilled the auspice of the Hatch Act of 1887, whose purpose 
was “to assure agriculture a position in research equal to that of industry”.1107 
However, by ruling that new and distinct asexually reproducing plant varieties were like 
human inventions and, thus, patentable under the PPA, U.S. Congress moved them from the 
realm of nature to that of culture and started a process of legal de-naturalization of plants. In 
the conceptual shift of meaning from plants regarded as “products of nature” to “artificial 
products”, the mechanistic and chemical analogies were fundamental and proved legally 
successful. The mechanistic and chemical analogies conveyed by metaphors affirmed a way 
of imagining life detached from the environment and emptied of its organic properties (i.e. 
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reproduction and growth). This kind of imaginary hinged on the advantages that these 
biotechnological products could entail in terms of social and economic progress and on the 
incentives that IP protection could offer to plant and seed breeders. 
The House Committee on Patents, addressing the issue of the constitutionality of the PPA 
according to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, had to decide on whether 
a new plant variety would be a “discovery” in the constitutional sense and its originator an 
inventor or not.
1108
 The answer was positive, as in the Report the Committee argued that there 
is no difference between “the part played by the plant originator in the development of new 
plants and the part played by the chemist in the development of new compositions of 
matter”.1109 
However, it has been observed
1110
 that the utility patent requirement of disclosure was 
difficult to fulfill for plants, which were hardly identically reproducible, and in this respect, 
as living matter, they differed from chemical compounds. 
The approval, in 1970, of the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) was the further step 
towards the legal protection of plant varieties. The PVPA was passed after an unsuccessful 
attempt to amend the PPA to include sexually reproduced plant varieties, in 1968,
1111
 and 
provides a form of IP protection for new, distinct, uniform and stable varieties of sexually 
reproducing plant varieties.
1112
 Under the PVPA a breeder can be granted a Plant Variety 
Protection Certificate (PVPC) by the Plant Variety Protection Office (PVPO), which 
administers the act within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Although the extension of 
patent-like protection to sexually reproducing plant varieties came about under the aegis of 
stimulating private investments in plant breeding and enhancing plant varieties, nonetheless it 
raised sharp criticisms. The PVPA was viewed as a means to promote economic 
concentration in the seed industry, to limit the free exchange of germplasm, to favor genetic 
uniformity and weaken the relevance of public breeding.
1113
 
However, it provided two exemptions that would mitigate its effects on plant breeders’ 
activities: although the holder of a PVPC can exclude others from selling, offering for sale, 
reproducing (sexually or asexually), producing a hybrid from the variety and importing or 
exporting it, the certificate does not prevent farmers from saving seeds for crop production
1114
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and breeders from using it for research purposes.
1115
 By preserving these exemptions, the 
PVPC implicitly recognized and maintained the intimate “natural” biological relationship 
between seeds and plants, the link between seeds as “products” and “means of production”, 
as well as their socio-economical relevance for different stakeholders. 
The complete assimilation of new plants and seeds to man-made inventions
1116
 resulted from 
the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) in Ex parte Hibberd, 
in 1985, and occurred five years after the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Chakrabarty that 
life forms, like human modified microorganisms, were patent eligible.  
Stephen Bent illustrated that, in the early 1980s, the USPTO rejected utility patent 
applications on hybrid plants and seeds, drawing on the legal principle of preemption, namely  
“the principle (Derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or 
supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation”.1117 He referred, in particular, to the reply 
that the USPTO provided to questions submitted, in 1984, by the Biotechnology Patent Study 
Team of the Japan Patent Association which pointed out that: “In the absence of judicial 
guidance, the Patent and Trademark Office has for the present adopted a practice based on the 
legal principle of ‘preemption’. Any subject matter protectable under either the plant patent 
law or the Plant Variety Protection Act is preempted by that law and cannot be protected 
under the general patent law”.1118 
However, in 1985, the USPTO’s practice began to shift, when Ex Parte Hibberd was decided 
and was definitively overturned by SCOTUS’ judgement in J.E.M. Between 1985 and 2001 
the USPTO granted 1,800 utility patents on plants, plant parts and seeds under Title 35 § 
101.
1119
 However, until 2001, when J.E.M. was decided by SCOTUS, there were still some 
uncertainties on whether Chakrabarty had changed something in the intellectual property 
system of protection of plants and seeds. In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 
Inc. the Supreme Court carried out the final discursive effort for the de-naturalization of 
plants and seeds and their normalization as patentable subject matter in the U.S. IP protection 
system, upholding that “newly developed plant breeds fall within the subject matter of § 101, 
and neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of § 101’s coverage”.1120 
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In Ex parte Hibberd, the BPAI dealt with the patent examiner’s rejection of several patent 
claims related to maize plant technologies that included seeds, plants and tissue cultures, 
which had increased free tryptophan levels or were capable of producing plants or seeds 
having increased tryptophan content.
1121
 
The examiner argued that these claims were not patentable according to the statutory 
construction of the scope of patentable subject matter under Title 35 §101 U.S.C., in 
relationship with the PPA and PVPA. He purported that, by enacting the PPA in 1930 and the 
PVPA in 1970, Congress had specifically set forth how and under what conditions plant life 
covered by these Acts should be protected. He contended, therefore, that the only reasonable 
statutory interpretation was that “the PPA and PVPA, which were later in time and more 
specific than section 101, each carved out from Section 101, for specific treatment, the 
subject matter covered by each”,1122 concluding that the plant-specific acts (PPA and PVPA) 
were the exclusive forms of protection for plant life covered by those acts. 
The examiner showed full awareness of the practical implications in departing from PTO’s 
unbroken practice and allowing utility patents on plants and seeds, by pointing out all the 
differences between the plant-specific Acts and § 101 U.S.C. and, in particular, that “the 
PVPA contains both research (experimental use) and farmer’s crop exemptions, while 
Section 101 does not explicitly contain such exemptions”.1123 
Moreover, he contended that according utility patent protection under the circumstances of 
the case would have been a violation of Article 2 of the UPOV Convention that, although it 
was only an Executive Agreement not ratified by the U.S. Senate at that time, should be 
considered “in interpreting a statute on which it bears”.1124 Article 2(1) of the UPOV Act, 
which was revised in 1978, regarded the forms of protection for new varieties of plants and 
embedded a ban on double protection of plant varieties. 
The BPAI reversed his decision and, relying on the Supreme Court’s majority reconstruction 
of the legislative history of the PPA and PVPA in Chakrabarty, purported that, in the absence 
of any clear intention of Congress to remove plants and seeds from patent protection, the 
legislative intent of these acts was to extend patent protection to plant breeders.
1125
  
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. is a case of patent infringement filed by 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, one of the world’s largest seed corn producers, involving the 
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validity of 17 utility patents covering the manufacture, use sale, and offer for sale of its 
inbred and hybrid corn seed products. Pioneer Hi-Bred International alleged that J.E.M. 
Supply, trading as Farm Advantage, purchased from the company its patented hybrid corn 
seeds in bags bearing a license agreement. Although Farm Advantage was not a Pioneer’s 
licensed sales representative, it then resold these bags to other distributors and customers, 
infringing these patents, as well as the licensing agreement. J.E.M. Ag Supply, in turn, denied 
Pioneer’s allegations and counterclaimed that its patents were invalid, as sexually 
reproducing plants are not patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
Recalling the examiner’s arguments in Ex Parte Hibberd, Farm Advantage contended that the 
PPA and PVPA set forth the exclusive statutory means for the protection of plants, since these 
statutes are more specific than § 101 U.S.C. and carve out a special treatment for them.
1126
 
In this case two opposite narratives confronted. In the wake of Chakrabarty, the majority of 
the Court developed a narrative of continuity. Relying on this precedent, the majority 
embraced its reasoning, where a certain imaginary of ineluctable progress is tied and weaved 
together with the rhetoric of deference to the statutes. Thus, it reaffirmed that § 101 U.S.C. 
should be given wide scope and rejected the argument that Congress must expressly authorize 
protection for new patentable subject matter, recalling the Jeffersonian mythology.
1127
 
Although the majority of the Court admitted that USPTO’s unbroken practice of conferring 
utility patents on plants was established in the aftermath of Ex Parte Hibberd,
1128
 the judges 
did not consider this decision a major departure from the former way of applying IP rules to 
plants and seeds. Ex Parte Hibberd was regarded, on the contrary, as Chakrabarty’s natural 
judicial follow-up, as it confirmed that plants could be subsumed within the meaning of 
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” under § 101 U.S.C., together with the more 
general statement that “anything under the sun that is made by man” is virtually 
patentable.
1129
 
According to this narrative of continuity, the PPA and PVPA did not foreclose utility patent 
coverage for plants, since they do not contain any statement of exclusivity and do not 
expressly restrict the scope of patentable subject matter. As Judge Thomas pointed out, the 
PPA should be interpreted in the light of the “forward-looking” perspective of the utility 
patent statute and the reality of plant breeding then: “in 1930, seed companies were not 
primarily concerned with varietal protection, but were still trying to successfully commodify 
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seeds. There was no need to protect seed breeding because there were few markets for 
seeds”.1130  
In the Court’s reasoning, the logic of progress seemed to converge with the present economic 
needs and interests of the seeds’ industrial market.  
Conversely, Judge Breyer, who delivered the dissenting opinion, set forth a narrative of 
discontinuity. According to him, as Chakrabarty concerned a “man-made microorganism” 
(that SCOTUS defined as a “life form”, but not as a “plant”), it could not be applied to 
support the patentability of plants and seeds under the scope of the words “manufacture” or 
“composition of matter” in § 101.    
Judge Breyer firstly provided a semantic interpretation of the PPA, remarking that by 
referring to “any distinct and new variety of plants” asexually reproduced, this statute could 
potentially encompass all plants, as long as they met its three requirements. He, then, carried 
out an historical interpretation of the PPA, reducing ad absurdum the majority’s evolutionary 
construction. The judge imagined how, before and after 1930, a prescient court – knowing 
what SCOTUS would say in Chakrabarty, namely that Utility Patent Statute language in 
principle might cover “anything under the sun” – would answer the following question:  
“could a plant breeder who, in 1931, sought to patent a new, distinct variety of plant that he 
invented, but which he has never been able to reproduce through grafting (i.e. asexually), 
patent it under the more general Utility Patent Statute language “manufacture, or composition 
of matter?”1131 His conclusion was that, after 1930, the court would not consider the plant 
variety inside the scope of the Utility Patent Statute, otherwise it would “virtually nullify the 
PPA’s primary condition, namely that the plant breeder has reproduced the new 
characteristic through a graft, reading it out of the Act”.1132 In addition, he pointed out that, 
“since the Utility Patent Statute would cover, and thereby forbid, reproduction by seed, such 
a holding would also have read out of the statute the PPA’s more limited lists of exclusive 
rights”.1133 
Moreover, Judge Breyer contended that the enactment of the PVPA in 1970 could not change 
this conclusion. Nothing in the history, language, or purpose of the PVPA showed the intent 
to reintroduce into the scope of the general words “manufacture, or composition of matter” 
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the subject matter that the PPA had removed, namely, plants.
1134
 Any such reintroduction 
would make meaningless the research and plant breeders’ exceptions embedded in this statute. 
The narrative of continuity, however, prevailed. Since then, utility patents have been issued 
on hybrid and genetically modified plants and seeds, with several relevant consequences for 
the socio-economic organization of agricultural labor. Enabling utility patents to cover plants 
and seeds has consolidated seeds’ companies control over their use by agricultural producers, 
has eroded farmers’ independence towards agro-biotech corporations and disrupted and 
eradicated their traditional practice of saving and replanting seeds. 
The story of the de-naturalization of plants and seeds in the U.S. IP system is entwined with 
the creation of hybrid plants and seeds.  
Kloppenburgh Jr has illustrated that, although hybridization proved successful with some 
important species, for others it turned out to be too impervious.
1135
 In that respect, the 
development of recombinant DNA techniques in the 1970’s,  which converged with the rise 
of industrial genetics, provided the technological means to bypass the obstacles that 
agricultural science was facing with hybridization. It has been noted that, by allowing seed 
breeders to overcome biological barriers across species, rDNA techniques offered a short cut 
towards a wider range of opportunities to enhance plant varieties than hybridization.
1136
 
When according to the scientific community and U.S. institutions these techniques seemed to 
be brought under control and amenable to manageable risks, shortly after the approval in 
1976 of the Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules by the National 
Institutes of Health
1137
 and their relaxation in 1980,
1138
 the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chakrabarty paved the way to the patentability of GM plants and seeds. The Guidelines, that 
were approved in order to control laboratory research with genetically modified organisms, 
represent a significant piece of U.S. regulatory science, which concurred in normalizing the 
risks related to GMO’s deliberate release and the industrial-scale application of agricultural 
biotechnology. 
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However, if hybridization provided the technical means for the commodification of the 
seeds,
1139
 granting plant utility patents made GM seeds “effectively legally sterile”,1140 as it 
tolled the bell for farmers’ rights in the U.S. 
In this respect, technoscience and the law have co-produced a descriptive and normative 
order for biotechnological GM plants and seeds which favored their commodification and the 
allocation of IPRs over them. 
Kloppenburg Jr. pinpointed the benefits
1141
 that utility patents entail in comparison with PVP 
certificates: 
(1) “At $300 per application, PTO fees are substantially less than those levied by the 
Plant Variety Protection Office ($ 2,000 per application)”;1142 
(2) “Moreover applicants get more for their money. The PVPA and the Plant Patent Act 
permit only a single claim for a new plant variety as an indivisible whole. Utility 
patents may encompass claims not only to multiple varieties but also to the individual 
components of those varieties: DNA sequences, genes, cells, tissue cultures, seed, and 
specific plant parts, as well as the entire plant”;1143 
(3) “Unlike the PVPA, the utility patent statute does not include a farmer-exclusion 
clause. Farmers are no more exempt from the legal obligation to respect the property 
rights of developers of patented seed than are their corporate competitors. Legal 
precedent is that the purchase of a patented product brings with it the right to use the 
product, but not the right to make it. Applied to seed, this principle implies that a 
farmer purchasing patented seed would have the right to use (to grow) the seed, but 
not the right to make the seed (to save and replant)”.1144 
Utility patents have, actually, proved to be a highly requested form of IP protection for both 
transgenic and non-transgenic seeds and plants in the last two decades. As Janis noted, the 
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USPTO has granted at least 9,000 utility patents covering non-transgenic plant varieties, over 
4,000 directed to maize varieties and more than 3,000 to soybean varieties.
1145
 
Notwithstanding the legislative momentum built by the PPA and PVPA to the privatization of 
germplasm, the final discursive effort towards the de-naturalization of plants and seeds was 
performed by the Courts, which implicitly endorsed their full commodification. 
The de-naturalization of plants and seeds has been legally brought about through a process of 
judicial re-definition of their nature in artificial and reductionist terms, as chapter two has 
explained (sections 2.2 and 2.2.1), by resorting to metaphors of artificiality. Nevertheless, the 
narrative of the origins, progress and continuity set out in Chakrabarty proved to be a 
powerful discourse to support the normalization of different biotech products within the U.S. 
patent system. 
 
5.3 Metaphors of Patent Infringement: Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc. 
Canola (or rapeseed) is a major crop in Canada. The first record of production of B. 
campestris (B. rapa) dates back to 1936 and was started in Shellbrook, Saskatchewan, by a 
Polish immigrant farmer, Fred Solvoniuk.
1146
 In the following decades its production was 
extended to several Western provinces and, by the early 1970s, B. rapa was the main 
cultivated species
1147
 in that area of Canada.
1148
 It has been illustrated that the term “canola” 
was coined in order to differentiate the Canadian rapeseed oil product, characterized by low 
erucic acid oil and low glucosinolates meal, in comparison to other brand-rapeseed oils, such 
as “colza oil” commercialized by France.1149 The word “canola” was devised by a committee 
which was appointed by the Rapeseed Association of Canada and embeds “an abbreviation of 
Canadian “can” and the “suffix ‘ola’ which could have stood for –ol, or a chemical 
compound containing a hydroxyl group, or equally for –ole, oleo (French) for oil”1150 and 
was registered as a trademark in 1978. In Canada, Canola epitomizes a successful innovation 
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process, undertaken first by publicly funding R&D, which has been later sustained by private 
research and led to commercialization of products.
1151
  
Canadian breeding efforts and investments regarded, first, traditional rapeseed breeding
1152
 
and, successively, biotechnological research to develop new traits in the main areas of 
breeding: “(i) seed yield; (ii) seed quality (i.e. oil type and composition), meal quality 
(glucosinolate content) and seed fibre and colour; (iii) plant resistance to pests (i.e. resistance 
to microbial phytophatogens and resistance to insects) and (iv) agronomy traits (i.e. winter 
hardiness, herbicide resistance, height, lodging, maturity time, shatter resistance and 
others)”.1153 
Although in the Harvard College case the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) addressed the 
patentability of GMOs and resolutely rejected the use of either the mechanistic model of life 
or the metaphor of the chemical molecule to higher life forms, the settled boundaries of 
patent ineligible inventions become blurred thereafter, when the Court took a more 
ambiguous position.  
In 2004, the SCC decided in Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Ltd. v. Monsanto 
Canada Inc. and Monsanto Company (“Schmeiser”), a case of patent infringement involving 
a canola breeder from Saskatchewan who was sued by Monsanto Canada and Monsanto 
Company. The plaintiffs accused him of planting, cultivating and harvesting Roundup 
Ready
®
 canola seeds and plants, which embedded the chimeric plant gene and cell covered 
by Patent No. 1,313,830 Gliphosate-Resistant Plants by Monsanto in Canada, without 
purchasing a license to use the seed and paying the company the due fees per acre.  
In a 5 to 4 decision the majority
1154
 of the court held that Monsanto’s patent was valid and 
Percy Schmeiser had infringed it, but since he earned no profit from the invention, the 
company was entitled to nothing on its claim on the account.  
The Court did not discuss the salient facts of the case, deeming them ascertained by the Court 
of Appeal and the Trial Court of the Court of Appeal and dealt mainly with the issues related 
to the infringement. Moreover, it did not address the possibility that accidental GM 
contamination occurred,
1155
 although Schmeiser contended that the presence of Roundup 
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Ready canola seeds and plants on his fields resulted from “inadvertent contamination” from 
this kind of canola cultivated on neighboring fields.
1156
 
The Court started its analysis by pointing out that “canola is a valuable crop grown in Canada 
and used to make edible oil and animal feed”.1157  Patent No. 1,313,830 was granted to 
Monsanto US, on 23 February 1993
1158
 and Monsanto Canada was its licensee. The patent 
claims were for a chimeric gene, expression and plant transformation vectors, various species 
of plant cells into which the chimeric gene has been inserted and a method of regenerating a 
glyphosate-resistant plant. The chimeric gene, once inserted into canola plants, increases their 
tolerance to glyphosate-based herbicides.  
The focus of the Court’s judgement was section 42 of the Canadian Patent Act, which refers 
to the Contents of patent and establishes the rights of the patentee and the patentee’s legal 
representatives, and, in particular, the meaning of the word “using”, in French “exploiter”. 
Section 42 of the Patent Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4) sets out that: “Every patent granted under 
this Act shall contain the title or name of the invention, with a reference to the specification, 
and shall, subject to this Act, grant to the patentee and the patentee’s legal representatives for 
the term of the patent, from the granting of the patent, the exclusive right, privilege and 
liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be used, 
subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any court of competent jurisdiction”.1159 
As the majority dismissed the view that Schmeiser “made” the gene or the cell, the judges 
examined his possible infringement by “using” them. 
In determining the meaning of the word “use” or “exploiter” in French, the majority resorted 
to the work of lexicographers as the traditional hermeneutic starting point to determine the 
“plain meaning” of words. The majority clarified that “use”, according to the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, denoted “cause to act or serve for a purpose, bring into service; avail oneself 
of”,1160 therefore utilization for a purpose. Moreover, the French term “exploiter”, which was 
defined as “tirer parti de (une chose) en vue d’une production ou dans un but lucratif […] 
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Utiliser d’une manière avantageuse”,1161 indicated in a clearer way an “utilization with a view 
to production or advantage”.1162 
The majority applied three well-established rules or practices of statutory interpretation: it 
applied the purposive hermeneutical canon (“the reasons for which patent protection is 
accorded”),1163 contextual examination of the meaning of the word (examining the other 
words also of the provision) and how the case law defined “use” in the past.1164 
As the purpose of s 42, according to the majority was to define the exclusive rights of the 
patent holder and these rights were directed to the full enjoyment of the monopoly granted to 
the patent, the court framed the question over the infringement as whether the defendant’s 
activity deprived the inventor in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of full enjoyment of 
the monopoly conferred by the law.
1165
 
The judges, though, did not engage in a detailed contextual examination of s 42, but affirmed 
that the patentee’s monopoly generally protects its business interests, by referring to the 
doctrine.
1166
 
Metaphors embedded and employed in relevant case law and doctrine proved to be the 
analogical benchmark to judge on the patent infringement.  
The majority allowed that “patent infringement actions often proceed in a manufacturing 
context”1167 and “case law has for that reason focused on situations where a patented part or 
process plays a role in production”,1168 but still they drew on manufacturing metaphors in 
order to define patented genes and cells which are part of an organic process of reproduction. 
The judges, first, recalled one comment of Professor Vaver on the term “use”:1169 
“‘Use’ applies both to patented products and processes, and also to their output. A 
patent that covers a zipper-making machine or method extends to zippers made by the 
machine or method. Each zipper sold without authority infringes the patent, even if 
the zippers themselves are unpatented. This expansive doctrine applies, however, only 
if the patent plays an important part in production”.1170 
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They, then, unravel the analogy from the metaphor of the zipper: 
“By analogy then, the law holds that a defendant infringes a patent when the 
defendant manufactures, seeks to use, or uses a patented part that is contained within 
something that is not patented, provided the patented part is significant or important. 
In the case at bar, the patented genes and cells are not merely a ‘part’ of the plant; 
rather the patented genes are present throughout the genetically modified plant and the 
patented cells compose its entire physical structure”.1171 
Finally they drew on another manufacturing
1172
 metaphor in order to bolster the analogy: 
“In that sense, the cells are somewhat analogous to Lego blocks: if an infringing use 
were alleged in building a structure with patented Lego blocks, it would be no bar to a 
finding of infringement that only the blocks were patented and not the structure. If 
anything the fact that the Lego structure could not exist independently of the patented 
block would strengthen the claim, underlying the significance of the patented 
invention to the whole product, object, or process”.1173 
In assessing whether the infringement took place, therefore, the majority endorsed a 
mechanistic metaphor of higher life forms, namely that transgenic plants and seeds are bio-
artefacts, like zippers or constructions made up of Lego blocks. 
The use of these metaphors allowed the majority to ignore Harvard College and its holding. 
Since the object of the patent was defined by drawing on artefacts, namely capsules and 
tires
1174
 as metaphors for seeds and plants saved, planted and grown by Schmeiser, the 
majority dodged the questions related to the unpatentability of higher life forms in the 
Canadian patent system. 
The employment of artefacts metaphors coupled with the interpretation of “use” as utilization 
with a view to product advantage bolstered the conclusion of infringement.
1175
 
The opinion of the minority, which dissented in part and was delivered by Justice Arbour, 
conversely, addressed the relevance of Harvard College in deciding the case. 
The minority pinpointed that there were two main issues of the case: the scope of Monsanto’s 
patent and whether the production of Roundup Ready
®
 canola constituted a patent 
infringement or not.  
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Justice Arbour vividly articulated the fundamental dilemma of the case: a narrow 
construction of Monsanto’s claims would have rendered the claims valid, but not infringed, 
whereas a broader construction of the claims would have rendered them invalid.
1176
 
She noticed that the case was decided by the lower Courts without giving due consideration 
to the holding of the Supreme Court of Canada judgement in Harvard College, that higher 
life forms, including plants, were not patentable
1177
 and their decision would invalidate the 
Patent Office’s long-standing policy of not granting IPRs on higher life forms in the 
aftermath of this decision.
1178
 
She, then, applied the same hermeneutical criteria used by the majority and overturned its 
conclusions. 
With regard to purposive construction, she highlighted that the commercial value of the 
exclusive rights of the patentee were not the only considerations: fairness and predictability, 
the classic rule “what is not claimed is considered disclaimed” and patent claims must be 
interpreted from the point of view of the hypothetical worker skilled in the art. Examining the 
patent claims in light of these three considerations, Justice Arbour drew the conclusion that 
“a person skilled in the art, upon filing of Monsanto’s patent, could not reasonably have 
expected that the exclusive rights for gene, cell, vector, and method claims extended 
exclusive rights over unpatentable plants and their offspring”.1179 
Moreover, she rejected any mechanistic analogy on plants or seeds as appropriate to describe 
the process in which the patented invention was involved, by pointing out that: 
“In any event, there is no genuinely useful analogy between growing a plant in which 
every cell and every cell of all its progeny are remotely untraceable to the genetically 
modified cell and putting a zipper in a garment, or tires on a car or constructing with 
Lego blocks. The analogies are particularly weak when it is considered that the plant 
can subsequently grow, reproduce and spread with no further human 
intervention”.1180 
In light of the rejection of these kinds of metaphors and the analogies they entail, together 
with Harvard College, the minority drew the conclusion that Monsanto’s patent claims could 
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not “be interpreted to extend patent protection over whole plants and that there was no 
infringing use”.1181 
The adjudication, in Schmeiser, proved to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Harvard College and reshaped the scope of patentable subject matter which seemed to be 
settled. It, nevertheless, mirrored the product-based approach to biotechnology that has 
characterized Canadian biotech policy since 1983, when the Canadian Government launched 
the National Biotechnology Strategy.
1182
  As Pechlaner has illustrated, the regulatory 
framework of agricultural biotechnology,
1183
 in Canada, is similar to the U.S. one and is 
product rather than process based, since it does not embed “special provisions for the method 
by which GM products are produced”. 1184  Accordingly, rDNA biotechnology has been 
deemed not to require special regulation and few amendments were made to existing federal 
statutes regarding it, in Canada.
1185
 
This decision, moreover, is consistent with the Canadian investments carried out in those 
years to back the development of the canola market.
1186
  
 
5.4 Framing Transgenic Plants in the EPC Patent System: The Novartis II Case 
In Europe, the patent eligibility of GM plants and seeds has been established under the EPC 
by the Decision G1/98 (“Novartis II”) of 29 December 1999 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal 
(“EBA”),1187 on referral from the TBA 3.3.4.1188 
The case concerned European patent application No. 91 810 144.5, published under No. 0 
488 511 with the title “Anti-pathogenically effective compositions comprising lytic peptides 
and hydrolytic enzymes”, which was refused by the Examining Division. The application 
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related to the control of plant pathogens in crops and embedded claims to transgenic plants 
containing genes whose expression resulted in the production of antipathogenically active 
substances and to methods for preparing such plants.
1189
 Claims 19-24 were at the core of the 
rejection, as directed to a transgenic plant and seed and their further embodiments, as well as 
to a method of preparing a transgenic plant. 
The TBA was concerned about whether these kind of plant claims would be allowable in the 
future in view of Article 53(b), which sets out a patent exclusion regarding “ (b) plant or 
animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals”, 
but does not extends to microbiological processes or the products thereof. The TBA in 
decision T1054/96 (Transgenic plant/Novartis) referred four points of law to the EBA and 
focused, in particular, on whether (2) a claim which relates to plants but wherein specific 
plant varieties are not individually claimed ipso facto avoid the prohibition on patenting in 
Article 53 (b) EPC even though it embraces plant varieties and (4) a plant variety, in which 
each individual plant of that variety contains at least, one specific gene introduced into an 
ancestral plant by recombinant gene technology, fall outside the provision of Article 53 (b) 
EPC.
 1190
 
In addressing these questions, the EBA drew upon a narrative of novelty in order to frame 
genetic engineering technologies.  
It acknowledged that the “legislative history suggested that all problems posed by the 
patenting of self-reproducing living organisms at the level of higher plants or animals were 
simply to be by-passed by excluding them from patentability under EPC”. 
However, it focused its decision on re-interpreting this history according to an evolutionary 
and dynamic view, which framed genetic engineering as a biotechnological breakthrough in 
plant breeding. 
Addressing the second question, the EBA endorsed a substantive
1191
 approach to Novartis’ 
claims to assess the subject-matter to which the claim is directed, but it pointed out that the 
subject-matter of a claim should not be equated with the scope of a claim and, therefore is 
fundamental to identify the underlying invention and take into consideration “how generic or 
specific an invention is”.1192 
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The EBA, then, noticed that the referring decision made clear that the invention could be 
carried out by modifying plants, which may or may not be varieties, but “assumed that one of 
the main applications of the claimed subject matter” was plant varieties.1193 
It recalls that “plant varieties” are generally deemed to result from a breeding process of 
selection and crossing, which encompasses also modern techniques, such as cell fusion that is 
a laboratory technique. It drew on Article 2(2) of the UPOV Convention 1961, as specified in 
decision T 49/83 and T 320/87, to highlight that “plant varieties” means “a multiplicity of 
plants which are largely the same in their characteristics and remain the same within specific 
tolerances after every propagation or every propagation cycle”. Moreover, it added that under 
Article 1 (vi) of the UPOV Convention 1991, variety
1194
 “means a plant grouping within a 
single botanical taxon of the lowest rank, which grouping irrespective of whether the 
conditions for the grant of a breeder’s right are fully met, can be defined by the expression of 
the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of genotypes, 
distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said 
characteristics and considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated 
unchanged”. This definition, in substance, was identical to the ones provided in Article 5(2) 
of EC Regulation on Plant Variety Rights and Rule 23b (4) EPC. 
A plant defined by single rDNA sequences, conversely, the EBA argued, “is not an individual 
plant grouping to which an entire constitution can be attributed” and Novartis’ plant patent 
claims did not specify neither the taxonomic category within the traditional classification of 
the plant kingdom to which the claimed plants belong nor the characteristics which are 
relevant to assess homogeneity and stability of varieties within a given species.
1195
 
It came, thus, to the conclusion that “In the absence of the identification of specific varieties 
in the product claims, the subject-matter of the claimed invention neither limited nor even 
directed to a variety or varieties”.1196 
The EBA considered the wording of Article 53(b) EPC, which refers to “plant varieties” 
showing that plants, as such, are not excluded from patentable inventions under the EPC 
system. 
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It reconsidered the historical background of the article and pinpointed that its wording is 
basically due to avoid the so-called ban of dual protection for plant varieties under the 
original UPOV Convention 1961 and then eliminated in the UPOV Convention 1991, which 
imposed member Sates of the Council of Europe to exclude patent protection for varieties for 
which plant breeders’ rights were obtainable.1197 
Moreover, the EBA highlighted that at the time processes for the production of higher life 
forms and the products thereof entailed problems related to the fulfillment of the criteria of 
patentability, in particular as far as reproducibility was concerned. Nevertheless, some 
European countries at the time granted patents over plant varieties, for example Germany.
1198
 
According to this historical re-construction the purpose of Article 53 (b) EPC corresponds to 
the purpose of Article 2(b) SPC. Article 53 (b) EPC differs from its SPC counterpart 
therefore inventions which were not eligible for protection under the plant breeders’ rights 
system were supposed to be patentable under the EPC, if they fulfilled the other patent 
requirements.
1199
 
The IP scholar Sven Bostyn, in his thorough analysis of Novartis II, illustrated several 
arguments where he asserted the conclusions of EBA should be supported from a legal 
perspective. In particular, as far as the definition of “plant varieties” is concerned, he 
pinpointed that a claim embracing a plant variety is different from a claim to a variety: 
“Every claim to plants will embrace plant varieties, since a plant variety is a plant grouping 
of the lowest possible rank. When claiming a species, or even a higher rank, it will always 
embrace plant varieties: all Golden Delicious apples (variety) are apples (species), but not all 
the apples are Golden Delicious”.1200 He, therefore, concluded that “it is perfectly plausible to 
claim a plant grouping, which totally lacks homogeneity (group of different plants), except 
for one characteristic which all the plants of the plant grouping have in common”. 1201 
According to his argument, this plant grouping, instead of consisting of specific taxonomic 
units of plants, “may consists of a taxonomically non-specific plant grouping, which can lead 
to the development of a great number of plant varieties”.1202 
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However, the EBA stated that Novartis’ plant product claims were directed to a transgenic 
plant, which lacked the homogeneity and stability
1203
 of a plant variety, but did not engage in 
showing how and why transgenic plants had been deemed lacking these characteristics. As 
this decision marked a departure from the long-established way of interpreting the practice of 
not granting claims directed to plant varieties and from the Decision of the Technical Board 
of Appeal 3.3.4 of 21 February 1995 Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems, which concerned 
Greeenpeace’ opposition to a patent on “Plant cells resistant to glutamine synthetase 
inhibitors, made by genetic engineering”, in which the TBA clarified that a  claim 
encompassing plant varieties is not allowable if it is conducive to the evasion of the 
exclusions under Article 53 (b) EPC, but it can be allowed if the subject-matter of the claim is 
to be regarded as the product of microbiological process.
1204
 
In conclusion, the narrative of the novelty of genetic engineering within the field of plant 
breeding technologies, carried out by the EBA, allowed the Board to decouple the technology 
from the product in which it is embedded, the plant, and it largely supported and settled the 
taxonomical non-specific status of transgenic plants and seeds. This decision elicits, however, 
several questions about the uncertain scientific ontology of GM plants as a kind, linked to this 
decoupling, which supported their patent eligibility. In particular, it questions and challenges 
the premises of the settled botanical classification
1205
 on the face of genetic engineering and 
the more recent gene editing technologies
1206
 and on which grounds botanists establish the 
threshold of genetic modification that entail the creation of a new plant variety. 
Moreover, as it has been noted,
1207
 the “higher taxonomic level approach” has resulted in 
inconsistencies with earlier and later decisions on the exclusions set out in Article 53 EPC by 
the EBA and made redundant the public policy exclusions that it embeds. 
 
5.4.1 The “Nature” of the Process: the Broccoli I and Tomato I cases  
Sigrid Sterckx and Julian Cockbain have illustrated that the history of patent exclusions under 
the EPC is marked by the erosion of their scope, which largely resulted from the 
jurisprudence of the EPO’s Boards of Appeal.1208  
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In this chapter, it is argued that this erosion ensued from the boundary work that the Boards 
carried out, namely settling and re-settling the boundaries of what is natural and artificial by 
interpreting and applying the EPC and its implementing rules, as Novartis II points out. 
The Broccoli I (G2/07) and Tomato I (G1/08) case offer an insightful example of how the 
boundary work of these Boards operates with regard to biotech products and processes in 
order to settle their patentability.  
The case regarded patent EP1211926 granted to the Ministry of Agriculture of Israel on 26 
November 2003 by the EPO on  a “method for breeding tomatoes having reduced water 
content and product of the method” and patent EP1069819 granted on  a “method for 
selective increase of the anticarcinogenic glucosinolates in Brassica species” to Plant 
Bioscience Limited. Both patents were opposed. Whereas the Tomato patent was challenged 
by multinational consumer goods company Unilever N.V., the Broccoli patent was 
challenged by two agricultural groups Syngenta Participation AG and Groupe Limagrain 
Holding. 
As a consequence of the first referral decision of both consolidated cases to the EBA, the 
process claims were expunged from the patents and occasioned further quandaries concerning 
the interpretation of Article 53(b) EPC, namely whether the products obtained from non-
patentable methods should be considered unpatentable. A second consolidated referral to the 
EBA followed, as the opponents argued that the product and product-by-process claims of the 
patents ought to be revoked. 
Although both referrals to the EBA provide several insights on how the boundaries of 
patentability are drawn and accounted for, this section will focus on the EBA’ s decision on 
the first referral dated 9 December 2010, as it set out what is an unpatentable essentially 
biological process under Article 53(b) EPC. In particular the EBA had to settle whether a 
process embedding one technical step should be considered an essentially biological process 
or not.
1209
 
This first referral decision, in fact, addressed an issue that Novartis II did not settle, namely 
what is the technological threshold that makes a biological process patentable.
1210
 
The EBA considered the two referrals in case G 2/07 (Broccoli) and G 1/08 (Tomato) 
together and provided an answer to the points of law raised by TBA in T 83/05 and, in 
particular, whether “a non-microbiological process for the production of plants which 
contains the steps of crossing and selecting plants escape the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC 
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merely because it contains, as a further step or as a part of any of the steps of crossing and 
selection, an additional feature of a technical nature”.1211 
Both proceedings regarded appeals against the decisions of the opposition division to 
maintain the patents amended. Both Broccoli and Tomato cases did not concern a transgenic 
process and products (seeds, plants, fruits). Whereas the Broccoli patent involved a 
biotechnological step, as it referred to marker assisted selection in step (b) and (c) of method 
claim 1, the Tomato one consisted of a more conventional process of crossing and selecting.  
The EBA deemed the referral admissible and Rule 26(5) applicable to both cases, even 
though the referral of case G 2/07 was made before the EPC 2000 entered into force,
1212
 as it 
did not considered it in conflict with Article 53(b) and undermining the legitimate 
expectations of the parties. The Rule was interpreted as not changing the scope of process 
exclusion established by Article 53(b) EPC. 
The EBA’s referral focused on defining the boundaries of “essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants” under Article 53(b) EPC, by relying on the relevant case law, 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention and tracing back the history of Rule 26(5) and 
Article 2(2) of the Biotech Directive in relationship to the UPOV. 
It pointed out that whether a process (non-microbiological) is an “essentially biological 
process” was clarified in T320/87, as the Board argued that it “has to be judged on the basis 
of the essence of the invention taking into account the totality of human intervention and its 
impact on the result achieved”. 1213  According to the Board, “the necessity of human 
intervention alone”1214 was not considered “a sufficient criterion for its not being ‘essentially 
biological’”, since a human intervention may simply entail that the process is not “purely 
biological”,1215 but the human contribution maybe merely trivial regardless of its qualitative 
or quantitative character. Moreover, the Board pinpointed that the essence of the claimed 
process “lies in the particular manner of the combination of specific steps”,1216  as “The 
totality and specific operations do not occur in nature or not correspond to classical breeders’ 
processes”.1217 Accordingly, the Board specified as relevant: the feature of the process, the 
special sequence of the process steps and the result of the process.
1218
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However, the EBA highlighted that in T 356/93 the Board held that a process for the 
production of plants, which involves “one essential technical step, which cannot be carried 
out without human intervention and which has a decisive impact on the final result” does not 
fall under the patent exclusion of Article 53(b) first sentence.
1219
 
The EBA drew on Rule 26(5) EPC, which states that “a process for the production of plants 
and animals is essentially biological if it consists entirely of natural phenomena such as 
crossing or selection”.1220 The wording of the Rule corresponds to Article 2(2) of the Biotech 
Directive and under Rule 26(1) the Directive shall be drawn upon as a supplementary means 
of interpretation.
1221
 However, it then, had to address whether the Rule offered an exhaustive 
definition or merely an illustrative example.
1222
  
The EBA, using the references to Article 2(2), argued that the definition was meant to be 
exhaustive as Recital 33 suggested together with the Statement of Council’s Reasons for the 
Common Position of 26 February 1998.
1223
 
The EBA endorsed an historical narrative which reconstructed the use of the terms “crossing” 
and “selection” within the European governance of IPRs. 
It recalled the criteria of legal interpretation for international treaties set forth in the Vienna 
Convention, namely that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance within the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose” (Article 31(1).1224 
Referring to these criteria, the EBA rejected a pure semantic interpretation of the terms, 
pointing out that in the context they concern “acts performed by a breeder”, not merely acts 
that take place in nature, but refer to a human intervention to obtain a result and therefore are 
not intended as natural phenomena.
1225
 It observed that T 1242/06, point 10 of the Reasons, 
backed this interpretation, by arguing that if the terms referred to purely natural events, the 
exception would be redundant by excluding processes which would be anyway not patentable 
for lack of technical character.
1226
  
However, this result was not considered satisfactory as it highlighted the ambiguity of the 
rule. Hence, the EBA resorted to the legislative history of the Directive in order to understand 
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the meaning of the rule. The history of Article 2(2) showed a contrast between the European 
Parliament’s approach and the Council’s and Commission’s stance, which marked the 
troubled history of the Biotech Directive and its highly contested draft. Article 7 of the first 
Proposal of the Council,
1227
 submitted on 20 October 1988 set out: “A process in which 
human intervention consists in more than selecting an available biological material and 
letting it perform an inherent biological function under natural conditions shall be considered 
patentable subject-matter”.1228 
Moreover, Recital 17 buttressed the text of the proposed draft of the article and the 
explanatory memorandum of the Commission clarified that, in contrast with the EPO’ s 
Examination Guidelines that required that human intervention had a “significant part” in 
achieving the result, Article 7 was simply excluding “only traditional biological breeding 
activities based upon selection”.1229 The draft of Article 7 entailed, therefore a more liberal 
interpretation of the processes that fell outside this patent exclusion. The Board, however, 
highlighted that this narrow approach to the exclusion was overruled by Parliament that 
approved the text of Article 7 amending it in the following way: “Essentially biological 
procedures shall not be patentable. Whether or not a procedure is to be so classified shall be 
determined on the basis of the nature of the invention, having regard to the extent of human 
intervention and its impact on the result achieved”.1230 
The Commission, on 16 December 1992, then drafted an amended proposal and the Common 
Position endorsed by the Council, however, pointed out that “In determining this exclusion, 
human intervention and its effects on the result obtained should be taken into account”1231 
and the Recital 27 was shaped accordingly. Since, the official text of the first Common 
Position was rejected by Parliament, a new draft of the article was submitted.
1232
 Its wording 
expressed the narrower approach to the exclusion, whereas the broader version was moved to 
the Recital. In the following parliamentary debate, several amendments were voted, which 
mirrored a wider perspective of the scope of the exclusion. However, finally these 
amendments were not incorporated by the Council in the drafting Article 2(2) and Recital 
33.
1233
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The analysis of the EBA pinpointed that the final definition embedded two different elements 
of different concepts endorsed by the Council and Parliament: the first part of the article, by 
referring to processes consisting entirely of natural phenomena, sustained by the former and 
the second part, concerning crossing and selection, taking on the latter’s view.1234 This inner 
contradiction could not be clarified, but since Rule 26(5) did not have its own legal history, 
this historical interpretation was considered applicable to the rule and served to interpret 
Article 53(b).
1235
 
As a consequence of the contradiction embedded in Article 2(2), the EBA claimed its 
authority in interpreting the exclusion. It, therefore, engaged in the interpretation of the terms: 
1. plant v. plant variety; 2. “production” v. “Züchtung” and “obtention”; 3. “essentially 
biological”.1236 On the first quandary, the EBA recalled that the term “plants” replaced “plant 
varieties”, which was originally embedded in the Preliminary Draft Convention of the EC 
working group of March 1961, and ruled out interpreting it as signifying “plant varieties”.1237 
As to the second point, it argued that “production” has a broader meaning than the terms 
“Züchtung” and “obtention”; however, the difference did not matter for deciding on the 
referred questions.
1238
 
In order to define the locution “essentially biological”, the EBA drew on the existing 
jurisprudence, which established the standard of interpretation for the exclusion. In particular, 
it distinguished three possible approaches to the exclusionary clause. Two of the approaches 
were proposed in referring decision T 83/05: the first hinging on the analogy between the 
clause and Article 52(4) EPC 1973, as far as methods of treatment by surgery and therapy are 
concerned; the second based on the analogy with the principles elaborated in order to 
determine the technical character of computer-related inventions.
1239
 The third approach was 
devised in T 320/87 and entered on several criteria whose fulfillment largely hinges on the 
state of the art. Since all the approaches were considered inadequate,
1240
 the EBA resorted to 
the legislative history of the SPC and EPC 1973 in order to infer the object and purpose of the 
exclusion. This history is related to the background provided by the draft of the UPOV 
Convention at the time and, in particular the ban on dual protection that it embedded. Article 
12 of the Preliminary Draft Convention of the EC Working group of 14 March 1961, in 
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paragraph 2 set out a patentability exception concerning “inventions relating to the 
production of or a process for producing a new plant variety or a new animal species” and 
clarified that the provision should not be applied to processes whose nature was technical.
1241
 
In the Preliminary Draft Convention of the Council of Europe (SPC), furthermore, the 
exception from patentability for new plants was devised in Article 2 which pertained to 
industrial character.
1242
  
In a subsequent meeting of the Committee of Experts of the Council of Europe, the EBA 
pointed out, the wording of the article was changed by adding “or purely biological, 
horticultural or agricultural (agronomic) processes” and the exclusion was introduced as 
several national laws excluded these classes from patentability.
1243
 However, after a long 
discussion in a committee meeting on 7-10 November 1961, these categories were eliminated 
from article 2 and inserted in article 6 and the locution “purely biological processes” was 
substituted with the present reference to “essentially biological processes”.1244 
The EBA, finally concluded that the exchange of the word “purely” for “essentially” implied 
a deliberate legislative intention of excluding that the mere recourse to a technical device in a 
breeding process could be sufficient to characterize it as technical and, therefore, make it fall 
out of the exclusion.
1245
 Although the Board acknowledged that present technical means of 
achieving crossing and selection have expanded and reached high level of sophistication, the 
intention of the legislator could be ignored since the wording had never been revised or 
altered.
1246
 
The EBA, accordingly, deemed that a non-microbiological process for the production of 
plants, which consists in crossing and selection, was in principle excluded from patentability 
as it was essentially biological (answer to question 1) and it did not dodge the exclusionary 
clause merely because it entailed a step of technical nature which enabled crossing and 
selecting (answer to question 2).
1247
 Nevertheless, if the process claimed embeds a step of a 
technical nature, which “by itself introduces a trait into the genome or modifies a trait in the 
genome of the plant produced, so that the introduction or modification of that trait is not the 
result of mixing of the genes of the plants chosen for sexually crossing”,1248 it is not excluded 
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from patentability (answer to question 3). In establishing whether the process is patentable 
under Article 53(b) EPC it does not matter whether the technical step is known or not, it is 
trivial or it involves a fundamental alteration of a known process, if it is naturally occurring 
or is the essence of the invention.
1249
 
The interpretation of the terms of the definition shifted, hence, from a narrower to a broader 
construction of the exclusion. This sedimentation resulted from the different position of 
Parliament and Council and the questioned first drafts of the Directive, which came to the 
forefront of a European debate about biotechnology, IP and the related issues. 
The complex historical narrative of the decision showed awareness of the significant issues 
involved in settling the boundaries of Article 53(b) EPC and, in particular, of the impact that 
the decision could have on plants with the native traits,
1250
 namely “plants exclusively 
consisting of naturally occurring plant genetics, which is combined in the plant by sexual 
crossing”.1251 The Broccoli patent, as Kock illustrated, is an example of plant with native 
trait.
1252
 In patents on native traits, the claims on the plants and plants component 
“comprising the native traits, the trait is often ‘characterized by a marker’” that can be 
phenotypical of genetic.
1253
 Consequently, this decision could have a significant impact on 
marker-assisted selection and, new non-transgenic breeding technologies.
1254
 
After the decision the process claims were withdrawn, but there was a second joint referral to 
the EBA, which made clear that the scope and boundaries of the exclusion were not settled. 
On 25 March 2015, in the G 2/12 Broccoli II and G 2/13 Tomato II 
1255
 decisions, the EBA 
concluded that “the exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
in Article 53(b) EPC does not have a negative effect on the allowability of a product claim 
directed to plants or plants material such as fruit” and that also product-by-process claims had 
to be deemed allowable.  The EBA ruling drew on Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which set out the rules of interpretation for international 
treaties, and concluded that the exception should be construed narrowly. It should be noted 
that some Member States of the EPC, such as Germany
1256
 and the Netherlands,
1257
 exclude 
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from patentability the products resulting from an essentially biological process.
1258
 The 
consequence could have entailed, as the opponent in the Tomato II case pointed out that 
allowing claims to plants resulting from an essentially biological process would allow eluding 
the patent exclusion by changing the wording of the claims and would undermine the 
exclusion tout court.
1259
 
This case showed the political dimension of patent breeding exclusions.
1260
 
Although the EBA upheld the exclusion of process claims as not patentable, it allowed the 
product claims, creating a tension in the interpretation of the exclusion. In the aftermath of 
this decision, the European Commission expressed its dissent about the EBA’s interpretation 
of this exclusion In the EU Commission Notice on certain articles of Directive 98/44/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions,
1261
 the Commission pointed out that it “takes the view that the EU legislator’s 
intention when adopting Directive 98/44/EC was to exclude from patentability products 
(plants/animals and plant/animal parts) that are obtained by means of essentially biological 
processes”.1262 
In this respect, both the European Commission and Parliament
1263
 have expressed the same 
view about the scope of the patent exclusion concerning essentially biological processes and 
the resulting plants. It has been highlighted that only non-technical processes are covered by 
the exclusion under Article 53(b) EPC and 4(3) of the Directive.
1264
 
Consequently, on 29 June 2017, the Administrative Council of the EPO decided
1265
 to amend 
Rules 27 and 28 of the Implementing Regulations to the EPC and the new rules entered into 
force on 1 July 2017.
1266
 These amendments, which provide a statutory interpretation of 
Article 53(b) EPC in order to harmonise EPO’s interpretation and rules with the Biotech 
Directive. New Rule 28(2) is, in particular fundamental for the interpretation of the article as 
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it clarifies that: “(2) Under Article 53(b), European patents shall not be granted in respect of 
plants and animals exclusively obtained by means of an essentially biological process”.1267 
These amendments are related to Article 4(1)(b) of the Biotech Directive. However, it has 
been noted that, as the Commission Notice is not binding since it has been issued by a non-
judicial body,
1268
 it is not clear whether the amendments will be effective or not.
1269
 
The Broccoli and Tomato cases show how the EBA construes that boundaries and thresholds 
of the natural and artificial/technical, as far as biological processes and products are 
concerned. Some scholars
1270
 have pointed out that in most cases this construction has been 
brought about according to the expectations of industry. However, the prologue and epilogue 
of these cases highlight that a step back has been taken by EU institutions and, partially, the 
EBA in order to preserve the patent exclusion under Article 53(b) and also to consider the 
concerns and interests of other stakeholders and civil society at large. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The analysis of these landmark cases involving mostly transgenic plants and seeds shows to 
what extent the use of specific narratives of continuity or novelty, as well as frames and 
conceptual metaphors, shaped the boundaries and scope of patentable subject matter in 
different patent systems. 
The shifting of these boundaries was sustained by specific views about what kind of 
artificiality inventions covering plants and seeds embed. Transgenic plants and seeds have 
been defined like mechanical and chemical technological products, whose reproductive 
capacity was totally overlooked in judicial reasoning. 
In the U.S., judges and the USPTO largely acted as the gatekeepers of the definition of patent 
eligible matter and favored a metaphorical-analogical and dynamic interpretation of its scope. 
Drawing on the narrative of progress set out in Chakrabarty and on the metaphor of the 
machine, they characterized transgenic plants and seeds as “reproductive technologies” and, 
therefore, assimilated them to other kinds of patent eligible products. This imaginary of 
biotech products has been endorsed by the scientific community and the public, which largely 
shares the view that IPRs over GM seeds and plants are beneficial to U.S. progress and 
economic growth. 
                                                          
1267
 Decision of the Administrative Council (n 1265). 
1268
 Snodin (1266) 119. 
1269
 ibid 119-120. 
1270
 Sigrid Sterckx and Julian Cockbain, ‘The Patentability in Europe of Plants Produced by Conventional Plant 
Breeding Processes: The European Patent Office Enlarged Board of Appeal Cases G-2/12 Tomatoes II/State of 
Israel and G-2/13 Broccoli II/Plant Bioscience’ (2015) 37(4) EIPR 193, 195-196. 
235 
 
In Canada, although the SCC held that higher life forms were not patentable inventions 
because it rejected their definition in terms of bio-artefacts or chemical molecules, in 
Schmeiser it sustained the mechanistic nature of chimeric genes and cells. As a consequence, 
fundamental inconsistencies in the definition of patent eligible matter emerged between 
judgements and this decision is questionable for its tenets and uncertain implications. 
Furthermore, this decision points out that the Canadian sociotechnical imaginary of 
biotechnology oscillated between fully backing a semantic of artificiality of life and nature 
and censuring its use for higher life forms and DNA sequences. It supported an artificial view 
of life especially in those sectors in which the country had made large R&D and industrial 
investments and where the benefits for Canadian society were more discernible. However, 
this semantic was partially rejected because of its possible consequences in terms of the 
protection of fundamental human rights and, in particular, the right to health of citizens. 
In Europe, the EPO’s Boards did not rely on metaphors to address these issues, but resorted 
to a technical re-framing of what is a plant variety, expanding the scope of patent eligible 
matter, in order to accommodate transgenic plants and seeds.  
In Novartis II, the narrative of novelty and control of genetic engineering, as a plant breeding 
technology, allowed the EBA to characterize the claimed product not as a variety, but as a 
plant, and supported the taxonomical non-specific status of transgenic plants and seeds. This 
decision has elicited, however, several questions about the uncertain scientific ontology of 
GM plants as a kind, which supported their patent eligibility. 
Moreover, the EBA resorted to an historical narrative to confirm that essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants were still deemed excluded from patent protection. The 
Broccoli I and Tomato I case shows that, after backing a long-standing erosion of patent 
exceptions (and exclusions), the EBA opted for partially safeguarding the scope of the patent 
exception under Article 53(b), as far as essentially biological processes were concerned, but 
then weakened its holding by allowing the patentability of the products derived from them. 
However, in this case, the common position on the interpretation of the Biotech Directive 
expressed by the European Commission and Parliament proved to be crucial in making the 
EPO’s Administrative Council embrace a broader interpretation of the exception. 
Under the EPC, the technical definition of invention has proved pivotal in establishing the 
patent eligibility of plants and seeds and the nature of the process for their production.  
The legal scholar Sheila Jasanoff illustrated that “Institutions of governance, such as 
legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies, create order by sorting the complexity of 
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human experience into categories that can be rationally dealt with”.1271 She pinpointed that 
these institutions, by providing their opinions, which result in settlements, “do metaphysical 
work, because they express binding, collective judgements about the nature of things in the 
world”. 1272  In that respect, biotechnology and its inventions elicited a substantial 
metaphysical endeavor from patent examiners and judges, as it constantly questions the 
boundaries between the natural and artificial.
1273
 However, in the three compared patent 
systems, these boundaries have been re-framed according to specific narratives and views 
about the nature of transgenic plants and seeds. 
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Chapter Six 
Imagining Bodies 
 
6.1 Narrating Bodies: Making Nature, Governing Property 
The human body is the crossroads in the construction of meanings about individual and 
collective identities and devising imaginaries of future health and life. Technoscience and law 
are the expert domains in which the boundaries of bodily identities are largely designed and 
inscribed, as they represent, define, produce and govern the body, as a whole and its parts 
(organs, blood, breast milk, tissues and cells). They both act as “the prime custodians of the is 
and ought”1274 of the body in shaping the ontological definition of the body and backing and 
maintaining specific ethical and legal views about whether and how individuals and society 
should own, use and transfer it. The narratives of the body that these expert domains bolster 
are influential in settling and establishing dominant views about what or who the whole or 
molecular body is and justifying normative choices about it. 
The legal status of the human body is largely ambiguous and unsettled across national, 
regional and international regulations, as this chapter will point out.  
This kind of ambiguity is also embodied in the Council of Europe’s Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine open to signature in 
Oviedo on 4 April 1997 (“Oviedo Convention”), which is the only international binding 
instrument in order to protect human rights in the biomedical field.
1275
 
The Convention aims at protecting the dignity and identity of all human beings,
1276
 including 
their bodies, together with their integrity, and affirms the principle of autonomy of the 
individual in making choices on his own health. Moreover, it states the primacy of the 
interests and welfare of the human being over the sole interest of science or society.
1277
 It sets 
out the principle of informed consent as a general principle regarding any intervention in the 
health field, including organ and tissue removal from living donors for transplantation 
purposes and the disposal of a removed part of the body.
1278
 The Convention, however, 
embeds relevant limits to some of these stated principles. 
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Mariachiara Tallacchini and Fabio Terragni illustrated that the human body is at the core of 
three unsettled legal, ontological and moral dichotomies,
1279
 which account for most issues 
related to its governance and the implementation of the Oviedo Convention. 
The first dichotomy concerns its definition of the body either as “subject” or “object”.1280 
Although most national constitutions and international human right conventions acknowledge 
that human beings are full “subjects” and therefore entitled to basic human rights and confer 
them autonomy over their bodies, namely freedoms grounded on the complex relationship of 
habeas corpus and habeas mentem, this full “subjectivity” is far from being actually 
implemented and granted across different jurisdictions. Moreover, the autonomy over the 
body is limited by several specific legal provisions. 
Since the 1950s and 1960s, the technoscientific means of intervening, transforming, 
preserving and altering the body have expanded and resulted in the production of new body 
entities and bodily hybrids, such as cell lines,
1281
 transplantable organs, chimeras, GMOs, 
whose legal and ontological framework as “subjects” or “objects” is only partially settled 
within jurisdictions, as much as their status. These entities challenge the boundaries between 
the natural and the artificial body and whether and to what extent these bodies should be 
framed as “subjects” or “objects”.  
The body, moreover, is concerned by a second dichotomy, which regards the autonomy or 
heteronomy of legal regimes over it.
1282
 Although a large degree of autonomy of the 
individual over his own body is recognized, nationally and internationally, the different parts 
of it – organs, tissues, cells, discarded materials – are subject to heterogeneous legal regimes, 
which frame and curtail the human autonomy and the forms in which it could be exercised 
under the aegis of the human dignity of the body and its integrity. Significantly the Oviedo 
Convention endorses this frame by setting out a prohibition of financial gain from the human 
body and its parts which regards the individual human being to whom they belong. However, 
the Explanatory Report to the Oviedo Convention clarifies that “the provision does not refer 
to such products as hair and nails, which are discarded tissues, and the sale of which is not an 
affront to human dignity”.1283 The sale of these body materials is, in fact, well-established, 
culturally accepted and legally allowed in several countries worldwide. Nevertheless, the 
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Explanatory Report, whose interpretative force is not compulsory, does not provide any 
rationale to justify the distinction between different kinds of body materials and the 
regulatory frameworks according to which they are governed. 
In different jurisdictions, human biological materials (HBMs) are subject to different lawful 
property transfer regimes, mainly gift and/or sale, which are backed and justified under 
different views of what is the nature of these materials and cultural narratives about their 
individual and social value. Although gift systems and commodity systems, as suitable legal 
frameworks in order to govern human tissues, are often considered “mutually exclusive and 
morally incompatible”,1284 they co-exist in the global political economy of biotechnological 
HBMs.
1285
 Anthropological studies have highlighted that these systems, which establish 
particular patterns of relations between persons and persons and things, have been largely 
envisioned and socially promoted in terms of opposition.
1286
 
These dominant narratives on the body are locally and culturally embedded and mark how 
HBMs are devised and framed by states. They, however, also affect the governance of these 
materials in the regional and international arena, as they back and sustain specific legal 
frameworks which are possibly endorsed in these political contexts. 
It has been noticed
1287
 that the body in the Oviedo Convention has been considered as res 
extra commercium, something which is outside the market, because its dignity does not allow 
to put a price on it.
1288
 As Article 21 states, “The human body and its parts shall not, as such, 
give rise to financial gain”. However, Article 22 of the Convention opens the way to 
secondary uses of human biological materials, as it sets forth that: “When in the course of an 
intervention any part of the human body is removed, it may be stored and used for a purpose 
other than that for which it was removed, only if this is done in conformity with appropriate 
information and consent procedures”. The storage and use of HBMs for a purpose other than 
that for which they were removed, can give rise to financial gain and on an invention 
involving these materials a patent could be granted. The Explanatory Report, nevertheless, 
clarifies that “the question of patents was not considered in connection with this 
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provision”1289 and the article is not intended to apply to the question of the patentability of 
biotechnological inventions, which should be addressed in a future study. 
Finally, whereas some human biological materials are specifically and thoroughly regulated, 
others apparently fall within the “no man’s land” of the anomy of the body.1290 In this case, 
the scientific community, patent offices and judges have contextually defined their biological, 
ontological, moral and legal status, drawing on metaphors, frames and narratives about their 
nature, which entail specific entitlements, modes of property transfer and evaluation, but 
mostly handled them as commodities. 
The molecular view of body and life which biotechnology conveys, as chapter two has 
clarified (section 2.2.1), contributed to the design and production of materials whose very 
ontology and legal status suit this anomic land. In this land, as Tallacchini illustrated, the 
discourse of dignity and autonomy is opposed to property matters.
1291
 As a result, a certain 
allocation of property rights emerged in different cultural contexts, which impinged on 
alternative ways of representing, framing and governing bodies. 
In the last decades, intellectual property has been at the core of the process of regarding, 
defining and framing the body, its parts and materials and establishing the governance of it. 
This process is focused on representing and defining the nature of the body and drawing the 
boundaries between the natural body, which is owned by the individual, and the artificial and 
molecular one, namely human cells, tissues, materials, which are dealt with as “raw 
materials”, resources in the production of patentable products to which others are entitled. 
However, as it has been illustrated in chapter one, the STS scholar Bruno Latour explained, in 
his seminal work “Science in Action”, that “the settlement of a controversy is the cause of 
Nature’s representation, not the consequence”.1292 In that respect, all the IP controversies on 
HBMs are controversies on their nature, in which the courts offer an authoritative settlement 
of nature and how it should be governed within the patent system. In making sense of the 
nature of the molecular body, the courts have relied on technoscientific practices and 
representations of the body, which back and justify particular ways of framing and governing 
it. At present, these representations result from an artificial imaginary of the body that they 
contribute to support and maintain. In these representations, isolation and purification as 
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criteria for patentability play a fundamental role in defining the molecular body as an 
artificial product to be regarded as totally separate and distinct from the natural body from 
which it was detached. 
As a consequence of the hiatus constructed between dignity and property, the body and 
HBMs are at the crossroads of competing and alternative legal narratives about their nature 
and regime, unfolded according to a human rights’ or property rights’ perspective, which are 
drawn upon in judicial controversies over intellectual property. 
Whereas the previous chapter illustrated how the use of metaphors on biotech micro-
organisms, organisms and genes have shaped the boundaries of what is natural and artificial, 
as far as the interpretation of patent eligible matter is concerned, this chapter will address 
how these boundaries have been settled and shaped by patent offices’ practices and 
courts’/patent boards’ judgements to accommodate or dismiss other biotechnological 
products related to the molecular body, namely cell lines, embryonic stem cells and HBMs at 
large. 
 
6.2. IPRs on HBMs in the United States: Moore v. Regents of the University of California 
This section will examine how some of the issues concerning the ambiguous ontological, 
moral and legal statute of the body and its parts have been settled in the United States, when 
the judges decided a landmark case on the IP over human biological materials (HBMs) and 
how a well-established national biotech narrative and frame, together with the use of 
metaphors in defining the nature of materials, accounted for the arguments and holding of the 
majority of the court. 
In the United States, the intellectual property over human biological materials (“HBMs”), in 
particular as far as their secondary uses are concerned, has been ambiguous and formally 
legally unsettled until the Supreme Court of California decided in Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California (“Moore”) on 9 July 1990. Prior to Moore, at least three disputes 
over the property of cell-lines in the United States arose, but they were all settled out of 
court.
1293
 
The Moore case concerned a lawsuit started by John Moore, a patient who underwent 
treatment for hairy-cell leukemia in 1976 at the Medical Center of the University of 
California (UCLA Medical Center) in Los Angeles, against Dr David W. Golde, his 
physician at UCLA Medical Center, the Regents of the University of California, Shirley G 
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Quan, an employed researcher by Regents, Genetics Institute, Inc., and Sandoz 
Pharmaceuticals Corporation.
1294
  
Moore was confirmed as having developed hairy-cell leukemia by Dr Golde on 8 October 
1976 and underwent, as recommended by the doctor, a splenectomy operation to slow down 
the progress of his disease.
1295
 Although, at the time, Moore signed an informed consent 
authorizing the splenectomy, he was not informed that Dr Golde and Shirley Quant made 
arrangements to obtain parts of his spleen after the removal to conduct research on the 
removed materials. 
In the following years, between November 1976 and September 1983, Moore returned to 
UCLA Medical Center several times and samples of blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow 
aspirate and sperm were taken, that he understood were necessary for his health treatment 
under the care of Dr Golde.
1296
 He, later, discovered that Dr Golde and Shirley Quant were 
undertaking research on his cells with the aim of benefitting financially from them.
1297
  
In 1979, Dr Golde obtained a cell line from Moore’s T-lymphocytes (“the MO-Cell line”) 
and, on 30 January 1981, the Regents of the University of California applied for a patent on 
the cell line, which was granted on 20 March 1984.
1298
 The patent covered also several 
methods to use the cell lines to produce lymphokines. Moore’s T-lymphocytes, which are a 
type of white blood cells that produce lymphokines (proteins regulating the immune system), 
were scientifically and commercially interesting as they overproduced a specific kind of 
lymphokines.
1299
 
Dr Golde, then, entered together with Regents into commercial development agreements of 
the cell line and its derivative products with Genetics Institute and, in 1982, with Sandoz 
Pharmaceuticals Corporation.
1300
 
Once Moore became aware of Dr Golde’s undisclosed activities and use of his cells and 
materials, he attempted to state 13 causes of action before the Superior Court, which 
considered only the first cause of action, namely conversion.
1301
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The opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court of California, which was delivered by 
Justice Panelli, addressed briefly the issues concerning breach of fiduciary duty and lack of 
informed consent and, then, discussed and rejected Moore’s action as conversion, a tort 
which safeguards parties against interference with possessory and ownership interests in 
personal property.   
The majority agreed with the Court of Appeal that Moore had cause of action for lack of 
informed consent against Dr Golde, as a “physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for 
medical procedure must in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s 
informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether 
research or economic, that may affect medical judgment”. 1302   The majority, therefore, 
acknowledged that the allegations against Dr Golde were sufficient, because of the 
physician’s nondisclosures prior to the medical procedure and the postoperative taking of 
blood and other samples. 
The court, however, deemed that, since the other defendants were not physicians and did not 
stand in a fiduciary relationship with Moore and did not have to obtain his consent to medical 
procedures, they could not be held primary liable, but possibly considered secondary-liable, 
provided that Moore offered sufficient allegations.
1303
 The Supreme Court, nevertheless, did 
not engage in examining these issues, since the superior court had to address them on 
remand.
1304
 
The opinion focused on the cause of action as conversion, which was admitted by the Court 
of Appeal. The majority allowed that case law lacked on the matter, but it refused to engage 
in considering conversion liability for the use of human cells in medical research in the name 
of the safeguard of scientific research against individual proprietary claims.
1305
 
Justice Panelli recalled that conversion sprung from the common law action of trover, which 
was almost certainly used in cases of casual loss of goods, in which “the finder of lost goods 
did not return them, but used them himself, or disposed of them to someone else”, so he 
converted them to his own use.
1306
 
                                                          
1302
 Moore (n 1294) 1757. 
1303
 ibid 1758-1759. 
1304
 ibid 1759. 
1305
 ibid. 
1306
 ibid.  
244 
 
The majority rejected the tort of conversion as a cause of action under the existing law, as an 
extension of the theory which could not be considered advisable to the context of human 
biological materials.
1307
 
The judges endorsed a restrictive interpretation of the tort of conversion hinging on the same 
narrative of scientific and social progress set out in Chakrabarty, by examining, first, 
Moore’s claims under the existing law and, second, whether the conversion liability should 
be extended. 
In addressing the first issue, Justice Panelli pointed out, that, in order to establish conversion, 
the plaintiff must prove “an actual interference with his ownership or right of possession”.1308  
The court framed the laws governing human tissues, such as transplantable organs, blood, 
fetuses, pituitary glands, corneal tissues and dead bodies, as lex specialis, which dealt with 
them as objects sui generis, “regulating their disposition to achieve policy goals rather them 
abandoning them to the general law of personal property”.1309 
In contrast with the Court of Appeal’s opinion, which affirmed that a patient has a continuing 
right to control the use of his excised cells, of what becomes of his own tissues, as holding 
otherwise “could open the door to a massive invasion of human privacy and dignity in the 
name of medical progress”,1310 the majority argued that: 
“Yet one may earnestly wish to protect privacy and dignity without accepting the 
extremely problematic conclusion that interference with those interests amounts to a 
conversion of personal property. Nor is it necessary to force the round pegs of 
“privacy” and ‘dignity’ into the square hole of ‘property’ in order to protect the 
patient, since the fiduciary-duty and informed consent theories protect these interests 
directly by requiring full disclosure”.1311 
Tallacchini pinpointed that the court, as it would occur in subsequent U.S. legal analysis 
regarding the property of HBMs, framed the issues of the case in terms of a dichotomy 
between the protection of autonomy, conceived as privacy, and property tout court.
1312
 
According to it, HBMs “belong to the sphere of ‘private autonomy’ as far as they remain in 
the body”1313 and “the body-subject is only legally entitled either to abandon or to donate 
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them”.1314 Once HBMs are detached, “they become abandoned things (res derelictae) that 
some legally entitled subject or entity (research institutions, corporations) may acquire as res 
nullius (things that nobody owns)”. 1315  This divide provides, thus, the suitable legal 
background to transform HBMs into potential patentable subject matter covered by IP. 
She has, moreover, noticed
1316
 that this legal framework for HBMs as res nullius has been 
also supported by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, which used the metaphor of 
“wild animals” with reference to HBMs, claiming that:  
“It could be argued the patient and his tissues stand in a relationship similar to that 
between a landowner and wild animals on his land. If tissues were removed without 
consent, the wrongful possessor would be like a poacher of wild animals, and would 
have rights inferior to those of the patient. If, however, the tissues were removed 
without the removal itself being wrongful, their status would be that of wild animals 
in a state of nature and the possessor could attempt to exercise dominion over them. 
Not having exercised dominion or control over the tissues, the patient’s rights therein 
would be like those of a landowner who had made no attempt to capture wild animals 
passing over his land. The argument seems strongest in the case of tumors because 
these are not normal, healthy parts of the body. A defendant/researcher could contend 
that it was he, not the patient, who isolated and cultured the abnormal bodily 
constituents and thereby reduced them to ‘possession’”.1317 
This qualification as “res nullius” enabled to transform and allocate detached human 
materials, which inhabit an anomic zone, into objects of property and IPRs.  
The doctrine of abandonment in common law countries, however, significantly differs from 
civil law ones. Abandonment, as the OTA acknowledged in its report, could be used as a 
defense in order to preclude a claim of conversion, but the defendant must prove “an 
intention to abandon or relinquish accompanied by some actor omission to act by which such 
an intention is manifested”.1318 
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OTA’s remark is consistent with the common law tradition, according to which abandonment 
is a purposeful act, which cannot be merely implied by discarding.
1319
 Consequently, property 
cannot be considered abandoned without a clear display of this intention by the owner. It is, 
furthermore, questioned in common law countries whether property could be abandoned at 
all.
1320
 Both case law and statutory law highlight this feature of property in several common 
law systems such as the U.K.
1321
 and Australia.
1322
  
It has been noted that, in the U.K., the English courts largely refrained from holding property 
abandoned
1323
 and dead human bodies have not been qualified,
1324
 according to a long 
tradition, in terms of property.
1325
 Moreover, it has been illustrated that the authority in 
favour of the doctrine of divesting abandonment is slender and case law is limited only to 
wreck and theft.
1326
   
Conversely, in the U.S., case law
1327
 upheld that it is possible to abandon personal property, 
even though in most cases the property has been qualified abandoned when there was “an 
intention to abandon and a physical act supporting this intent”.1328  
Imogen Goold has explained how the doctrine of abandonment take on a pivotal role in the 
“tissue property model”, as it is the step which enables the possible subsequent transfer of 
property, under the three requirements set out by the relevant case law: “an original owner of 
the tissue, a physical relinquishment of the tissue, and a clear, unequivocal intention on the 
part of the owner to divest herself of all rights in relation to the tissue”.1329 
In 1995, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics issued the report Human Tissue: Ethical and 
Legal Issues and addressed the issues of abandonment and pinpointed that, in the U.S. Venner 
v. State of Maryland, decided by the Court of Special Appeals in Maryland, clarified that: 
“By the force of social custom (…) when a person does nothing and says nothing to indicate 
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an intent to assert his right of ownership, possession, or control over [bodily] material, the 
only rational inference is that he intends to abandon the material”.1330 
The Report, therefore, concluded that in the U.S. the doctrine of abandonment entails that: “1. 
The legal presumption is in favour of abandonment. 2. Abandonment may be prospective. 3. 
Where, however, the circumstances are such that abandonment may not be presumed, it must 
follow that if no consent were given, or a consent expressed to be ‘on terms’, were given, 
property rights over the tissue would not necessarily pass but would be retained by the person 
from whom the tissue was removed”.1331 
In comparison to the U.K., the U.S. courts backed a long-standing doctrine of divesting 
abandonment
1332
 which supported the circulation of commodities, including HBMs. This 
approach has marked the civic epistemology of U.S. legal system on the face of the majority 
of other common law national jurisdictions.  
In the U.S., the different doctrine of abandonment has proved pivotal, in the Moore case, in 
order to affirm a particular narrative and support a specific metaphor to provide a legal 
framework and allocate property rights on HBMs. 
The necessary ontological and legal cleavage between the natural and the artificial body, 
between privacy and property, which the majority of the Court maintained, rested on the 
characterization of Moore’s excised cells as “hazardous waste”. The definition of biowaste 
has supported the conclusion that Moore could not retain any proprietary interest on his 
spleen cells and their genetic information, since they were hazardous unusable materials to be 
properly disposed by the safe hands of professionals.
1333
 
This definition of Moore’s HBMs as hazardous waste is metaphorical. According to the 
Oxford Dictionary “waste” is “unwanted or unusable material, substances, or by-
products”,1334 which should be disposed of according to statutory regulation as “hazardous”, 
namely “fraught with hazard or risk”.1335 “Hazardous waste” is defined, consequently, as 
“waste, esp. industrial waste, that is potentially harmful to human health or to the 
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environment and which requires special facilities for its disposal”.1336 It, therefore, refers to 
anything which is considered devoid of value of use and need to be disposed of, in order not 
to create significant hazards.  
Yet, Moore’s HBMs failed to be subsumed under “unusable materials, substances or 
byproducts”, as lymphokines which are products of the same kind of the MO-Cell line have 
been deemed worth $3billion in the market of HBMs.
1337
 As Lori Andrews and Dorothy 
Nelkin pointed out, “characterizing something as ‘waste’ signifies that it is valueless – and 
human tissue in the biotechnology age is anything but valueless”.1338 Human tissues and 
materials, as several scholars explained, turned out to be crucial for the “knowledge-based 
genomics revolution”1339 and the development of stem-cell technology. 
Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell illustrated how, in the U.S., previously established 
discourses of “waste” used in the debates on human tissues played a pivotal role in fostering 
the use of the idea of waste in relationship to Moore’s excised spleen cells.1340 In particular, 
they illustrated that the idea of waste accounted for bringing about the process of what the 
STS scholar Michel Callon named “disentanglement”.  
Callon, addressing how technological markets are built and stabilized, pinpointed that the 
economies of organ transplantation are “entangled in the body of a potential donor”,1341 as the 
movement of organs is limited by their material and social embodiment.  Making human 
organs circulate into the market mandates efforts of disentanglement. The transfer of the 
organ, therefore, hinges on a successful process of disentanglement, which “transform it into 
a good free of all attachments”.1342 This process, as Hogle explained,1343 is carried out by 
setting up a market of organs which can circulate better because of the donor protocols, 
which aim at supplying “consistent materials that could be used in any appropriate recipient 
and to produce prime quality organs”.1344 In order to achieve this goal, obtaining informed 
consent together with setting up a standardized file on the donor, which embeds all the salient 
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information about him and his relations in order to make decisions about transplantation, 
initiate the disentangling process of the organ.
1345
 The moves of disentanglement convert the 
organ, which was previously attached materially and socially to a human being, into a half-
good, though they are designed and carried out in view of the re-entanglement of the organ 
into the recipient.
1346
 
Examining in depth the entanglement and disentanglement process which involves different 
kinds of HBMs, Waldby and Mitchell pointed out that embryos and human biological 
materials, like organs, are entangled entities embedded in material and social relationships, 
which can be technically and legally disentangled. As far as the embryo is concerned, 
informed consent is a legal means which detaches it from “the network of family relations 
that produced it, and positions it as a technical entity whose productivity is at the disposal of 
the laboratory”.1347 The process of separation of human biological materials from individuals 
is, therefore, carried out by informed consent, which enables the production of a cell line. 
The next stage is technoscientific, but has also legal relevance, and consists in deriving from 
the embryo a cell line, which can be “standardized, stored, divided, multiplied and 
transported throughout the world”.1348 The transformation that the embryo undergoes, in fact, 
support either the existence of the “inventive step” 1349  and its “patent eligibility” as an 
invention and not a mere natural discovery. Stem cell lines, for example, derived from 
embryos can be banked, copied, and made to circulate
1350
. Moreover, they can be constituted 
as the IP of the researcher.
1351
  
In this section, it is argued that both these technical and legal moves of disentanglement co-
produce the ontology and moral and legal status of HBMs. However, as Waldby and Mitchell 
remarked patent protection, in particular, acts as a very powerful form of disentanglement, as 
it “involves a profound transmutation in value, as the ontological significance of the embryo 
and the social value of its donation give way to the investment value of the patented cell 
line”1352 and convert cell lines into negotiable assets. 
They noted that, in Moore, the Supreme Court of California largely drew selectively on the 
early debates about blood and organs transplantation hearings and legislation held in the 
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1960s and 1980s, in which witnesses argued that tissue donation would assure a free flow of 
information which was necessary to protect human health and avoid the waste of these 
materials.
1353
 Moreover, they observed that the metaphor of “waste” was also evoked by 
Senator Birch Bayh in the opening hearings of the Bayh-Dole Act, when he declared that 
“talent responsible for the development of numerous innovative scientific breakthroughs each 
year [was] going to waste as a result of bureaucratic red tape and illogical government 
regulations”. 1354  The metaphor of waste, in his speech, concerned the government’s 
appropriation of IP on the inventions which were publicly funded
1355
 and has proved 
influential in backing a specific patent policy in the U.S. 
In addressing whether the conversion liability should be extended, Justice Panelli 
underscored that Moore’s ownership claim was problematic because California statutory law 
limited a patient’s control over excised cells. He referred to Health and Safety Code section 
7054.4, which mandated that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, recognizable 
anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains, or infectious waste following 
conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of by internment, or any other method 
determined by the state department [of health services] to protect the public health and 
safety”.1356 
Justice Panelli acknowledged that section 7054.4 occurred in a division of the Health and 
Safety Code entitled “Dead Bodies”, but he considered the terms “recognized anatomical 
parts” and “human tissues” as not limited to dead bodies.1357 
Despite the opinion conceded that the statute did not address whether a patient was entitled to 
compensation for the use of his excised cells without his consent, but aimed at ensuring “the 
safe handling of potentially hazardous biological waste materials”,1358 the drastic limits to a 
patient’s control over excised cells qualified as “waste” were deemed sufficient to deprive the 
patient of any property right and control over his HBMs. 
The conclusion drawn by the Court was that “By restricting how excised cells may be used 
and requiring their eventual destruction, the statutes eliminates so many of the rights 
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ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to 
‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for purposes of conversion law”.1359 
The majority’s argument, first, framed the issues of IP over HBMs as a strict alternative 
between privacy rights and property rights, and then, by applying the metaphor of biowaste 
to Moore’s excised cells, emptied his proprietary interest over them. This double move, 
allowed the court to protect the interests of research, which were affirmed within the same 
narrative of progress, endorsed by SCOTUS in Chakrabarty, according to which promoting 
scientific research and the market would foster social progress.  
Justice Panelli argued that access to human cells was pivotal for medical research, because 
researchers were increasingly able to “to isolate naturally occurring, medically useful 
biological substances and to produce useful quantities of such substances through genetic 
engineering”. 1360  The extension of conversion law in the area of HBMs was, therefore, 
deemed to “hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw materials”1361 and 
“destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research”.1362 
The opinion largely confirmed the well-established U.S. frame for biotechnology as a set of 
valuable products, which was supported by the U.S. OTA in the Report entitled “New 
Developments in Biotechnology: Ownership of Human Tissues and Cells”, largely used in 
the argument of the majority,
1363
 which pointed out that the biotech efforts to isolate HBMs 
were beginning to bear fruit: “Products developed through biotechnology that have been 
approved for marketing in this country include treatments and test for leukemia, cancer, 
diabetes, dwarfism, hepatitis-B, kidney transplant rejection, emphysema, osteoporosis, ulcers, 
anemia, infertility and gynecological tumors, to name but a few”.1364 
In contrast with the majority, Justice Mosk, who dissented, highlighted the “inherent capacity 
of the common law for growth and change is its most significant feature”1365 and that the law 
of conversion as a common law creature underwent several extensions, because of the 
advances in science and technology that could not be foreseen when the traditional tort 
doctrine was formulated. 
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Moreover, he challenged the interpretation of Section 7054.4, which refers and permits only 
“scientific use”, not commercial exploitation. Highlighting that in interpreting the statute 
judges should give them their usual, ordinary meaning, he deemed that the expression 
“scientific use” could encompass routine postoperative examination of excised tissue 
conducted by a pathologist for diagnostic or prognostic reasons or, possibly, purely scientific 
study by a disinterested researcher. However, he clarified that it could not be stretched to 
encompass commercial exploitation of the kind alleged before the court.
1366
 However, the 
locution did not cover the entrepreneurial activities of Dr Golde and Quan and the support 
they had from UCLA in order to apply for IPRs and negotiating with bioengineering and 
pharmaceutical companies.
1367
 
He disagreed, moreover, that the limits set out in the section could leave Moore without 
property or ownership rights.
1368
 He observed that property consists of a bundle of rights that 
could be disposed of by sale or gift.
1369
 Although both law and contract may be subject to 
restriction on the time, place and manner of use of their property, still what is left is a 
protectable property interest, which is retained by the individual.
1370
 
This property interest, according to him, extended to the patented cell line and the products 
derived from it, as it not factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from his body. He 
highlighted that Moore could not be considered a “joint inventor”, because he did not 
contribute to substantial development of the product, but as a patient who unknowingly 
provided his unique raw materials and, in that respect, part of the legal doctrine supported the 
analogy between providing raw materials and contributing in an essential way to create a 
patented product.
1371
 
He, then, challenged the majority’s policy considerations and the narrative of progress, 
according to which research on human tissues could be hindered by recognizing patients’ 
property rights over their materials. Overturning the narrative and pointing to the limitations 
that allocating IPRs over the invention derived from HBMs could entail, he pinpointed the 
limits to free exchange of material among researchers, which could impinge on scientific 
research.
1372
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He, therefore, concluded that, as research on human cells handles the body as a commodity, 
“a means to a profitable end”, the owner of the HBMs should benefit from them.1373 
Jasanoff illustrated that this decision, like several other U.S. biotech patent judgements, 
makes sense within “the specificity-circulation framework”.1374 According to this framework, 
“the property claim has to involve both taking a specific, characterizable, and reproducible 
bite (and, today, perhaps as much byte as bites) out of nature and a capacity to make the 
excised element circulate widely in commerce”.1375  The judges endorsed this framework and, 
on its premises, deemed that property was allocated best to who was able to generate greater 
economic value by taking and making the natural HBMs specific and reproducible and able 
to make them commercially viable, namely the researchers and the pharmaceutical companies.  
As the majority argued, the patented cell line was “factually and legally distinct from the cells 
taken from Moore’s body”,1376 since Moore’s natural spleen cells have been made artificial 
enough to deserve patent protection and, thus, to be allocated to whom made them viable for 
commercial use. 
As the IP scholar Gold noticed, in a large number of cases regarding property and IP in the 
last decades, the U.S. courts privileged mainly the economic mode of evaluating goods, either 
in cases regarding the protection of computer programs and algorithms, personas, genetically 
modified microorganisms and HBMs, and recognized  property interests only to claimants 
who proved the economic value of the good at stake, notwithstanding the relevance of other 
modes of evaluation could prove to be more fundamental for them.
1377
 The expansion of this 
approach to HBMs, which has been questioned by Gold, is fully consistent with the 
specification-circulation framework explained by Jasanoff. 
In that respect, all the U.S. biotech patent cases that have been analysed in this work show 
how technoscience, patent judgments, as well as USPTO’s practices, have acted in removing 
the natural and  legal hurdles to the commodification of microorganisms, organisms, seeds, 
HBMs and genetic sequences: biotechnology by developing new ways of overcoming 
interspecific barriers to the genetic modification of organisms and making them artificial 
enough to fall into the framework, the case law by extending the scope of patent eligible 
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matter and allocating IP rights to research institutions and companies, who are able to carry 
out the specificity-circulation path. 
This work argues, as other scholars have thoroughly illustrated,
1378
 that this trend is largely 
supported by U.S. political regulatory culture, which is “product-centered”, as it regards and 
endorses the “product” as the main way to conceptualize all the issues related to 
biotechnology, since the 1970s: from the risks related to rDNA technology to the 
patentability of GM microorganisms and organisms. 
As Parthasarathy has illustrated, in her comparative study of the IP policy of biotech 
inventions in the US and Europe, this cultural way of dealing with the issues related to 
biotechnology also marked how the U.S. patent system addressed the main patent cases in the 
last four decades, which was oriented “to market making”.1379  
In conclusion, Moore has settled the issues of ownership over HBMs and the patented cell 
lines derived from them, allocating IPRs to the researcher and the pharmaceutical companies 
who could best specify and transform the HBMs and make them commercially viable. 
The arguments of the majority show that between corporeal and incorporeal claims, excised 
cells as bodily chattel and incorporeal ones over the Mo-Cell line, the latter should prevail, as 
they promote best the specificity-circulation framework and the creation of markets for 
products. 
 
6.2.1 Stabilizing Ontologies and Allocating IP over HBMs in the United States: 
Greenberg v. Miami Hospital and Washington University v. William J. Catalona 
In Moore, the Supreme Court of California set out the rationale to allocate the property and 
IPRs over HBMs in the United States in favour of researchers and biotech pharmaceutical 
companies. As these actors were able, in fact, to commodify HBMs and the information they 
embed more efficiently under the specification-circulation framework, they have been 
entitled to use and have control over these materials. 
More than ten years later, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute 
(“Greenberg”) and Washington University v. William J. Catalona (“Catalona”) settled, 
furthermore, the issues concerning who ought to be considered the legal owner of HBMs, in 
controversies opposing medical researchers to academic, medical and clinical institutions or 
patients’ families.  
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Although these two cases concerned the property over HBMs, they were pivotal in paving the 
way and backing the allocation of IPRs over inventions arising from HBMs to the institutions 
employing medical researchers and clinicians in place of the employees.  
In the last forty years, the market value of different human and non-human biological 
materials has emerged, because of the extension of the technoscientific possibilities of 
extracting, isolating and using them (together with the genetic information they embed) and 
the ability of turning them into commercial products. Sperm, oocytes, embryos, blood, cells 
have increasingly been devised, since the 1970s, as valuable products that could boost both 
research and the economy. 
Moreover, emerging patent policies in the United States, Canada and Europe (EPC system 
and European Union), centered on the criteria of isolation and purification as the techno-legal 
rationale to support the patentability of products derived from biomaterials as different from 
the materials in their “native” natural and embodied state, have provided the legal conditions 
in order to attract capital and investments and bring about their commercialization into the 
market.  
Settling the property issues over HBMs and vesting property rights on who has the 
knowledge and economic means to transform these materials into circulating commodities is 
the first move to exclude any legal claim over IPRs on patented inventions granted on them, 
as well as on the earned profits, which could encroach on the use of IP. 
Catalona significantly shows the bond between making and allocating property over HBMs 
and establishing IPRs on inventions obtained from them. 
Catalona was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit on 20 June 
2007 and concerned the ownership of human biological materials in their “natural state” 
housed on campus of WU for the purpose of genetic cancer research. Washington University 
(“WU”) filed, on 4 August 2003, a declaratory judgment action against Dr Catalona, a 
renowned urologist and prostate cancer surgeon employed at WU from 1976 to 2003,
1380
 
aiming at establishing WU’s ownership over biological materials. Dr. Catalona had focused 
consistently his research on the genetic basis of prostate cancer and, since 1983, started to 
collect samples of HBMs, together with his colleagues at WU, such as blood and tissues 
removed during patients’ surgery, in order to study prostate cancer.1381  
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Moreover, he had promoted the creation of the Genito-Urinary Biorepository which, at the 
time of the lawsuit, was the world’s largest storage facility for biological samples for prostate 
cancer research.
1382
 
In 2001, Catalona began to negotiate with a biotech company in order to develop a genetic 
prostate cancer test,
1383
 but the university’s technology management office interposed and 
tried to negotiate a more beneficial agreement for the university.
1384
 As Lori Andrews pointed 
out, WU throughout the years began to consider these collected and stored tissue samples not 
just a “resource for prostate cancer research advances, but as a capital resource for the 
university”.1385 
Afterwards, in 2003, Catalona accepted a faculty position at Northwestern University and 
sent, in February 2003, to his former patients and their relatives, as well as other research 
participants, a letter informing them that he was leaving and asking for the transfer of their 
biological materials to him at Northwestern University. Approximately 6,000 research 
participants agreed and returned the signed form
1386
 to Catalona. 
The main issue of the lawsuit on which the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight 
Circuit had to rule on was: “whether individuals who make an informed decision to 
contribute their biological materials voluntarily to a particular research institution for the 
purpose of medical research retain ownership interest allowing the individuals to direct or 
authorize the transfer of such materials to a third party”.1387  
The Court of Appeals, like the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri previously, 
found that WU owned the biological samples, as the research participants donated their 
HBMs as inter vivos gifts, to the University, namely as a kind of “voluntary transfer of 
property by the owner to another, without any consideration or compensation as an incentive 
or motive of the transaction”.1388  
The existence of an inter vivos gift entails the proof of the existence of “a present intent of the 
donor to make a gift”, “the delivery of the property by the donor to the donee” and the 
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acceptance of the gift by the donee.
1389
 Since the research participants delivered their 
biological materials to WU, the court only dealt with the first and third elements.
1390
  
By relying on the language of the brochure given to the research participants and the 
informed consent form, the Court of Appeals concluded that all the elements of an inter vivos 
gift occurred and that the donation of the HBMs was absolute.
1391
 The research participants, 
therefore, did not retain any proprietary interest on their HBMs that could authorize them to 
transfer the biomaterials to Dr. Catalona.
1392
 
In this judgment, allocating property over HBMs to WU constituted the anticipatory move in 
order to confirm and sustain the allocation of IPRs on inventions originated from the isolation 
of these materials to the research and clinical institution which stored them.  
Under U.S. patent law, an employee is deemed the owner of the “patent rights to his or her 
inventions conceived or reduced to practice during the course of employment”,1393 however, 
he has to “assign patent rights to his employer if he was initially hired or later directed to 
solve a specific problem or to exercise inventive skill” 1394  or “if signed an assignment 
contract”. 1395  These two exceptions are significant as, in most patent cases involving 
employees-inventors, the relationship with the employer falls within these exceptions.  
Catalona is consistent with the policy of allocating IPRs to the employer, who is supposed to 
have the expertise to negotiate more efficient economic deals with biotech companies in 
order to bring patented products into the market, as it ruled on the property of the HMBs, 
which are the source of possible future inventions, in favor of the clinical and research 
institution-employer. 
In the aftermath of these judicial decisions, in the U.S., the courts favoured this approach, 
which allocated property over HBMs and IPRs on the invention derived from them to the 
actors who could best foster innovation for market purposes. In this regard, the Bayh-Dole 
Act has carved out a clear role in the neoliberal agenda for academic institutions, as far as IP 
and patents in particular are concerned. 
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Greenberg v. Miami Hospital (“Greenberg”)1396  was decided in 2003 and concerned the 
donation of HBMs to Dr. Reuben Matalon, a medical researcher employed at Miami 
Children’s Hospital Research Institute, by Mr. and Mrs. Greenberg and other patients’ 
families in order to advance the study and cure of Canavan disease, a degenerative gene-
linked neurological birth disorder, which affects most frequently Askenazi Jewish 
families.
1397
 The Greenbergs brought action for damages and equitable and injunctive relief 
against Dr. Matalon and the Hospital on counts of lack of informed consent, breach of 
fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, conversion and misappropriation 
of trade secrets.
1398
 
Greenberg, just like Moore, concerned the product of research on HBMs and, in particular, 
the patent resulting from it.  
However, in this case, as Judge Moreno pointed out, the families of children affected by the 
disease asserted their legal rights challenging “the commercialization of the fruits of their 
Canavan disease research”.1399 
Dr. Matalon and his research group isolated the gene linked to Canavan disease and applied 
for a patent, which was granted in 1994, unbeknown to the Greenbergs and the families who 
provided the HBMs and information.
1400
 He, then, attempted to license his patent on the gene 
sequences.
1401
 
In Greenberg the District Court clarified that the duties of researchers differ from those of 
physicians, whose relationship with patients is built on trust, and the law on medical consent 
“does not apply to medical researchers”.1402 Whereas physicians have to fully disclose their 
interests to patients agreeing to provide their HBMs, researchers do not have to communicate 
their commercial interests.
1403
  
The Court drawing on Moore pointed out that, once the biomaterials were donated to Dr. 
Matalon, the patients and their families did not retain any ownership right over them and, 
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since he was granted IPRs over the isolated gene, he was also the indisputable owner of the 
HBMs.
1404
 
In conclusion, these cases show that allocating property of the materials and IPRs rights are 
strictly dependent and the US courts, through judicial decisions, created a stable and coherent 
link between how property rights on HBMs and IPRs on inventions derived from them are 
allocated. 
Both cases show U.S. courts’ proclivity to consider informed consent as legal means to 
exclude that patients and research participants have any proprietary rights and interest on 
their HBMs, once they have agreed and signed the informed consent form, and to vest 
proprietary rights to the research institutions and the biotech companies, which are more able 
to foster “the specificity-circulation framework”.1405 
 
6.3 IP over HBMs in Canada 
In this chapter, it will be explained that governance of HBMs has been marked by significant 
differences across countries that impinged on national patent policies. 
In Canada, inventions on different HBMs, as well as their property, have not been challenged 
before the courts. The focus of bioethical, social and legal concerns has largely been the 
patenting of higher life forms.  
In June 2002, the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (“CBAC”) issued a report 
entitled “Patenting of Higher Life Forms and Related Issues”,1406 in which it addressed the 
problems raised by the Harvard mouse case and the Schmeiser case, namely whether 
“Canada should permit the patenting of plants, seeds and animals”, 1407  which was later 
addressed and decided by the SCC, and the social and ethical concerns raised by 
biotechnology. The Report was the result of a research and consultation program started in 
2000, since the government officials and the CBAC members had pinpointed the patenting of 
higher life forms as area of growing concerns
1408
 and the Harvard mouse case was proving 
highly divisive for Canadian society. The report aimed at exploring the different positions of 
the groups and individuals involved in the consultation process and making normative 
recommendations on future biotech patent policy.  These recommendations also focused on 
the patentability of the human body and HBMs. 
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The first recommendation suggested by the CBAC was to amend the Patent Act, in order to 
exclude human bodies, at any stage of development, from patentable inventions.
1409
  
The CBAC, nevertheless, drew a line that shielded the molecular human body from this 
patent exclusion. It pointed out that the human body should not be included in the scope of 
the recommendation, which therefore “would not, however, prevent patent claims from being 
granted with respect to DNA sequences, cell lines or stem cells of human origin”.1410  
The CBAC proposed a narrow definition of the locution “human bodies at all stages of 
development”, which encompassed the “human bodies of infants, children and adults within 
the exclusion, but also all precursor of the human body from zygotes to fetuses”,1411 but 
agreed with the need to support economic investments in order to research cell lines and to 
safeguard IPRs over HBMs-based inventions. 
By arguing that stem cell research ought not to be discouraged, the CBAC clarified that, 
notwithstanding the recommendation, DNA sequences, gametes (ova or sperm cells), stem 
and other cells or organs would remain patentable, in conformity with the provisions of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, introduced in Parliament on 9 May 2002, which allowed 
research on gametes, cells (as well as stem cells), DNA sequences and embryos under certain 
conditions, but embedded a ban on the creation and use of human clones.
1412
 
CBAC emphasized the relevance of biotechnology for the Canadian economy, as one of the 
world’s fastest growing industries whose revenues amounted to nearly $2 billion, in 1999, 
and were expected to reach $5 billion in 2005.
1413
  
Although the CBAC cautioned against some human, animal and environmental risks in 
biotechnology, it argued that higher life forms should be patentable in Canada, in order to 
promote “economic and social benefits in areas such as health, agriculture, the environment 
and industry”.1414 
The Committee proposed a general definition of the principle of non-patentability of the 
human body, criticizing some of the detailed recitals and provisions of the Biotech Directive. 
It pinpointed that they engendered confusion about which elements of the human body could 
be patentable or not (e.g. genes of human origin) and the interpretation of Article 5(3), 
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namely whether patent applications were required to specify the function of the gene only if 
it’s human or also if it’s non-human.1415  
According to CBAC, the choice between a general or detailed formulation of the concept of 
non-patentability of the human body had taken into account three main issues, which backed 
a general exclusion: 1. The concept must be flexible and clear enough to be applied to all 
future technologies; 2. It should avoid making unnecessary distinctions between discoveries 
and inventions, as Canadian patent law already excludes natural occurring substances, in their 
natural state, from patentability; 3. It ought to highlight that assessing what is patentable is 
different from addressing the issues of its novelty, non-obviousness and usefulness.
1416
 
From the consultation emerged that a segment of public opinion deemed that patents on 
animals, plants, or any biological material (DNA sequences, genes and cells) should not be 
patented on moral grounds,
1417
 but, at the time, CIPO had already established genetic material 
(DNA, RNA and genes) of plant, animal and human origin, as well as on microorganisms,
1418
 
as falling within the scope of patentable “invention”. 
Furthermore, the CBAC argued that administration of the Canadian patent system ought to be 
improved, by developing specific guidelines for patents on biological materials, which had to 
be regularly updated by CIPO. The guidelines should aim for more transparency (and 
certainty) about the interpretation of the criteria for issuing patents in the biotech sector and 
“the process to be followed by patent applicants and the benchmark time frames for each step, 
to the extent (if any) that these may differ from other patent applications”.1419 
In the same year, the majority of SCC clearly rejected CBAC’s recommendation in favour of 
the patentability of higher life forms and, conversely, ruled, in the Oncomouse case that they 
were not patentable, deeming Parliament, not the courts or CIPO, the most appropriate forum 
to discuss and decide granting IPRs over complex organisms. However, this line judicially 
drawn, between higher life forms and the molecular dimension of life, has become murkier 
after the SCC’s decision in Schmeiser. 
Litman and Robertson illustrated that the legal status of genetic and human biological 
materials in Canadian common law was largely unsettled,
1420
 when the CBAC’s report was 
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issued, and it is still at present. Canadian legal scholars drew on and commented the U.S. case 
law, which has been in part analysed in this chapter, in order to devise whether and to what 
extent the human body and its parts could be considered subject/person or object of property 
and IPRs. Moreover, in Canada, any research involving the status of these materials have to 
take into account that Quebec’s civil law system co-exists and frames the status of the body 
differently,
1421
 overall making sense and co-producing an order which rests on the hybrid 
Canadian civic epistemology. 
Canada launched, in 1983, the National Biotechnology Strategy (NBS), whose goal was to 
exploit and facilitate the potential of rDNA techniques in order promote Canadian 
biotechnology. According to the strategy, biotechnology was framed as products. After the 
strategy was set forth and successfully implemented, the rhetoric of its development was 
centered on maintaining Canadian advantage in biotechnology. As far as IPRs on HBMs and 
life forms, the Canadian Supreme Court did not endorse the narrative of progress, that in the 
U.S. led the judges in Chakrabarty to open up to the patentability of biotech products. 
Although the Canadian Patent Act embeds a definition of invention, which is almost identical 
to the U.S. definition of patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court’s judges refrained from 
endorsing a deterministic vision of progress and relied on a different constitutional view of 
how to settle the boundaries between the judiciary and legislative power, where patent policy 
is concerned. 
However, under the National Biotechnology Strategy, named since 1998 Canadian 
Biotechnology Strategy, the preferred “product” frame for biotechnology has largely 
supported CIPO’s long-standing practice of allowing the patentability of HBMs, provided 
that they fulfill a certain threshold of artificiality. 
Following the holding of Oncomouse, CIPO refused patents claiming animals at any stage of 
development, from fertilized eggs on. Moreover, also totipotent stem cells, which can 
potentially develop into an entire animal are considered equivalent to a fertilized egg and, 
therefore are not patentable inventions. 
At present, adult stem cells are patentable in Canada. Patent claims directed to human 
embryonic stem cells have been rejected by CIPO, but in 2006 CIPO issued a notice, which 
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clarified that “Embryonic multipotent and pluripotent stem cells, which do not have the 
potential to develop into an entire animal, are patentable subject matter”.1422 
Blanchard has pointed out that, since CIPO did not make any distinction concerning the 
source of the stem cells, this part of the notice encompasses any kind of source and include 
human embryonic stem cells, and that the Notice conformed to the position adopted by the 
U.K. IPO, which allowed since 2003 claims to embryonic stem cells as long as they were 
non-totipotent.
1423
 
At present, CIPO’s Manual of Patent Office Practice (MPOP), in Chapter 17.02.02, regarding 
organs and tissues sets out that : “Organs and tissues (whether of plant or animal origin) are 
generally not considered to be manufactures or compositions of matter for the purposes of 
section 2 of the Patent Act. Organs and tissues are in general created by complex processes, 
elements of which require no human intervention, and do not consist of ingredients or 
substances that have been combined or mixed together.  In view of this, the Office considers 
that a genetically-modified organ or tissue is not statutory subject-matter”.1424 Nevertheless, it 
states that “Artificial organ-like or tissue-like structures that are distinct from true tissues and 
organs and that have been generated by human intervention through the combination of 
various cellular and/or inert components may be considered, on a case-by-case basis, to be 
manufactures or compositions of matter within the scope of section 2 of the Patent Act. For 
example, functional and anatomical differences may be indicators that serve to distinguish an 
organ-like or tissue-like structure from a true organ or tissue”.1425 This guideline mirrors what 
CIPO’s Notice settled on organs and tissues in 2006, namely that these kinds of biological 
materials, which fulfill a threshold of artificiality are possibly patented, on a case-by-case 
basis.
1426
 
 
6.4 A Matter of Europe 
In Europe, the patentability of HBMs has been questioned in the last two decades and the 
debate has focused mostly on embryonic stem cell lines, which have been challenged on 
morality grounds. 
The European Convention on the Grant of European Patents in 1973 set out, first, a morality 
and ordre public clause in Article 53, which regards the exceptions to patentability, by 
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establishing in Article 53(a) that “European patents shall not be granted in respect of: 
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or 
morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because 
it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States”.  
The clause has been partially modified by the Act revising the Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents, signed in Munich on 29 November 2000 and entered into force on 13 
December 2007, and in the text of EPC 2000 the reference to publication disappeared, so that, 
at present, under Article 53(a) the morality and contrariety to the ordre public of an invention 
is only assessed as regards the commercial exploitation of it. 
Article 53 sets out also at (b) and (c) several categories of products, processes and methods 
that shall not be deemed patentable. 
The presence of this clause marks the EPC patent system from U.S. and Canadian patent law 
and in the last decades, when IPRs in biotechnology have increasingly been at the forefront of 
social and political debates and legal challenges, its interpretation in patent decisions is 
shaping the epistemic development of the European governance of IP in comparison to other 
jurisdictions. 
The EPC is not the only patent system which set forth a morality exception clause. Section (3) 
of Article 4 of the Patent Law of the Russian Federation, which sets forth the conditions of 
patentability of inventions, embeds an ordre public and morality exception, by stating that 
“proposals that are contrary to public interest, humanitarian principles or morality”1427 shall 
not be deemed patentable.  
In New Zealand, both the 1953 Patents Act, s 17(1),
1428
 and Section 15
1429
 of the Patents Act 
2013 include morality exclusion. Whereas the former exclusion was more general, as it 
referred to “the use of the invention in respect of which the application is made would be 
contrary to morality”, Section 15 of Patents Act 2013 offers examples of invention, which are 
contrary to morality: “an invention that is a process for cloning human beings; an invention 
that is a process for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; an invention 
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that involves the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; an invention 
that is a process for modifying the genetic identity of animals that is likely to cause them 
suffering without any substantial medical benefit to human beings or animals, or an invention 
that is an animal resulting from such a process”.1430 
Furthermore, under the Patent Law of People’s Republic of China (PRC) Article 5 states that 
“Patent rights shall not be granted for invention-creations that violate the law or social ethics, 
or harm public interests”1431 and for inventions “that are accomplished by relying on genetic 
resources which are obtained or used in violation of the provisions of laws and administrative 
regulations”.1432 The SIPO’s (at present re-named CNIPA) Patent Examination Guidelines 
explain accurately the meaning of the locution “social morality” and “public interest” and 
provide a list of examples of inventions which could be deemed contrary to “social morality”, 
such as “an artificial sexual organ or its substitute not designed for medical use, a process for 
modifying the genetic identity of the human being’s germ line or use of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes, a process for cloning human beings, a process for 
modifying the genetic identity of animals which is apt to cause suffering to the animals, as 
long as it has no substantial value for the treatment of human beings or animals”.1433 
It has been noted that general exclusions related to the granting of IPRs because of 
contrariety to ordre public or morality were included in the Paris Convention for the 
protection of Intellectual Property adopted in 1883, in the 1963 Strasburg Convention and in 
several national laws.
1434
 However, the adoption of the EPC has been considered as a turning 
point, since it established a “pan-European institutional framework for the unified 
examination and grant of European patents alongside and legally separate from the 
institutions of the European Union”.1435 
The relevance of this clause, in the significant shift to a pan-European patent framework, lies 
in the formal acknowledgement of national ethical and legal pluralism concerning particular 
subject matter as a ground for patent exceptions, as the travaux preparatoires show. 
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In the last two decades, this clause has turned out to be the test bed of patent eligibility of 
HBMs and, in particular, hESCs. 
The meaning of ordre public and morality as grounds for patent exceptions has been dealt 
with by the EPO Boards of Appeal in several patent cases. As chapter three has illustrated, 
the Onco-mouse has been one of the main cases addressing the meaning of the clause and 
devising an institutional approach to morality based on an utilitarian balance of interests. 
EPO Boards of Appeal, as well as the examining divisions, use to refrain from engaging in 
defining morality, as they mainly construe their expertise as technical, dealing with patent 
claims and law. Moreover, as Isasi and Knoppers illustrated, the heterogeneity of legal and 
constitutional provisions makes the definition of European moral standards an arduous 
task.
1436
 In Onco-mouse, this inclination has been openly professed, as the TBA declared its 
willingness to avoid delving into the meaning of morality. 
However, in Plant Genetic Systems, the TBA acknowledged that the EPC Working Party was 
aware that “there was no European definition of morality”,1437 but the Member States of the 
EPC agreed that the “interpretation of the concept of morality should be matter for European 
institutions”,1438 as much as the concept of ordre public.1439 It, therefore, took upon itself the 
task of interpreting these concepts. 
According to the TBA, “It is generally accepted that the concept of ‘ordre public’ covers the 
protection of public security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of society”1440 
including the protection of the environment.
1441
 It, therefore, elucidated that “inventions the 
exploitation of which is likely to breach public peace or social order (for example, acts of 
terrorisms) or to seriously prejudice the environment”1442 shall be considered contrary to 
ordre public, under Article 53(a) EPC, and excluded from patentability. The TBA, thus, 
separated the protection of the environment from morality, even though bioethics as 
discipline include it as field of moral collective choices, and subsumed its protection under 
the ordre public clause. 
The TBA, moreover, explained that “The concept of morality is related to the belief that 
some behavior is right and acceptable whereas other behavior is wrong, this belief being 
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founded on the totality of the accepted norms which are deeply rooted in a particular 
culture”1443 and that the EPC refers to “the culture inherent in the European society and 
civilization”. 1444  In its account of what is contrary to morality and thus excluded from 
patentability, the TBA points out that Article 53(a) EPC refers to “inventions the exploitation 
of which is not in conformity with the conventionally-accepted standards of conducts 
pertaining to this culture”.1445 However, it did not offer any examples of inventions contrary 
to European standards of conduct. 
Article 53(b) EPC 1973 embedded also a specific exception concerning “(b) plant or animal 
varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals”, which 
did not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof. 
EPC 2000 expanded the scope of exceptions by adding a new exception to Article 53: “(c) 
methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic 
methods practiced on the human or animal body; this provision shall not apply to products, in 
particular substances or compositions, for use in any of these methods”. 
Article 6(1) of Directive 98/44/EC states that: “Inventions shall be considered unpatentable 
where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality; however, 
exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or 
regulation”. 
Article 6(2) sets forth particular exceptions to patentability in biotechnology: “On the basis of 
paragraph 1, the following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: (a) processes for 
cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human 
beings; (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; (d) processes for 
modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without 
any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such 
processes”. However, this list is not exclusive. 
Whereas the wording of Article 6(1) replicates most of the text of Article 53(a) EPC 1973, 
Article 6(2)(d) resulted from the legal balancing test developed in the Oncomouse I case.
1446
 
In particular the exception embedded in Article 6(2)(c) has been the ground to several patent 
oppositions regarding embryonic stem cell lines, as this chapter shows. 
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Jasanoff and other scholars explained why the Biotech Directive has proved a democratic 
benchmark for the EC. The first draft of the Directive, which conveyed the Commission 
intent to further harmonize European patent law in order to boost European biotech industry 
confronting U.S and Japanese dominance, was rejected in 1995. In the aftermath of the 
rejection, the new draft reflected more ethical concerns, expressed in recitals and embedded 
in articles.  
As Porter illustrated, the draft included “a clearer formulation of discovery/invention 
distinction in patent law, and again merged this distinction with the moral prohibition of the 
ownership of the human body”.1447 Nevertheless, embryos were not mentioned in the articles 
of the proposal until 1996.
1448
 
The first explicit reference to human embryos, he explained, was introduced by the Opinion 
adopted by the Economic and Social Committee on 11 July 1996, which pinpointed that the 
former drafts of the Directive lacked any reference to embryos and suggested that “the human 
embryo, which is a special case, should be excluded from patentability”.1449 
The remarks and concerns expressed by the Economic and Social Committee were taken into 
consideration in all the subsequent drafts. However, the Common position adopted by the 
European Council on 26 February 1998, affected the wording of the final draft of Article 
6(2)(c), by limiting the patent exception to “uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes”.1450 
It has been observed,
1451
 furthermore, that the Parliamentary debates before the adoption of 
the Directive show that this limitation was introduced because the U.K. was undertaking a 
public consultation regarding the possibility of extending the research scope on human 
embryos under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA), as also PSE’s 
rapporteur Rothley pointed out.
1452
 
As far as the interpretation and application of the morality exceptions in articles 53 EPC and 
Article 6 of the Biotech Directive, Sterckx and Cockbain pointed out that a fundamental shift 
has taken place in EPO’s approach to morality, namely the EPO has abandoned the 
consequentialist and balancing approach that it has validated for years in favour of a 
deontological principle-based approach which has emerged in the G-2/06 Use of 
embryos/WARF, “according to which certain things may be morally impermissible, even if 
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they would produce more benefits than disadvantages”.1453 The next section will illustrate 
how the EBA endorsed this approach, re-shaping the boundaries of what was deemed 
patentable under the EPC. 
 
6.4.1 A Matter of Morality: The Morality of the Embryo Stem Cells Patent in the 
“WARF Case” 
In the last two decades, the morality of embryonic stem cells patents has become the test bed 
of European identity, which EPC conveys in Article 53(a) EPC. 
As Drahos pinpointed, the EPO has embraced, in its guidelines, a “narrow approach to 
Article 53 (a)”1454 affirming that it could be resorted to only in “rare and extreme cases”1455 
and that also in the Relaxin case the Board of Appeal emphasized that such exceptions to 
patentability under Article 53(a) “are to be narrowly construed”.1456 
Although the morality clause was embedded in the EPC1973, the EPC Boards of Appeal 
have only occasionally engaged in addressing morality issues regarding patents. As it was 
pointed out in chapter three, in the Onco-mouse case the Board of Appeal did not deal with 
the moral issues that the opponents to the patent brought up, but handled the morality clause 
formally,
1457
 namely as a means to assess and balance conflicting interests which involved 
moral problems, which could be sorted out, nevertheless, in a technical way. 
However, the EPO had to face constant challenges to granted patents by NGOs and research 
groups, after the Onco-mouse
 
case, which made clear that intellectual property was 
considered by European citizens a sensitive political institution, no longer entrusted only to 
the legal and technical professionals working in the field, but a highly ethical and political 
area of the law. 
The WARF case, in particular, shows how the ethical dimension of IPRs could not be 
dismissed and solved by recurring to a formal balance of interests, but had to be taken on, as 
several member states were developing national frameworks on embryonic stem cell research, 
which questions the possible next steps of the research: the patentability of embryonic stem 
cell lines.  
Moreover, it pinpoints that, although the Boards of Appeal have decided most sensitive 
biotech patent cases under the aegis of the criteria of isolation and purification, these criteria 
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fell short in providing an acceptable answer to the ethical questions regarding human 
embryonic stem cells (“hESCs”). hESCs were not considered as mere chemical molecules by 
many European citizens and several national legal frameworks. This case pinpoints that, 
under the EPC and in the European Union, different sociotechnical imaginaries of the biotech 
molecular body have emerged and that a unified European moral vision failed to emerge. 
The WARF case G 2/06 was decided by the EBA on 25 November 2008 and involved a 
European patent application of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), the 
technology transfer office of the University of Wisconsin, for James Thomson’ invention, 
namely primate embryonic stem cells.
1458
 
The invention involved the kind of embryonic stem cells, which are pluripotent, namely cells 
“which are derived from the inner cell mass of the mammalian blastocyst”1459 and “can self-
renew indefinitely and differentiate into all cell types of the three germ layers (ectoderm, 
endoderm, and mesoderm)”.1460 
On 13 July 2004, EPO examiners refused to grant a patent application No. 96 903 521.1 on 
this subject matter, as it was considered excluded from patentability under Rule 28(c). 
However, WARF appealed the decision before the TBA,
1461
 which referred the issues relating 
to patentability of the invention to the EBA. The decision of the Examining Division related 
to claims 1 to 10 of the European patent application. 
Rule 28, which implements the regulations to the EPC, concerns Exceptions to patentability 
and sets out that: “Under Article 53 (a) EPC Europeans patents shall not be granted in respect 
of biotechnological inventions which, in particular, concern the following: (…) (c) uses of 
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; ”.1462 
The EBA had to decide on four points referred and, in particular, on whether Rule 23d(c), at 
present 28(c) EPC, forbade the patenting of claims directed to products (here: human 
embryonic stem cell cultures) which – as described in the application – at the filing date 
could be prepared exclusively by a method which necessarily involved the destruction of the 
human embryos from which the said products are derived, if the said method is not part of the 
claim.
1463
 The EBA did not draw on metaphors in order to assess the patentability of the 
claimed invention under Rule 28, but on technoscientific and legal distinction between 
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“embryo” and “pre-embryo” (a fertilized ovum less than 14 days after fertilization, according 
to the usage in medical field) which in some member states, such as the U.K., have been 
endorsed and justify morally and legally their use for research purposes.
1464
 The EBA, 
therefore, clarified that, since this distinction was endorsed in the legal framework of some 
member states, inventions derived from stem cell research on pre-embryos could not be 
deemed immoral under Rule 28(c) EPC.
1465
 Moreover, it was pointed out that a claim to an 
embryonic stem cell does not constitute a monopoly to the use of an embryo or the use of an 
embryo “for an industrial or commercial purpose”.1466 
In order to answer and provide guidance on the main issue raised by the TBA, namely 
question two, the EBA resorted to the travaux préparatoire of the Directive, pointing out that 
the first draft of the Directive did not embed any specific prohibition concerning the use of 
human embryos, whereas in the amended proposal only “methods in which human embryos 
are used”1467 are set out as unpatentable. However, in the Common position EC No 19/98 
adopted by the Council in February 1998, Article 6(2)c of the Directive was amended in its 
present form.
1468
 The EBA highlighted that Directive 98/44/EC aims at preventing the 
commodification of human embryos and protecting human dignity, as argued in the decision 
of the German Bundespatentgerich of 5 December 2006.
1469
  
The EBA, however, did not clarify the meaning of “commodification”. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the term commodification refers “the action of process of treating 
a person or thing as property which can be traded or whose value is purely monetary; the 
treatment of a person or thing as a commodity: commercialization”.1470 The EBA, by linking 
the prevention of commodification to the protection of human dignity as two of the main 
goals of Directive 98/44/EC, contended that human embryos should not be treated as property 
that could be commercialized, because of their dignity.
1471
 
The EBA affirmed that the correct approach to Rule 28(c) consisted of pinpointing the 
claimed monopoly and determining whether that monopoly embraced the “use of an embryo 
for industrial and commercial purpose”.1472  The EBA acknowledged the different settled 
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national legal definitions of “embryo”, for example in the German1473 and the UK1474 laws, 
but argued that, since “neither the EU legislator nor the EPC legislator have chosen to define 
the term ‘embryo’, as used in the Directive or now in Rule 28 (formerly 23(d) of the 
EPC)”,1475 the term should not be interpreted in a restrictive way in Rule 28. A restrictive 
interpretation of the term “embryo” would undermine the intention of the legislator, in terms 
of the protection of human dignity and prevent the commercialization of embryos.
1476
 
The EBA rejected the argument of WARF, that in order to fall within the prohibition of Rule 
28(c) the use of human embryos must be formally claimed.
1477
 Conversely, it pinpointed that, 
as the rule refers to “invention” in the context of its exploitation, the technical teaching of the 
application, as a whole should be considered.
1478
 From the technical teaching, it is clear that 
the use of the hESCs involved the destruction of human embryos.
1479
 
The EBA concluded, therefore, that Rule 28(c) EPC forbids the patenting of claims, which at 
the filing date could be prepared only by destroying human embryos from which the products 
were derived and that it was not relevant that after the filing date these products could be 
obtained by applying a method which does not entail the destruction of embryos.
1480
 
In the United States, conversely, embryo stem cell research has not been challenged on moral 
grounds as far as the patentability of stem cell lines is concerned.  
After James A. Thomson and his research team were able to obtain the first hESC line in 
1998, the USPTO granted to WARF three patents, which covered the hESC line and the 
method for isolating it.
1481
 The scope of these patents was very broad and they have been 
disputed because they hindered other scientists’ research in the field.1482 Moreover WARF 
licensed exclusively most of the cell lines to Geron. As the U.S. patent system does not 
embed a morality clause, these have been challenged for lack of novelty and they have been 
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ruled invalid by USPTO in a preliminary ruling, but in 2014 the standing of CW has been 
denied and then the patents have been upheld.
1483
 
 
 6.4.2 The Morality Clause in the Brüstle Case 
The meaning and scope of the morality clause has been interpreted in a more expansive way 
by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Oliver 
Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V. (“Brüstle”), Case C-34/10, which was decided on 18 October 
2011 and concerned the patentability of isolated and purified neural precursor cells and the 
processes of their production from embryonic stem cells, which comprise human embryonic 
stem cells. 
The case was referred to the CJEU for preliminary ruling regarding the interpretation of 
Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC by the Bundesgerichtshof (the German Federal Court of 
Justice) in its decision of 17 December 2009.  
The Bundesgerichtshof required the CJEU to answer what is the meaning of the terms 
‘human embryos’, in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC, and ‘uses of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes’ and whether the technical teaching was relevant in 
assessing the patent eligibility of the invention pursuant to Article 6(2)(c).
1484
 
In particular, as regards the first question, the Bundesgerichtshof demanded clarifications on 
whether the expression “human embryos” included all stages of the development of human 
life, from fertilisation, or only certain stages of development. Moreover, it enquired whether 
the locution encompassed “unfertilized human ova into which a cell nucleus from a mature 
human cell has been transplanted” 1485  and “unfertilized human ova whose division and 
further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis”.1486 
The case arose when Greenpeace brought proceeding against Brüstle and requested the 
Bundespatentgericht (the German Federal Patent Court) annul the German patent granted to 
Brüstle on isolated and purified neural precursor cells.  
The Bundespatentgericht held the patent invalid, under Paragraph 22(1) of the PatG, as it 
covered “precursor cells obtained from human embryonic stem cells and processes for the 
production of those precursor cells”.1487 However, Brüstle appealed against the judgment to 
the Bundesgerichtshof. According to the Bundesgerichtshof, the focus of the case rested on 
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whether the technical teaching of the challenged patent, since it regarded precursor cells 
obtained from hESCs, was excluded from patentability under Paragraph 2(2), first sentence, 
point 3 of the PatG, which, in turn, relied on the interpretation of Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 
98/44/EC.
1488
 
Paragraph 2(2), first sentence, point 3 of the PatG provides that patents shall not be awarded 
for “(3) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes”.1489 The application 
of patent exclusions set forth in Paragraph 2(2) is governed by the relevant provisions of the 
Embryonenschutzgesetz (ESchG, German Law on the protection of embryos). 
Addressing the first question, the CJEU acknowledged that the Directive does not offer any 
definition of “human embryo” and does not refer to national laws in order to define this 
locution. As a consequence, it argued that it must be considered as “designating an 
autonomous concept of European Union law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner 
throughout the territory of the Union”.1490 
Recalling Recitals 3 and 5 to 7 of the Directive and Netherlands v. Parliament and 
Council,
1491
 namely the CJEU’s judgement which dismissed the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
application to annulment of Directive 98/44/EC also on moral grounds,
1492
 the Court 
highlighted that the main aim of the Directive was the harmonization of the rules on the legal 
protection of biotech invention across Europe, in order to remove hurdles to trade and 
promote the smooth and efficient functioning of the internal market of the European 
Union.
1493
  
It affirmed the need for a uniform definition of the concept of “human embryo”, in order to 
prevent the risk of patent applicants trying to seek patent protection for their biotechnological 
inventions in Member States, which endorse the narrowest definition of the concept and have 
a liberal policy on human embryonic stem cells research.
1494
 A uniform definition of “human 
embryo”, according to the CJEU, would contribute to a smooth functioning of the internal 
market by averting this kind of “patentability shopping” in Member States and contribute to 
patent law harmonization.
1495
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This conclusion – the CJEU pointed out – was also backed by the scope of the listing set forth 
in Article 6(2), which is to “delimit the exclusion laid down in Article 6(1), and does not 
allow the Member States to have any discretion with regard to the unpatentability of the 
processes and uses set out”.1496 In this respect, the Court explained that, whereas Article 6(1) 
of the Directive “allows the administrative authorities and courts of the Member States a wide 
discretion in applying the exclusion from patentability of inventions whose commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality”,1497 Article 6(2) does not permit 
any margin of discretion in applying the exclusion.
1498
 
Although the CJEU admitted that “the definition of human embryo is a very sensitive social 
issue in many Member States, marked by their multiple traditions and value systems”,1499 it 
purported not to carry out an interpretative task involving questions of medical or ethical 
nature.
1500
 Conversely, the Court claimed to limit its interpretive duty to the relevant legal 
provisions of the Directive.  
Since the Directive provides no definition of “human embryo”, the context and scope have 
been deemed fundamental for interpretation purposes. 
In interpreting the concept, the CJEU  gave prominence to Recital 16 of the Directive 
98/44/EC, which highlights that “patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental 
principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person”,1501 dismissing implicitly all 
other recitals, which could have suggested conflicting interpretations of Article 6(2)(c). The 
meaning of Recital 16 has been construed in conjunction with Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of 
the Directive and Recital 38, in order to pinpoint the concept of human embryo “must be 
understood in a wide sense”.1502 It included in definition any fertilized ovum, at any stage of 
development, but also the non-fertilized ovum obtained through different techniques, such as 
cloning and parthenogenesis, as the written observations submitted to the court pointed out 
that also these ova are capable of developing into a human being,
1503
 concluding that : “any 
human ovum after fertilization, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus 
from a mature human cell has been transplanted, and any non-fertilised human ovum whose 
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division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis constitute a 
‘human embryo’”1504 for the purpose of interpreting Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC. 
The CJEU, nevertheless, did not address whether stem cells derived from a human embryo at 
the blastocyst stage, should be encompassed, but left this decision to the referring court on 
the basis of advancement of science.
1505
 
As far as the second question was concerned, the CJEU embraced a very broad definition of 
the term “industrial or commercial purposes”, clarifying that the purpose of the Directive was 
to regulate the patentability of biotech inventions and it did not consider the use of human 
embryos for scientific research.
1506
 By drawing on Recital 14 of the Directive, which sets out 
that a patent “entitles [its holder] to prohibit third parties from exploiting it for industrial and 
commercial purposes”,1507 the Court pinpointed that the act of being granted a patent, in 
principle, is related to and implies an industrial and commercial purpose. This interpretation 
was supported also by the EBA in the WARF case, pinpointing that a patent is connected to 
and implies, in principle, industrial and commercial acts.
1508
  
It concluded, therefore, that the exclusion from patentability regarding the use of human 
embryos for industrial and commercial purposes “also covers the use of human embryos for 
purposes of scientific research, only use for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which is 
applied to the human embryo and is useful to it being patentable”.1509 
The CJEU, finally, pointed out the significance of the technical teaching as the subject matter 
of the patent application, by pointing out that if it involves the destruction of human embryos 
or their use as base material, regardless of the fact that the technical teaching does not refer to 
the use of human embryos and whatever the stage at which it takes place, the invention is 
excluded from patentability under Article 6(2)(c).
1510
 The Court argued that not including the 
technical teaching in the scope of the exclusion under Article 6(2)(c) would make the 
provision redundant, since patent applicants could easily elude it through drafting the claims 
in a skillful way.
1511
 
In Brüstle, the destruction of the human embryos emerged as the fundamental issue in 
applying the morality clause, set forth in Article 6(2)(c). 
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The ruling has been criticized
1512
 for its potential implications for stem cell researchers and 
the biotech industry, as it undermined the chances of filing successfully patent applications 
involving hESCs before a national patent office of countries, which are part of the EPC, or 
before the EPO. Moreover, it could hinder investments in stem cell projects. 
The CJEU, on 18 December 2014, in International Stem Cell Corporation v. Comptroller 
General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks,
1513
 partially overturned its own ruling in 
Brüstle as regards the parthenogenesis process,
1514
 by holding that “Article 6(2)(c) of 
Directive 98/44/EC must be interpreted as meaning that an unfertilised human ovum whose 
division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis does not 
constitute a ‘human embryo’, within the meaning of that provision”.1515 However, it left  
national courts to determine whether “in the light of current scientific knowledge, that ovum 
does not, in itself, have the inherent capacity of developing into a human being”.1516 The 
Court, therefore, ultimately referred to the national court the decision about the moral and 
legal status of human parthenotes, considering science and the legal and moral national 
framework. 
The emerging of morality as an actual patent issue within EPC shows that, although the 
morality clause marks the EPC patent system in comparison to the U.S. and Canadian ones, 
the EPO and the Boards of Appeal have struggled to find a unified European approach to 
ethical patent challenges. 
It has been questioned by several scholars whether common European principles of morality 
do exist.
1517
 Although Plant Genetic Systems
1518
 and Relaxin
1519
 cases refer to a common 
European frame for morality, this frame fell short when confronting with concrete patent 
cases. 
In Brüstle, the CJEU deemed that human dignity ought to be ascribed to the embryo under 
the Biotech Directive. However, this kind of interpretation of the morality clause, which is 
consistent with the definition of “the embryos” in the national German debate on hESC 
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research, is creating, as Plomer has illustrated, several tensions within the EPC patent 
system.
1520
 
The German stem cell debate has largely focused on Oliver Brüstle, as he formally was the 
first researcher to apply for funding in order to import human embryonic stem cells to DFG, 
the German Research Society.
1521
 Brüstle’s request was granted, but the ZES accurately 
clarified the boundaries and the conditions of the permitted research, not allowing him to 
develop heart cells, but only neuronal ones.
1522
 Since he had his request granted and, later, 
when he obtained his patent, his research became the focus of the German debate on the 
moral and legal status of the embryo and of the kind of protection that the 
Embryonenschutzgesetz ought to provide. 
The protection of human dignity has been fundamental in order to provide moral legitimacy 
to the German state after World War II and is embedded in Article 1 of the German Basic 
Law, which states that “Human dignity is inviolable”.1523 Although the German Basic Law 
proclaims to protect also scientists’ freedom of research, these two basic rights have been 
drawn upon in German stem cell debate and seemed to conflict.
1524
 Stefan Sperling, 
illustrating the German stem policy debate, explained that “many Germans saw stem cell 
research as a threat not merely to human embryos and, by extension, to society’s weakest, 
most defenceless members, but to humanity itself”.1525 Ethics, according to his analysis, in 
this debate became pivotal in order to legitimize choices on stem cell research. The German 
stem cell debate has been inscribed in the nexus memory-conscience-ethics which marks 
German civic epistemology and how, at present, German society makes sense and order of 
challenging technoscientific products and processes, in order to justify policy frameworks. 
Some scholars have pointed out that it has been “the overarching role of the embryo in 
framing and structuring discourses in many countries”1526 which has made stem cell science 
such a contested domain, but most of the public controversies regarding human embryonic 
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stem cells did not concern stem cells directly. Conversely, they concerned, in specific 
national contexts, older controversies on whether the embryo had the right to life and who 
was entitled to make decisions on life. Nevertheless, how these controversies have been dealt 
with depends on the national civic epistemologies, namely “institutionalized practices by 
which members of a given society test and deploy knowledge claims used as a basis for 
making collective choices”.1527 
Although the CJEU in Brüstle, as well as the EBA in WARF, referred to the need for a 
uniform definition of the concept of “human embryo” and a common European clue of 
morality which should result from the implementation of Directive 98/44/EC, the member 
states of the European Union and the EPC have settled the meaning of these terms nationally. 
The settlement of when life begins and what an embryo is result from a complex process of 
co-production between science and society that contribute to define and decide what an 
acceptable balance within that political context is. 
The national settlements (and unsettlements) are hard to reconcile with a uniform European 
view and definition, as they are grounded on particular civic epistemologies through which 
particular collectivities make sense and order of new technologies and their implications. 
Even the European Court of Human Rights had to acknowledge that, to a certain extent, legal 
and ethical pluralism marks the definition and scope of protection of the human rights set out 
in the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).1528 
In Vo v. France,
1529
 a case involving the unintentional abortion that Ms Thi-Nho Vo 
underwent in 1991, because of a series of mistakes made by medical personnel, the European 
Court of Human Rights had addressed whether France failed to protect the right to life set 
forth in Article 2 and whether Ms Vo’s foetus was the victim of unintentional homicide.  
Article 2.1 ECHR states that: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following 
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law”.1530 
The Court had, therefore, to judge which were the boundaries of the term “everyone” (in 
French “toute personne”) and if a foetus fell within this definition. 
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In dealing with this quandary, the majority of the Court pinpointed that the interpretation of 
Article 2 “has been informed by a clear desire to strike a balance”1531 and take into account 
“the moral and philosophical differences, reflected by the extreme diversity of legal rules 
applicable to human embryo research … It is not only legally difficult to seek harmonization 
of national laws at Community level, but because of lack of consensus, it would be 
inappropriate to impose one exclusive moral code’”.1532 
Consequently, the majority avowed that “the issue when the right to life begins comes within 
the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in 
this sphere”1533 and that there is “no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition 
of the beginning of life”.1534   
Furthermore, the judges noted also that the Oviedo Convention has been careful in not 
defining the term “everyone”, because, as its Explanatory Report clarified, there is no 
unanimous agreement on its meaning and hence the member States intended “to allow 
domestic law to provide clarification”,1535 in order to apply the Convention. 
The Court, accordingly, deemed that, in the absence of a European consensus on the nature 
and status of the embryo and/or foetus, Article 2 was meant to cover human beings (with 
legal personality) and there was no violation of it.
1536
 
Notwithstanding the claims of patent harmonization in the biotechnology field, these kinds of 
settlements which result from the co-production at the national level impinge on the 
harmonization attempts performed by technocratic institutions like the EPO. 
According to some scientists, involved in stem cell research, the technological solution could 
close this ethical conundrum affecting the patentability of hESC. 
In 2006, Irving Weissman, a Stanford biologist who has been involved in the U.S. stem cell 
debate, published on Nature an article
1537
 which pinpointed that researchers had already 
developed methods to “bypass” religious and ethical objections to hESC research.  
The STS scholar Giuseppe Testa,
1538
 examining one of these methods (ANT) e and the 
proposal of a definition of “embryo death”, in analogy with the definition of human brain 
death, in order to overcome the ethical impasse, highlighted that these are construction of 
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pretended “neutral” solutions, based on science. These solutions, he points out,1539 mainly 
aim at de-politicizing the ethical issues by shifting from the more political question, “when a 
normal embryo is a normal being with moral worth”,1540 to a more epistemic one, namely 
“what component parts and organized structure constitute the minimal criteria for considering 
an entity a living human organism”.1541 
These kinds of solutions which result from the co-production of science and patent law are, 
however, preferred by patent examiners and EPO’s Boards, as they sustain the neutrality of 
the patent system and allow dodging significant ethical and policy issues concerning 
patenting hESCs.  
It has been noted that Armitage and Davies, who were engaged in the preparatory works of 
the Strasburg Convention, pointed out that “the morality provision did not feature in the early 
drafts of the Convention” and “morality was not meant to be concerned with the essentials of 
patent law but added to permit the continuation of powers existing in national laws to refuse 
patents where the granting of them would be unacceptable on moral or public order 
grounds”.1542 They referred to Article 2 of the Convention, which has been the model for 
Article 53 EPC. 
Although the EPO has relied on isolation and purification as legal and ontological criteria 
supporting the patent eligibility of HBMs, the Brüstle case has pinpointed that the national 
civic epistemology which impinge on framing hESCs cannot be overlooked within the EPC 
system. The moral clause has been drawn upon by NGOs and civil society in order to let the 
national dimension in defining hESCs emerge. 
However, more significantly, the morality clause has been relied on by Member States of the 
EPC as offering the flexibility to maintain different sociotechnical imaginaries of the 
molecular biotech body and to decide whether and to what extent it could be an object of 
IPRs. 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
The analysis of the issues concerning the patentability of HBMs in U.S., Canada and under 
the EPC shows how the different civic epistemologies impinged on addressing and framing 
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whether and how they can be “objects” of property and IPRs and who ought to be considered 
their legitimate owner.  
In the U.S., the courts drew upon the metaphor of “hazardous biowaste” in order to settle the 
question of who is the owner of HBMs, in favor of researchers and biotech companies. This 
metaphor proved to be pivotal to maintain that patients were not entitled to property rights 
and IPRs on their detached HBMs, as they are valueless for those that do not have the 
knowledge and economic resources to transform them into commodities. Moreover, the 
Catalona and Greenberg cases illustrated that, once patients/research participants have given 
their informed consent and made an inter vivos gift of their biomaterials, it is the clinical 
institution which retains control over the HBMs and the IPRs on the inventions obtained from 
them.  
In Canada, the legal status of genetic and HBMs under Canadian common law, as well as 
under Canadian civil law, is mostly unsettled. However, the patentability of inventions based 
on HBMs and human stem cells has not been debated extensively. The CBAC has broached 
some of the social and moral problems related to the IP over HBMs, but implicitly pointed 
out that the normalization of these kinds of inventions had already occurred within the 
Canadian patent system. Since no substantial social opposition to these kinds of patents has 
emerged, the molecular body has been imagined as socially beneficial biotech product, which 
did not entail relevant moral and legal challenges. 
In Europe, the issues concerning the patentability of inventions related to HBMs seemed to 
be solved by setting forth, in Article 3(2) of the Biotech Directive, the criteria of isolation and 
purification, but as far as hESCs patents were concerned, the national civic epistemologies 
and related legal frameworks which defined “the embryo” emerged as relevant in shaping the 
boundaries of what is patentable or not. Especially the German bioethical debate
1543
 over 
whether and how research on human embryonic stem cell should be allowed has proved 
pivotal in interpreting the morality clause embedded in the EPC and the Biotech Directive in 
order to rule out the patentability of hESC lines which involve the destruction of embryos. On 
the face of different national frameworks concerning the “human embryo”, EPO’s policy of 
isolation and purification of HBMs fell short of providing an adequate answer to the moral 
issues related to patenting hESCs, which were raised by civil society. 
These jurisdictions have all settled the ontological and legal status of the “molecular body” as 
an artificial technoscientific object, which has fostered its circulation and commodification, 
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though in different ways. The cases that have been analysed in this chapter show that the 
biotechnological body has been framed as an artificial chattel, which can be patented, as it is 
detached and isolated from its owner, provided that privacy is protected and informed consent 
obtained. In all these jurisdictions the human body, as a whole, has been recognized full 
subjectivity and considered not patentable, because of the human dignity of which it is 
endowed. The need for the protection of human dignity, which is set forth in Article 1 of the 
Oviedo Convention, and the related prohibition of financial gain from the human body and its 
parts prove to be, however, in tension with the process of commodification and circulation 
that the molecular body underwent in the last forty years and its partial anomy. 
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Conclusions 
 
7.1 The Co-Production of Patent Eligible Matter: Technoscientific Metaphors, 
Narratives and Law 
This work has showed that metaphors are not transient theoretical scaffoldings, but rather 
recurring and solid conceptual means to “make sense and order” of the world, by co-
producing it cognitively, materially and practically, at once. Likewise, it has pointed out that 
narratives are not just fickle, provisional modes of constructing consistent accounts of the 
technoscientific human experience, which is dealt with in the judicial and administrative 
context of patent law. 
This work has illustrated that some metaphors, namely machine, molecule and code, have 
shaped new scientific fields and the scope of patentable subject matter in different 
jurisdictions. These metaphors are the conceptual tools which oriented the definition of the 
nature and ontology of biotech products and processes. Their use impinged on “the is” and 
“the ought” of the claimed inventions before the courts, because their endorsement entailed a 
series of analogies or differences between them and the kinds of inventions which case law 
had already established as patentable. As a consequence, the choice in favor of or against a 
metaphor made the claimed invention fall or not within the statutory categories of patentable 
subject matter. 
These metaphors, as chapter two has explained, have been epistemically influential in the 
construction, establishment and development of specific fields of research, such as molecular 
biology and genetics, which have been pivotal in fostering contemporary biotechnology and 
its commercial potential in terms of patenting innovative products. Moreover, they have 
sustained an enduring reductionist vision of life (in molecular terms) and DNA sequences (in 
terms of information) which still inform these fields and, partially, account for the 
assimilation of biotech products to bio-artefacts and chemical molecules. 
The thesis has explained that metaphors are not just heuristic devices, which are discarded 
once a thorough and accurate scientific knowledge is attained, nor just figures of speech that 
judges, patent lawyers and examiners resort to in order to argue more persuasively.  
Conversely, as cognitive linguistics clarified, they are cognitive means that orient perception 
(Gestalt), thought and action, in everyday life as much as in specific areas of knowledge and 
practice. The analysis carried out in this work on how these metaphors have been employed 
in specific technoscientific disciplines and patent law pinpoints that metaphors are conceptual 
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tools endowed with epistemic and explanatory powers, which involve particular interpretative 
and prescriptive views. 
The metaphors of the machine and chemical molecule have proved pivotal in informing the 
model and kinds of patentable inventions in the United States and Canada. In both countries, 
the definition of invention, set out in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Section 2 of the Canadian Patent 
Act, dates back to the 18
th
 century and is alike. It draws on the same kinds of products: 
“machine”, “manufacture” and “composition of matter”. As chapter three and four have 
illustrated, the case law related to biotech genetically engineered microorganisms, organisms 
and gene sequences relied on these metaphors to assess the nature of  these technoscientific 
products: whether they were natural or artificial and their liveliness mattered or not to decide 
on their patentability. 
Whereas the metaphor of the machine steered the judgment of the majority of U.S. Supreme 
Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, as the majority argued that the microorganisms at issue 
were bio-artefacts, not different from other kinds of artefacts made by man, the metaphor of 
the chemical molecule has oriented the arguments of the judges and patent applicants in In re 
Bergy and in In re Chakrabarty and was also resorted to by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in AMP v. Myriad Genetics to define DNA sequences (as well as the 
Australian Full Court of the Federal Court in D’Arcy).  
These metaphors have been nurtured and settled in specific scientific disciplinary contexts, 
however the authority of the scientific language and expertise, which shifted into the judicial 
patent discourse, validated them as appropriate and accurate descriptions of “the nature of the 
thing” that was claimed. 
For example, in In re Bergy, the use of the metaphor of the chemical molecule to define 
genetically modified microorganisms has been supported by the expertise of Upjohn’s  
biologists, who argued for the patent applicants, and the analogies that it entailed with 
patentable chemical compounds were fully endorsed by Justice Rich. 
In Canada, the CIPO and the judges relied on the chemical molecule metaphor to expand the 
boundaries of the definition of “invention”. This move allowed them to accommodate 
genetically modified microorganisms (and also HBMs) within patent eligible matter. 
However, in 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Harvard mouse drew a line between 
lower and higher life forms, by rejecting the mechanistic and chemical metaphors of life 
applied to transgenic organisms. Accordingly, the Court judged higher life forms not falling 
within the definition of invention and pinpointed that, in the absence of a provision clearly 
encompassing this kind of products, Parliament was the appropriate democratic forum to 
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decide the relevant scientific, legal and moral issues that patenting organisms involved. 
Nevetheless, in Schmeiser, the Court endorsed a mechanistic metaphor of chimeric genes and 
cells, which was inconsistent with the holding in the Harvard mouse case, but mirrored the 
Canadian biotech interests in fostering GM plant breeding. 
In Europe, although the EPO’s Boards of Appeal employed some metaphorical expressions 
related to the code and the chemical molecule, they usually refrained from relating them 
openly to the conceptual metaphors. The kind of discourse of their legal narratives has been 
mainly technical. Just in the Relaxin/Howard Florey Institute case the TBA drew on and 
elaborated on the metaphor of the chemical molecule and code addressing the patent 
eligibility of gene sequences. 
This work has pinpointed that the U.S. definition of “inventions patentable” and the Canadian 
definition of “invention” embed an epistemic mechanistic model of patent eligible matter, 
which has impinged on how its scope has been expanded by patent offices and courts in these 
countries. In that respect, it has been illustrated that, in order to subsume some biotech 
products, such as microorganisms and organisms, under these definitions, the courts had to 
implicitly embrace forms of methodological and ontological reductionism, which was 
conveyed by the metaphors that they endorsed. 
Conversely, the EPC does not set out categories of patentable inventions in Article 52(1), but 
refers to “any inventions”, “in all fields of technology”, provided that they fulfill the 
requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability. This article was drafted 
centuries after the 1793 U.S. definition of patentable subject matter and it does not embed a 
mechanistic model of invention. Article 52(2) sets out, however, kinds of products and 
methods which are not considered inventions and, notably, establishes an epistemic 
distinction between invention and discovery under Article 52(2)(a).  
This legal epistemic distinction is absent in 35 U.S.C. § 101, under which “whoever invents 
or discovers” may be entitled to a patent. This significant difference entailed that in the U.S. 
the courts had to face the problem of elaborating a doctrine in order to distinguish mere 
products of nature from inventions tout court, namely the product of nature doctrine.  
Although the recourse to certain metaphors in legal argumentations results to be contingent, 
as they do not have an enduring impact on the process of decision-making and its outcome, 
this work explained that some metaphors had a conceptual role in defining patent eligible 
matter. 
In particular, the thesis showed that the conceptual metaphors of the machine and the 
molecule informed the epistemic model of patentable subject matter and invention in the 
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United States and in Canada, statutorily, administratively (as far as the decisions of patent 
examiners were concerned) and judicially. 
The metaphors of the machine, molecule and code, it has been argued, are ontological and 
structural, namely metaphors which “specify kinds of objects” and provide different models 
for what life (microorganisms and organisms, embryos, plants and seeds), genes, HBMs are. 
This kind of conceptual metaphors served to define the model of patentable subject matter in 
U.S. and Canada, but also partially impinged on the definition of patentable inventions 
offered by the technical narratives of the EPO Boards of Appeals. 
From an STS point of view, whereas the metaphor of the machine, which is often drawn upon 
in everyday language as well as in the scientific one, to make sense of several kinds of 
abstract objects, such as the mind, could be linked to the direct human physical experience, 
others, such as the molecule, have been mediated by the technoscientific experience of the 
scientists working in laboratories. In technoscientific societies, people do believe that 
microorganisms or genes can be viewed as chemical molecules (or information) not because 
they directly experience them, but because they trust the experience and knowledge of 
molecular biologists and geneticists, who describe them as such.  
The use of some ontological metaphors, which have been largely drawn upon in patent 
litigation and everyday language, therefore, is related to the mediated virtual experience that 
professionals and in general human beings gain from the experience, material knowledge and 
action that scientists have of molecules and the genome. This sort of mediated and virtual 
metaphorical experience has been at the core of the co-production of metaphors among 
science, patent law and society. 
In that respect, this STS analysis shows that the authority of the scientific language and 
experience of scientists have credited the use of these metaphors in the patent legal discourse 
and contributed to a shifting of meanings in the definition of patent eligible matter in all the 
jurisdictions which have been compared. In turn, the jurisprudential re-definition of 
patentable inventions has partially impinged on how different communities of scientists and 
researchers view these metaphors. 
As chapter four and five have illustrated as far as genes and transgenic seeds are concerned, 
individuals and groups sometimes propose alternative metaphors of life and nature. However, 
as AMP v. Myriad Genetics pointed out, in order to undermine dominant narratives, the 
plaintiffs had to reframe the narrative of progress, origins and the social contract between 
citizens, the inventor and the state in order to be successful.  
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Likewise, this work has explained that patent judicial and administrative narratives result 
from the co-production of technoscientific and legal discourses. Although some of these 
narratives prove to be provisional, others prove to be stable ways of “making sense and order” 
of technology in specific national and supranational contexts. 
The narrative of the origins and progress devised and told by the Supreme Court in 
Chakrabarty turned out to be constantly drawn upon by the USPTO, judges and parties in 
order to justify a specific view of innovation, IP and the public interest in the United States. It 
has become a master narrative in the product-centered U.S. policy of science and technology, 
which could not easily be undermined. It has been drawn upon to affirm the patent eligibility 
of transgenic plants, seeds and isolated/purified HBMs. 
In AMP v. Myriad Genetics the plaintiffs posited a successfull counter-narrative of it, while 
still drawing on it. They offered an alternative metaphor of the genes centered on the code 
(DNA sequences as information), recalled the significance of the doctrine of the product of 
nature re-affirmed in Chakrabarty and, then, showed how the narrative of progress and 
origins of the United States was undermined by Myriad’s patents. These patents, according to 
them, impaired the social contract between inventors and society embedded in the U.S. 
Constitution, as they impinged on citizens’ and researchers’ freedom of ideas and right to 
health as they were directed to products of nature. They challenged, therefore, that IPRs on 
DNA sequences could foster the progress that IP, in the U.S., is supposed to bring about. 
In Canada, the narratives concerning the patent eligibility of biotech products have been 
cautious in not stretching the boundaries of administrative or judicial powers to encompass 
potentially divisive patentable subject matter, such as transgenic organisms, that could raise 
scientific, ethical and legal concerns.  
The Canadian courts did not draw on a narrative of the origins. They fostered the expansion 
of IPRs, but have been very careful in expanding it to organisms for the kind of uncertain 
justification of this legal expansion. Notwithstanding this choice, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has been more reluctant to maintain this patent restriction, as far as transgenic seeds 
and plants are concerned, as the Schmeiser case has pointed out. 
In Europe, the EPO Boards of Appeal drew on a technical kind of discourse in order to justify 
their patent decisions. As the analysis of the Myriad cases pinpointed, the Boards made clear 
that, whenever patent claims should not have been granted because they did not fulfill patent 
requirements, the EPC patent system embed adequate judicial procedures to oppose and 
review patents. 
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Moreover, the Boards have privileged historical legal narratives to construct the meaning of 
the EPC, which also were used to handle the morality and ordre public patent exclusions 
under Article 53(a) EPC and the other exclusions under Article 53(b). 
However, as the WARF and Brüstle cases pointed out, the patent eligibility of hESCs has 
proved to be the test bench of the morality clause embedded in Article 53(a) and of the 
European identity. 
 
7.2 Why Metaphors and Narratives Matter: Technoscientific Imaginaries of Life and 
Future 
On 28 November 2014 Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier published an article in 
Science entitled “The new frontier of genome engineering with CRISPR-Cas9”1544 in which 
they explained how they developed the groundbreaking technology CRISPR-Cas9 that 
purports to be more effective, cheaper and simpler than any other existing technology of 
“gene editing”. Moreover, they described some of its possible applications in biology, 
biomedicine and biotechnology, spanning from human gene therapy and the modification of 
the germ line to the development of crops in agriculture and the creation of new animal 
models for research purposes.
1545
 This article followed the publication of their research paper 
on CRISPR-Cas9.
1546
 A little over two years this technology had been applied to a broad 
range of microorganisms and organisms, for manifold purposes. 
Just a year later, in 2015, a whole volume of the American Journal of Bioethics has been 
devoted to CRISPR and focused, in particular, on the metaphors and metaphorical 
expressions used to describe it.  
In particular, several scholars illustrated that “gene editing” and “targeting” 1547  are the 
dominant metaphors used to describe CRISPR technology in Anglo-American journals
1548
 
and are also largely employed in other languages.
1549
 Some scholars viewed these metaphors 
as troublesome for what they implied in terms of the description of the physical mechanisms 
of CRISPR-Cas9 techniques, the risks they involve and the reductionist view that they imply. 
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They questioned the use of these specific metaphors because their endorsement affects the 
bioethical debate, public deliberation and policymaking. In particular, O’Keefe et al. 
remarked that probing the words used with reference to a technology is pivotal for “sound 
policymaking”,1550 as the terms should convey: “(1) the ethical complexity of the technology; 
(2) an accurate description of the technology, how it works, and how it can be used; (3) what 
is known and unknown about its potential consequences”.1551 
The most frequent metaphorical expressions related to gene “editing” are “cutting and 
pasting”, “copy and paste”, “read” and “write”, “the first draft”.1552 These expressions, as 
much as “editing”, are linked to the conceptual metaphor of the genome as a code, which has 
been drawn upon in the patent controversies concerning DNA sequences. 
They suggest a high degree of control over the genome, as they imply that it can be cut 
precisely and the exact location of off-target effects can be envisaged and handled. However, 
it has been illustrated
1553
 that the predictions of specific locations of possible off-target 
effects, which are based on the use of algorithms, turn out to be not as precise as expected 
and unintentional “cuts” can take place anywhere in the genome. 
The ballistic metaphorical expression “target”, likewise, entails precision, but also conveys 
the idea that hazards can result from missing the target.
1554
 
Ben Merriman pointed out that “regulation is a metaphorical practice”, 1555  since a new 
regulatory framework is rarely devised and set out for the latest technology and “in most 
cases, regulation involves drawing an analogy between something new in science and 
something that is already regulated, thereby extending an existing framework”.1556  
Regulation is a matter of envisioning futures and metaphors are at the core of the process of 
devising technoscientific imaginaries of what a technology and its products are and entail in 
terms of hopes, possibilities, cure and risks, uncertainty, distributive problems. 
The metaphor of “editing”, he noted, implies that CRISPR is like an information technology 
and the metaphorical expression of “editing” is grounded on the metaphor of the code that 
has oriented how genes have been devised in molecular genetics, as information. However, as 
he points out, by applying the metaphor of editing, it should be taken into consideration that 
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“the technology physically modifies cells rather than manipulating symbolic 
representations”.1557 
As chapter three highlighted about the regulation of rDNA in the 1970s, metaphors and the 
analogies they entail had a pivotal role in deciding whether and how that technology should 
be regulated and which could be the most appropriate frame for its governance. The choices 
that were made in specific national contexts on rDNA regulation impinged on the patent 
eligibility of biotech products related to this technology. 
On 15 February 2017, the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued a decision in the The 
Broad Institute, Inc., MIT and Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College v. The Regents of 
the University of California, University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier, concerning 
the patent interference between patents and patent applications of the parties involved. All the 
claims challenged are related to CRISPR-Cas9 systems and methods of using them. The 
PTAB judged the parties’ patent claims not interfering.1558  The Regents of the University of 
California appealed against the decision in October 2017
1559
 and this will probably be one the 
most important case of patent interference on a new technology. However, this is just the 
dawn of a new wave of patent controversies related to CRISPR-Cas9. 
In the aftermath of this, a group of interested stakeholders organised a meeting in Napa to 
debate the scientific, medical, ethical and legal implication of this technology.
1560
 The 
meeting and the reaction of the scientific community, to a certain extent, resembles the 
“responsible” answer prompted by the first experiments on rDNA in the 1970s that led to the 
Asilomar Conference in 1975 and the approval of the NIH Guidelines (which has been 
explained in chapter 4). Some of the promoters of the meeting, David Baltimore and Paul 
Berg, are still the same prominent biologists who drew up the agenda of Asilomar. 
Furthermore, the narratives of progress regarding CRISPR-Cas9 are not surprisingly similar 
to the ones concerning rDNA.
1561
 The accounts on CRISPR-Cas9 are narratives of novelty 
and progress. Although the scientific community has pointed out the ethical issues arising 
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from the manifold uses of it, it has however expressed confidence that the potential risks and 
controversial applications can be addressed in a process of public discussion of science policy 
analogous to the legacy and still dominant laudatory and exemplary narrative of the Asilomar 
Conference. 
Following the meeting, the participants formulated a series of recommendations, among 
which figures a temporary moratorium on experiments on germline genome modification for 
clinical application in humans.
1562
 Moreover, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the 
National Academy of Medicine promoted an international summit to discuss the scientific, 
ethical, legal and policy problems related to CRISPR-Cas9 and gene editing.
1563
 
The present narratives regarding CRISPR-Cas9, as well as some of the metaphors used to 
describe it, are like the ones employed in the rDNA debate. They are centered on progress 
and hope and the responsibility of the scientific community, in the legacy of Asilomar.  
For example, the metaphorical expression of “genome engineering” has been applied to 
CRISPR-Cas9. As Jennifer Doudna and Samuel Sternberg pointed out in their recent account 
of the development of this technology, this locution suggests a higher degree of command 
and control over inserting, editing or deleting genes: “But with CRISPR, gene editing was 
now so powerful and multifaceted that it was also referred to as genome engineering, a 
reflection of the supreme mastery that scientists held over genetic material inside the living 
cells”.1564 
Genome editing seems to be a step ahead of rDNA in terms of control and reproducibility, 
which had been claimed, likewise, in the patent specification and drawings of highly divisive 
patent applications, such as the Oncomouse
®
 one, in the past. Not surprisingly Rudolf 
Jaenisch, who was the first researcher to develop a transgenic mouse in 1974,
1565
 published 
with his MIT research group an article on the creation of gene-edited mice through CRISPR, 
in 2013.
1566
  
The Asilomar Conference has been praised as a model of responsible debate promoted by the 
scientific community on a disruptive and uncertain technology (rDNA),
1567
 which can be 
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replicated with regard to CRISPR-Cas9. However, several STS scholars pinpointed the limits 
of that debate and deliberation in terms of the limited view about containment, imaginaries of 
risk, modes of deliberation, exclusions of relevant voices and relevant issues regarding 
biosecurity and ethics.
1568
 Moreover, they highlighted how many of the legal issues, in 
particular concerning intellectual property, had been overlooked.  
Doudna and Sternberg highlighted the democratic nature of this technology, which is cheap 
and simple, as it “has made gene editing available to the masses and is poised to turn this 
once-esoteric practice into a hobby or a craft, just like home-brewing beer”.1569 Nonetheless, 
others observed that “A therapeutic as complex as CRISPR gene therapy with multiple 
macromolecular components (protein, RNA, and delivery agents) is likely to be engineered 
and reformulated for decades to come to maximize safety and efficacy”.1570 Consequently, it 
may result in a chain of evergreening patents.
1571
  
Furthermore, the present patent interference proceeding controversy
1572
 in the U.S and the 
breadth of the patent claims involved suggest that maybe IPRs so much upstream might 
impinge on future research on this technology and limit access to patented products and 
methods. The IP scholars and attorneys Jacob Sherkow and Jorge Contreras, commenting on 
the interference patent case, cautioned against the parties’ patent strategy, as it “could rapidly 
bottleneck the use of CRISPR technology to discover and develop useful human 
therapeutics”.1573 
This work pinpointed the need for a certain degree of reflexivity towards performative 
metaphors and narratives which shape national and supranational collective imaginaries of 
technoscience. Without this kind of reflexivity IP and, in particular patent law, cannot offer 
an adequate collective answer to what is an acceptable contract between inventors and society, 
in the name of the public interest. 
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Appendix 
Science and Technology Studies (S&TS): Origins and Development 
 
1.1 Science and Technology Studies (S&TS) 
Tracing the origins of Science and Technology Studies is complex and burdensome for 
several reasons, but is however crucial for defining a field whose development depends on 
the historical, theoretical and political context where it arose. 
Science and Technology Studies or “S&TS” emerged in the late 1980s from the rich and 
multidisciplinary work carried out across vast and different areas of research, such as history 
and sociology of science and technology, anthropology, science policy, legal sciences and 
economics (to name only the major areas of research),
1574
 by scholars guided by 
heterogeneous theoretical and practical interests.
1575
 The history of S&TS, however, spans a 
longer period, approximately five decades, as S&TS are marked by the rise, in the 1960s, of 
two traditions which both regarded science as a social activity: the constructivist tradition in 
sociology and ethnography of science and the critical analysis undertaken in “Science, 
Technology and Society” (STS)1576 by an international group of scholars, who directed their 
work at the social and policy dimensions of science and technology.
1577
  
The convergence and intertwining of these traditions contributed to the gradual establishment 
of S&TS as a research field grown out of distinct disciplines and heterogeneous 
methodologies, but sharing the view that science and technology are social enterprises to be 
accounted for. In order to explain the “inherent diversity” 1578  of S&TS, its theoretical 
perspective and analytical tools, I will try to illustrate how the field emerged, thrived and 
became institutionalized since the 1960s. 
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1.2 S&TS: Origins and Development 
As David Edge recalled, in the first edition of the Handbook of Science and Technology 
Studies, when on March 1, 1966, he arrived at Edinburgh University to start the Science 
Studies Unit, he was tempted to think that there could be “no subject” corresponding to 
S&TS initials. It was only a passing thought, since he was fully aware that scholars, in some 
well-established disciplines, had already focused their analysis on science in its social context 
and these research streams were gathering in the mid-1960s.
1579
 
History and sociology of science were at the forefront of this disciplinary and epistemic shift. 
In 1962, Thomas Kuhn published his influential essay The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
Kuhn, a theoretical physicist who turned his interests and career towards the history of 
science,
1580
 challenged the dominant view of science as a continuous incremental and 
cumulative enterprise, centered on the concept of “development-by-accumulation”. 1581 
According to the cumulative view, science is portrayed as a collection of facts, theories and 
methods and historians of science are assigned the task to chronicle the “successive 
increments and the obstacles that have inhibited their accumulation”.1582 Kuhn proposed a 
new picture of scientific development, characterized instead “as a succession of tradition 
bound periods punctuated by non-cumulative breaks”.1583 
He defined the tradition bound periods as “normal science”, which is the “research firmly 
based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular 
scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further 
practice”. 1584  Normal science is related to particular achievements 1585  named by Kuhn 
“paradigms”, whose meaning refers to “some accepted examples of actual scientific practice 
– examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together – [that] 
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The University of Chicago Press 2012) 1, 9-10. 
296 
 
provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research”.1586 
Although the word “paradigm”1587 recalls, in the established language, an accepted model or 
pattern which is applied to replicate examples,
1588
 Kuhn points out that in science a paradigm 
is rarely an object for replication, but only for further research articulation and specification, 
and that its status is due to its success in solving problems that practitioners recognize as 
acute.
1589
  
Normal research does not pursue major fundamental scientific novelties, but is directed to 
“puzzle-solving”: it is, namely, an activity devoted to problems that test solving ingenuity or 
skill, where more than a solution is assured and “rules that limit both the nature of acceptable 
solutions and the steps by which they are obtained” 1590  do exist. A paradigm provides, 
therefore, the scientific community with a framework, which is taken for granted, within 
trying to address problems that have a solution.  
If one or more anomalies result from normal science and cannot be reconciled with the 
established paradigm, they may create a crisis and induce a paradigm change. These 
anomalies consist in discoveries (novelties of fact) and/or in inventions (novelties of theory). 
Profound awareness of the anomaly in the scientific community, however, plays a 
fundamental role in paradigm change.  
Kuhn illustrates the prevailing of the Copernican heliocentric astronomic system, in the 16th 
century, against the Ptolemaic geocentric astronomy as one of the main examples of 
paradigm change in the history of science. Since the Ptolemaic system, that was developed 
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between the last two centuries before Christ and the first two after, was “admirably 
successful”1591 in predicting the changing positions of stars and planets in comparison to all 
other ancient systems, it was widely adopted in the following centuries. Nevertheless, it was 
not completely successful in predicting the planetary positions and the procession of 
equinoxes. Astronomers, thus, tried to reduce the discrepancies of the system, but they 
increasingly became aware of its failure in solving some problems. This significant 
awareness, achieved in the Renaissance, gave the Copernican competing system a chance to 
be embraced. Yet, Kuhn notices that this system was not more accurate than Ptolemy’s one 
and the available observational tests did not proved decisive to support the choice between 
them. The Renaissance astronomers turned to the former mainly because they significantly 
recognized the crisis due to the latter. An anticipation of the heliocentric system, however, 
existed since antiquity and was elaborated by the Greek mathematician, physicist and 
astronomer Aristarchus of Samos in the 3rd century B.C.,
1592
 but his contemporary 
astronomers did not subscribe to his theory, as they did not consider the Ptolemaic system 
failing in solving most of the problems they were dealing with. 
The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one entails the reconstruction of a whole 
scientific field from new fundamentals – namely, theoretical generalizations, methods and 
applications – and, therefore, results in what Kuhn calls “scientific revolution”.1593 Whilst 
normal science is deemed cumulative, as it is directed to the “steady extension of the scope 
and precision of scientific knowledge”, 1594  scientific revolutions are described as “non-
cumulative developmental episodes” that replace a normal scientific tradition with 
another.
1595
 The new normal tradition is incommensurable with the previous one, since it 
induces a “displacement of the conceptual network through which scientists view the 
world”.1596 
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In his concluding chapter, Kuhn portrays science as a field significantly marked by progress, 
generally defined as “the result of successful creative work”,1597 in comparison to other areas 
of knowledge. Although he acknowledges that scientific progress is not different in kind from 
progress in other fields, he ascribes it to the unparalleled insulation of the scientific 
community from society, which allows each scientist to concentrate his attention on a specific 
problem. This insulation is gained by a specific educational initiation and professional 
activity. Scientists’ education relies heavily on the study of textbooks rather than in the early 
exposure to a variety of creative scientific literature, so that students become confident and 
familiar only with the paradigms that will direct their future research. Their further individual 
activity, then, will undergo a very exclusive scrutiny and evaluation by the other members of 
the community,
1598
 which has no equal in other professional groups. Insulation is regarded as 
the condition for scientists’ successfulness as producers and validators of knowledge. 
Kuhn’s essay concurred to a historiographic change in the study of science, outside strict 
linear cumulative lines,
1599
 and to shift the theoretical interests
1600
 from scientific facts, 
theories and data towards the pivotal role of scientific communities,
1601
 their ideas and 
practices.
1602
 His view of science and scientific community received thorough criticism
1603
 by 
philosophers, sociologists and historians of science,
1604
 who challenged the nature of the 
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concept of “paradigm” and its incommensurability and found his essay marked by 
subjectivity, irrationality and relativism. 
Kuhn’s work has been influential in the development of Science and Technology Studies, as 
it has nurtured new streams of research. Nonetheless, as Sismondo points out, “few of Kuhn’s 
specific ideas have survived S&TS intact”.1605 The sociologist Steve Fuller provocatively 
remarks that The Structure has been turned in a paradigm for further research 
1606
 by 
historians and sociologists of science and explicitly refers to “the research program known as 
the ‘sociology of scientific knowledge’ (SSK)” and “the interdisciplinary field of ‘science 
and technology studies’ (STS)”. Fuller deems that Kuhn showed these scholars “to look 
beyond the positivist jargon that scientists use to justify their activities and to focus instead 
on what scientists actually do in their workplaces”.1607 He thinks, therefore, that Kuhn’s 
example accounts for the post-Kuhnian methodologies that became largely imbued with 
“histories and ethnographies of research environment and deconstruction of disciplinary 
discourse”.1608 
Gieryn showed, however, that the inherent diversity of STS, in comparison to other 
perspectives such as Kuhn’s one, lies in its constructivist way of dealing with the “boundary 
problem”, namely how to demarcate society from science, science from non-science and the 
scientific community from other communities. According to him, the constructivist view is 
centered on the claim that “no demarcation principles work universally and that the 
separation of science from other knowledge-producing activities is (…) a contextually 
contingent and interests-driven pragmatic accomplishment drawing selectively on 
inconsistent and ambiguous attributes”.1609 Kuhn’s picture differs from STS’ constructivist 
view, since it is “essentialist”.1610 It is actually focused on identifying a demarcation principle 
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that sets science apart from other cultural practices, which Kuhn places in scientists’ 
consensus on a paradigm.
1611
 
Constructivism turns out to be a pivotal key in understanding how STS diverges theoretically 
and methodologically from other relevant traditions, which STS confronted with in its 
“formative years”. 
Another influential tradition with which STS confronted with, though in a very critical way, 
is Merton’s social theory of science. In 1949, the sociologist Robert K. Merton published a 
book entitled Social Theory and Social Structure, that included the paper ‘Science and 
Democratic Social Structure’, written during World War II, in 1942. In this paper Merton 
defends, against the attacks on the integrity of science launched by the Nazis and their 
ideology, the social structure of science. Merton’s portrayal of science is embedded in his 
functionalist theory, where science is seen as an institution that, together with other 
institutions such as government and religion, fulfills a necessary function and, thus, concurs 
to the stability and order of society.
1612
 “The extension of certified knowledge”1613 is the 
institutional goal of science, which consists of “empirically confirmed and logically 
consistent predictions”.1614 
Merton analyzes only on one aspect of science,
1615
 its cultural structure as an institution, what 
he terms “the ethos of science”, excluding all the methodological and cognitive issues. The 
ethos of science is “that affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be 
binding on the man of science”. 1616   The norms consist of prescriptions, proscriptions, 
preferences and permissions that “are legitimized in terms of institutional values” and are 
transmitted by precept and example by the scientific community and reinforced by sanctions. 
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Although the ethos of science is not codified, it can be inferred from the moral consensus of 
scientists. The institutional imperatives (mores) of science are drawn from its goal and 
methods. Merton identifies four sets of institutional norms:
1617
 universalism, communism, 
disinterestedness and organized scepticism. 
Universalism is based on the purported impersonality of science and lies in the idea that 
“truth claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to preestablished impersonal 
criteria”.1618 According to this norm, in assessing scientific claims, the scientific community 
is not influenced by personal or social attributes, such as race, nationality, religion, class and 
personal qualifications. Merton notices however that, as science is part of a larger social 
structure, this imperative may be in conflict with other cultural particularistic norms. He 
refers to ethnocentrism and nationalism as potential threats to scientific universal standards, 
as well as to the potential influence of caste-standards in excluding individuals from scientific 
pursuit. Nevertheless, he argues, scientists are able to react to these kinds of counter-
pressures and reassert their commitment to universalism. Merton considers universalism also 
a dominant guiding principle of the ethos democracy, since “impersonal criteria of 
accomplishment and not fixation of status characterize the democratic society”. 1619  He 
suggests, therefore, that the democratic society is the best environment for assuring and 
promoting “the exercise of universalistic criteria in science”.1620 
Communism is the second norm embedded in the ethos of science. Merton uses this term in 
its extended meaning to denote “common ownership of goods”. 1621  As he deems the 
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substantive findings of science “a product of social collaboration”, he holds they belong to 
the community. Recognition and esteem are the only property rights scientists are granted 
over their discoveries. Eponyms, such as “Boyle’s law” and “Copernican system”, epitomize 
the highest recognition of scientific work.
1622
 Scientific knowledge is, thus, assigned the 
status of common heritage. Nevertheless, this imperative is linked to scientists’ implicit duty 
to communicate their findings to foster the advancement of knowledge and obtain, by 
publishing scientific achievements, due recognition. A scientist, who does not share his 
findings, is regarded with suspicion and surrounded by a certain kind of disapproval by his 
colleagues. 
Merton explains that communism, as an institutional norm, entails that the scientific 
community has to face conflict-situations in a capitalistic economy,
1623
 since this imperative 
is irreconcilable with conceiving technology as private property. He points out that the 
exclusive rights, conferred by patents, raised different responses by scientists aiming at 
solving this conflict: some scientists, such as Einstein, for example, took out their patents, 
others were directed towards becoming entrepreneurs or urged socialism.
1624
 
The third moral imperative, disinterestedness, refers to “a distinctive pattern of institutional 
control of a wide range of motives which characterizes the behavior of scientists”.1625 It does 
not correspond to altruism, but is a means to detach scientists’ motives from contingent self-
interested behavior. Merton invokes the virtual absence of fraud in the annals of science as 
evidence of the special qualities of scientists in comparison with other communities of 
professionals and ascribes it to the close scrutiny that scientific work undergoes: scientists are 
constantly under the judgment of their peers and cannot exploit, therefore, credulity and 
                                                          
1622
 Robert K Merton, ‘Science and Democratic Social Structure’ in Social Theory and Social Structure (1st edn 
1949, enl edn, The Free Press 1968) 604, 610. 
1623
 See also Robert K Merton, ‘Puritanism, Pietism and Science’ in Social Theory and Social Structure (1st edn 
1949, enl edn, The Free Press 1968) 628. 
1624
 Merton remarks: “Current writings on the ‘frustration of science’ reflect this conflict. Patents proclaim 
exclusive rights of use and, often, nonuse. The suppression of invention denies the rationale of scientific 
production and diffusion, as maybe seen from the court’s decision in the case of U.S. v. American Bell 
Telephone Co.: ‘The inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may 
withhold the knowledge of it from the public …’. Responses to this conflict-situation have varied. As a 
defensive measure, some scientists have come to patent their work to ensure its being made available for public 
use. Einstein, Millikan, Compton, Langmuir have taken out patents. Scientists have been urged to become 
promoters of new economic enterprises. Others seek to resolve the conflict by advocating socialism. These 
proposals – both those which demand economic returns for scientific discoveries and those which demand a 
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intellectual property”. Robert K Merton, ‘Science and Democratic Social Structure’ in Social Theory and Social 
Structure (1
st
 edn 1949, enl edn, The Free Press 1968) 604, 612. 
1625
 Robert K Merton, ‘Science and Democratic Social Structure’ in Social Theory and Social Structure (1st edn 
1949, enl edn, The Free Press 1968) 604, 613. Emphasis in the original. 
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ignorance in their profession. As Tallacchini notices,
1626
 validity and ethicalness of scientific 
knowledge constitute an indissoluble combination in Merton’s science structure, where 
“validity is part of that ethos, that, (…) while expressing the reliability of scientific method, 
also shapes scientists’ moral integrity”.1627 
The last institutional element, organized scepticism, is defined as the “suspension of 
judgment until the facts are at hand”1628 and sufficient evidence exists. It is a methodological 
and institutional kind of scrutiny that conflicts with more dogmatic attitudes that prevail in 
other institutional areas. 
Several features of Merton’s ethos of science underwent criticism by STS scholars, who 
spotted some basic flaws in his functionalist analysis. Most of them are thoroughly explained 
by the sociologist of science Michael Mulkay in his article “Some Aspects of Cultural 
Growth in the Natural Sciences”, where he shows that there are no empirical studies 
demonstrating that Merton’s norms are characteristic of the scientific community and that, 
conversely, according to the few available empirical studies, scientists do not conform to 
these norms.
1629
 Moreover, many examples pinpoint that resistance to innovation by groups 
of scientists seems more the rule than the exception.
1630
 He has, then, proved that an open and 
general violation of Merton’s moral norms by the scientific community occurred in the 
“Velikovsky case”.1631 
Immanuel Velikovsky in his work Worlds in Collision, published in 1950, purported that 
historical catastrophes were the result of the near-collision between Earth and planet-sized 
objects breaking off from other planets, such as Mars and Venus. Most of his contemporary 
scientists refused to read his manuscript, before it was published, and judged his work 
pseudo-scientific. The rejection of Velikovsky’s claims rested on their clear violation of the 
                                                          
1626
 Mariachiara Tallacchini, ‘Before and Beyond the Precautionary Principle: Epistemology of Uncertainty in 
Science and the Law’ (2005) 207 Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 645, 647; Mariachiara Tallacchini, 
‘Scienza, politica e diritto: il linguaggio della co-produzione’ (2005) 1 Sociologia del diritto 1, 11. 
1627
 Merton remarks: “The virtual absence of fraud in the annals of science, which appears exceptional when 
compared with the records of other spheres of activity, has at times been attributed to the personal qualities of 
scientists (…); a more plausible explanation may be found in certain distinctive characteristics of science itself. 
Involving as it does, the verifiability of results, scientific research is under the exacting scrutiny of fellow-
experts”. Robert K Merton, ‘Science and Democratic Social Structure’ in Social Theory and Social Structure (1st 
edn 1949, enl edn, The Free Press 1968) 604, 613. 
1628
 Robert K Merton, ‘Science and Democratic Social Structure’ in Social Theory and Social Structure (1st edn 
1949, enl edn, The Free Press 1968) 604, 614. 
1629
 Michael Mulkay, ‘Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences’ (1969) 36 Social Research 1, 
27. 
1630
 Michael Mulkay, ‘Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences’ (1969) 36 Social Research 1, 
28. 
1631
 See Michael Mulkay, ‘Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences’ (1969) 36 Social Research 
1, 22. 
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law of mechanics and other fundamental assumptions of astronomy, geology and historical 
biology. As Velikovsky did not conform to most of the rules of the scientific community, 
scientists responded in vehement ways, contrary the institutional norms of universalism, 
organized skepticism and communism or communality, as well as originality.  Mulkay, 
therefore, concludes that the reception of Velikovsky’s work suggests that Merton’s moral 
norms do not govern scientists’ behaviour and “theoretical and methodological norms 
[namely, cognitive norms] are more central to the structure of the scientific community than 
are the Mertonian social norms”.1632 
Merton’s ideal vision of science, however, became established in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
when some of his papers were re-published, in 1973,
1633
 and is still the informing model of 
the relationship between science and society in the United States. As the historian of science 
Steven Shapin remarks, “it is overwhelmingly Merton’s framework for a sociology of science 
that is turned to by U.S. government agencies on the occasions when they have asked 
sociologists to advise them how the social system of science works and whether it is working 
well”.1634 The Mertonian thesis has been called by Restivo “the hypothesis that wouldn’t die”, 
1635
 since it is still a very influential rhetorical means to legitimize science policy in the 
United States.  
Merton’s portrayal of the scientific community is ambiguous. He envisions an ideal 
community of peers that embeds intrinsically democratic norms, such as universalism, and 
therefore should be considered an inspiring model for democratic societies. However, 
preserving the community’s autonomy from social influences entails that science is not 
legally and politically accountable. In Merton’s view, the ethos of science serves to 
demarcate science from ideology, whose pressures over the autonomy of science Merton 
examined and dismissed, 
1636
 but it also makes science “exempt from legal and political 
guarantees constructed against other powers”.1637  
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 Robert K Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (University of 
Chicago Press 1973). 
1634
 Steven Shapin, ‘Mertonian Concessions’ (5 February 1993) 259 Science 839. 
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 Sal Restivo, ‘The Theory Landscape in Science Studies’ in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E Markle, James C 
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95, 97. 
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 Robert K Merton, ‘Science and the Social Order’ in Social Theory and Social Structure (1st edn 1949, enl 
edn, The Free Press 1968) 591-603. 
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Whilst Merton’s structure of science impinged on American modern sociology of science, 
Kuhnian vision inspired a number of sociologists who started, in the 1970s, a new field 
named “sociology of scientific knowledge” (SSK). The philosopher of science David Bloor 
and other historians and sociologists of science, mostly based at Edinburgh University’s 
Science Unit, addressed the implications of Kuhn’s perspective.1638 In their work, scientific 
knowledge is regarded as “embodied collective practice”, where social and cognitive factors 
are deeply entangled and, therefore, cannot be contrasted.
1639
 In SSK the analysis of the 
context of collective practices is also theoretically relevant to understand how scientific 
knowledge gains social credit. 
This group
1640
 devised the so called “strong programme” in the sociology knowledge, 
epitomized by the four tenets for the sociology of scientific knowledge, which Bloor 
illustrated in Knowledge and Social Imagery: 
1. It [SSK] would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or 
states of knowledge (…). 2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality 
or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation. 3. 
It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain, 
say, true and false beliefs. 4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation 
would have to be applicable to sociology itself.
1641
 
The program claims no a priori distinction between what is rational or irrational, belief or 
knowledge, truth or falsity, as SSK aims at understanding and exploring the causes of both 
these dichotomies, by using the same kind of intellectual resources. Moreover, it entails that 
sociology of scientific knowledge must undergo the same analytical work of explanation 
applied to its object. 
                                                          
1638
 Three are the main implications SSK drew from Kuhn’s work: “First, the ‘social order’ of science was likely 
to be not one but many orders, as many as there were ‘paradigms’ that structured researchers’ epistemic 
judgments. Second, the appropriate methodological posture for an historian or sociologist concerned to interpret 
scientists’ behavior was ‘relativistic’, since epistemic judgment was relative to the local culture of scientific 
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an account of social order in science”. Steven Shapin, ‘Mertonian Concessions’ (5 February 1993) 259 Science 
839. 
1639
 Steven Shapin notices: “Indeed, the ‘neo-Kuhnian framework, with its stress upon scientific knowledge as 
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Concessions’ (5 February 1993) 259 Science 839. 
1640
 The group was composed by the philosopher of science David Bloor, the sociologist of science Barry Barnes, 
the historian and sociologist of science Steven Shapin, the sociologist of science Donald Angus MacKenzie, the 
historian of science John Henry, and the sociologist of science Harry Collins, who developed what is named 
“the Bath School approach” to SSK. 
1641
 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (1
st
 edn 1976, University of Chicago Press 1991) 1, 7. 
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Sismondo explained that SSK’s engagement in methodological symmetry and impartiality 
constitutes “a reaction against an unsymmetrical pattern or style of explanation, in which true 
beliefs require internal, rationalist explanations, whereas false beliefs require external or 
social explanations”,1642 such as ideologies, social and political interests. 
The process of “explanatory symmetrization” started off by SSK has become part of STS 
theoretical agenda, at large, and has been regarded as a methodological goal. However, the 
way in which symmetry is pursued and achieved differs largely among the group of 
researchers named “social constructivists”, which includes SSK’s and STS’s scholars. SSK’s 
academics are critical, for example, towards the symmetric mode of explanation of the Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) and, conversely, ANT expresses a negative evaluation of SSK’s 
principle of simmetry. 
The Actor-Network Theory (ANT) or “acteur reseau” theory is a materialist 1643  frame 
elaborated in the mid-1980s by the French philosopher and anthropologist Bruno Latour, the 
sociologist Michel Callon and the British sociologist John Law. ANT addresses “science and 
technology in the making”1644 rather than “ready-made science and technology”.1645 As Law 
explained, ‘actor’-‘network’ is “an intentionally oxymoronic term that combines – and elides 
the distinction between – structure and agency”,1646 nature and society, subject and object. 
The term entails the “performative character of relations and the objects constituted in those 
relations”,1647 namely that entities “achieve their form as a consequence of the relations in 
which they are located”1648 and “are performed in, by, and through those relations”.1649 ANT 
explores how networks are established as a whole. As ANT’s scholars have shown that non-
humans – such as machines, hybrids, animals – have agency,1650 they describe networks as “a 
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 Sergio Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies (Blackwell Publishing 2004) 1, 43. 
1643
 ANT is interpreted as a “semiotics of materiality”, since “[i]t takes the semiotic insight, that of the 
relationality of entities, the notion that they are produced in relations, and applies this ruthlessly to all materials 
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 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society  (Harvard 
University Press 1987) 1, 4. 
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University Press 1987) 1, 4. 
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Network Theory and After (Blackwell Publishers 1999) 1. 
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 John Law, ‘After ANT: Complexity, Naming and Topology’ in John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor 
Network Theory and After (Blackwell Publishers 1999) 1, 7. 
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 John Law, ‘After ANT: Complexity, Naming and Topology’ in John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor 
Network Theory and After (Blackwell Publishers 1999) 1, 4. 
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 John Law, ‘After ANT: Complexity, Naming and Topology’ in John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor 
Network Theory and After (Blackwell Publishers 1999) 1, 4. 
1650
 Latour explains that “actantiality is not what an actor does – with its consequence for the demiurgic version 
of ANT – but what provides actants with their actions, with their subjectivity, with their intentionality, with their 
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heterogeneous amalgamation of textual, conceptual, social and technical actors”.1651 “Actant” 
is the term used by Latour to denote any agent in a network, collective or individual, human 
or non-human. The word has been applied by ANT’s scholars to “stress that material causes 
as well as human actors may be determinants of social interactions and outcomes”.1652  
Actor-network theory endorses a specific methodological approach, based on three principles: 
1. “agnosticism, which advocates abandoning any a priori assumptions of the nature of 
networks, causal conditions, or the accuracy of actant’s accounts”; 1653  2. “generalized 
symmetry, employing a single explanatory frame when interpreting actants, human and 
nonhuman”;1654 3. “free association, which advocates abandoning any distinction between 
natural and social phenomenon”.1655 
ANT has extended the application of the principle of symmetry to non-human “actants”1656 
and treated both the social and material worlds as products of networks and has, therefore, 
been described as “supersymmetric”:1657 “representing both human and non-human actors, 
and treating them in the same relational terms, is one way of prompting full analyses, 
analyses that do not discriminate against any part of the ecologies of scientific facts and 
technological objects”.1658 
ANT scholars, such as Latour, pointed out that the symmetry postulate, embedded in the 
Strong Program for the sociology of knowledge, is asymmetrical, since it does not “give 
proper weight to non-social things and processes, or acknowledge their contribution to our 
social arrangements”.1659  According to Latour, society and nature should be seen as co-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
morality”. Bruno Latour, ‘On Recalling ANT’ in John Law and John Hassard (eds), Actor Network Theory and 
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produced
1660
 and, therefore, he proposes a new generalized symmetry principle, in 
comparison to SSK, where the agency to things is recognized. 
Although ANT mode of explanation can be considered symmetrical around the human/non-
human actants, it has been noted that,
1661
 according to the theory, non-humans act in the same 
way as humans in a network. It has been noted that this implies that non-humans’ agency is 
the effect of a network and does not exist before it.
1662
 Moreover, ANT scholars tend to focus 
their work more on human actants, as their range of strategies is more complex than non-
humans. Generalized symmetry is, thus, a methodological principle that has lost much of its 
significance in the actual analytic work. Nonetheless, the idea that the natural and social 
orders are co-produced has become a fundamental part of STS’s theoretical framework and 
fostered a new methodological approach. 
In conclusion, Science and Technology Studies emerged out of the critical confrontation with 
the influential epistemic traditions in history and sociology of science. These encounters 
directed the theoretical focus of the field towards the concrete dynamics that complement 
science and social practices, in order to understand how science builds up its social 
credibility.
1663
 STS’ approach, in comparison to other disciplinary areas is marked by the 
theoretical role assigned to practices and context, a constructivist approach to the boundary 
problem and methodological commitment to symmetry.   
 
1.3 Science, Technology and Society (STS) 
Whilst in the previous section I addressed how the development of Science and Technology 
Studies (S&TS) is related to the emergence of a constructivist tradition in sociology and 
ethnography of science, in this paragraph I will show how S&TS’ analytical agenda has been 
shaped by the field of research named “Science, Technology and Society” (STS). 
Science, Technology and Society is a cross-disciplinary perspective concerned with the social 
and policy dimensions of science and technology, which became institutionalized in the mid-
1960’s.1664 As Ina Spiegel-Rösing recalls in the first handbook of Science, Technology and 
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Society, the genesis of that volume is linked to a series of initiatives undertaken by an 
international organization of scholars in different social sciences. Although STS movement 
dates back to the 1960’s, 1665  the establishment of the International Congress (then 
Commission) for Science Policy Studies at the 13th International Congress of the History of 
Science in the summer of 1971, in Moscow, constituted a decisive moment in the 
development of the field.  
The first meeting of the group was held at Schloss Reisesburg, in Southern Germany, in 1972, 
and in the same year a project to promote a cross-disciplinary mode of access to the whole 
range of STS scholarship, by publishing a handbook, was proposed. After a second extended 
and improved outline of the work was presented in the following meeting in Delhi, in 1973, 
in a four day conference of the authors, held in Paris in 1975, the group discussed the 
punctual and extensive critique of the drafts addressed by the editors. The aim of the volume 
was “primarily to contribute to the intellectual integration of a field”,1666 but with the hope 
that it could serve “some purposes in teaching and for science policy makers in the field of 
science and the government”.1667  Science, Technology and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary 
Perspective, was finally published in 1977, edited by the psychologist and sociologist of 
science Ina Spiegel-Rösing and the physicist and historian of science Derek de Solla Price, 
under the aegis of the Council for Science Policy Studies. The volume was organized in three 
main sections: whereas the first section was devoted to “the contextual values of science and 
technology in society, particularly the evolving critical attitudes to science and technology 
and the interplay between the making of science policy”1668 and the understanding of all these 
processes by STS scholars, the second section focused on the different disciplinary 
perspectives of the social study of science and technology and the third one dealt with 
specific kinds of issues in science policy. 
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Challenges” in Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de Solla Price (eds), Science, Technology and Society (Sage 
Publications 1977) 1, 11. 
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 Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de Solla Price, “Preface” in Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de Solla Price 
(eds), Science, Technology and Society (Sage Publications 1977) 1, 2. 
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At the time, the study of science, technology and society (SSTS) was already an established 
and institutionalized field, nationally and internationally, with its own research institutions, 
teaching programs, journals and formal or informal organizations.
1669
 Ina Spiegel-Rösing 
listed, as significant examples of its expansion, 14 programs and institutions across the U.S., 
Canada, U.K., France, Sweden, U.S.S.R., the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic.
1670
  
Moreover, she noticed that in the 1960s and 1970s several STS international journals, that 
had a significant role in the definition and development of the field, were founded, as well as 
specialized national research journals,
1671
 publication series
1672
 and newsletters.
1673
  “Social 
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Studies of Science. An International Review of Research in the Social Dimensions of Science 
and Technology”, “Minerva. A Review of Science, Learning and Policy” and “Research 
Policy. A Journal Devoted to Research Policy, Research Management and Planning”1674 were 
some of the well-established international publications in the field, already in 1977. 
The origins of Science, Technology and Society are, however, embedded in the rise of 
science policy after World War II. As Jean-Jacques Salomon, one of the handbook’s 
contributors and, at the time, head of Science Policy Unit of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), pointed out, World War II represented the watershed 
in the relationship between science and the state, as it “established science as a national 
asset”. 1675  During World War II, the belligerent countries involved a large number of 
scientists and engineers in military and non-military projects, which led to significant 
scientific and technological contributions. The creation of the radar, the industrial 
development and production of new drugs such as penicillin,
1676
 that improved the medical 
treatment of injured soldiers, and the manufacturing of synthetics to compensate for the 
shortage of raw materials during the war
1677
 are only some of the most widely mentioned 
scientific and technological wartime achievements. In the United States, as in other countries 
committed to the war effort, thousands of scientists and engineers were diverted from their 
research projects and involved in war related projects funded by the U.S. government, as 
military or civilian personnel.
1678
 They were required to work in teams under governmental 
control and according to the sets of research goals fixed by Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD).
1679
 The “Manhattan Project”, which Salomon significantly refers to, 
epitomizes most of the novel features of these wartime government’s oriented projects, which 
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would inspire U.S. science policy in the aftermath of World War II.
1680
 The code-named 
“Manhattan Project” was a secret military-controlled atomic research plan, set out by the U.S. 
government in 1939 with the support of the United Kingdom and Canada, that required a 
considerable amount of funding – as its cost reached two billion dollars – in comparison to 
the total expenditure for research and development, which the U.S. spent in the last peacetime 
budget, which amounted to 1.5 billion dollars.
1681
 The project rested on several decades of 
basic research, but had an immediate practical utility, namely the development of the first 
atomic bombs, which were later dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the war. 
Moreover, it required a broad cooperation of scientists and engineers from different countries, 
who were sometimes refugees.
1682
 
This kind of wartime research experience was unprecedented for scientists. Before World 
War II, most of the scientific research and development, in the United States, was funded by 
industry and, to a lesser extent, in some universities by professors themselves.
1683
 Scientists 
deemed the attempt to fund basic research in universities, through Federal research grants, 
“inappropriate if not unconstitutional” 1684  and they opposed private universities from 
accepting government funds.
1685
 Federal government funding was regarded as a form of 
intrusive intervention in scientists’ work. The negative attitude of the scientific community 
rested partially on concerns of losing autonomy and undergoing restrictions: for example on 
the communication and publication of the outcomes of research, which scientists experienced 
during World War I.
1686
  
Interventions on scientific research by the states occurred, before World War II, but in 
Europe and U.S. a “laissez-faire” approach, that left scientific research relatively immune 
from systematic intervention over its organization and financial support, prevailed. Although 
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World War I was marked by the consistent contribution of scientists, especially chemists, in 
war-related projects,
1687
 military research was mostly focused on adapting civil technology to 
the needs of war. Wartime research organizations were, therefore, dismantled after the end of 
the conflict.
1688
 
According to Salomon, “the doctrine of laissez-faire prevailed all the more naturally, because 
the lapse of time between scientific research and its application remained long, and 
consequently the involvement of the state in scientific matters remained limited to sectors 
which could guarantee relatively quick results”.1689  As a consequence, the institutionalization 
of science policy only started “when scientific activities began to have a direct effect on the 
course of world affairs”.1690 
However, cultural differences in the mode of legitimazing political action through science 
matter and the institutionalization of science policy in western democracies took place, as the 
political scientist Yaron Ezrahi showed, chiefly in countries like the U.S., which largely 
relied on an instrumental view of policy and were, therefore, more receptive towards 
“scientific and technological paradigms of public action”.1691 A different political culture, 
therefore, consistently accounts for the fact that, after the end of World War II, the U.S. was 
the political context whereby science policy was firstly devised and envisaged, in a liberal-
democratic state, as a planned, organized and institutionalized attempt to direct scientific 
research.
1692
   
The document that laid the foundations of science policy in the U.S., in the aftermath of 
World War II, was the Report entitled “Science. The Endless Frontier” (1945),1693 authored 
by Vannevar Bush, an engineer and MIT professor who was the Director of the Office of 
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Scientific Research and Development during the war and largely endorsed the Manhattan 
Project. The Report was drafted to comply with President Roosevelt’s request of the 17th 
November, 1944, for recommendations on how to employ “the information, the techniques 
and the research experience developed by the Office of Research and Development and by 
the thousands of scientists in the university and in private industry”,1694 gained during the war, 
in times of peace.  
The Report was grounded on the premise that “scientific progress” is essential to defend the 
U.S. nation against military aggression,
1695
 to fight diseases and improve public welfare. 
Bush significantly evoked the metaphor of the “endless frontier”, in the title and throughout 
the Report, and exploited its rhetorical power within the American imaginary to support the 
assumption that scientific research could undergo a possible boundless growth, if it was 
properly funded by the U.S. government. The metaphor of “endless frontier” recalls the 
conquest of the Far West territories and the pioneer’s spirit, which accompanied and 
supported the foundation and expansion of the United States. In his Letter of transmittal of 
the Report to the President, Bush emphasized that: “The Pioneer spirit is still vigorous within 
this nation. Science offers a largely unexplored hinterland for the pioneer who has the tools 
for his task. The rewards of such exploration both for the Nation and the individual are great. 
Scientific progress is one of the essential keys to our security as a nation, to our better health, 
to more jobs, to a higher standard of living, and to our cultural progress”.1696 Furthermore, 
explaining and justifying why science should be a proper concern of the government, he 
added that “It has been basic United States policy that Government should foster the opening 
of new frontiers. It has opened the seas to clipper ships and furnished land for pioneers: 
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Although these frontiers have more or less disappeared, the frontier of science remains. It is 
in keeping with the American tradition – one which made the United States great – that new 
frontiers shall be made accessible for development by all American citizens”.1697 
His proposal was centered on funding basic scientific research – namely, research “performed 
without thought of practical ends”1698 that “results in general knowledge and understanding of 
nature and its laws” –1699 within universities, colleges and research institutes, preserving, 
however, the traditional autonomy that the scientific community used to enjoy.
1700
  
By increasing “the flow of new scientific knowledge through the support of basic 
research”1701 and aiding the flourishing of scientific talent, he argued, the U.S. Government 
would promote industrial research as well. In order to attain these goals, he suggested setting 
up a new independent
1702
 agency, “composed of persons of broad interest and experience, 
having an understanding of the peculiarities of scientific research and scientific 
education”.1703 The agency ought to be granted stability of funds to undertake long-range 
programs. The agency, though, had to recognize freedom of inquiry to the institutions in 
which research was carried on and leave them “internal control of policy, personnel, and the 
method and scope of research”.1704 Preservation of freedom of inquiry and choices within the 
funded research institutions and the funding agency was regarded as the main condition
1705
 to 
foster science progress and fulfill the promises adumbrated in the Report.
1706
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His recommendation led, eventually, to the creation of the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
in 1950,
1707
 although its establishment proved to be difficult. 
Bush’s view had its opponents. Notably Senator Harley Kilgore (D-WV), joined by the 
scientists Harold C. Urey, Edward U. Condon and Harlow Shapley and a group within the 
executive branch, headed by Presidential Assistant John R. Steelman.
1708
 Kilgore and 
Steelman both favored the foundation of an agency more “politically responsible to the 
President” than the one envisaged in the Bush Report. Steelman, who was commissioned by 
President Truman to draft an alternative report, which was published on 27
th
 August 1947, 
with the title Science and Public Policy. A Program for the Nation, remarked in the report 
that “[…] it is vital that funds for the support of basic research be administered with the 
advice and counsel of an imaginative group of scientists. But this necessity should not blind 
us to the relations of a grant program for basic research to the total science program of the 
Government or to the other national programs in support of education. Nor it can justify a 
departure from our traditions of democratic government or from tested principles of 
administrative organization”.1709 
Although Steelman and Kilgore agreed, as Tallacchini illustrated, that any kind of restriction 
to science should be confined to extraordinary actions and scientific knowledge should be 
fostered, notwithstanding the fact that society could be unprepared to cope with it, they 
convened that all these different timing issues should be addressed in political and 
institutional settings.
1710
 Relevant critics came also from the National Patent Council, which 
raised concerns about the possible state control over patents related to research funded by the 
National Science Foundation, in the future.
1711
 The Bush Report featured specific 
recommendations concerning patent policy.  
The Report, first of all, made clear that “there should be no obligation on the research 
institution to patent discoveries made as a result of support from the Foundation”. Moreover, 
whilst it suggested that the “public interest” would be adequately protected if the Government 
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receives a royalty-free license for governmental purposes, it also insisted that “there should 
certainly not be any absolute requirement that all rights in such discoveries be assigned to the 
Government, but it should be left to the discretion of the director and the interested Division 
whether, in special cases the public interest requires such an assignment”. 1712  It, then, 
concluded that “legislation on this point should leave the Members of the Foundation 
discretion as to its patent policy in order that patent arrangements may be adjusted as 
circumstances and the public interest require”.1713 The discretion left to the Members of the 
Foundation casted some doubts about what the future legislative choices and their impact on 
the patent system would have been and accounts for the fears of state control over inventions, 
whose development could be related to NSF grants, voiced by the National Patent Council. 
Bush’s perspective, nevertheless, sponsored a research and market environment free from 
state intervention. He recognized that patent laws fostered new inventions and contributed to 
the flourishing of new industries and the national wealth. However, he pointed out that some 
uncertainties, which in the past had impaired the ability of small industries to translate new 
ideas into processes and products of value to the nation, should be eliminated, but not at the 
expense of the free market.
1714
 Kilgore substantially dissented from the patent policy 
recommendations in the Bush Report, as he deemed that patents, obtained through publicly 
funded research, should be assigned to the government.
1715
  
Although on 22
nd
 July, 1947, the U.S. Congress passed the legislation establishing the 
National Science Foundation, President Truman opposed his veto to the act; since he 
considers that the Act did not provide an adequate political control over NSF governing 
structure and activities. Three years later, in 1950, after a long debate, the Congress passed a 
new bill on the establishment of NSF, which President Truman finally signed. The Bill 
represented a compromise between the opposing views, as it provided that the director of the 
NSF would be appointed by the President and for a mandate to assess and coordinate the 
Federal research activities. The National Science Board, which had to share NSF 
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responsibilities, was organized, however, according Bush’s plan and no intervention to 
change the patent granting procedures was included.
1716
 
President Truman’s choice of vetoing the first NSF Act signals that the differences between 
the two proposals were not confined to “political disagreements about the administration of a 
new agency”,1717 but on large divergences on how the relationship between science and the 
U.S. government ought to be set up in the aftermath of World War II. According to Steelman 
and Kilgore, science represented just another policy area to be addressed, not different 
enough to deserve a special status. Bush, conversely, treated science as a special policy area 
to be dealt with, since he considered that the scientific community should enjoy freedom of 
inquiry and autonomy in order to be able to promote scientific progress. 
Bush’s Report contained several relevant omissions. The social sciences, as well as the 
humanities, were kept outside his devised mechanism to support research and he clearly 
interpreted his mandate concerning only the natural sciences: “It is clear from President 
Roosevelt’s letter that in speaking of science he had in mind the natural sciences, including 
biology and medicine”.1718 Although he admitted that “progress in other fields, such as the 
social sciences and the humanities, is likewise important” and warned against setting up “a 
program under which research in the natural sciences and medicine was expanded at the cost 
of the social sciences, humanities and other studies”,1719 he deemed “the program for science 
presented” in his report to deserve immediate attention. In his view, the progress of scientific 
research clearly involved and corresponded to the progress of American society tout court. 
He did not consider any grey areas that could be addressed by other kinds of knowledge. This 
significant exclusion may be due to his personal intellectual disregard for the social sciences, 
judged as a means of political propaganda, as well as to the suspicion associated with the 
social sciences throughout the Cold War period in the U.S. In the 1950s, the U.S. 
Congressman Carroll Reece, from Tennessee, headed a congressional investigation to prove 
that private foundations which supported the social sciences should be excluded from tax 
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exemption, as social sciences were fostering socialism within the United States.
1720
 However, 
Don K. Price noted that natural scientists, who lobbied for the creation of the National 
Science Foundation, exercised considerable pressure to keep the social sciences outside this 
proposal,
1721
 and afterwards social sciences were relegated among the “other sciences”, 
which were assigned a “severely limited” amount of funds .1722 
The Bush Report and its implementation are often referred to as the “social contract” between 
science and society, as it set out the underpinnings of this relationship in the aftermath of 
World War II. This contract however, as Tallacchini pointed out, did not involve enforceable 
rules and guarantees, because of the special epistemic and moral statute that was accorded to 
the scientific community by politics and the law, which made scientific research immune 
from political oversight.
1723
 
Science, Technology and Society (STS) emerged in the 1960’s, when several fissures and 
flaws in this contract became apparent and citizens, as well as scientists, began to question in 
the U.S. and in Europe its basic assumption: that, by funding and fostering scientific research, 
social progress would follow. 
Science policy was implemented and was supposed to fulfill its promises in the Cold War 
context, a “context of strategic competition as a consequence of the impossibility of 
establishing real peace at the end of World War II”.1724 The intensification of the Cold War 
between the communist and non-communist nations of Europe and North America and the 
technological and weapon escalation, which marked the decades following World War II, 
cast some doubts on the criteria applied to established research priorities, as far as public 
funding was concerned. Priority was mostly accorded to costly
1725
 large scale research related 
to the “competitive confrontation of the two blocs”, namely military, nuclear and space 
projects. Notwithstanding European R&D projects could not confront the scale of 
expenditures undertaken by the emerging super-powers (the U.S. and U.S.S.R.), significant 
                                                          
1720
 Tax-Exempt Foundations, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and 
Comparable Organizations, House of Representatives, 83
rd
 Cong. 2
nd
 Sess., H. Rep. 2681 (1984), pp. 17-19, 56, 
60, 67, 73, 200.  See on the point Don K Price, ‘Endless Frontier or Bureaucratic Morass?’ in Gerald Holton and 
Robert S Morison (eds), Limits of Scientific Inquiry (WW Norton & Company 1979) 75, 84. 
1721
 Don K Price, ‘Endless Frontier or Bureaucratic Morass?’ in Gerald Holton and Robert S Morison (eds), 
Limits of Scientific Inquiry (WW Norton & Company 1979) 75, 84. 
1722
 Don K Price, ‘Endless Frontier or Bureaucratic Morass?’ in Gerald Holton and Robert S Morison (eds), 
Limits of Scientific Inquiry (WW Norton & Company 1979) 75, 84. 
1723
 Mariachiara Tallacchini, ‘Politiche della scienza contemporanea: le origini’ in Stefano Rodotà and 
Mariachiara Tallacchini (eds) Trattato di biodiritto. Ambito e fonti del biodiritto (Giuffrè Editore, 2010) 53, 55. 
1724
 Jean-Jacques Salomon, ‘Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy’ in Ina Spiegel-
Rösing and Derek de Solla Price (eds), Science, Technology and Society (Sage Publications 1977) 43, 44. 
1725
 See Harvey M Sapolsky, ‘Science, Technology and Military Policy’ in in Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de 
Solla Price (eds), Science, Technology and Society (Sage Publications 1977) 443, 449. 
320 
 
atomic energy programs were set up for military and economic purposes in countries such as 
France, that was facing post-war reconstruction.
1726
 
Moreover, the Vietnam War protests that spread in the U.S. campuses, in the late 1960s, 
contributed to increased public awareness about the universities’ involvement in scientific 
research funded by the Department of Defense. The demand for social accountability of 
publicly funded science was consistently backed by the researchers’ community. Many 
scientists and engineers urged action against what was called “the military-industrial 
complex”, which they claimed had corrupted science with its political, industrial and military 
interests.
1727
 “Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action”, later named “Science 
for the People”, is one of the main researchers’ organizations that promoted actions to stop 
scientists’ involvement in military projects.1728 
On March 4, 1969, scientists at over 30 U.S. schools, including Harvard University and 
M.I.T., interrupted their research to protest against the use of science for military purposes in 
Vietnam.
1729
 Following this protest, the U.S. Congress passed the so-called Mansfield 
Amendment, the aim of which was “to reduce the research community’s dependence on the 
Defense Department when it appears that the investigation under consideration could be 
sponsored more reasonably by a civilian agency”.1730 
Also within the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), during the 
Cold War, scientists debated about their social responsibility.
1731
 In the 1970s, AAAS funded 
a project to assess the impact of the use of herbicides in the Vietnam War, which showed the 
negative long-lasting effects of these products on human health and the environment.
1732
 As a 
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consequence, AAAS formulated two resolutions commending U.S. Government to phase-out 
of herbicides
1733
 and appealing for cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.
1734
 
The public attitude towards science and scientific progress was changing: they were regarded 
with increasing disillusion and suspicion, as a number of public opinion surveys showed.
1735
 
In 1971, the OECD Report entitled Science, Growth and Society (also named “the Brooks 
Report”) pointed out that “scientific research became associated in the minds of many with 
war, and with environmental and social deterioration resulting from the large scale 
application of technology”.1736 
Most of the problems arising from the implementation of the social contract between science 
and society were ascribable to the linear model that informed the Bush Report. According to 
the STS scholar Sheila Jasanoff, the Report proposed a linear model of how science is 
converted into technology, where discovery, invention and commercialization are regarded as 
“discrete, sequential activities following each other as if by natural law”.1737 Within this 
model, the process of scientific research and product development, she points out, “were 
imagined as naturally self-regulating enterprises”, where the state and the law intervene, 
eventually, at the end of the pipeline, if some risks and damages emerge.
1738
  
Although the implementation of this contract fell short in engaging with environmental, 
health and safety issues related to scientific research, its premises and the linear model were 
still applied to the life sciences, in the 1970’s, when the debate over the risks of recombinant 
DNA technology and genetic manipulation spread.  
Throughout these years, Science, Technology and Society scholars critically addressed and 
tried to understand, from different theoretical perspectives, the social dimensions of science 
policy and the problems it engendered in order to improve science policies. Although Ina 
Spiegel-Rösing remarked, in the handbook, that STS needed to improve the integration of 
several discipline perspectives, she also pointed out which were some of the main 
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contributions of the field. STS theoretical efforts, by showing the subjective side of science, 
namely that the scientist is not a dispassionate truth seeker, got “the actor back in the picture, 
not as an abstract unit”. Moreover, STS studies, by analyzing the historical and cultural 
context where the functioning of science takes place, fostered a less conceptual and abstract 
approach to the sociology of science and technology. In addition, STS research showed the 
normative aspects of science and technology. 
Science, Technology and Society (STS) impinged on Science and Technology Studies (S&TS) 
and converged with it. In the second STS handbook, published in 1995 and entitled the 
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, the editors described STS “as a still emerging 
field” and they wondered what “STS” stood for in the volume, whether for “science, 
technology and society”, as in the first handbook, or for the newer guise “S&TS”, “science 
and technology studies”.1739 They preferred to use the newer guise in the title, although most 
of the contributors employed indifferently both acronyms in their essays. In the third 
handbook, published in 2008 and entitled The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, the 
editors clearly considered the newer guise already established and implicitly endorsed the 
conflation of STS with S&TS. The editors acknowledged, nevertheless, STS’ heredity in 
terms of theoretical and practical commitment. 
The acronym “STS” and the expression “Science, Technology and Society” are, however, 
still used to refer to the field. A handbook entitled Routledge Handbook of Science, 
Technology and Society had been published in May 2014
1740
 and this choice clearly signals 
that both acronyms (STS and S&TS) are currently widely used to refer to the same tradition. 
STS theoretical work, however, fostered another important stream of research. This stream 
arose from the work of one of the editors of the first STS handbook, the historian of science 
Derek de Solla Price, who is deemed to be the founder of modern “scientometrics,” namely 
the “quantitative mathematical study of science and technology”.1741  “Scientometrics”, in 
comparison to S&TS qualitative approach, is focused on a specific methodology, which is 
based on “the use of quantitative indicators of the structure and development of science in 
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order to decide the basic regularities of their functioning and direction”.1742 In the 1980s and 
1990s, researchers committed to this kind of quantitative approach to STS gradually became 
part of a sub-community (“Science, Technology and Innovation” or STI) with its own 
handbooks,
1743
 journals
1744
 and conferences.
1745
 Although the dialogue between the two 
streams seemed possible, in the early 1970s, in the following years they diverged. The STI 
scholars Martin, Nightingale and Yegros-Yegros, pointed out that the main reason for this 
split was related to methodological issues: quantitative sociology and scientometrics “focus 
on the products of science, an approach that, for the qualitative philosopher-historian, only 
captures a ‘frozen’ and potentially misleading snap-shot of something ‘in the process of 
becoming’, or, worse still, attempts to impose order and therefore social difference on people, 
their worlds and the dynamic connections that gave them their properties”.1746 
 
1.4 Conclusions: Defining S&TS 
Science and Technology Studies (S&TS) is a field largely marked by inter-disciplinarity, 
which “is creating an integrative understanding of the origins, dynamics and consequences of 
science and technology”. 1747  Most of S&TS scholars’ work is concerned with the 
implications of scientific practices and policies to improve the process of democratic 
decision-making. 
The two traditions I referred to at the beginning of this appendix – the constructivist tradition 
in sociology and ethnography of science and the analysis undertaken in “Science, Technology 
and Society” (STS) – both shaped the way in which S&TS, as a field, looks at the social and 
policy dimensions of science and technology and try to understand them.  
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These two streams, that are also two different intellectual and cognitive regions, are densely 
intertwined in most of S&TS analytical work, as they both have enriched the field of 
theoretical tools and methodologies, which resulted from their meeting. 
S&TS, in comparison to other fields, is characterized by conceptual and methodological 
contamination among the different areas of research and by linguistic hybridization across the 
disciplines, which marked its epistemic perspective in addressing the issues at the interface of 
technoscience and society. 
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